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Abstract
Targeted attacks on digital infrastructures are a rising threat against the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of both IT systems and sensitive data. With the emergence of
advanced persistent threats (APTs), identifying and understanding such attacks has be-
come an increasingly difficult task. Current signature-based systems are heavily reliant
on fixed patterns that struggle with unknown or evasive applications, while behavior-
based solutions usually leave most of the interpretative work to a human analyst.
This thesis presents a multi-stage system able to detect and classify anomalous
behavior within a user session by observing and analyzing ubiquitous kernel processes.
Application candidates suitable for monitoring are initially selected through an adapted
sentiment mining process using a score based on the log likelihood ratio (LLR). For
transparent anomaly detection within a corpus of associated events, the author utilizes
star structures, a bipartite representation designed to approximate the edit distance
between graphs. Templates describing nominal behavior are generated automatically
and are used for the computation of both an anomaly score and a report containing all
deviating events. The extracted anomalies are classified using the Random Forest (RF)
and Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithms. Ultimately, the newly labeled patterns
are mapped to a dedicated APT attacker–defender model that considers objectives,
actions, actors, as well as assets, thereby bridging the gap between attack indicators
and detailed threat semantics. This enables both risk assessment and decision support
for mitigating targeted attacks.
Results show that the prototype system is capable of identifying 99.8% of all star
structure anomalies as benign or malicious. In multi-class scenarios that seek to as-
sociate each anomaly with a distinct attack pattern belonging to a particular APT
stage we achieve a solid accuracy of 95.7%. Furthermore, we demonstrate that 88.3%
of observed attacks could be identified by analyzing and classifying a single ubiquitous
Windows process for a mere 10 seconds, thereby eliminating the necessity to monitor
each and every (unknown) application running on a system.
With its semantic take on threat detection and classification, the proposed system
offers a formal as well as technical solution to an information security challenge of great
significance.
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1.1 Motivation
IT systems are threatened by an ever-growing number of cyber-attacks. With the
emergence of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), the focus shifted from off-the-shelf
malware to multipartite attacks that are tailored to specific organizations or systems.
These targeted threats are driven by varying motivations, such as espionage or sabotage,
and often cause significantly more damage [305].
Several cases have shown that targeted attacks can remain undiscovered by their
victims for many months or even years [71, 118, 126, 159, 307]. The prime example,
Stuxnet, which targeted programmable logic controllers (PLCs) of sensitive industrial
systems, was active for at least 3 years until discovery [294]. According to a Syman-
tec study [95], Stuxnet infected close to 100,000 systems across 115 countries. Its
quasi successor, Duqu, also targeted industrial control systems (ICS), gathering sensi-
tive information in at least eight countries [51, 152]. On the espionage side, the Regin
Trojan is believed to have been used for global, systematic campaigns since at least
2008 [304]. Other examples include Flame [153], Mahdi [279], and Gauss [154]. These
strains are currently used for cyber-espionage in Middle Eastern countries and, depend-
ing on the variant, are capable of stealing passwords and cookies, recording network
traffic, keystrokes, microphone audio, and even entire Skype conversations [214].
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Figure 1.1: Average annualized cost of cyber-attacks by industry sector [136]. The study
investigated a total of n “ 254 companies.
APTs are increasingly affecting less prominent targets as well. In 2013 alone,
“economic espionage and theft of trade secrets cost the American economy more than
$19 billion. Over the past 4 fiscal years, the number of arrests related to economic
espionage and theft of trade secrets overseen by the FBI’s Economic Espionage Unit
has almost doubled, indictments have more than tripled, and convictions have increased
sixfold. Halfway through fiscal year 2013, the number of open investigations is running
more than 30 percent above the total from 4 years ago” [231]. In the 2017 Official Annual
Cybercrime Report by Cybersecurity Ventures [229], analysts speak of an estimated
$6 trillion of annual damage that will be caused by cyber-attacks by 2021. A 2017
study by the Ponemon Institute [136] identifies the financial sector as the most affected
by cybercrime, closely followed by the utilities and energy sectors. Figure 1.1 breaks
down current costs by industry.
While APTs use malware like most conventional attacks, the level of complexity
and sophistication of the malicious programs is usually higher. This is problematic
since defensive measures offered by security vendors often utilize primarily signature-
based systems, which are effective in the defense against known exploit carriers or ill-
considered user actions but struggle with hitherto unknown malware [80]: Traditional
misuse detection relies heavily on signature databases that have to be updated whenever
a new attack technique or sample is discovered. For emerging threats in particular, such
binary patterns of the involved malware are unlikely to exist at the time of attack. Poly-
and metamorphic techniques [237] additionally obfuscate malicious software by creating
self-altering malware variants that sport differing static appearance for cryptor and
payload. Mimicry attacks, on the other hand, might substitute system calls, interweave
instructions, or attempt to avoid generating observable events at all, which increases
the complexity of dynamic detection efforts [329]. Lastly, the multi-stage nature of
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APTs makes it generally difficult to interpret findings without semantic context, as
certain systemic events can only be considered malicious in conjunction with other
activity [187].
While APTs are undoubtedly among the greatest digital threats to organizations,
off-the-shelf malware and “hacks of opportunity” remain an issue for individuals and
companies alike. The frequency of such semi-targeted attacks against computers with
Internet connectivity is still increasing: a Clark School study at the University of Mary-
land [68] recorded a mean of 2,244 attacks on each participating machine – which
amounts to one attack every 39 seconds. While such threats are not typically part of
sabotage or espionage efforts, computers compromised this way may still be abused as
proxy attackers in APT campaigns.
Targeted or not, modern cyber-threats are no longer limited to a single malware
executable (i.e. sample) but often comprise multi-stage attacks that are difficult to
spot using only file- and signature-based malware detection systems. Therefore, it is
necessary to explore novel techniques for threat intelligence and APT detection that are
augmented with contextual information and provide resilience to various stealth tech-
niques. The use of behavioral anomaly detection and classification allows for a “defense
in depth” approach to attack mitigation: threats identified as anomaly can be blocked
immediately, followed by intelligent attack classification and the generation of new alert
patterns describing malicious actions. Behavior-based solutions are a promising means
to identify and learn from such behavior. No matter the stealth techniques employed,
the attacker will eventually execute his or her action on target – be it data theft, hijack-
ing or sabotage. Anomalies signifying a deviation from a known behavioral baseline can
then be used to detect the threat in its early stages. However, most existing systems
do not provide the offending behavioral data to the analyst and contribute little to its
interpretation. We argue that closing the resulting semantic gap is a vital next step in
holistic (IT) system threat mitigation.
The following details additional information about the problems considered, high-
lights key contributions and introduces related background information. All research
questions and hypotheses are discussed in detail, followed by information on the struc-
ture of the thesis as a whole.
1.2 Problem Statement
We have identified three key problems of current threat detection methods and systems
that need to be addressed for improved APT detection. These encompass a) the lim-
itations of pattern-based systems, b) the current focus on known binary samples for
behavioral analysis and the general lack of complementary observation points, as well
as c) shortcomings of current systems in terms of classification and interpretation of
detected threats.
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1.2.1 Problem 1: Limitations of Pattern-Based Detection
Pattern-based threat detection relies on existing knowledge about uti-
lized software and attack techniques that is unlikely to exist for novel
(targeted) attacks. Furthermore, patterns are more susceptible to ob-
fuscation and mimicry attacks.
Threat detection is at the heart of modern cyber-defense. In this thesis, we re-
view memory-based approaches, numerous behavioral detection and analysis systems,
function call monitoring solutions, host-based intrusion detection systems, and more.
Like many IDS and anti-virus (AV) products, most of these solutions have in common
their reliance on binary signatures or other predefined patterns to identify malicious
characteristics [5].
Pattern (misuse) detection is based on predefined templates. Knowledge of an
attacker’s methods or the expected consequences of an attack are encoded into behav-
ioral patterns or strings that can be found by an IDS or AV solution looking for their
occurrence [170]. Examples include sequences of suspicious opcalls, the use of certain
API functions, network packet payloads, or the existence of specific characters or bi-
nary patterns within a file. This approach is traditionally referred to as signature-based
detection, which is known to have several shortcomings [54]:
Firstly, obfuscation techniques commonly utilize polymorphic or metamorphic mu-
tation to generate an ever-growing number of malware variants that are functionally
identical but different in appearance. Similarly, function or opcall patterns may be
circumvented through substitute commands or the targeted induction of errors.
Secondly, many common signature-based tools only detect malware which has al-
ready been identified and analyzed by e.g. an AV vendor. New species or hitherto
unknown variants are overlooked if no corresponding pattern exists in the database at
the time of the attack.
1.2.2 Problem 2: Lack of Complementary Observation Points
Single points of observation are insufficient, since modern attacks
comprise both local and network activity. Furthermore, sample-based
analysis often builds on existing suspicions about a certain binary, which
will not exist in the case of an unknown attack. Evasion techniques are
more likely to skew the results of on-demand sample analysis systems.
APTs and advanced malware manifest as multipartite attacks that can no longer be
identified or mitigated at one point of observation alone. Security information and event
management (SIEM) systems [164] go in the right direction by offering event correlation
across data sources, but are often nontransparent in their functionality. Furthermore, we
argue that system and application logs are not sufficient to truly understand kernel-level
behavior. On the analysis side, malware sandboxes offer on-demand investigation for
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select suspicious binaries but typically do not encompass host-based IDS functionality
for continuous system monitoring, which would be required to detect activity stemming
from unknown sources.
The majority of analysis systems focus on suspected malware samples that are
often analyzed independently from the rest of the system [330]. Suspicious files or pro-
cesses may prompt the starting of an analysis sandbox that keeps the sample running
for a predetermined amount of time – be that manually by an operator or automati-
cally when passing on an attachment from an IDS to an analysis environment. Such
sandboxes are the foundation for many a threat detection implementation. Depending
on a system’s capabilities and requirements [330], these environments may be physical
machines, virtual machines [115], or emulated systems [29].
In both cases, determining the nature of the threat requires advance knowledge
about which process to observe and creates problems with sandbox detection and evasion
techniques [139]. For example, if an attack solely utilizes system processes without
dropping additional binaries, sample-focused systems may not trigger at all. Even if
they do, various evasion techniques can cause problems: Frequently, malware samples
are coded to delay their execution until most sandboxes time out, or will utilize detection
mechanisms that seek to identify the analysis environment. What follows is a change in
behavior that will likely hide relevant information from the analyst or crash the sample
altogether.
Furthermore, most attacks and malware infections include activity on both the
affected host and the connected network [28, 120, 232, 356]. Payload downloads, com-
mand and control (C2) traffic, and general exfiltration activity will result in kernel
events representative for file system as well as network activity. Focusing on only one
or the other is not sufficient to understand the adversary’s objective.
1.2.3 Problem 3: Insufficient Interpretation of Malicious Events
The interpretation of malicious activity is currently lacking in regards
to the identification of adversary techniques and objectives, making it
difficult to understand advanced attacks.
Event interpretation and event-to-goal mapping is currently lacking in depth, ac-
curacy, and automation, which makes understanding advanced attacks difficult. Most
classification systems are either not transparent in how they operate or do not offer much
insight into the inner workings of a malicious procedure or program. Pattern-based de-
tection tools usually feature a manually populated, significantly limited database of
events that maps isolated behavior to e.g. a descriptive keyword. This is often not
enough to truly understand the attack as a whole. Anomalies, on the other hand,
usually offer little other than a threshold that, when exceeded, will trigger an alert.
The semantics (meaning) of an attack is an important factor for threat identifica-
tion and analysis [187]. In the age of APTs, it is prudent to move away from black box
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systems that present their findings as vague numbers and to work towards explainability.
Unfortunately, most existing systems do not disseminate the offending behavioral data
to the analyst and contribute little to an attack’s interpretation. If they do, semantic
enrichment is often done by means of fixed patterns similar to misuse detection scenar-
ios, which is faced with the same range of problems. Of the 60 solutions surveyed as
part of our literature review, only 13 potentially contribute to the detection of complex
targeted attacks. The remainder has been developed with common threats in mind or
present purely formal systems that are not tied to actual observables. We argue that
closing the resulting semantic gap between concrete patterns/anomalies and semantic
attack properties such as motivation, goal, involved actors, targeted system, and specific
techniques employed is a vital next step in holistic (IT) system threat mitigation.
Current models for semantic enrichment are similarly limited. In the literature, the
complex nature of targeted attacks and the mapping of specific exploits to a broader
goal is often depicted as a linear multi-stage process. For example, Giura and Wang
[113] and the cyber kill chain by Hutchins et al. [133] expand on the military concept of
target engagement and define typical phases of an attack. While such models can often
be used as a starting point for threat interpretation, they do not consider the intricacies
of an attack in its entirety.
1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
We argue that behavioral analysis of dynamically captured data is key to understanding
attack semantics, since static or pattern-based analysis requires knowledge of a file in
questions and observes only predefined properties. Based on this premise, we formulate
the following key research questions:
1. How can advanced targeted attacks be comprehensively modeled in
preparation for semantic enrichment? We argue that a complete model of
actor behavior ready for semantic annotation is vital for any attack interpreta-
tion effort. By answering this question we provide the foundation for closing the
semantic gap between data and threat description.
2. How can suspicious system behavior be accurately identified without
relying on predefined patterns? Since we have identified pattern-based sys-
tems as limited in some regards, it becomes necessary to research anomaly-based
alternatives. The inherent identification of application behavior and its accurate
classification into benign and malicious activity is at the core of our research.
3. How can system anomalies be mapped to specific attacks? Here, we
tie sub-questions 1 and 2 together by researching mechanisms for the semantic
enrichment of monitored (IDS) data such as behavioral anomalies.
Answering the three above research questions provides us with the tools for creating
an intrusion detection and interpretation system unburdened by the problems of pattern-
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based and sample-focused solutions that are currently in widespread use. The listed
questions go hand in hand with the central hypotheses of the dissertation:
• The detection of APTs can be improved by using semantics-aware tech-
niques and tools. We argue that current detection solutions are largely insuf-
ficient to recognize the wide range of targeted attacks currently conducted in
the wild. It will become easier to understand and mitigate modern threats by
employing semantics-aware techniques and methods.
• System anomalies describing attacker behavior are more feasible to
use in a holistic system/network environment than fixed misuse sce-
narios. Following the problem statement, we hypothesize that anomaly detec-
tion approaches are better suited to detecting host and network attacks than
maintenance-heavy patterns stored in a signature database.
• Knowledge extraction followed by model-based attack explication is a
viable approach to understanding targeted threats. The interpretation
of previously determined anomaly data (i.e. events that constitute a deviation)
by mapping it to a dedicated attacker/defender model can, in conjunction with
automated data classification, be used to explain threats in a comprehensible
manner.
• Observing ubiquitous OS kernel processes is a feasible alternative to
sample-focused analysis. We argue that assessing omnipresent processes in an
operating system is an improvement over solely sample-focused analysis. Accuracy
permitting, this approach could drastically reduce the number of local observation
points while making an IDS more resilient to evasion and obfuscation.
• Considering traces of abstracted behavior is more effective than ob-
serving raw API calls. Using abstracted kernel activity instead of raw API
calls reduces the overall vocabulary of observed events and promises increased
accuracy.
• Classifying anomalies is preferable to classifying entire traces of un-
known behavior. Classification algorithms used to categorize types of at-
tacks promise improved accuracy and comparable performance when used on pre-
identified anomalies instead of full system traces depicting all exhibited (benign
and malicious) activity.
Our hypotheses are supported by our extensive literature review, as well as previous
research into malware behavior and intrusion detection. All research questions are
centrally answered in Chapter 8.
1.4 Structure of the Work
The remainder of this document is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides back-
ground information and details the literature review process for the thesis. It identifies,
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evaluates, and scores 60 papers and articles that introduce methods, models, frame-
works, formalisms, or systems which could potentially contribute to the defense against
APTs and other multi-stage cyber-attacks. Chapter 2 also presents our initial work
into an APT defense framework and introduces a design checklist that was ultimately
used to develop the AIDIS system. In Chapter 3, we discuss methodology, research and
experiment design, data selection, and procedures used in this work.
Chapters 4 through 7 discuss the core components of the anomaly interpretation
system. Initially, sentiment extraction from structured kernel event data is detailed, pre-
senting an LLR-based approach to anomaly detection and identification for the most
meaningful ubiquitous processes in the Windows operating system. In Chapter 5, for-
mal definition of adversarial behavior is discussed. Here, the ‘SEQUIN’ grammar in-
ference system for unsupervised anomaly detection, knowledge discovery, visualization,
and event compression is explained. Chapter 6 takes a step back and provides a com-
plete meta model for describing cyber-attacks in great detail. This foundation for our
subsequent anomaly explication approach is grounded on a non-cooperative, imperfect
incomplete information strategy game with a wide range of additional applications. Fi-
nally, Chapter 7 describes the AIDIS system as a whole and evaluates its functionality
with a large set of real-world behavioral process data.
The system’s overall evaluation is summarized in Chapter 8, where we also discuss
implications, improvement potential, practical implementation, and suggested future
work.
1.5 Summary
This thesis proposes anomaly-based threat detection revolving around the abstracted
behavior of ubiquitous kernel processes. Anomaly detection is based on the premise that
malicious activity manifests as abnormality that can be identified through measuring
the variance of certain key metrics such as behavior deviating from a defined baseline
(i.e. known nominal behavior). In our system, threat identification is performed using
dynamic, behavior-based analysis, which is expected to be far more resilient to modern
obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques than signature-based alternatives [330].
Our research seeks to further endpoint attack detection by reducing the reliance
on patterns in general: All components of AIDIS forgo fixed, predefined sequences
to define malicious behavior and instead use several novel approaches to flexible and
transparent anomaly detection for captured operating system events. In response to
the known performance issues of behavioral systems, we implemented grammar-based
event compression to reduce the processing times of more expensive computations.
Our proposed system uses two observation points (local host and network) that
are automatically correlated to create one single data basis for subsequent formalization
and anomaly detection. No advance knowledge is required about any malware binaries
dropped on the system. This is achieved by identifying and monitoring ubiquitous kernel
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Figure 1.2: High-level overview of the AIDIS system.
processes, which are always present in a particular version of the operating system.
We argue that execution delay mechanisms are not effective against kernel process
observation, since any deviating activity of the OS process would constitute an anomaly
no matter the initial execution time of the core malware.
Each component developed as part of AIDIS is transparent in its operation: No
black-box anomaly detection is in use, always allowing analysts to fully understand
machine learning decisions by presenting concrete patterns or anomaly descriptions
contributing to a verdict or score. Anomaly classification is implemented through a set
of generic competency questions and evaluated through established machine learning al-
gorithms. The determined attack classes are mapped to a novel APT attacker–defender
model that considers actions, actors, as well as assets and mitigating controls, thereby
enabling decision support and contextual interpretation of past and ongoing attacks.
Figure 1.2 depicts the proposed multi-stage system in its entirety.
In summary, this work contributes by:
• Presenting a sentiment-like analysis system for initial string-based anomaly de-
tection and malicious process identification (Chapter 4);
• Providing flexible unsupervised anomaly detection for dedicated intrusion detec-
tion scenarios, as well as an effective compression system for arbitrary system
event data (Chapter 5);
• Constructing a gamified attacker–defender meta model serving as recommendation
system for cyber-attack mitigation (Chapter 6);
• Presenting and evaluating the prototype of an ‘Advanced Intrusion Detection and
Interpretation System’ able to accurately classify anomalies by their APT stage
and attack pattern (Chapter 7).
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2.1 Introduction
The sophisticated and multipartite nature of modern cyber-attacks is one of the main
reasons why a defender needs to consider host-based, network-based and hybrid moni-
toring tools when it comes to capturing suspicious events that can later be analyzed and
interpreted. While there are numerous solutions that focus on specific attack aspects
such as malware infection or network intrusion, only few consider the greater picture. In
order to truly understand a targeted attack, it becomes necessary to not only focus on
malicious software or intrusion detection but to use every suitable tool at one’s disposal.
This chapter evaluates existing research retrieved from six academic search engines us-
ing an incremental search and refinement process utilized with a view to integrating the
results into a holistic framework for APT detection and assessment. Existing models
and technologies were methodically categorized by their capabilities, purpose, as well as
several operational parameters with the aim to establish their applicability to a general
concept of an APT defense framework presented that is the foundation of the system
introduced in this thesis.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 2.2 we introduce
the concept of APTs, define frequent terms, and provide some background on models
and use cases. Section 2.3 specifies the research questions, review method, and various
literature collection criteria. In Section 2.4 we introduce the categorization schema used
in the review process. Section 2.5 provides specific background and reviews the selected
papers. Section 2.6 contains a comprehensive comparison charts and breaks down the
results. In Section 2.7, we discuss our findings and present the concept of a defense
framework, which became the design foundation of AIDIS.
2.2 APT Taxonomy and Semantics
2.2.1 Modeling Advanced Persistent Threats
APTs are not necessarily limited to a tailored piece of malware, but often encompass
various stages with their own respective methods [133, 179]. For example, spearfishing
and malicious websites are common approaches to delivering a malicious payload to a
target system [294, 185]. RATs embedded in a Trojan horse are then often used to
take control of a machine. In addition, targeted attacks reportedly employ zero-day
vulnerabilities [34, 294].
In order to better understand the complex nature of targeted attacks and to map
specific exploits to a broader goal, APTs are often modeled as a multi-stage process.
Hutchins et al. [133] expand on the military concept of target engagement and de-
fine seven typical phases, as seen in Figure 2.1: (1) Reconnaissance, such as network
scans, mapping procedures, employee profiling, and search for suitable zero-day exploits,
(2) weaponization, i.e. the development of targeted malware and the set-up of malicious
services, (3) delivery via various channels, (4) exploitation, such as the activation of
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Figure 2.1: APT phases as defined by [133]
malware and the use of the previously weaponized payload to exploit a vulnerability,
(5) installation, i.e. establishing a persistent presence, (6) command & control commu-
nication, and (7) actions on objective, which include the primary malicious task as well
as exfiltration and clean-up activities.
Giuara and Wang [113] as well as De Vries et al. [71] use similar kill chain models
to describe APTs – only the naming and some stage boundaries differs. Independent
of taxonomy, APTs are complex attacks that, unlike bulk malware or fire-and-forget
network attacks, carefully consider the target’s system environment, security measures,
and assets.
Adversary actions in each of the phases are possibly countered by a number of de-
fense mechanisms. For example, the installation on the target system might be detected
by a dedicated host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). Each of the models helps
to plan network defense measures as well as illustrates some data providers that are
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promising to use in an attack detection system. This is the reason why we decided to
include solutions from different domains instead of just malware detection tools.
2.2.2 Semantics-aware and Semantics-based Approaches
The semantics of an attack is an important factor for its identification and analysis.
Generally speaking, semantics is the study of meaning. It is widely used in both tech-
nical and non-technical fields such as linguistics, philosophy, and information theory.
When applied to computer science, it is often synonymous with determining execution
paths of a program. In that case, the meaning of an artificial programming language as
opposed to a natural language is evaluated. The mathematical model of computation
is defined using one of the following techniques [344, 62]:
Denotational semantics describes the formalization of programming languages into
mathematical objects. This includes the translation of a phrase into another, strictly
formal language. Operational semantics encompasses the description of the execution
and its correctness by e.g. describing machine state transitions. Axiomatic semantics
describes meaning and proves correctness through rules of inference that map input to
output properties. It is important to note that these strands are highly dependent on
each other and are often used in concert.
In this document we differentiate semantics-aware and semantics-based approaches.
We define semantics-aware solutions as considerate of the goal, means, and specifics of
an attack. The overall premise can be summarized as the analysis of meaning of an
attack. Based on this central aspect, we compiled a list of prerequisites that need to be
met in order for a defense measure to be considered semantics-aware:
• The solution needs to counteract specific objectives or the overall goal of the
attacker by e.g. detecting or preventing an attack or by helping to determine
what the adversary wants to achieve (see primary category G in Section 2.4 for
more information);
• The solution has to investigate, analyze, detect, or extract the technical means
(i.e. techniques) of an attack or attack action through e.g. anomalies or patterns
in behavior or code (see primary categories D and A in Section 2.4);
• The techniques, goals, or methods investigated can be mapped to one of the seven
APT phases depicted in Figure 2.1 (primary category APT ).
Semantics-based approaches usually revolve around four key topics we identified
as representative for the semantic domain in general: activity context, ontology design,
data abstraction, and correlation. As works in these fields are often more universal in
nature, the above restrictions do not strictly apply. Instead, we opted to include security
solutions that facilitate the development of models, languages and formal definitions or
that determine the correctness of information through rules of e.g. inference. We argue
that they, while perhaps not directly applicable to a particular scenario, are sufficiently
adaptable to benefit the defense against advanced cyber-attacks.
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Unlike semantics-aware approaches, the semantics-based category closely adheres
to the type definitions introduced at the beginning of this section. For the literature
review in Section 2.5, we categorized each paper in accordance to above definitions:
Semantics-aware, semantics-based: denotational, operational, or axiomatic.
2.3 Review Method
This study is based on the guidelines for systematic literature reviews by Barbara
Kitchenham [158], with some deviations from her guidelines. These include the omis-
sion of papers beyond the 50th result of each respective search engine, the post-review
exclusion of articles with a low total score, and less reliance on search process automa-
tion.
The main goal of this chapter is to systematically review available literature on the
topic of host-based, network-based, and multi-source detection of cyber-attacks with
a focus on semantics-aware and semantics-based approaches. The surveyed papers are
evaluated by their applicability to the domain of targeted attacks.
2.3.1 Research Questions
Specifically, there are a number of research questions addressed by this review:
1. Which models, frameworks, formal definitions, and tools exist to describe infor-
mation system attacks?
2. Which semantics-aware and semantics-based tools and techniques exist to detect
and evaluate such attacks?
3. What are promising approaches to APT detection and how can they be classified?
4. What kind of information is required to identify targeted attacks and how could
it help to get a more complete picture of an incident?
To address R1 and R2, we have conducted a search of several scientific databases.
This process is detailed in the next subsection. To satisfy R3, we came up with a list of
criteria and categories to classify each identified solution. These criteria were combined
into structured overview tables that are thoroughly explored in Section 2.6. In response
to R4, Section 2.7 conceptually combines the benefits of solutions from several review
categories and sketches an ideal defense framework.
2.3.2 Search Process
The search process included a manual keyword search on IEEE, ACM, Scopus, Web of
Science, Academic Search Premier and Google Scholar. In the first stage we focused on
the following keywords and keyword combinations: “targeted attack {detection, identifi-
cation, recognition, analysis}”; “{APT, advanced persistent threat, threat, cyber-threat}
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{detection, identification, recognition}”; “semantic{s}{-}{based} {malware, intrusion}
detection”; “SIEM” +”APT” as well as further combinations including the “model” or
“framework” suffix.
For data providers, we disregarded all publications released prior to 2003. General
papers (e.g. original publications on key topics) were not filtered by date. These initial
searches yielded a total of 112 papers. Every publication was perused and summarized.
In stage 2, we assessed and selected all additional references used in the grant pro-
posal document of the corresponding APT research project1 at the St. Pölten University
of Applied Sciences. Stage 2 increased the number of considered papers to 114.
Lastly, we extracted a sample set of relevant references from papers we identified
as key publications. This increased the total number of considered works to 123. Below
exclusion criteria and quality assessment ultimately brought this number down to 60.
2.3.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
We included all peer-reviewed articles released between 2003 and 2015. We specifically
looked for publications that matched the following criteria:
• Frameworks, models, methods, formal descriptions and tools of host-based,
network-based, and multi-source approaches to data collection and evaluation;
• Papers that explicitly focused on the detection, identification, recognition, and
analysis of (targeted) attacks.
Product specification sheets, magazine articles and gray literature were excluded
from our search. In addition, we removed the following material:
• Articles which focused excessively on visualization, code manipulation, honeypot
technology, and social engineering;
• Papers about data stream processing techniques;
• Marketing texts and general descriptions of commercial malware analysis suites;
• Well-established industry solutions already discussed in dedicated survey pa-
pers [89, 330];
• Patents, as they typically lack in replicability and presentation.
2.3.4 Quality Assessment
The quality assessment of the reviewed articles is based on a number of questions related
to both overall soundness and APT detection suitability of the presented solutions. Each
quality assessment factor Qn was graded from 0 to `1. The composition of the score
is detailed below:
1. Were the research questions and the overall goal clearly defined?
1Josef Ressel Center for Unified Threat Intelligence on Targeted Attacks
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• Research question exists (`0.5)
• The overall objective and motivation is stated in accordance with the goals
identified in Section 2.4.1 and Table 2.4 (`0.5)
2. Was the attack detection domain introduced and explained?
• An attack domain (see ’Domain’ in Section 2.4.1 and Table 2.4) can be clearly
assigned (`0.5)
• A practical application is exemplified (`0.5)
3. Was the approach presented in a clear and replicable manner?
• Starting point and core process are described (`0.5)
• Evaluation exists (`0.5)
4. Did the article explain the nature and type of operational data used in the process?
• Base (origin) data and its representation are stated (`0.5)
• Result (outcome) data and its representation are stated (`0.5)
5. Can the proposed solution be applied to the detection of targeted attacks?
Specifically, a paper was awarded 1 point for a category when: the research ques-
tion, motivation and goals were clearly defined (Q1), the domain was well specified (Q2),
the approach to solving the stated problem was presented in detail (Q3), the specifics of
the input and output data were provided (Q4), and the solution is applicable to the field
of targeted attacks or one of its primary aspects (Q5). Since Q5 cannot be objectively
computed by evaluating definitive indicators, the score was determined in the course of
an expert discussion among at least 4 security researchers per paper.
Complementing the QA score, a domain expert rating ranging from 0 to 5 was
added following the initial assessment. This score is the result of a group discussion for
each paper (minimum of 3 researchers, excluding the primary author) and mirrors their
view on the paper independent from formal criteria. To remove any bias, this second
grade was awarded without prior knowledge of the QA score.
In addition to the exclusion criteria, we used the quality assessment to reduce the
number of papers ultimately included in the survey. Each article with an overall QA `
expert score below 4.5 as well as papers with a Q5 score of zero were removed from the
list.
2.3.5 Data Collection
The following data was extracted from each reviewed paper:
• The type of source (journal, conference, book) and full reference;
• Classification of general type of article (model, method, framework, formal defi-
nition, or tool);
• Classification of information system domain (host, network, multi-source, or gen-
eral semantics);
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• Classification of data gathering, analysis/detection, and learning techniques used;
• Summary including tags identifying core topics and goals;
• Quality evaluation in regards to the possible contribution to the detection of
malicious, ATA-related activities or patterns.
Data extraction and initial checking was done by four security researchers.
2.3.6 Data Analysis
The extracted data was analyzed and put into tables in order to provide a quantitative
overview:
• Total number of papers and papers per year, addressing R1;
• Number of papers per type of article and domain, addressing R1 and R2;
• Tags describing the key factors of the respective solution appended to each paper,
addressing R2 and R3;
• Quality score of all papers as well as an APT detection applicability rating, ad-
dressing R3 as well as Q1 through Q5;
• Full table containing used technology, specific approach, technical properties and
capabilities of the solutions introduced in the reviewed articles, addressing R4.
All tables as well as the statistical breakdown of the results can be found in Sec-
tion 2.6.
2.4 Review Categories
We developed a versatile schema with 4 distinct categories to classify the surveyed
articles. Although similar in part to Jacob et al.’s [139] behavioral malware detection
taxonomy, our schema included additional properties relevant to APT detection and
analysis, e.g. specific input types and general goals that aren’t usually seen in malware-
centric approaches. Figure 2.2 presents an overview of the properties investigated. The
schema can be freely applied to all topical literature and will help categorize solution
capabilities ranging from data collection and analysis to automated learning.
Primary categories, identified by an asterisk, are used for synthesizing the assessed
papers and represent tags assigned to each solution. These tags include the general goal
G of the solution, the type of threat T , data input type I, detection method D, and
analysis technique A. Knowledge generation K is demarcated as either true or false and
mentions the solution’s learning and classification capabilities, where applicable. The
type of semantic affinity S (see Section 2.2.2) is identified as well. This is complemented
by the mapping of the technique to one or more of the APT categories (including a
brief rationale) by Hutchins et al. [133] (see Section 2.2), thereby satisfying all the
semantics-side selection criteria previously defined.
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Figure 2.2: Categorization of surveyed papers
For example, a paper describing a malware detection and behavioral analysis so-
lution based on system events and including a methodology to semantically describe
correct sample execution might be tagged as ˛G{detection, analysis}; T{malware};
I{event traces}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{operational}; APT{4,5,7: host
activity}. Such a solution would be best suited to detect local (host) events that are
part of APT stage 4 (exploitation), 5 (installation), or 7 (action on target).
A full breakdown of both primary and additional properties can be found in Tables
2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7.
2.4.1 General Properties
The ‘General’ category encompasses high-level objectives and type definitions.
• Primary domain – Each paper was assigned a single domain that most closely
matches the solution’s area of application. Domains follow the subchapters of
Section 2.5 and include host, network, multi-source, and general/unspecified so-
lutions.
• Contribution – This describes the type of solution introduced in the respective
paper. Frameworks, models/methods, formalisms/languages, and tools or systems
are possible types of contribution. One solution may fit several categories.
• Goal G˚ – This criterion defines the general goal the authors want to achieve.
Typically, this can encompass threat prediction, prevention, threat intelligence/-
classification, threat correlation/event fusion, threat detection, threat analysis,
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and threat response. The introduced approaches usually have more than one
goal.
• Threat type T˚ – The threat type describes the general attack the introduced
solution attempts to combat. We have separated threat types into malicious code
(malware), host intrusion, and network intrusion. A system can counter a specific
or several types of threat.
2.4.2 Data Collection
Here, we categorize input data specifics, data gathering, and monitoring techniques.
• Data gathering – Distinguishes between static and dynamic data gathering. Data
gathering is concerned primarily with the method employed to collect the infor-
mation from a system or application. Detection of suspicious activity or code
is part of the detection approach specified below. A combination of static and
dynamic data gathering is unlikely, but not impossible.
• Monitoring approach – There are a number of ways to dynamically monitor ex-
ecution information. Among them is function monitoring, packet monitoring,
code monitoring, disk monitoring, memory monitoring, and conventional logging.
Specialization on one approach is likely, but not universal.
• Data input type I* – Defines the kind of input information processed by the
respective solution. This may include general threat information, system logs,
application logs, network traffic, traces of system events such as API and system
calls, binary code or raw data, as well as alerts generated by distributed agents
or third-party software like an IDS. Many solutions support several input types.
• Flow functionality – Solutions with the capability to record data flows are identi-
fied here. This often includes, but is not limited to, network flow-based solutions.
• Environment – Depending on the system environment the respective solution can
be executed on, we categorize it as running natively – or ‘on-device’ in case of
physical appliances – or as running inside a virtualized environment such as a VM
or emulator. Unspecified or environment-neutral solutions are identified as well.
Tools can support or utilize several environments.
2.4.3 Analysis and Detection
In this category, we take a look at how suspicious activity or code is recognized and
analyzed.
• Detection approach – Similar to data gathering, the detection of relevant informa-
tion can either happen statically or dynamically. This may in some cases differ
from data gathering when the process of collection and detection is realized sepa-
rately. For example, data may be dynamically recorded and subsequently undergo
static analysis.
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• Detection method D* – This incorporates general detection methods such as
anomaly detection, pattern/misuse detection, similarity detection (e.g. string sim-
ilarity), graph matching, or ontology-based methodologies. Systems such as pure
correlation solutions do not necessarily utilize a particular detection method. Sev-
eral methods may be employed.
• Analysis technique A* – Including but not limited to malware, the analysis of data
and, by extension, the decision about its relevant properties, can usually happen
based on pre-defined attributes (properties, states), through behavioral analysis
techniques, or at a contextual (semantic) level. In most cases, solutions use only
one approach.
• Temporal domain – Depending on their implementation, detection or analysis
solutions can offer real-time, delayed but continuous, fixed-interval, or on-demand
processing initiated by user command or upon detection of a certain event.
• Processing – Data processing itself can be performed locally on the system the
data is stored/collected, in a centralized fashion on e.g. a dedicated server, or
distributed across several nodes.
2.4.4 Knowledge Generation
A number of solutions offer mechanisms to generate knowledge from the collected and
analyzed data.
• Learning – (Machine) learning capabilities are identified here. Supervised learning
uses available malicious and benign data to determine the difference to a baseline,
unsupervised learning tasks the system to determine the deviation by itself, and
deductive learning uses inference to draw conclusions based on known premises.
• Classification and clustering – This category lists all the identified techniques used
to classify or cluster information. We consider support vector machines (SVM),
decision trees, neural networks, methods based on nearest-neighbor or nearest-
prototype determination, Bayesian techniques and respective statistical, ‘belief’-
based systems, Markov models or other ‘memoryless’ statistical models, grammars
realized through e.g. grammar parsing, outlier detection, change detection such
as state comparison, and hierarchical clustering.
• Extraction – In some cases, data is merely extracted for later analysis or visu-
alization. Techniques found in the reviewed papers include dependence graphs,
behavior graphs, and semantic (link) networks.
• Visualization – As a by-product of knowledge generation, the results of earlier
assessment stages can be graphically presented. Solutions offering visualization
are identified here. See [330] for further details about security-related visualization
systems.
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Figure 2.3: Paper categorization
2.5 Review
In this section we assess and summarize all the papers found through the structured
search process specified above. Solutions are categorized into host-based, network-
based, multi-source, and purely semantic approaches that cannot be attributed to a
specific domain. Figure 2.3 offers an overview of the full categorization used in below
subsections.
The beginning of each category section provides some additional background rel-
evant to the respective category. Tags are used to identify primary categories for each
paper, providing information about the assessed solution’s general approach to data
gathering, monitoring, detection and analysis, as well as knowledge generation.
2.5.1 Host Domain
Host-based solutions can be understood as detection systems running on the endpoint.
We identified memory-based approaches, numerous behavioral detection and analysis
22
R. Luh 2.5. REVIEW
systems, function call monitoring solutions, host-based intrusion detection systems, and
more. For many of the tools, malicious software (malware) is something of a common
denominator:
Most cyber-attacks involve malware smuggled onto the system to perform its sin-
ister deed. Malware can generally be defined as “any software that does something that
causes harm to a user, computer, or network” [291]. Examples include viruses, Trojan
horses, backdoors, worms, rootkits, scareware, or spyware. Malicious software is known
to exploit vulnerabilities of the system it is designed to run on. Flaws in applications
can serve as drop vector and may be exploited as part of a privilege escalation routine
required for administrative tasks. In the case of APTs, this often includes hitherto
unknown exploits known as zero-days.
Common malware i.e. aims at financial gain through fraud or blackmail; it is
delivered to a large number of recipients in hope that a sufficient number of people
unknowingly install it on their machines. Malware used for targeted attacks is much
more sophisticated and typically includes additional components for e.g. long-term per-
sistent installation and more complex command and control communication than can
be found in other malicious software. The main distinguishing factor is its tailoring to a
specific environment, however. APT malware is designed to attack a particular device,
operating system, or specific application version. This influences the choice of dropping
technique, evasion routines, and attacks against specific defensive measures employed
by the victim. While this fact makes such software dangerous to only a limited number
of systems, the damage caused by targeted malware can be much more severe.
Malware analysis is probably the most widely used and arguably most important
class of host-based approaches. Solutions range from analysis suites built to determine
a sample’s general maliciousness to interpretation of behavior or clustering of potential
malware into families. [89] and [134] offer an overview of dynamic malware analysis tools
and describe various monitoring and detection techniques. In a previous paper [330],
we expanded on some of the tools and assessed the information they provide. There
is a multitude of information to be gleaned from various malware analysis techniques,
each offering specific insight into the nature and functionality of a malicious program.
This includes the virus definition, packer information like packer designations and gen-
eral compression information about the sample, file and header information and code
sections, library and function imports, CPU instructions and their associated assembly
operations, system and API calls executed by the sample, file system operations indi-
cating the creation, modification, and deletion of files, as well as interpreted registry,
process, thread, and network operations.
A large number of the data providers surveyed below focus on the detection or
analysis of malware. We generally define malware data providers as tools that utilize
static or dynamic analysis methods as well as signature- and behavior based detection
techniques to gather information about a potentially malicious piece of software [330]:
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Static analysis describes techniques that do not require the sample under scrutiny
to be actually executed. Depending on the depth of analysis, a file may be checked
for its basic properties like file type, checksum, easily extractable information such as
null-terminated strings or DLL import information, or be fully disassembled [156]. The
analysis environment – bare metal, virtual machine, or emulation – plays a negligible
role for static analyses – the analyst simply chooses a platform compatible with the tools
of her choice. Dynamic analysis goes a step further and executes the file on a dedicated
host system. Various tools then monitor the execution and log relevant information into
an execution trace. This ranges from simple file system operations to a full instruction
list captured through a debugger. The analysis environment is essential for the dynamic
approach since the type of data logged depends on both the platform as well as on the
techniques used to capture system events.
On the detection side we differentiate between signature-based and behavior-based
techniques:
Signature-based approaches are best known for their prominent role in antivirus
software and traditional intrusion detection systems. A so-called definition or signature
is created to describe an entire file or parts of the code that are known to be mali-
cious [330]. The detection software then compares the appearance of a file or packet to
this set of known signatures. Signature-based detection has several shortcomings [80]:
Firstly, obfuscation techniques commonly utilize polymorphic or metamorphic mu-
tation to generate an ever-growing number of malware variants that are different in
appearance, but functionally identical. This leads to bloated signature databases and,
ultimately, to an overall slowdown of the detection process. Secondly, signature-based
techniques only detect malware which has already been identified and analyzed; new
species or hitherto unknown variants are often overlooked.
Behavior-based techniques, on the other hand, focus on specific system activities or
software behavior typically captured through dynamic analysis. Malicious actions are
defined through patterns or behavioral anomalies. Since the behavior-based approach
can be semantics-aware, it is largely immune to obfuscation [80]. Its performance is
limited, however: While signature matching takes but the fraction of a second, dynamic
execution and trace analysis can take several minutes.
The second big area of host-based threat mitigation is intrusion detection. IT
systems intrusion describes the act of accessing a local or network-based resource with-
out proper authorization. It can basically be defined as computer break-in leaving the
targeted system vulnerable to theft or sabotage [170]. In many cases the line between
black-hat hacking and malicious software becomes blurred [150]. Most typical intrusions
involve malware or tools designed to circumvent security measures of the target system.
The attack procedure varies from case to case and can be considered ‘targeted’; few
intruders act without knowing which system they are attacking.
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On the defense side, intrusion detection is primarily concerned with activities
deemed harmful by the system operator [170]. These may include digital breaking
and entering but generally encompasses all ‘malicious actions’ aimed at e.g. privilege
acquisition or resource abuse. Literature differentiates two classes of intrusion detection
systems (IDS): network-based and host-based [329]. The main differences are the type
and number of sources used to detect adversary activity; network-based IDS analyze the
traffic transmitted between systems and typically utilize a number of sensors distributed
throughout the network. Host-based systems, on the other hand, attempt to discover
attacks taking place on the very machine the sensor component is installed on.
There are two approaches to detecting malicious activity through an IDS: Anomaly
detection and misuse (pattern) detection [170]. Anomaly detection is based on the
premise that illegal activity manifests as abnormality and that it can be identified
through measuring the variance of certain key metrics. This may include the excessive
use of system functions, high resource utilization at unusual times, or other behavior
deviating from a defined baseline.
Misuse detection, on the other hand, is based on predefined patterns. Knowledge
of an attacker’s methods or the expected consequences of an attack are encoded into
behavior sequences that can be found by an IDS looking for their occurrence [170]. Ex-
amples include sequences of suspicious function calls, certain network packet payloads,
or the exploitation of known bugs.
Many of the reviewed papers describe various host-based approaches to locate,
identify, categorize, or analyze malicious software. Both semantics-aware as well as a
few semantics-based techniques are used. Most focus on determining the maliciousness
of a piece of software or attempt to classify a set of samples.
There are also various data providers that fall under the wider definition of an
intrusion detection system. Since IDSs can be both host- and network-based, tools
range from local process or system call tracers to traffic anomaly detectors utilizing
various statistical methods or data mining approaches. Network-based systems are
reviewed in Section 2.5.2.
Malware Analysis Solutions
Inspired by [139], we categorized solutions into malware analysis suites, dynamic and
static detection and analysis solutions, hardware state detection and analysis, execution
path analysis, behavior extraction systems, as well as malware classification systems.
Malware analysis suites. While malware analysis suites are mostly established com-
mercial solutions and thereby not included as per the criteria defined in Section 2.3,
they are an important class of data providers that need to be mentioned. Malware
suites do not per se run on the endpoint: Tools like Anubis/LastLine Analyst [24, 137],
Cuckoo Sandbox [67], CWSandbox/Threat Analyzer [343, 342], Joe Sandbox [144], and
FireEye MAS [100] run in their own, usually virtualized environment. They employ
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function hooking and kernel mode drivers to record and report system and/or API
calls executed by the sample under scrutiny. The recorded activity is then interpreted
and returned as human-readable summary. Malware analysis suites are a good starting
point for general dynamic analysis and are undoubtedly the inspiration for some of the
solutions introduced below. See [89] and [330] for more information. ˛Representative
tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{malware}; I{event traces, network traffic}; D{pattern};
A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{3-7: host and network activity}.
Dynamic malware detection and analysis is covered by a multitude of articles:
Grégio et al. [120] introduce BehEMOT, a non-intrusive malware behavior analysis
system. It uses both a native and emulated system environment that promises to cir-
cumvent sandbox detection. Functions and their arguments as well as network events
are captured using system call interception via System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT)
hooking: The SSDT is a list of memory addresses that each correspond to a system call.
If hooked, it becomes possible to redirect calls to an altered copy of the function; a tech-
nique useful for monitoring activity or modifying results. Similar to commercial suites
like Anubis [137] or Joe Sandbox [144], BehEMOT abstracts specific calls to a gen-
eral operation type (e.g. ‘open process’). ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{malware};
I{event traces, network traffic}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{3-
7: host and network activity}.
Fukushima et al. [108] developed another behavior-based detection approach: Sus-
picious process behavior is identified through specific system and temporary directories
accessed by the sample as well as the creation of certain registry keys responsible for
e.g. automated startup. Registration or deletion of uninstall information is considered
as well. Fukushima’s system utilizes Procmon [270] as primary data provider. Unlike
BehEMOT’s post-monitoring abstraction [120], Procmon abstracts system calls in a
non-transparent manner prior to analysis. For this reason, many additional calls are
not considered. This arguably increases performance while potentially reducing ac-
curacy. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{malware, host intrusion}; I{event traces};
D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
In [132], the authors introduce the Taiwan Malware Analysis Net (TWMAN), an
ontology system for behavioral malware analysis. The VM-based dynamic analysis
system is built around the TRUMAN sandnet [75] that logs contacted IP addresses,
created, changed, and deleted files, as well as registry activity. While some features
are taken from CWSandbox [342], others are comparable to the generally more de-
tailed BehEMOT approach [120]. The file output is akin to a list of changes to the
original system state. An OWL-based ontology built in Protégé [296] describes the
impact and approximate activity of each sample and includes a rough categorization
into different types of malware. Actors, assets, and activity beyond abstracted malware
function calls are not considered in the proposed ontology. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, anal-
ysis}; T{malware}; I{event traces}; D{ontology}; A{behavioral, contextual}; K{no};
S{operational}; APT{3-7: host and partial network activity}.
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The work of Chiang and Tsaur [50] introduces dedicated, ontology-based behavioral
analysis for mobile malware. Their approach is based on the TOVE project by Fox et
al. [104] and considers infection routes, potential damage, and propagation capabilities
via e.g. Bluetooth. While the authors do not directly propose a practical implementa-
tion, their work can be seen as example of a domain-specific, ontology-based approach
that could be transported to the information system environment. ˛Tags: G{analysis};
T{malware}; I{-}; D{ontology}; A{bahavioral, contextual}; K{no}; S{denotational};
APT{-: general approach}.
Static malware detection and analysis is less concerned with application behavior,
but primarily considers a sample’s code structure. Zhang et al. [356] introduce a detec-
tion technique for polymorphic code through static identification of its self-decryption
functionality. Limited emulation of instructions is used in conjunction with recursive
traversal of loops to find the starting location of the respective routine. Since Zhang
et al. address a very specific property of only a subclass of malicious programs, their
approach could potentially complement systems that attempt to identify other func-
tion entry points [83] or illegitimate code paths [37]. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware,
host intrusion}; I{network traffic, raw}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware};
APT{3,5: partial network and initial program activity}.
Dube et al. [83] take a more general approach. Their system, MaTR, focuses on
target recognition of malware attacks through static heuristic features. These non-
instruction-based heuristics include structural anomalies such as non-standard section
names, characteristics such as the presence of unpacking routines, entry points out-
side the code section, and unusual numbers of function imports and exports. MaTR
utilizes supervised machine learning based on bagged decision trees. Dube’s research
contrasts the n-gram approach found in other surveyed articles [263, 47, 32], where se-
quences of byte patterns of various lengths are assessed. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis};
T{malware}; I{raw}; D{anomaly}; A{behavioral}; K{yes: supervised learning, decision
tree classification}; S{aware}; APT{5: structural program properties}.
One of the most cited works is undoubtedly by Christodorescu et al [53]. The
authors describe a malware detection algorithm that incorporates instruction semantics,
an approach that uses resilient pattern matching which can deal with slight variations
in code. Activities such as decryption loops and search operations for certain strings are
considered malicious behavior indicators, which are specified by templates and depicted
as control-flow graphs (CFG). Christodorescu et al. also developed a tool based on IDA
Pro [127]: It takes a binary, disassembles it, constructs a CFG, produces an intermediate
form using abstract machine language, and determines a possible match. In a later
paper, Preda et al. [69] prove that the concept of semantic malware detectors such
as [53] is a sound one and can indeed defeat numerous obfuscation techniques. ˛Tags:
G{detection, analysis}; T{malware}; I{raw}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral, contextual};
K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7: program activity}.
Sharif et al. [287] introduce Eureka, a framework for facilitating static analysis
of obfuscated code. The sample is first executed to trigger its unpacking procedures,
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then captured and dumped for static analysis. Here, API resolution comes into play:
Eureka identifies subroutines and builds a control flow graph for every function. Calls
are then extracted from the image of the previously packed sample. The combination
of static and dynamic analysis addresses the issue that packed or encrypted samples
are hard to analyze in their original state. Letting the respective routines execute be-
fore taking a closer look on the disassembled code promises an unimpeded view on the
malware in question – with any of the above-mentioned static analysis tools. ˛Tags:
G{analysis}; T{malware}; I{event traces, raw}; D{pattern, ontology}; A{attribute, be-
havioral}; K{yes: behavior graph extraction, visualization}; S{aware}; APT{5: initial
program activity}.
Hardware state detection and analysis solutions encompass raw operation mon-
itoring applications that are often VM-centric. Fore example, the approach described
in [143] focuses specifically on virtual machines. VMwatcher constructs an on-system
semantic view on files, processes, and kernel modules to bridge the gap between the
inside and outside view on a system. Jiang et al. use virtual machine introspection
(VMI) to monitor the raw disk and memory states of a VM in a transparent and
tamper-resistant fashion. This ultimately eliminates the need to install malware detec-
tion software on the guest machine and could enable further research into system state
analysis in virtual environments. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware}; I{event traces,
raw}; D{-}; A{attribute}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7: raw host activity}.
Payne et al. [243] also focus on VMI-based monitoring. Their proposed solution,
Lares, is primarily intended to protect other defense measures such as antivirus programs
and intrusion detection systems by providing an isolated API monitoring environment.
Lares could be combined with other tools that would benefit from the additional protec-
tion against evasion or tampering. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware, host intrusion};
I{event traces, raw}; D{-}; A{-}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4,5: raw host activity, sec-
ondary protection}.
Mankin and Kaeli [199] propose a similar disk monitoring system: Their imple-
mentation, the Disk I/O analysis engine (DIONE), intercepts and interprets disk access
operations using a sensor that resides in the Xen hypervisor outside the guest OS.
Thanks to this design, DIONE is more resilient against many conventional attacks and
various obfuscation techniques. Attacks against the hypervisor itself [244] and cross-VM
attacks [265, 17] remain an issue, however. Unlike Jiang’s VMwatcher [143], DIONE is
capable of monitoring the NTFS filesystem. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware}; I{raw};
D{-}; A{-}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4,5: raw disk operations, secondary protection}.
Execution path analysis explores or defines code paths that are dynamically investi-
gated during execution. Miles et al. [213] focus on the interrelationship among malware
instances to discover new connections between actors, machines, and malware: Code,
semantically similar procedures of code, and API call execution/event log traces are
compared to identify similarities. This includes websites, e-mail messages and PE file
headers. Names, addresses, and certain constants are generalized using BinJuice [172].
The discovery system itself uses concolic execution: It is able to explore multiple exe-
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cution paths by using an SMT solver to create new input values for subsequent runs.
Miles’ prototype system, VirusBattle, further includes an unpacking routine as well as
monitoring capabilities utilizing VMI. With a focus on threat intelligence and attribu-
tion, Miles’ approach could be combined with other, more detection-centric methods to
enhance its capabilities. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, analysis}; T{malware}; I{event traces,
raw}; D{similarity}; A{attribute, contextual}; K{no}; S{operational}; APT{3-7: host
and partial network activity, web, e-mail}.
Another interesting approach is presented by Xu et al. [347]. They introduce a
waypoint mechanism in the form of markers on the execution path that a process must
follow to provide trustworthy control flow information for subsequent anomaly monitor-
ing. Waypoints, for which Xu et al. use the context of the currently active function of the
code, are generated through static analysis and later imported as traps into the kernel.
A system utilizing this method would be able to detect mimicry attacks [329], i.e. the in-
terleaving of malicious calls in benign sequences. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware, host
intrusion}; I{raw}; D{anomaly}; A{contextual}; K{no}; S{operational}; APT{4,5:
program flow}.
PECAN [37] is a dynamic anomaly detector that identifies unusual program be-
havior through the definition of legitimate code paths. It has been developed to identify
bugs that use valid executions but violate the programmer’s expectations. The authors
introduce both a training and monitoring module: The system scans for specific security
functions that can affect the system outside the Java VM, considers the calling context
of a call, and checks for anomalous sequences. This is achieved through probabilistic
calling context (PCC), which appends a unique number that represents the location
a program is called from [36]. Clients then query that number at every system call
to determine whether the context is known or suspicious. While PECAN is a solu-
tion specific to Java, the concept of context can also be found in system calls [166].
Synergies to process-graph-based systems are likely, but have yet to be investigated.
˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware}; I{raw}; D{anomaly}; A{bahavioral, contextual};
K{supervised learning}; S{operational}; APT{4,5: program flow}.
Behavior extraction solutions often focus on graphs and subgraphs of certain behav-
ioral commonalities. Often similar to classification approaches (see below), they usually
focus on the generation of knowledge.
Kwon and Lee [171] introduce BinGraph, a discovery method for metamorphic mal-
ware. API calls are extracted and converted to a hierarchical behavior graph. Extracted
subgraphs represent common behavior and can be considered a ‘semantic signature’ –
Kwon and Lee assume that the same API sequences occur in metamorphic variants
of the same malware strain. To counter isomorphism, node types are abstracted into
categories such as process, registry, memory, or socket operations. Each operation can
be further split into groups that denote the specific action (open, close, read, write)
performed. Graphs are matched to search for subgraphs in newly submitted traces.
˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{malware}; I{event traces}; D{graph}; A{attribute};
K{yes: behavior graph extraction}; S{aware}; APT{4-7: host activity, sockets}.
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In [334], the Wang et al. describe a malware feature extraction system based
on application behavior. System calls and their dependencies are mapped to a graph
and then tainted to trace the passing on of parameters. Calls of interest include file,
registry, process, and network functions. Single-step debugging is used to keep track of
the tainted information. Semantic analysis is used on certain, not further specified calls.
The taint approach sets this work apart from other solutions and allows the authors
to extract calls that are actively used by malware. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, analysis};
T{malware}; I{event traces}; D{graph}; A{behavioral, contextual}; K{yes: dependence
graph extraction}; S{aware}; APT{4-7: host and partial network activity}.
Another graph-based approach, DAVAST, is described by Wüchner et al. [346]:
The authors visualize trace information as quantitative data flow graphs where files,
sockets, processes, and more are represented as nodes while the edges depict the execu-
tion flow. Both online and oﬄine analysis is supported. Rules define normal behavior
as well as malicious activities. Abstraction of e.g. memory addresses is used to reduce
processing complexity. Unlike most other solutions, Wüchner et al. use time slices
to further reduce the size of their graphs. Since DAVAST primarily focuses on visu-
alization, further automated processing it is not explored. It is currently unknown if
Wüchner’s approach [346] could be used in combination with e.g. Wang’s feature ex-
traction system [334] or other graph-based approaches such as BinGraph [171] or the
system introduced by Dolgikh [79]. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{malware, host in-
trusion}; I{event traces}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{yes: visualization}; S{aware};
APT{3-7: host activity, sockets, e-mails}.
Dolgikh et al. [79] conduct behavioral analysis capable to automatically create
application profiles for both malicious and benign samples. Their system considers
recorded API calls that are subsequently transformed into a labeled graph representing
a stream of system calls. Graphs are compressed using the Graphitour algorithm [245]
used in genetic data processing. When applied to benign software, the resulting dataset
describes rules that represent normalcy – functionality of system calls that can be seen
as benign behavior. Ultimately, each node in the rule graph is modeled as part of
a Colored Petri Net [142]. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, detection}; T{malware}; I{event
traces}; D{anomaly, graph}; A{behavioral}; K{yes: supervised learning, classification
grammar, behavior graph extraction}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
Graph mining is another interesting approach to extracting behavior. Next to
developing a language for specifying malicious behavior through system call dependen-
cies, Christodorescu et al. [54] came up with a method to mine behavioral data from
trace files of benign and malicious samples. Both are collected during dynamic analy-
sis and linked through their parameters. Christodorescu’s system, dubbed ‘MiniMal’,
constructs dependence graphs for later comparison. To keep the classification process
non-specific to individual samples, the graphs are generalized into so-called minimal con-
trast subgraphs describing the smallest possible malicious subgraph that does not occur
in benign sequences. Other works build on Christodorescu et al.’s concept: Fredrik-
son et al. [106] introduce a graph mining method for extracting significant behavioral
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specifications used to describe classes of programs. Their system, Holmes, aims to
extract specifications that distinguish malicious from benign applications on a system
call level. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, detection}; T{malware}; I{event traces}; D{graph};
A{behavioral}; K{yes: deductive learning, dependence graph extraction, visualization};
S{aware, denotational}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
Touching the network domain, Jacobs et al. [141] present Jackstraws, a system
designed to identify command and control (C2) communication. Unlike other network-
centric approaches, Jackstraws captures host activity through dynamic analysis per-
formed by tools such as Anubis [137] and associates network communication to local
malware activity. Association is achieved through behavior graph modeling of data flows
between individual system calls. Graph templates for C2 pattern similarity matching
are mined from a known set based on a technique introduced by Yan and Han [350],
followed by a clustering stage. While Jackstraws is potentially vulnerable to certain ob-
fuscation and mimicry attacks [329], its unique approach to detecting C2 traffic makes
it particular interesting to APT detection and knowledge generation efforts. ˛Tags:
G{intelligence, detection}; T{malware}; I{event traces}; D{pattern, similarity, graph};
A{behavioral, contextual}; K{yes: supervised learning, graph clustering, behavior graph
extraction}; S{aware}; APT{6: C2 network activity}.
Malware classification solutions found in literature usually cluster dynamic analy-
sis traces or static function use. The primary purpose of malware classification is the
generation of knowledge through sample similarity assessment. Unlike behavior ex-
traction (see above), classification does not necessarily yield discriminative patterns for
subsequent use.
Riek et al. [314, 263] describe a clustering and classification approach for malware
behavior traces generated by dedicated dynamic analysis tools (in their case the mal-
ware sandbox ‘CWSandbox’ [342]). The focus lies on API and system calls as well
as their arguments. The reports are embedded in a vector space in order to enable
similarity assessment based on geometry. Hierarchical clustering is then used to iden-
tify groups of malware displaying similar behavior. The distance to a representative
prototype is determined and stored. Incremental analysis allows for comparing new
samples to existing clusters. For better granularity, the authors introduced the optional
Malware Instruction Set (MIST) format: The behavior of a binary is described as a
sequence of instructions similar to CPU opcodes. Each level of MIST allows for addi-
tional details to be included or omitted on demand. Riek et al.’s work later became
‘Malheur’ [262], a system capable of rapidly processing function call n-grams. Malheur’s
performance and flexibility makes it a useful tool for pre-classifying samples without
having to convert existing traces. However, since Riek’s approach does not extract pat-
terns like e.g. Christodorescu’s work [54], Malheur’s performance and accuracy comes at
the expense of semantic expressiveness. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, detection}; T{malware};
I{event traces}; D{-}; A{behavioral}; K{yes: unsupervised learning, nearest prototype
clustering}; S{aware}; APT{4-7: support solution}.
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In [25], Bayer et al. present a scalable behavior-based malware clustering sys-
tem. Dynamic analysis is performed using Anubis [137] and extended with taint track-
ing functionality that marks out-arguments and return values and monitors them for
changes. The resulting trace files are then generalized into profiles which characterize
sample behavior. Ultimately, the abstracted data is clustered using the locality sensi-
tive hashing (LSH) algorithm based on the work of Indyk and Motwani [135]. Despite
the fact that Riek’s approach is more accurate in terms of F-measure [263], the ex-
traction of profiles is a distinct advantage over pure classification systems like Malheur.
˛Tags: G{intelligence, detection}; T{malware}; I{event traces}; D{pattern, similarity};
A{behavioral}; K{yes: nearest prototype classification}; S{aware}; APT{4-7: host and
limited network activity}.
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems
Host-based intrusion detection systems focus less on the tool/malware utilized by the
attacker but rather on anomalous activities registered on the system. For example,
Mutz et al. [166] describe a classical approach to detecting anomalies in system call se-
quences. Their system is designed to detect attacks against privileged applications. To
this end, it analyzes the relation between system call arguments and calling contexts.
Function return addresses gathered from the application call stack are used to add
cohesion. Among the anomalies considered are string length, character distribution,
and the use of certain non-printable characters. As part of Mutz’ prototype imple-
mentation, a Linux kernel module monitors system calls through a wrapper function
that logs relevant activity before actual execution. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{host intru-
sion}; I{event traces, raw}; D{anomaly}; A{behavioral, contextual}; K{yes: supervised
learning, Markov-based classification}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
Anomalies in system call patterns are a predominant theme: Creech and Hu [66] in-
troduce a host-based anomaly detection method that uses discontiguous (unconnected)
system call patterns. A context-free grammar describes benign and malicious call traces;
learning is achieved through an Extreme Learning Machine (ELM), a new type of fast-
learning artificial neural network. Several decision engines were tested and compared by
the authors, making the paper a good starting point for the selection of learning algo-
rithms applicable to system call sequences. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, detection}; T{host
intrusion}; I{event traces}; D{anomaly}; A{contextual}; K{yes: supervised learning,
neural network/Markov-/grammar-based classification}; S{aware w/ denotational ele-
ments}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
A way to formally describe a data flow without losing information about the ac-
cessing resource is described in Chaturvedi’s work [47]. Their model can capture certain
properties of the sample and identifies anomalies hinting at malicious use of functions or
configuration files. Among the considered properties are command line arguments and
environment specifics such as local variables. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware, host
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intrusion}; I{event traces}; D{anomaly}; A{behavioral}; K{yes: supervised learning,
behavior graph extraction}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
Based on this approach, Bhatkar et al. [32] propose anomaly detection within
the data flow of an application: In addition to calls, call arguments are considered
and used to establish a temporal context. Unary relations define the properties of
an argument in the form of a specific value or range, while binary relations estab-
lish the relationship between two event arguments. This model allows to search
for e.g. certain paths or file extensions and is able to compare them to each other.
With its focus on learning as well as matching control flows, both Bhatkar’s [32]
and Chaturvedi’s [47] systems exemplify and discuss the use of n-gram and execution
graph methods. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware, host intrusion}; I{event traces};
D{pattern, ontology}; A{contextual}; K{yes: supervised learning, Markov-based extrac-
tion}; S{aware, denotational}; APT{4,5,7: host activity}.
Ou et al. [238] emphasize the issue that attacker and user actions are often syn-
tactically similar and are therefore hard to distinguish from one another. They propose
the formal modeling of uncertainties to counter false-positives and use various system
monitoring data sources to score them. The introduced reasoning engine is designed to
determine whether a system is actually compromised. Statements written in the logic
programming language Prolog [61] describe the rules and aim to emulate the reasoning
process of a human administrator. ˛Tags: G{prediction, detection}; T{host intrusion};
I{system/app logs, network traffic, event traces}; D{-}; A{-}; K{no}; S{denotational};
APT{3-7: general approach}.
Kumar and Spafford [170] take a step back and present a pattern matching model
for misuse intrusion detection, which is not based on the premise that intrusive activity
always manifests as an abnormality. Instead, misuse detection uses knowledge about
attacks such as known exploits as well as patterns and monitors the system for the
occurrence of these patterns. The approach proposed in their paper defines the patterns
as state transition graphs that are an adaptation of Colored Petri Nets [142]. Start and
final states as well as the paths in between are matched by the net. Like most pattern-
based approaches, Kumar’s system only looks for known behavior. ˛Tags: G{detection};
T{host intrusion}; I{-}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4,5,7:
general approach}.
Andersson et al. [13] focus on code injection that can be mapped to DLL injection
attacks. Their framework uses process tracing and DLL hooking based on the Microsoft
Detours library: Potentially executable instructions are identified through Snort [56]
and Fnord [44] and are sent to a monitored environment where they are dynamically
scanned for shellcode. Two methods were employed by the authors: NOP detection
similar to [53], and executable code identification. Andersson’s framework is an example
for how suspicious traffic data can be automatically forwarded by an IDS to a dynamic
host-based analysis tool. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{host intrusion}; I{network
traffic, event traces}; D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{4-7: partial
host and network activity}.
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2.5.2 Network Domain
Network-based approaches primarily include generic network-based intrusion detection
systems (NIDS), specific attack detection systems, traffic flow analysis solutions as well
as detection systems for malicious web traffic.
Although usually classified as NIDS (see above), network traffic analysis systems
deserve special attention. They come in two distinct flavors [295]: Packet inspectors
that analyze the payload of certain (or all) packets, and flow-based detection systems.
The latter focus on communication patterns instead of individual packets. Such patterns
typically include source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, timestamps and
transmission duration, as well as the amount of data and number of packets sent.
Flow monitoring systems like compatible IOS routers usually export Netflow [55] or
IPFIX [313] records and transmit them to a central node for analysis.
Detailed packet inspection requires significant processing capacities and may cause
slowdowns on even the most powerful networks. For this reason, many solutions focus
primarily on header information and analyze only specific packets such as HTTP re-
quests and responses relevant for malicious web traffic detection. Flow-based systems
are generally faster but ignore packet payloads. In addition, they are reliant on external
analysis systems that amalgamate and interpret the collected data.
Both approaches may utilize pattern- and anomaly-based detection (see HIDS
above). For example, a large number of SSH connections to a specific destination
IP address could match the pattern of a brute-force attack. Significant amounts of data
sent during the out-of-hours period, on the other hand, could constitute a data leakage
anomaly.
A growing number of data providers use flow-based detection to complement clas-
sical packet inspection. It is often used to identify Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and
other suspicious communication patterns. Packet scanning, on the other hand, aims
at finding potentially malicious payload data. This makes it the direct equivalent to
signature-based malware detection.
Many network-based systems use publicly available datasets to test the capabilities
of an NIDS. Examples include the 2000 DARPA set [218] and KDD 1999 [318]. On
the payload side, ADMmutate and the Clet engine [148] are often used to generate
(polymorphic) shellcode.
Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
General NIDS are represented in a large number of papers and products. Several of
those include a semantic component. While commercial solutions are exempt as per the
criteria defined in Section 2.3, there are a number of established (open-source) NIDS/IPS
that need to be mentioned. Snort [56], Suricata [103], and Zeek [242] (formerly Bro) are
among the best known projects in the security community and are utilized by some of
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the solutions discussed in this chapter. Feature lists and in-depth comparisons can be
found in the literature [42, 210, 241, 311, 340] and will not be reiterated here. Summed
up, these products primarily offer pattern-based detection that sometimes extends to
more complex rules that describe specific attacks1.
Abdoli and Kahani [1] describe a distributed IDS that can extract semantic rela-
tions between attacks using an ontology based on the Semantic Web [328], a collection
of W3C formats for data exchange. Like similar solutions [132, 50], they utilize Pro-
tégé [296] for ontology design and SPARQL [327] for querying. Their system uses
Java-based JENA [16] agents to collect IPs, ports, protocols, and connection status in-
formation. A dedicated master node interprets the data and attempts to find indicators
for embedded malware, buffer overflows, password attacks, or ongoing DoS activity.
˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware, host intrusion, network intrusion}; I{network traf-
fic}; D{pattern, ontology}; A{attribute, contextual}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{1,3-7:
network activity with payload detection}.
Many papers are based on or inspired by Christodorescu et al.’s work ([53], see
‘Static malware detection and analysis): In [275], the authors describe two sliding-
window-based schemes used to automatically generate malware signatures: a fixed-size
scheme and a more flexible variable length scheme which stops at certain, pre-defined
patterns. In combination, they augment Christodorescu’s approach with a traffic classi-
fier and a binary detection and extraction module capturing polymorphic shellcode.
Like a part of Andersson’s less successful host-based approach [13], their work fo-
cuses on the presence of ‘no operation’ (NOP) and NOP-like instructions. ˛Tags:
G{correlation, detection}; T{malware, host intrusion, network intrusion}; I{network
traffic}; D{pattern}; A{attribute, contextual}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{3,4,6: network
activity with payload detection}.
Hirono et al. [128] present another, more architecture-centered approach. They
propose a distributed IDS that uses a transparent proxy able to analyze internal net-
work traffic in an isolated environment. The system primarily uses signature-based
detection to identify malware propagation, spamming, or DoS attacks. Suspicious bina-
ries are automatically extracted and forwarded to a dynamic malware analysis sandbox.
The decision whether a sample is suspicious is made by Snort [56] complemented by
an off-the-shelf virus scanner. Similarly, Andersson [13] uses the Snort IDS for initial
decision-making. Unlike Andersson and Scheirer [275], Hirono et al. do not attemt to
identify shellcode but rather focus on the extraction and analysis process of the flagged
binaries. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{malware, host intrusion, network intru-
sion}; I{network traffic, event traces}; D{pattern}; A{attribute}; K{no}; S{aware};
APT{3,7: network activity with normal malware scan}.
Correlation of intrusion events is a vital part of most multi-agent IDS systems.
Chien et al. [52] introduce a primitive-attack (PA)-based correlation framework able
to detect multi-stage attacks. IDS alerts from various tools such as Snort [56] are ex-
1https://www.snort.org/rules_explanation
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tracted, stored and evaluated. Through time window correlation complemented by port
and IP matching, the system is able to identify e.g. network scans and denial of service
attacks. The authors construct attack templates, mapping abstracted goals to specific
attacker actions such as reconnaissance, penetration, and other unauthorized activ-
ity. ˛Tags: G{correlation, detection}; T{network intrusion}; I{alerts}; D{ontology};
A{contextual}; K{no}; S{axiomatic}; APT{1,3,6,7: partial network activity}.
Zhu and Ghorbani [358] present an alert correlation technique that also consid-
ers attacker strategies. Their classification encompasses a neural network as well as
a support-vector machine (SVM) [64] approach. Their system suggests relationship
of alerts: For example, consequences of one event are mapped to the prerequisites of
another in order to construct scenarios that consider both correlation strength and
probability. In addition to IP similarities and matching ports, the frequency of alerts is
assessed. In the end, an attack graph is generated from the extracted attacker strate-
gies. ˛Tags: G{prediction, intelligence, correlation, detection}; T{network intrusion};
I{alerts}; D{similarity, ontology}; A{contextual}; K{yes: supervised learning, SVM
and neural network classification, behavior graph extraction}; S{aware}; APT{1,3,6:
network activity}.
A more recent paper by AlEroud and Karabatis [7] (also see [125]) presents a
layered attack detection system that utilizes semantics and context through a seman-
tic network describing relationships between attacks. Their approach uses Conditional
Entropy Theory – the uncertainty of one event given another [285] – to create attack
context profiles that filter out non-relevant events. In addition, the Anderberg similarity
coefficient measure [82] is used to detect similarities in binary network data. For exam-
ple, the ‘host context’ profile considers type, vulnerabilities, operating system, applica-
tions, and services when filtering. ˛Tags: G{prediction, correlation, detection}; T{host
intrusion, network intrusion}; I{network traffic}; D{ontology}; A{contextual}; K{yes:
supervised learning, Bayesian classification, semantic network extraction}; S{aware};
APT{1,3-7: general approach}.
Traffic Flow Analysis Solutions
Flow-based approaches are increasingly used to detect network attacks. Sperotto et
al. [295] offer a good overview of traffic flow IDS systems. Over the years, a number of
different solutions have been proposed:
Münz and Carle [232] present TOPAS, a traffic flow and packet analysis system
compatible with Cisco NetFlow and IPFIX. TOPAS provides a framework for user-
defined detection modules operating in real-time. The data used is netflow-specific in
nature: Source and destination IP addresses/ports as well as protocols are considered.
The system’s detection algorithm encompasses threshold-based detection via pre-defined
values that need to be exceeded, principal component classifiers (PCC) to detect anoma-
lies in multivariate time series, outlier detection through the comparison of a sample to
previously learned, normal behavior, and rule learning through a classification extracted
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from these “good” and “evil” training sets. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{network
intrusion}; I{network traffic}; D{anomaly, pattern}; A{contextual}; K{yes: supervised
learning, outlier classification}; S{aware}; APT{1,6: network flows}.
Vance’s work [322] is one of the few approaches that focus directly on APTs: He
describes a flow-based monitoring system that uses statistical analysis of captured net-
work traffic data to detect anomalies. He uses change detection through sketch-based
measurement [165] to identify flows that hint at command & control traffic, data min-
ing, or exfiltration activities. Volume, timing, and packet size are of primary interest;
the respective baseline and subsequent analysis consider packet and traffic throughput,
number of concurrent flows, TCP/IP SYN and RST packets, flow duration, and the cur-
rent time. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, detection}; T{network intrusion}; I{network traffic};
D{anomaly}; A{contextual}; K{yes: change classification}; S{aware}; APT{6: specific
network flows}.
Another example of flow-based intrusion detection is described in [8]: The authors’
approach utilizes probabilistic semantic link networks (SLN) synonymous to graphs us-
ing similarity values to describe node connections. The target’s IP address, time and
duration of communication, as well as various other features such as protocols and
flags are mined from network traffic and the corresponding flows. Common character-
istics are translated into link weight between the respective nodes of the graph. ˛Tags:
G{prediction, intelligence, correlation, detection}; T{host and network intrusion};
I{system logs, app logs, network traffic, alerts}; D{similarity}; A{contextual}; K{yes:
decision tree classification, semantic network extraction}; S{axiomatic}; APT{1,3,6:
general approach}.
Web Traffic Detection and Analysis Systems
Web service attacks are often part of the reconnaissance stages of a targeted attack or
aim to publicly disclose sensitive information. More often than not, business-critical
infrastructure can be accessed through exposed web portals that allow privileged users
to monitor or configure backend systems. Because of their high visibility, web servers
are also frequent targets of defacement attacks. For these reasons, a number of security
solutions focus on the detection of malicious HTTP traffic:
Razzaq et al. [257] describe a system able to detect and classify web applica-
tion attacks. Threats are specified through semantic rules that establish the context:
Both attack consequences and common application properties such as protocol use are
evaluated. The system analyzes the user part of an HTTP request (header, message)
to detect authentication bypass attacks, DoS, probing, cookie stealing attacks, and
more. The authors developed an ontological model (see also [256]) using a description
logic based on OWL [209] and validated through OntoClean [121]. The inference rules
were implemented using the Apache JENA framework [16]. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, cor-
relation, detection, analysis}; T{network intrusion}; I{network traffic}; D{ontology};
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A{contextual}; K{yes: deductive learning}; S{axiomatic}; APT{1,3,6,7: specific net-
work traffic}.
Earlier work of Razzaq et al. [255] describes another interesting semantic approach.
The authors introduce an application-level IDS using a Bayesian filter to find malicious
scripts in HTTP protocol traffic. URL, parameters, cookies, etc. are considered. This
‘spam filter’ assigns values to specific keywords and generates a score. Potential at-
tacks are matched with attack descriptions stored in an external database. ˛Tags:
G{detection}; T{network intrusion}; I{network traffic}; D{ontology}; A{contextual};
K{yes: deductive learning, Bayesian classification}; S{aware}; APT{3,6: specific net-
work traffic}.
Another semantic intrusion detection system is presented by Sangeetha and
Vaidehi [76]. It defines malicious behavior as rules that consider source, frequency of
occurrence, and parts of the HTTP packet content. Rules are represented as BNF gram-
mar [96]. Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping [163] is used for attack prediction. The authors’ traf-
fic sniffer and interpreter system was implemented as part of a client-server infrastruc-
ture. ˛Tags: G{prediction, detection, analysis}; T{network intrusion}; I{network traf-
fic}; D{pattern, similarity}; A{contextual}; K{no}; S{aware, denotational}; APT{3,6:
specific network traffic}.
SpuNge [22] is a system explicitly designed to detect targeted attacks through
behavior clustering (similar behavior with respect to malicious resources used) and lo-
cation/industry correlation. The analysis focus lies on URLs – its framework is able
to detect machines that are part of the same attack. This is achieved through hi-
erarchical clustering and string similarity measurement utilizing the Levenshtein dis-
tance [177]. SpuNge determines host distance (hostname similarity) and request dis-
tance (request path similarity) and groups the processed requests accordingly. ˛Tags:
G{intelligence, correlation, detection}; T{host and network intrusion}; I{network
traffic}; D{similarity}; A{contextual}; K{yes: hierarchical clustering}; S{aware};
APT{1,3,6: specific network traffic}.
Thakar et al. [306] also focus on the analysis and extraction of traffic patterns.
Unlike SpuNge, their work revolves around the extraction of signatures that can later
be used by an IDS. Specifically, the authors log SOAP [326] traffic and extract informa-
tion such as client identifiers, IP addresses, ports, and certain strings in HTTP requests
and response packets. The data is then clustered using an SVM-based classifier [64].
Extraction and analysis utilizes the Longest Common Substring (LCS) algorithm [18].
˛Tags: G{intelligence, analysis}; T{network intrusion}; I{network traffic}; D{pattern};
A{attribute}; K{yes: SVM-based classification}; S{aware}; APT{1,3,6: specific net-
work traffic}.
Zarras et al. [352] introduce BotHound, a detection method for malware communi-
cating over HTTP. The system automatically generates models for benign and malicious
requests and classifies new traffic in real-time. The primary goal is to discover bot traffic
and C2 communication through suspicious header chains (sequences of HTTP headers)
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and HTTP templates that encompass content data such as IP addresses, ports, trans-
ported file types, and more. Like in [22], string similarity is measured using the Leven-
shtein distance [177]. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{malware}; I{network traffic}; D{pattern,
similarity}; A{attribute, behavioral}; K{yes: supervised learning}; S{aware}; APT{6,7:
specific network traffic}.
Attack-specific Approaches
There are a number of network attack detection systems that focus on a specific type of
threat. Because of their prominence, (distributed) Denial of Service (D/DoS) attacks
are of special interest. One such solution is introduced by Gamer et al. [110]. Their
proposed attack detection system is placed on routers and focuses on DDoS attacks and
malware propagation. Network traffic is sampled and then refined in several stages:
At the first level of granularity, Gamer’s approach only considers the overall number
of packets and attempts to find anomalous changes in volume. Level two differenti-
ates DDoS from worm propagation by analyzing target subnets. Protocol anomalies
hinting at a specific attack are detected in stage three. This e.g. includes the anoma-
lous ratio between incoming and outgoing packets that typically accompanies a DDoS
attack. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{network intrusion}; I{network traffic}; D{anomaly};
A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{3,7: specific network traffic}.
‘Vanguard’ [197] is a detection system addressing low-rate and random-interval DoS
attacks. Luo at al.’s approach is formal in nature: They propose a detection scheme
for polymorphic DoS attacks that registers anomalies in TCP traffic. The decision is
primarily based the ratio between incoming data and outgoing ACK packets. Vanguard
has been implemented as Snort [56] preprocessor plug-in, presenting a more specific
and better tested approach than Gamer’s model [110]. However, its narrow focus on
low-rate DoS attacks limits its use; the applicability of the algorithm to other types of
DoS attacks has not yet been explored. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{network intrusion};
I{network traffic}; D{anomaly}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware}; APT{3,7: specific
network traffic}.
On the ontology side, the system by Ansarinia et al. [15] provides an interesting take
on the detection of DDoS attacks. The authors model prerequisites and consequences
(e.g. unwanted disclosure) of such attacks and automatically generate an attack ontology
based on Mitre’s CAPEC [219], CWE [222], and CVE [221] threat information. Events
and IDS logs are combined and converted to a single format: CEE [220]. In the end, it is
possible to ontologically describe how a vulnerability is comprised of certain weaknesses
and how exploiting them leads to a successful attack. ˛Tags: G{detection}; T{network
intrusion}; I{threat info, alerts}; D{pattern, ontology}; A{contextual}; K{yes: deduc-
tive learning}; S{denotational, axiomatic}; APT{1,3,6: general approach}.
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2.5.3 Multi-Source Domain
Multi-source approaches typically focus on data fusion and event correlation. The pri-
mary categories within this domain are SIEM-like solutions and log correlation systems:
Logs are record files created by a wide range of devices and applications. Their
primary purpose is non-repudiation through event auditing as well as system diagnostics.
Log analysis systems retrieve log files and assess their contents. This can again be done
using pattern or anomaly detection (see IDS) and will typically yield simplified alerts or
a list of anomalous log entries. Their simple yet versatile nature makes bulk-processing
easy and feasible for a wide range of applications.
Log analysis is often used in conjunction with multi-source event fusion. Solutions
such as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems take log files
of e.g. several intrusion detection systems, traffic flow analyzers, and OS event logs to
correlate or visualize attacks. SIEM systems usually do not monitor assets on their own;
they merely process logs, alerts, and other monitoring reports generated and supplied by
other tools. Multi-source (log) analysis is the closest thing to an attack interpretation
system currently on the market.
SIEM systems and SIEM-like event fusion tools have become increasingly impor-
tant in today’s cyber-defense. SIEM development has spawned open source solutions
like OSSIM [9] as well as various commercial products. Combined with the assessment
of conventional log files, multi-source event aggregation and correlation is a promising
new approach to understanding cyber-attacks.
SIEM-like Systems
SIEM-like systems are prototypical of the multi-source domain. One of the earliest
multi-source approaches was introduced by Gorodetski et al. [116]. Their general pa-
per on multi-agent system (MAS) technology for IDS encompasses attack simulation
and intrusion detection learning. A model mapping attacker intentions to actions as
well as targets is introduced and formally described by the authors. The proposed
simulator considers network traffic data, data from the OS audit trail, system logs,
and application audit data. Combined attacks with e.g. shared source IP addresses are
detected through pattern matching on pre-processed input streams. Specific learning
algorithms are mentioned but not explained in detail. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, detec-
tion}; T{host and network intrusion}; I{system logs, app logs, network traffic, alerts};
D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{yes: supervised learning, Bayesian classification, visual-
ization}; S{aware, denotational}; APT{1,3-7: general approach, attack simulation}.
A general APT attack model following the intrusion kill chain [133] is presented
by Bhatt and Gustavsson [33]: The logging module collects security events as well as
various logs and submits them for analysis. Malware forensics is part of the framework
but not specified in detail. A dedicated intelligence module is responsible for event
correlation and searching. An experimental implementation was realized on a 5-node
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Apache Hadoop cluster and tested with constructed log files. ˛Tags: G{intelligence,
analysis}; T{malware, host and network intrusion}; I{system logs, app logs, alerts};
D{pattern}; A{behavioral}; K{no}; S{aware, denotational}; APT{3,5-7: general log
analysis approach}.
The system proposed in [205] aims to establish real-time situational awareness
through semantic event fusion to detect multi-stage attacks. Event streams from in-
trusion detection systems are correlated with pre-defined alert templates and mapped
to various categories (e.g. scan or intrusion), services (e.g. web, FTP), protocol stacks,
and consequences (e.g. DoS). Attack criticality is also modelled. Unlike Bhatt’s pri-
marily time-based approach [33], Mathew et al.’s basis for correlation are similarities
of IP addresses and semantically linked events. The authors implemented their sys-
tem using the model editor FUME [204] and the fusion engine INFERD [300] on an
emulated OSIS network [114]. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, correlation}; T{network intru-
sion}; I{system logs, app logs, alerts}; D{pattern, similarity}; A{contextual}; K{no};
S{aware}; APT{1,3,6: network activity}.
Atighetchi et al. [21] present ‘Gestalt’, a cyber-information management system
that simplifies the access to event data stored on various systems. Unlike classical SIEM
solutions, Gestalt leaves the data where it was generated. The focus lies on forensics:
the actual methods and techniques required to access the data are abstracted and de-
scribed using a new Cyber Defense Language (CDL). All information is provided via
a single interface accessible from a central management workstation – something that
is achieved through the use of the Asio tool suite [26] and the web ontology language
OWL [209]. Queries are submitted using SPARQL [327]. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, correla-
tion, response}; T{host and network intrusion}; I{system logs, app logs, network traffic,
event traces, alerts}; D{ontology}; A{contextual}; K{no}; S{denotational}; APT{1,3-
7: multi-system data correlation}.
Sadighian et al. [272] propose an alert fusion approach that incorporates public
vulnerability data (CVE, NVD) and contextual attack information such as network
configurations, host settings, application requirements, and user-specific configurations.
This data is retrieved from a dedicated configuration management system. The col-
lected information is then converted to a unified format and combined with common
IDS alerts. A pre-populated set of ontologies for alerts, context information, and vul-
nerabilities is used as basis for the subsequent decision process. Fusion rules are built
using SWRL, a language based on the OWL description logic (OWL-DL). In contrast
to other solutions, Sadighian’s system focuses on alerts collected by different sensors
but describing the same event. This potentially reduces redundant and irrelevant infor-
mation. ˛Tags: G{detection, analysis}; T{network intrusion}; I{threat info, network
traffic, alerts}; D{ontology}; A{contextual}; K{no}; S{denotational}; APT{1,3,6: net-
work activity event fusion rules}.
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Event Correlation Solutions
The second focus of multi-source data analysis is correlation. Unlike SIEM systems, the
focus here lies more on the underlying correlation algorithms and less on data generation
or management considerations. This promises high synergy potential between solutions
of the two categories.
In [109], the authors describe the application of data mining techniques to iden-
tify patterns in data. A combination of association analysis, which aims to discover
interesting relationships, and similarity-based propagation analysis is used to fuse log
events into semantic incidents. Host data, user data, and events from both the OS and
antivirus software are used as input for classification. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, correla-
tion}; T{malware, host intrusion}; I{system logs, app logs, event traces}; D{pattern,
similarity}; A{contextual}; K{yes: deductive learning}; S{aware}; APT{4,5: host event
discovery}.
Langeder [175] introduces a framework for dynamic threat recognition and com-
bines it with a proof-of-concept classification comparing Bayes, SVM, and decision trees.
Patternized rules are extracted from a training environment and include attributes such
as IP addresses, time, HTTP status and request information, ports, users, and more.
Best results were achieved with the SVM approach; however, processing performance
was only assessed for small data sets. Further domain testing is required to generi-
cally compare the various classification methods. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, correlation};
T{network intrusion}; I{app logs}; D{pattern, anomaly}; A{contextual}; K{yes: unsu-
pervised learning, SVM, decision tree, Bayesian classification}; S{aware}; APT{1,3,6:
network event classification}.
Bordering the domain of network-based correlation solutions, the work by De-
bar and Wespi [72] addresses IDS weaknesses such as event flooding, lack of context,
false alerts and lack of scalability. The authors propose an intrusion detection archi-
tecture that correlates the output of several host-based and network-based probes to
produce a condensed view of an incident. Next to the definition of conceptual and
operational requirements, an alert class hierarchy considering both target and probes
is presented: Generic information and probe status messages are combined with vic-
tim host information such as process or port details. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, correla-
tion, analysis}; T{host and network intrusion}; I{alerts}; D{-}; A{contextual}; K{no};
S{aware}; APT{3-7: host and network alert correlation}.
Strasburg et al. [301] introduce S-MAIDS, a semantic model for automated tun-
ing, correlation, and response selection in IDSs based on observable attack indicators
the authors call ‘signals’. Each signal is decomposed into a domain/characteristic such
as the high-level protocol used (e.g. TCP), a type constraint (e.g. integer), and an
value (e.g. 80). The proposed model is formalized using OWL. Cross-system correlation
was assessed using IIS log messages and the output of a Netflow-aware system. As a
reasoning-based ontology, S-MAIDS requires predefined attack responses to be present
in the knowledge base. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, correlation, response}; T{host and net-
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work intrusion}; I{app logs, network traffic}; D{-}; A{contextual}; K{no}; S{aware,
denotational}; APT{3,6: app and network event correlation}.
2.5.4 Semantic Domain
Unlike the other three categories, this section focuses solely on formal definitions and
general ontology models. Only approaches that specifically revolve around formal def-
initions, ontologies, and other semantic approaches are reviewed here. Also, this sec-
tion includes articles that cannot be clearly attributed to one of the other domains.
Semantics-aware solutions designed to support attack detection on the host or network
can be found in the respective subsections above.
A number of models and some select data providers focus on semantics-based de-
tection of cyber-attacks or malicious behavior in general. Most of the time, the term
‘semantics’ is used very loosely and only refers to the process of assigning meaning to
e.g. specific patterns of system functions or network packets. Other solutions identify
sequences of code that produce identical results.
While almost every solution discussed in this chapter can be considered semantics-
aware, this particular section focuses on semantics-based approaches per our definition
found in Section 2.2.2.
General Semantic Systems and Ontologies
Semantic systems and ontologies have found resonance with the information security
community a good while ago. Landwehr et al. [174] were among the first to define a
taxonomy of computer program security flaws. While that was not an ontology per
se, their work laid the foundation for later attack models. Raskin and Nirenburg [253]
eventually introduced a semantic approach to information security in regards to the
unification of terms and nomenclature. Today, several application-independent semantic
systems can be found in the literature:
Razzaq et al. [256] describe a general approach to ontology-based attack detection
and argue its suitability for web application security purposes. While they also propose a
domain-specific model (see [257] in the overview tables), the paper primarily introduces
general ontology engineering methodologies such as ‘Methontology’ [98]. A layered
model for ontology design is presented.
The paper by Anagnostopoulos et al. [11] is a workable example for the appli-
cation of semantics to general intrusion scenarios. The authors seek to classify and
predict attacker intentions using a Bayesian classifier and a probabilistic inference al-
gorithm. Their semantic model includes both legitimate and illegitimate actors, the
formal characterization – dubbed behavior – of the actor, activities in the form of se-
quential events, concrete commands issued, and an overall state of attack triggered
by specific commands. ˛Tags: G{prediction, intelligence}; T{host and network intru-
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sion}; I{-}; D{pattern, ontology}; A{contextual}; K{yes: deductive learning, Bayesian
classification}; S{axiomatic, denotational}; APT{3-7: general approach}.
Yan et al. [348], on the other hand, focus on the conversion of raw sensor alerts
into a machine-understandable format in order to enable easier data fusion. They adver-
tise the use of a Principal-subordinate Consequence Tagging Case Grammar (PCTCG)
that considers object, location, method, cause, ‘has object’ and ‘is part of’ rules, at-
tack stage, and attack consequence of an intrusion. Together with a 2-atom semantic
network [323], their system is able to generate attack scenario classes that can be ex-
tracted and used as detection templates for e.g. IDS systems. ˛Tags: G{intelligence};
T{host and network intrusion}; I{alerts}; D{ontology}; A{contextual}; K{yes: deduc-
tive learning, grammar-based classification, semantic network extraction}; S{axiomatic,
denotational}; APT{3-7: general approach}.
Languages and Models
There are a number of languages that form the basis for many a semantic model.
Meier [211] offers a good overview of approaches by introducing a model of attack
signatures for use on pattern detection systems. It is based on a meta-model for the
semantics of database events by Zimmer and Unland [359]. The author identifies several
types of information relevant for misuse detection: Exploit languages used to encode at-
tacker actions, event languages that represent information to be analyzed by an IDS (e.g.
HiPAC, SNOOP, NAOS, and ACOOD), detection languages used to describe signatures
(rule-based (e.g. P-BEST), state-transition-based languages (e.g. STATL, IDIOT IDS),
algebraic languages (e.g. LAMBDA, ADeLe, and Sutekh), response languages (alert
information), and report languages such as the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange
Format (IDMEF) [73].
For example, Totel et al. [312] correlate events from different IDS sources to combat
the usually high number of false positives. The authors developed ADeLe, a language
specifically tailored to describe exploits and attacks from the target’s perspective in
addition to the intrusion response. Their correlation model supports event sequences,
(non-)occurrence, recurring events, and time constraints. While ADeLe is not a data
provider or analysis system, its event correlation capabilities make it especially useful for
describing multi-stage attacks. ˛Tags: G{intelligence, response}; T{host and network
intrusion}; I{-}; D{-}; A{-}; K{no}; S{denotational}; APT{3-7: attack description
language}.
2.6 Results
In this section we investigate the general and statistical findings derived from this survey
of 60 domain articles. This includes scoring per the quality assessment introduced in
Section 2.3.4, a list papers identified as especially good fit for APT detection efforts, as
well as the full categorization (see Section 2.4) of all solutions.
44
R. Luh 2.6. RESULTS
Paper Year Paper Year Paper Year Paper Year
[72] 2001 [52] 2007 [108] 2010 [7] 2013
[116] 2003 [232] 2007 [132] 2010 [22] 2013
[347] 2004 [356] 2008 [37] 2010 [272] 2013
[312] 2004 [54] 2008 [76] 2010 [301] 2013
[349] 2004 [238] 2008 [205] 2010 [257] 2014
[13] 2005 [275] 2008 [106] 2010 [213] 2014
[47] 2005 [243] 2008 [120] 2011 [346] 2014
[11] 2005 [287] 2008 [141] 2011 [322] 2014
[53] 2005 [50] 2009 [79] 2012 [8] 2014
[358] 2005 [1] 2009 [334] 2012 [175] 2014
[110] 2006 [255] 2009 [171] 2012 [33] 2014
[197] 2006 [109] 2009 [66] 2012 [21] 2014
[32] 2006 [25] 2009 [15] 2012 [128] 2014
[143] 2007 [263] 2009 [199] 2012 [352] 2014
Table 2.1: Publication date breakdown
(a) Domain focus (b) General categories
Figure 2.4: Overview of paper categorization and domain
2.6.1 Findings Summary
The mean date of publication of the surveyed papers is 2009. There are two deviations
from the rule set by the publication date constraint (2003): the key papers [170] and [72]
were included for their overall contribution to the field despite their more advanced age.
See Table 2.1 for a breakdown of publication dates.
Interestingly, the focus on specific techniques changed little over the years. For
example, system event traces are still widely used as basis for threat detection and
analysis. Of the 30 papers published more recently (after 2010), 40% process system
events. This stands in contrast to a 41.7% overall ratio. The same can be observed for
a number of categories, including learning techniques. Even the use of semantics-based
approaches did not significantly increase. Shy of 57% of the post-2010 papers can be
classified as at least partially context-based; this is only slightly higher than the overall
average of 53.3%. The trend towards semantic solutions is recognizable, but not notably
so.
In contrast, 9 of the 13 top-scored (score > 7) papers that have been awarded the
highest score in APT domain applicability (Q5) were published in recent years. This
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Paper Key research Domain Score
[141] Host-side C2 traffic identification and behavior extraction through
graph mining (Jackstraws)
Host 8.5
[263] Heuristic classification of dynamically generated application traces
(Malheur)
Host 8.5
[79] Automatically created application profiles through graph-based func-
tion/parameter tracing
Host 7.0
[213] Connection discovery for actors, machines, and malware through code
semantics and function behavior (VirusBattle, BinJuice)
Host 7.0
[238] Emulation of human reasoning process to distinguish user from attacker
actions
Host 7.0
[257] Detection and classification of web app attacks by means of an onto-
logical model
Network 8.5
[352] Detection of C2 traffic through malicious and benign HTTP traffic tem-
plates (BotHound)
Network 7.5
[15] Attack ontology generation based on threat intelligence information
and event fusion
Network 7.0
[22] Behavior clustering through industry/location correlation based on
URL strings (SpuNge)
Network 7.0
[322] Flow-based traffic monitoring system capable of statistical anomaly de-
tection
Network 7.0
[21] Ontology-based data management system for central forensic data anal-
ysis (Gestalt)
Multi-
source
7.5
[116] Attacker intention modelling and traffic simulation system considering
multi-source data
Multi-
Source
7.0
[312] Event correlation through attack/exploit language describing the tar-
get’s view (ADeLe)
General 7.0
Table 2.2: Papers scoring highest for TA relevance (Q5 = 1.0; Overall > 7.0)
shows that the focus is slowly shifting towards the detection and analysis of targeted
attacks, even though many of the articles were not authored specifically with APTs in
mind. As prime examples for techniques that can more easily be transferred to this new
class of threat, these 13 papers are of special interest to answering research question R4
thanks to their determined scores. See Table 2.2 for a complete list.
In addition to particularly APT-relevant articles, highly graded works are of special
interest as well. In Table 2.3, we take a closer look at papers scored 8.0 or higher.
Because of the constraints defined in Section 2.3, all of the research has been classified
with a TA (Q5) score of at least 0.5.
Delving deeper into the individual stages of a targeted attack, we see that exploita-
tion, installation, C2, and action stages are roughly equally represented. We see 34 to
37 methodologies that directly or indirectly contribute to phases 4-7. The reason can
be found in the nature of common malware: A larger number of malicious software vari-
ants include functionality that is comparable to the operations implied by the APT kill
chain seen in Figure 2.1. Initial (exploit) code execution, installation activity, remote
communication and payload execution is not necessarily unique to targeted attacks and
can be spotted by a wide range of tools that consider host or network activity.
The delivery phase (3) is in the scope of 50% of the surveyed papers. However,
as delivery may include common e-mail communication and local device activity, most
of the solutions only indirectly consider it – more focused work specifically targeting
delivery actions is still rare.
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Paper Key research Domain Score
[53] Static malware detection algorithm incorporating semantics and de-
picted as control-flow graphs
Host 8.5
[141] Host-side C2 traffic identification and behavior extraction through
graph mining (Jackstraws)
Host 8.5
[263] Heuristic classification of dynamically generated application traces
(Malheur)
Host 8.5
[54][106] Malware classification and behavior extraction through dependence
graphs (MiniMal, Holmes)
Host 8.0
[166] Host-based function anomaly detection system with added context Host 8.0
[346] Data flow graphs depicting execution flow of various objects (DAVAST) Host 8.0
[257] Detection and classification of web application attacks through onto-
logical model
Network 8.5
Table 2.3: Papers with the highest overall score (Overall > 8.0)
Reconnaissance (phase 1) is covered by 15 solutions, most of which are capable
of analyzing web traffic that could yield insight into suspicious scanning activity or
targeted information mining from publicly accessible resources. Stage 2 (weaponization)
is currently not in the scope at all, as it takes place solely on the attacker’s systems.
Here, alternative approaches such as active intelligence into code reuse or post-attack
attribution need to be investigated.
Taking a closer look at the distinctive semantic categories defined in Section 2.2.2,
we most often see semantics-aware solutions (44 papers). This is followed by solu-
tions that include formal denotations of languages or rules (denotational semantics, 14
papers). Axiomatic and operational semantics are still rarely used (6 and 4 papers,
respectively).
In Section 2.7, we discuss the implications of these findings and present a model of
a workable APT detection system based on key components identified in the surveyed
literature.
2.6.2 Statistics
Primary domain (see ‘General categorization’) is a unique property used for initial cat-
egorization. Each article can be assigned a single domain. Of the 60 papers surveyed,
30 present a host-based solution, 20 focus on the network, 7 describe multi-source ap-
proaches, and only 3 could not be classified or were independent of a specific application.
Contributions most often encompass methods or models and a (prototypical) tool
or system (39 papers each). 19 papers introduce a formalism or language while 15
papers revolve around a more general framework. See Figure 2.4 for a breakdown chart
and Table 2.4 for a full overview.
The goals of the respective solutions noticeably lean towards threat detection:
42 papers discuss approaches specifically aimed at detecting attacks or spotting attack
indicators. Threat intelligence or classification components could be found in 26 articles.
The actual analysis of a threat – done usually to determine its nature or goal – is an
integral part of 19 papers, followed by 14 works that also consider threat correlation or
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event fusion. Only 6 solutions attempt to predict threats, and not a single one focuses
on preventive measures. Threat response is also rarely found: only three articles claim
to support follow-up activities to a previously detected attack.
In contrast to the diverse goals of the surveyed approaches, the type of threats
combated is almost evenly distributed between malware (31 papers), host intrusions (28
papers), and network intrusions (27 papers). This shows that countering each means
of attack is considered equally important by the research community. See Table 2.4 for
details.
Data collection is distinctively dominated by dynamic methods. 51 papers describe
dynamic techniques to acquire input data. While data gathering capabilities do not
necessarily mean that the solution records information by itself, a large number of
solutions (47 papers) do in fact include monitoring functionality or at least a means to
directly import results from integrated tools.
Static retrieval is used by 5 solutions, whereas 5 approaches do not collect data at
all. 23 solutions dynamically monitor functions that are often logged as event traces.
In contrast, 21 approaches sniff, record, or interpret network packets. Conventional
logging is used in 8 cases. Code, disk, and memory monitoring are used least often
– only three to four systems directly observe respective activities. In terms of type,
capabilities mostly correspond to the approach identified above: We most often see
system event traces (25 papers) and network traffic (23 papers). External alerts (11
papers), system and application logs (7 and 9 papers, respectively), and direct binary
(raw) data input (11 papers) are used less often. General threat information is only
collected in 2 cases.
Flow functionality is usually found in network-domain articles. Of the 47 papers
that monitor information, 8 utilize data flow processing.
With the exception of emulation (7 papers), monitoring environments almost
equally encompass native (17) and VM (14) systems. Interestingly, 14 papers do not
specify a particular environment. The reason can be found in the nature of the works –
many solutions are not yet part of an operational system but only roughly sketch a pro-
posed functionality. Also, there exist a number platform-independent implementations.
See Table 2.5 for details.
A total of 56 papers describe either analysis or detection functions – or both.
Similar to data gathering, detection also leans towards dynamic techniques were the
attack or sample under scrutiny is executed on an isolated system or is let loose in a
testing network. More often than not, this analysis environment is also the one that
monitors abovementioned data.
Pattern-based systems are most common (24 papers). Anomaly detection is used
in 13 cases. This is only surpassed by ontologies – 15 solutions use various ontology
models, languages, and tools to describe and detect a multitude of threats. Since this
chapter expressively focuses on at least semantics-aware approaches, this number is not
surprising. In accordance, distinctively semantics-based or context-aware solutions are
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Figure 2.5: QA and overall scores for each surveyed paper.
described in over 50% of the papers. Less formal behavioral approaches (26 papers) are
almost as common. At the same time the trend shows that attribute-based detection is
on the decline (9 papers). This mirrors the opinion of many researchers that signature-
based detection found for example in AV software is slowly becoming obsolete [230, 254,
198, 38].
On the processing side, on-demand analysis (28 papers) on either the local system
(23 papers) or a central server (29 papers) is most widely used. Still, a total of 11 works
claim to have achieved real-time processing. See Table 2.6 for details.
Knowledge generation is part of 32 of the surveyed solutions. Supervised learning
is most widely used (14 papers), followed by deductive learning (7) and unsupervised
approaches (2 papers). The specific methods used are diverse and do not lean towards
one specific approach. Bayes-based systems are slightly more common than e.g. outlier
or change detection (5 vs. 1 paper). On the extraction side, we most often see behavior
graphs. Only five solutions offer post-analysis visualization. Part of the reason is the
explicit exclusion of pure visualization systems. See Table 2.7 for a list of papers with
knowledge generation capabilities.
2.6.3 Scores
Quality assessment was conducted through scores ranging from 0 to 10. The average
score awarded to the reviewed papers is 6.94. Eight of the articles received an excellent
score of 8 points or higher, while 38 papers were given a solid 7-point or above rating.
Interestingly, the QA average (3.59 of 5) is slightly higher than the average expert rating
(3.35).
In direct response to the QA questions, we have calculated average scores and
assessed the number of papers that achieved the maximum score of 1 point for the
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respective category (see Figure 2.5). It stands to notice that the attack domain (Q2)
was usually well defined. 44 papers were given the full point; the average score was
close to 0.87. In contrast, the definition and explanation of the type of operational data
(Q4) used by the solutions was often found lacking. Only ten papers received the full
score, resulting in an average grade of only 0.56. In regards to targeted attacks, 15
papers were found to be especially well-suited for APT defense-related objectives. See
Figure 2.5 for a full score breakdown of all reviewed papers and Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for
top picks.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Research Questions
In this study, we have addressed 4 specific research questions that are now evaluated in
this section. The overarching goal of the survey was to provide an overview of approaches
and methods that could be employed to strengthen an organization’s defense against
advanced persistent threats and targeted attacks in general. Effective solutions tailored
to the APT realm are very rare, presenting researchers with ample opportunity to
develop specialized solutions that transport conventional cyber-defense mechanisms to
this new threat domain.
In answer to R1 (“Which models, frameworks, formal definitions, and tools exist to
describe information system attacks?”), we have identified various models, frameworks,
formal definitions, and tools that describe information system attacks. The solutions
and techniques they employ can serve as foundation for the design or technical imple-
mentation of a system capable of identifying targeted attacks at various levels: the host,
the network, or a custom combination thereof. Armed with this knowledge, future re-
search can be focused and prioritized in accordance to the user’s specific needs in terms
of data formats, specific approaches to gathering and monitoring as well as knowledge
generation capabilities. A detailed evaluation and overview of all reviewed solutions can
be found in Section 2.6.
In response to R2 (“Which semantics-aware and semantics-based tools and tech-
niques exist to detect and evaluate attacks?”), we have highlighted solutions that use a
semantic approach to perform their primary task. Semantics-aware tools are of signifi-
cant interest when they establish attack context (see also contextual analysis technique
in Table 2.6) and thereby enable research into the still problematic differentiation be-
tween common and targeted attacks. Semantics-based approaches offer additional in-
sight and are often able to link actors and assets with a specific attack action. Enabled
by the semantic categorization introduced in Section 2.2.2, we have highlighted solutions
that focus on execution correctness/state transition, correlation through rules or I/O
inference, as well as denotational approaches. This can help to e.g. better understand
attacks and their consequences, identify high-level goals, or determine existing flaws in
the defender’s security design or implementation.
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Techniques useful to analyzing targeted attacks are identified through their Q5
score as well as their APT stage affinity tag. This addresses research question R3
(“What are promising approaches to APT detection and how can they be classified?”)
by highlighting solutions deemed promising for APT/ATA detection and analysis. With
semantics-based methodologies in the minority, there is still room for improvement in the
areas of formalization as well as axiomatic and operational semantics. Next to awareness
of meaning, knowledge generation was determined to be of utmost importance. Many
papers offer functionality enabling the extraction of certain behavioral particularities
that support the process of learning typical APT activity.
In accordance to R4, we determined which information is actually most helpful
to the general task of detecting and understanding APTs by seeking to encompass all
primary categories (see 2.4. In combination with the aforementioned APT stage tags,
it becomes possible to maximize the scope through diversity of approach. With the aim
to put together a system design checklist for a successful holistic defense strategy (see
Table 2.8 for details), we infer that:
• The highest possible number of primary goals (G) should to be considered for
maximum breadth of defense;
• Every threat type T needs to be countered as they are all part of a typical ATA;
• Each data input type I should be taken into consideration for a complete view on
the system and its neighboring network infrastructure;
• Detection methods D and analysis techniques A need to be diverse to maximize
obfuscation and evasion resilience;
• Knowledge generation K should be part of at least one solution per threat type
so that the defender does not only detect, but also learn from adversary action on
both host and network level;
• Each APT stage per Hutchins’ model [133], possibly excluding weaponization,
should be covered.
This can either be achieved through a combination of approaches – ultimately
requiring correlation – or by utilizing a system general enough to be flexible in its
application. The necessary information to assemble such a defense framework can be
extracted from the reviewed and scored papers and is further detailed in the subsection
below. We focus specifically on the kind of information required to identify targeted
attacks and show how a system considering most of the APT stages as well as a diverse
range of data collection and analysis methods could look like. To this end, we conceptu-
alized the approach starting from the choice of data provider (data collection approach
as summarized in Table 2.5) up to the correlation and interpretation of events. The
resulting roadmap is intended to assist further research into applied APT defense and
other domain-aware countermeasures.
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2.7.2 APT Defense Framework
The approaches discussed in this study can be used to assemble a model of a system
capable of dealing with a variety of targeted attack scenarios. While other defense
mechanisms only return isolated events or counter single attacks, a holistic system
would interpret the collected information and come to a more detailed verdict. Each
satisfied item in our checklist would increase the confidence in the result.
The following roadmap details a suggested design process for a conceptual APT
defense system based on the solutions reviewed in this survey. Please keep in mind that
a concrete technical implementation (AIDIS) is discussed in later chapters, in particular
Chapter 7.
We differentiate the following stages: Threat definition and modeling, formalization
and ontology building, as well as data provider selection.
Threat Definition and Modeling
Prior to implementation, the defending organization will have to define both assets and
threats. For threat definition, we found the model by Giuara and Wang [113] (see
Figure 2.1) and the more common cyber kill chain by Hutchins et al. [133] to be sim-
ple yet effective solutions for modeling targeted attacks. The decision of which model
to use largely depends on personal preference and data exchange requirements: While
the cyber kill chain model considers command and control activity and weaponization
as separate stages, Giuara’s model is more detailed when it comes to the collection
of data. Reconnaissance, exploitation, operation, and exfiltration stages are mostly
identical, albeit named differently at times. Both models can be used in conjunction
with MITRE’s APT-enabled Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) data
exchange format [223], which was developed to represent threat information in a com-
prehensive manner.
Before existing data sources can be combined and interpreted, the defender also
needs to evaluate their own assets in order to determine likely targets. This orga-
nizational step goes hand in hand with an assessment of possible attacker goals and
methods. The resulting top-down view on a potential targeted attack is the foundation
for subsequent ontology building and goal mapping. For initial actor and asset evalua-
tion, we propose the use of goal modeling techniques: KAOS [259], GRL [319], and the
i* Strategic Dependency (SD) model [92] are promising candidates for implementation.
Subsequent technical solutions will want to add reasoning to the mix – this is where
ontologies come into play.
Formalization and Ontology Building
Ontologies were identified as a promising way of approaching the challenge of formalizing
threats and threat responses in a semantics-aware manner. Evaluating the top results
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shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we can see that ontologies and related semantics-based
methods are among the more highly scored solutions [213, 238, 256, 15, 21].
The information security community has only in recent years begun to truly em-
brace the concept. Originally a discipline of philosophy, ontologies in information science
have become a formal approach to describing data types, properties, and interrelation-
ships of entities within a specific domain. Their reasoning capabilities and data formats
set them apart from semantics-unaware relational databases. Depending on general
requirements and desired granularity, system designers can choose from numerous lan-
guages or systems. Data formats and languages include RDF, OWL, OWL-DL, and
SWRL, among others. In the reviewed papers, ontology building and design often relies
on established implementations like Protégé [296] or Apache JENA [16]. Queries to an
ontological system are usually written in SPARQL [327].
For an APT detection system to succeed, research will have to bridge the gap be-
tween pure formalization and event interpretation by combining various data sources
into a domain-complete attack ontology. Only then can we collect all available infor-
mation and assign it a place in the greater picture. Fox et al. [104] emphasize that an
ontology needs to be designed with a number of competency question in mind. Each
question is representative for the information the completed ontology is supposed to
answer. For designing an APT defense system, these questions would have to revolve
around data providers and specific attack activities:
• Which data providers do I need to utilize in order to be able to detect a satisfyingly
high number of targeted attack stages?
• Which data provider is able to detect which attack stage or activity?
• What are the techniques used in an activity and how do they translate to data
provider events?
• Is the current activity indicative of a targeted attack, and if yes, which?
• Who are the actors of the attack and which assets are targeted/affected?
Fused into one system and complemented by a suitable reasoning engine such as
the ones offered by various Protégé plugins [296], such an ontology would be able to
answer straightforward, natural-language questions about any hypothetical or suspected
ongoing attack. For this to work, it is necessary to fill the ontology with detailed
knowledge of the attacks and assets identified in design stage 1. Only then can we move
on to the selection and implementation of data providers.
Data Provider Selection
Once the APT ontology has been defined and supplied with the necessary knowledge
as well as inference rules, we can begin to link each attack stage or activity to specific
events. As argued by Hutchins et al. [133], countering the different stages of an attack
will require both analysis and detection systems. The asset owner will have to choose a
number of data providers capable of collecting both host-based as well as network-based
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information. It is prudent to employ systems that, put together, encompass as many
types of input types (see Table 2.5) as possible.
The reasons are manifold: Reconnaissance and delivery will likely involve net-
worked resources and may not even register on the host. Since different layers of an
organization’s network may be accessed or analyzed by the attacker without him ac-
tually copying or manipulating resources, the traffic passing through the LAN as well
as the implied general behavior is of particular interest. Flow-based approaches would
help identify anomalous communication patterns while suspicious web traffic could be
a sign of initial probing activities. Alerts that are harmless by themselves could be
correlated to other findings using a dedicated SIEM-like system.
Sooner or later during exploitation, installation, or action stages, the attacker will
interact with a local system. Here, host monitoring and malware detection comes into
play. Again, the defender will not have to reinvent the wheel to protect himself from
isolated malicious activity. The true challenge is registering events that do not appear
to be harmful by themselves, but might be part of a larger attack. While data collection
and correlation are well-researched, mapping individual events to a greater picture is
still a challenge. This study shows that attack semantics is a term used in many a work,
but that there is often a significant gap between promise and delivery.
Source data will also be one of the key success factors of any practical APT defense
implementation – inadequate or too low a number of data providers will make it nigh
impossible to identify attacks affecting specific or multiple targets. On the other hand,
it might not be feasible to include too many sources lest the system would experience
slowdowns or a decrease in interpretation accuracy. An effective implementation will
have to carefully consider available solutions and hand-pick a small number of providers
suited to the respective task. This survey identified monitoring and data classifica-
tion [54, 263, 257, 22, 322, 346] as well as attack description, profiling and extraction
to be a vital part of this stage of APT identification [79, 141, 312, 346]. Various detec-
tion systems spread across all the primary detection domains will help to assemble the
picture [53, 352, 322].
To further support data provider selection and to offer a simplified view on the
surveyed solutions, we introduce a design checklist based on the categorization used in
this study (see Table 2.8). Each key property has been awarded a minimum coverage
threshold (in square brackets) that should be satisfied by the chosen data providers.
Once data providers have been selected based on specific needs, the actual semantic
engine can be built around the objective of detecting, explaining, and locating targeted
attacks. Developing such a system is the main goal of this very thesis.
2.7.3 Limitations of the Literature Review
To limit the scope of the survey, the articles reviewed in this chapter have solely been
chosen using the criteria defined in Section 2.3. Additional literature catering to specific
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topics not covered by the initial search terms was usually not considered, even if certain
aspects were later identified as potentially relevant, such as solutions focusing primarily
on knowledge generation.
Note that papers published after 2015 were not considered in this literature review
due to the dissemination date of the journal article [187] corresponding to this chapter.
Additional works are discussed in the respective ‘Related Work’ sections.
2.8 Summary
The detection of advanced targeted attacks is highly interwoven with more conventional
approaches to intrusion or malware detection. In this chapter, we identified 60 articles
that introduce methods, models, frameworks, formalisms, or applied systems that could
potentially contribute to the defense against APTs and other multi-stage cyber-attacks.
With ontologies and general semantics-based approaches, an increasing number
of attack models have found their way into the field of information security. The shift
towards APT-aware solutions is noticeable, but not as pronounced as suggested by many
a title. We identified only a total of 13 papers (see Table 2.2) that could contribute
significantly to the fight against advanced attackers, while the remainder of research
mostly provides tools aimed at more common or highly specific cyber-threats. Still,
each of the reviewed articles has something unique to offer and should be considered
when developing new systems.
To simplify prioritization, the categorization introduced in this chapter provides
researchers with the means to conveniently browse for solutions best suited to mitigate
or model particular APT scenarios. This is complemented by the design concept of a
defense framework which uses input from various data sources to detect and analyze a
targeted attack. We specifically used the resulting checklist to define the requirements
and capabilities of our own APT detection system.
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3.1 Research Design
The methodology chosen to investigate our approach to targeted attack detection and
interpretation is experimental, constructive research based on large-scale data analytics
as well as top-down threat modeling. The research design follows the Design Science
Research (DSR) process by Vaishnavi and Kuechler [320], which consists of five phases:
1) Defining relevant real-world problems, 2) research into related work that attempts to
address the issues, 3) development of specific solutions offering additional value over the
current state of the art, 4) evaluation of the developed solution to determine usefulness
and applicability, followed by a 5) concluding write-up.
Research in this thesis is founded on two cornerstones: Formal modeling and threat
definition using a top-down threat–response approach, and a technical bottom-up com-
ponent focusing on knowledge generation and anomaly analysis. The reason for this
choice can be found in the thesis’ problem statements: In particular, we argue that the
interpretation (i.e. semantic annotation) of intrusion events can only be achieved when
combining data-centric research with high-level modeling efforts. Figure 3.1 summarizes
the overall approach.
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Figure 3.1: Stages of research. Both a formal and a technical approach was pursued in
this research.
3.1.1 Formal Approach
After the initial definition of the research problems to be addressed by this work as part
of DSR phase 1 (see Section 1.2), our formal approach can be divided into the following
4 stages:
1. Top-down definition of APTs and their individual stages of attack. In
order to provide a template for future threat modeling, we aim to research and
develop a universal definition of APT-class attacks by separating them into gran-
ular stages that are more likely to correspond to individual attack actions than
common high-level models.
2. Evaluation of ontological approaches and modeling languages. Current
ontologies and modeling languages are assessed to derive the requirements and
design criteria for the development of an APT model able to consider all key
aspects of a targeted attack. In addition, semantics-aware tools and methods are
surveyed, determining their suitability for APT mitigation.
3. Assessment and classification of data providers. Once APT stages and
modeling criteria have been established, data providers capable of capturing on-
system activity corresponding to the compiled threat definitions are researched.
The goal is to ascertain which classes of tools provide the necessary type and
abstraction level of information for an effective intrusion detection solution sup-
porting model-based event annotation.
4. Research into a holistic attacker–defender model. In this final stage of
the formal approach, the actual APT attack–defense model is created, enabling
analysts to enrich real-world attack data captured as part of the technical approach
with meaningful threat semantics.
These formal aspects are designed to complement the experimental, data-driven
approach introduced below.
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3.1.2 Technical Approach
While the formal approach revolves around modeling the very threats we aim to miti-
gate, the technical side explores data monitoring and processing, behavioral inference
and analysis, as well as anomaly detection and classification. Specifically, our bottom-up
effort comprises four stages:
1. Observation of actively used computer systems. As part of the initial data
monitoring process, use an agent corresponding to the previously identified data
provider classes in order to collect data from machines connected to both a local
network (LAN) and the Internet. This is followed by data processing and storage
in preparation for later anomaly detection and classification.
2. Extraction of behavioral patterns. Subsequently, we extract behavioral in-
formation from the collected data to determine the most relevant processes and
features in regards to anomaly detection. Ubiquitous processes and their interac-
tion with the operating system are prioritized as part of our efforts to reduce the
system’s reliance on identified malware samples.
3. Transparent and reversible data compression. Our research plan includes
ongoing efforts to reduce the computational requirements of expensive processing
steps. To this end, we develop a mechanism that compresses reoccurring events
and helps analysts focus on behavioral deviations.
4. White-box anomaly detection and granular classification. Finally, we
use the collected dataset as well as domain knowledge gleaned from all previous
formal and technical stages to create a system able to spot attacks and classify
them in accordance to their attack stage or pattern. In combination, our research
is designed to provide the means of mapping specific monitoring data to a model
of threat actor behavior as part of a novel semantic enrichment process.
In the following, we discuss the design principles applied to each of the conducted
(data-driven) experiments.
3.2 Experiment Design
This research is founded on a number of experiments that are designed to prove the effi-
cacy of the AIDIS approach. In general, each component of our system is first evaluated
as individual solution for e.g. anomaly detection or knowledge extraction. Only then is
the system assessed in its entirety. In order to be as censorious as possible we follow a
number of experiment design principles that ensure our results are representative:
• Using a unified data set across all experiments. For evaluation purposes,
we ensure that the type of data processed stays the same across all experiments.
Only the amount of information available varies throughout the project, as new
traces are generated on a regular basis. Exceptions to this rule of uniformity are
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allowed where they serve the validation of the process in question, e.g. when
different datasets may prove a component’s feasibility for alternative detection
endeavors.
• Separation of training and validation data. The validation dataset will
always differ from the traces used for training a component. We aim to use
a 50/50 distribution ratio of training and validation data, as was found to be
common practice for the systems reviewed in the literature survey.
In addition to the above principles, we decided to depict realistic, usually disad-
vantageous scenarios in regards to data selection. While this choice arguably reduces
accuracy and/or performance in many an experiment, it also minimizes overfitting and
helps represent data as it is likely to be generated in other real-world settings: None
of the tests were tailored to anything more specific than the Windows platform. As a
consequence, there is a lot of room for future optimization, since most results can be
improved by simply relaxing some of the below design restrictions:
• No data generalization beyond ID and user information. In order to
retain as much information as possible, we do not generalize directory paths,
registry keys, or IP addresses. This decision was made to ensure reproducibility
even if it negatively impacts performance. Possible generalizations for a future,
speed-optimized implementation are discussed in Section 8.2.2.
• No removal of faulty or misleading data. At the expense of overall accu-
racy we decided to refrain from removing data representing benign or malicious
processes erroneously exhibiting behavior hinting at the respective other side of
the spectrum. This includes crashing malware failing to execute its full payload,
benign processes altered by a user in an atypical fashion, or data captured from
a faulty session.
• Minimization of the data basis. To evaluate AIDIS’s feasibility, we opted to
base the initial assessment of its core component on a single process candidate
automatically determined as part of the technical approach discussed above. For
this ubiquitous process, only the first 10 seconds of activity are analyzed. The
reason for this choice is mostly practical: Firstly, the at-scale assessment of all
system processes over their entire lifetime is unlikely to be completed in close
to real-time for a large dataset. Secondly, kernel processes are not commonly
affected by malware delay mechanisms, as they only trigger when the respective
functionality (e.g. the opening of a network socket) is actually used. Therefore, we
hypothesize that observing start-up behavior is sufficient in most cases. Thirdly,
we argue that the later analysis of additional processes can only increase overall
accuracy as part of a performance trade-off. If experiment results already prove to
be satisfying for a minimal dataset, it would better affirm the system’s usefulness
than too generous a selection.
In the following we discuss the nature of the data as well as the procedures applied
to selecting, collecting, and (pre-)processing it.
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3.3 Data Selection and Collection
We evaluated a total of 10 data providers during the selection process [188]. Data
providers are tools that monitor and evaluate information collected on a host or network
device. As argued by Hutchins et al. [133], countering the different stages of an attack
will require both analysis and detection systems. An asset owner is encouraged to
choose a number of data providers capable of collecting both host-based as well as
network-based anomalies and events. It is prudent to employ systems that, in addition
to local events, encompass e.g. kernel network events, raw traffic, or traffic flows. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the reasons for this are manifold: Hostile reconnaissance and
delivery actions will likely involve networked resources and may not even register in the
filesystem.
In our research, we opted to use kernel monitoring data of moderate abstraction,
which represents a compromise between raw events or API calls and high-level alerts
based on often problematic patterns. Our final data selection comprised abstracted
process and file system activity as well as network functions invoked on the endpoint.
The instrument used for collecting the data is an unreleased monitoring agent prototype
dubbed “Sonar”, developed by IKARUS Security Software and Sonar Cyber Intelligence
in cooperation with the thesis author’s project team. It runs as part of the Windows
kernel and utilizes SSDT hooking [120, 278] to remain undetected. Sonar collects pro-
cess, thread, image load, file, registry, and network events in the form of abstracted API
and system calls. These events describe i.a. process launches or terminations, access
to local resources, or the retrieval of system configuration information. Other functions
represent the establishing of network connections or general interaction with external
resources — all of which can be considered an event in the context of a process. For
more information about events, see Section 7.4.1 below.
The collected information is pushed to a central SQL database server every few
seconds, where it can be queried and converted to both process trees and traces. Please
note that the implementation of the agent and its database is not part of this thesis.
3.4 Data Processing
To maintain chronology as well as context, each individual event captured by the Sonar
agent is time-stamped and can be linked to a specific process or thread through its
respective ID. This allows us to construct trees of individual processes as well as entire
system sessions, as discussed at length in [201].
Summed up, a process tree is a hierarchical representation of an executable and all
the activity it displays during its lifetime. We use process events as root type since the
Windows kernel provides all necessary information to associate an event to a triggering
process through its process ID (PID). This works no matter which parent is responsible;
child processes spawned via the command prompt can be linked together as can events
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Figure 3.2: Example tree of a process launched by the kernel. Processing concurrency
can cause child processes to trigger events at the same time as their parent, which
makes it important to always maintain process context through (P)PID mapping to
avoid intermixing.
induced directly from the kernel (i.e. by the SYSTEM process). Using PIDs in addition
to timestamps to construct the tree is paramount to maintain process context. Using
temporal information alone would result in events linked to wrong processes simply
because of processing concurrency/multi-tasking. See Figure 3.2 for an example process
tree.
The structure of the initially collated database of events can be described as mul-
tiple lists containing all recorded activity triggered by an arbitrary process. Each list
(stored as table) has a column containing a timestamp that serves as primary sort con-
dition. Since process events are the root type, tree building starts with the process
event table. Every process event comes with the necessary PID, parent PID (PPID),
and timestamp used to create or expand the tree. If the respective parent process is
still running when the monitoring agent captures a snapshot, all information about that
parent is readily available. However, because of PID reuse in Windows [49], new pro-
cesses may be assigned a PID that has previously belonged to another, now terminated
application. Building a process tree by using only PIDs can therefore corrupt the entire
structure if the snapshot taken by the agent coincides with an instance of PID reuse.
To avoid such collisions, start and termination times logged by Sonar for each process
are also considered when constructing the tree, serving as a de-facto consistency check.
To further reduce the risk of incorrect parent–child assignment, the monitoring
agent is typically started at system boot. This results in database entries that are
session-complete, which makes it straightforward to find the correct parent process by
simply comparing process launch times. This feature is especially vital when the analyst
wants to assess the entire system state at a given time.
Ultimately, all process trees are converted to traces in order to enable word-based
processing. The central elements for building process traces are again the IDs and
timestamps logged for each event. First, all trees are saved as text in chronologically
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Figure 3.3: Orphan events in a context-unaware trace [190]. Smart traces counter the
issue of intermixing events that belong to different processes or threads by rearranging
them into a chronology by context (here: A followed by B).
ordered lists. If a tree contains two or more process events denoting the existence of
children, a new list is created. Simply parsing it level by level would mess up the
logical order and cause “orphan” events linked to the wrong process simply because of
their timestamp, as depicted in Figure 3.3. To avoid this issue, we create a per-process
timeline that starts with the initial process event followed by all activity associated
to its PID in chronological order. A ‘process terminate’ event typically completes the
list, provided the respective application has been cleanly shut down and is no longer
running. Table 3.1 shows an example based on the tree depicted in Figure 3.2:
ProcessEvent • Start process A with PID 220
ImageLoadEvent • Load image “process.exe”
RegistryEvent • Write file “document.txt”
ProcessEvent • Start process B with PID 224
RegistryEvent • Modify registry key “HKLM/...”
ProcessEvent • Terminate process with PID 220
• ———————————————
ProcessEvent • Start process B with PID 224
ImageLoadEvent • Load image “library.dll”
NetworkEvent • Connect to IP address 1.2.3.4
... • ...
Table 3.1: Timeline of events as chronological trace ordered by process occurrence.
All AIDIS components use such “smart” traces for their pattern extraction and
anomaly detection routines. With the potentially high number of events contained in a
full session dataset, both trees and traces can grow to significant sizes. Despite the func-
tion abstraction implemented by SONAR, manually interpreting the depicted activity
becomes a daunting task. Therefore, automated solutions are necessary to process the
newly generated timelines. These solutions, combined into AIDIS, are central to this
thesis and are discussed in depth in the following chapters.
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3.5 Data Storage and Dissemination
We have created a full set of system monitoring data by observing 13 physical Windows
7 and Windows 10 machines actively used by software developers and office personnel.
Our deployed kernel monitoring agent, which was developed in concert with the afore-
mentioned company partner, logs various event types (process, thread, image load, file,
registry, and network) to a central server that houses our evaluation data. Dedicated
scripts realized in PL/SQL query the database and construct trees – or rather a tree-like
representation of an executable including all the activity it displayed during its lifetime
– as well as process-context-aware traces (sequential event lists following a per-process
chronology) that are the basis for all further processing.
All data underwent company-side pseudonymization to protect the users of the
monitored machines. Account names, host IDs, and IP addresses were replaced by
hashed values; the added salt is protected by a passphrase known only to the part-
ner company’s works council. The corresponding keys to reversing the process were
provided only when required by the evaluation process. All researchers working with
the information signed an NDA stating that the data may not be passed on to a third
party. Specifically, the thesis author agreed to not disclose any confidential informa-
tion (documents, source code, software, documentation, customer data, etc.) to third
parties, except to those who are required to access the information in order to evalu-
ate or engage in discussions concerning a business relationship with the company. The
thesis author agreed to refrain from reverse engineering, disassembling or decompiling
any prototypes, software, or other tangible objects. This primarily applies to the Sonar
monitoring agent used as main measuring instrument (data provider).
While the original data was stored on a system at the partner’s premises, a local
pseudonymized copy was provided for this research. Data querying and subsequent
processing was done on virtual machines (VMs) hosted by St. Pölten University of
Applied Sciences. User restrictions and hard drive encryption are in place to safeguard
the information. The main VM, a dedicated data mining machine with 4 virtual cores
à 2,400 MHz and a total 192 GiB of memory, is only accessible locally or through VPN.
Some smaller, pre-existing datasets were executed on local university machines with
fewer resources – these are identified in the respective ‘Evaluation’ chapters together
with the specific samples used.
All findings will be or have been disseminated to the scientific community as peer-
reviewed papers [187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 201]. Raw and processed data
that does not violate the aforementioned NDA is published alongside our findings. Pro-
totypes will be released as open source code once the project officially concludes in
March 2020. There are several follow-up projects in the pipeline that seek to continue
research into aspects of AIDIS. Commercial exploitation is planned by Austrian IT
security provider CyberTrap Software. Refer to the Conclusion (Chapter 8) for more
information about post-project dissemination.
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3.6 Summary
This thesis marries a formal attacker–defender model with applied anomaly detection
and classification through experimental research. For analysis, we use abstracted Win-
dows kernel monitoring data captured directly on the host. The key measuring instru-
ment (data provider for most subsequent tasks) used in the research is a lightweight
agent developed and deployed by our company partner. Based upon its output, we con-
struct process trees linked by their timestamp as well as their process or thread IDs. The
trees are ultimately converted to sequences (traces) of events mapped to the triggering
process for context. All data, which was harvested from active company workstations
over the course of six months, was anonymized and protected against unauthorized
access in order to safeguard possibly sensitive user information.
Each of the following four chapters details one key component of AIDIS, the threat
detection and interpretation system designed to answer the question of how advanced
targeted attacks can be accurately identified using behavioral techniques.
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4.1 Introduction
Gathering insight about ongoing attacks through the detection and analysis of suspi-
cious interaction of executable binaries with both operating system and network is key
to successful endpoint defense. While most solutions focus on pre-identified samples
of potential malware [330], we implement anomaly recognition based on ubiquitous OS
processes. To maximize the efficiency of such an approach, we first need to identify pro-
grams with a higher tendency towards exhibiting malicious behavior within the context
of a Windows user session. At the same time, a straightforward initial verdict about an
app’s activity can help prioritize future investigations and provides analysts with the
means to quickly blacklist processes that are deemed malicious.
To achieve preliminary anomaly detection and relevant process identification, we
propose a behavior-based classification solution that utilizes dynamic kernel event analy-
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sis to learn and extract information from both clean and compromisedWindows systems.
Unlike many other machine learning approaches, our classification system is not a black
box in terms of analysis and decision-making: We monitor and log kernel events that
are stored and preprocessed in a central database. These events can be understood as
abstracted system calls that describe the access, creation, modification, deletion/termi-
nation of specific processes, threads, files, libraries, registry keys, and network sockets.
From this data we construct traces that consider the general order of events without
fragmenting activity sequences that belong to the same process. The trace files are then
split into bigrams of events. We use a supervised learning approach to determine the
log likelihood ratio (LLR) of each bigram – this enables us to assign each event pair the
likelihood of it occurring in sequence, as well as determine whether it is rather seen in
infected or uncompromised software environments. Based on this ratio, a WordNet-like
sentiment dictionary of events can be compiled.
We use a highly performant pattern matching approach to compare the extracted
semantic signatures to unknown trace files, calculating an alignment score in the process.
Using this score we are able to accurately decide whether or not an ongoing system
session is affected by malware and pave the way for an even more detailed behavioral
classification. Ultimately, it becomes possible to extract processes and event types that
contribute most to the overall maliciousness of an observed system session.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In the ‘RelatedWork’ section,
we take a look at similar approaches to malware detection and analysis. In Section 4.3.1,
we describe the structure of the data generated by our kernel monitoring program and
how it can be used to build n-grams out of smart process traces. Section 4.3.4 focuses
on sentiment mining and the compilation of the dictionary and also discusses scoring.
Section 4.4 takes a closer look at the implementation of the system and evaluates our
initial results. Limitations and future work are discussed in the concluding sections.
4.2 Related Work
There are several scientific works that revolve around API or system call sequences
as basis for malware detection and intrusion. One of the seminal works by Forrest
et al. [102] describes a method for the detection of anomalies in Unix parameter-less
system calls by building a database of common sequences. Somayaji and Forrest [293]
build upon this approach to design an intrusion response system. The system of Mirza
et al. [217] uses function hooking to monitor API calls. In their current implementa-
tion, they manually flag certain calls as suspicious and export the gathered information
to a SIEM system. Miles et al. [213] focus on the interrelationship among malware
instances to discover new connections between actors: Code and API call execution
traces are compared to identify similarities. This includes websites, e-mail messages,
and PE file headers. Xu et al. [347] introduce a waypoint mechanism in the form of
markers on the execution path. This provides trustworthy control flow information for
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subsequent anomaly monitoring. Waypoints are generated through static analysis and
later imported as traps into the kernel.
Function call analysis is often used in conjecture with graph-based approaches.
Kwon and Lee [171] introduce BinGraph, a system designed to discover metamorphic
malware. It is postulated by the authors that the same API sequences occur in meta-
morphic variants of the same malware strain. Graphs matching is employed to search
identical structures in the generated traces. Another graph-based approach, DAVAST,
is described by Wüchner et al. [346]: The authors visualize trace information as quan-
titative data flow graphs where files, sockets, processes, and more are represented as
nodes while the edges depict the execution flow. Rules define normal behavior as well
as malicious activities.
In data analysis, calls or abstracted (generalized) events are often found in clus-
tering and classification applications. Trinius et al. [314] and Rieck et al. [263] describe
such an approach for malware behavior traces generated by dedicated dynamic analysis
tools. The focus lies on API and system calls as well as their arguments. The used
sandbox reports are embedded in a vector space to enable similarity assessment based
on geometry. Hierarchical clustering is then used to identify groups of malware display-
ing similar behavior. Rieck et al.’s work later became ‘Malheur’, a system capable of
rapidly processing (but not extracting) function call n-grams.
Another malware classification approach is proposed by Christodorescu et al. [54]:
The authors came up with a method to mine behavioral data from trace files of benign
and malicious samples. Both are collected during dynamic analysis and linked through
their parameters. Christodorescu et al.’s system constructs dependence graphs for later
comparison. Alazab et al. [6] combine n-gram analysis of API calls with a purely static
approach. Unpacked malware is disassembled and API calls related to certain tasks are
extracted. The most frequent function n-grams of known benign and malicious samples
are used as feature set for later training and classification.
Sentiment analysis, as proposed in this chapter, subsumes a technique pertaining
to text categorization, where the criterion of classification is the attitude (emotion)
expressed in the text, rather than the “content” or topic [111]. Sentiment is usually
extracted from natural language texts such as comments, feedback or critiques. Cat-
egorization either yields a simple positive/negative score or is expressed as an n-point
scale [250]. As demonstrated by Pang et al. [240] determining the sentiment of an
expression is not as straightforward as perhaps expected. The same holds true for a
language of abstracted function calls: Each API or system call alone can be used for
both good and ill – depending on its contextual and chronological vicinity to other
functions.
Applying a sentiment approach to OS call traces is a novel concept. However,
approaches similar to the LLR-based methodology presented in this chapter have been
explored in other areas: Gamon [111] demonstrates automatic sentiment classification
for customer feedback data. The author does not utilize semantic resources but rather
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relies on SVM-based machine learning using a number of pre-tagged texts. Another
approach by Wiebe et al. [341] replaces certain fixed-word n-grams with semantically
stronger tags. Their goal is to identify subjective language and classification of instances
in context by building upon methods like the one proposed by Hatzivassiloglou and
McKeown [124], which determines whether two adjoining adjectives share the same
alignment.
4.3 LLR-based Sentiment Extraction of Kernel Events
The extraction of sentiment, i.e. the tendency of a specific corpus of events towards
varying degrees of maliciousness, provides an initial good/bad classification that helps
identify suspicious processes, which are the basis for AIDIS’ core anomaly detection and
interpretation. In short, the approach discussed in this chapter uses supervised learning
to create a dictionary of events that can be used to score unknown OS behavior. By
extracting event pairs with the highest sentiment rating we can easily spot processes
likely related to attacker activity.
4.3.1 Data Collection
As discussed in Section 3.4, the sentiment extraction process works with event traces
collected directly on the hosts (endpoints). Event traces are typically defined as descrip-
tions of operating system kernel behavior invoked by applications and, by extension, a
legitimate or illegitimate user. More often than not, these events are abstractions of raw
system or API calls that yield information about the general behavior of a sample [330].
API calls may include wrapper functions (e.g. CreateProcess) that offer a simple in-
terface to the application programmer, or native functions (e.g. NtCreateProcess) that
represent the underlying OS or kernel support tools. In the context of our system, pro-
cess and network event data is collected directly from the Windows kernel. We employ
a driver-based monitoring agent designed to collect and forward a number of events to
a database server. This gives us unimpeded and fast access to events depicting various
OS operations [201]:
• Process events – Whenever a process is started or stopped, the monitoring
system registers a new event. Next to PID and paths, we record parent and
contextual information such as ownership data. Process events are at the heart
of our system as every other type of event is ultimately associated to a process.
• Thread events – Some events are triggered by individual threads instead of
processes. The information logged by the agent is largely similar to process events;
the main identifier for threads is the thread ID (TID).
• Image load events – Most processes load additional resources (functions) stored
in various program libraries (DLLs). The nature of a DLL can give a good indi-
cation as to which behavior the executable will exhibit during its lifetime.
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• File events – File events are logged when a file is read, created, accessed, modi-
fied, or deleted. Logging file interaction is important since processes can interact
with virtually every file stored on the disk. Attack-related file events can e.g. help
identify dropped executables or data theft.
• Registry events – Applications use the registry to save user and program set-
tings while other hives contain startup programs or file type settings. Since it
is a common target for espionage and system manipulation attacks, monitoring
registry events is critical for any Windows-based detection solution.
• Network events – Network events encompass the handling of inbound and out-
bound connections as well as the access to general OS networking resources. De-
pending on the nature of the process, network events can be used as indicator
for malicious behavior as many malware variants contact a remote system for e.g.
command & control purposes.
The relative ease of monitoring as well as the semantic expressiveness of kernel
events and network operations make these traces ideal for dynamic software and, by
extension, malware analysis as well as application classification. The system introduced
in this chapter uses this rich repository of behavioral data to compile sentiment dictio-
naries as well as graph-like star structures of event sequences that can describe not only
a single application, but a system session in its entirety. This approach is detailed in
the following subsections.
4.3.2 Preprocessing
All previously collected events are linked through their parent process in order to es-
tablish a semantic connection between action and cause. This is realized through two
attributes that are present in all the data collected by the host monitoring agent: Cre-
ation time, and the PID that forms a unique identifier for each process. Threads work
in a similar fashion. Like PIDs, thread IDs (TIDs) are appended to other event types
(e.g. registry events). Both can therefore be used to construct an event tree depicting
the flow of file system activity that helps to determine specific dependencies between
processes or general events. Concatenated into a full system graph, the sequence of
events of the monitored session can be assembled without orphan entries (depicted in
Figure 3.3) interrupting the process flow. These so-called smart traces [190, 201] are
the basis for all follow-up computation.
Further preprocessing includes the normalization of non-uniform IDs such as user
names, security identifiers, and temporary folder names. This is done to make data
more comparable across systems and to prepare the traces for anonymization.
4.3.3 Extracting Event n-Grams
N-grams are typically slices of words [45] with a length of n characters. A window
with the size of n is slid over the string, creating a list of n sequential entries. If
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applied to longer texts instead, one entry may take the shape of a word or even a
sentence. In general, the number of corresponding n-grams is a measurement for the
similarity between two strings. A Boolean feature vector for every string (where every
dimension stands for an occurring n-gram) can also be used to determine the similarity
by calculating the distance between two vectors. Even though n-grams are a fairly
simple way to match texts, they are widely used for text analysis purposes because of
their versatility and accurate representation of n-sized lists.
In this chapter we apply the n-gram approach to kernel event traces. Each event is
part of a longer sequence – be that the trace of an entire session or a single process. The
order of entries depicts dependencies or chains of events. We decided to use bigrams –
kernel event pairs that are n “ 2 in length – as the basis for later likelihood calcula-
tions. This decision was primarily based on accuracy and performance considerations:
Unigrams (n “ 1), while slightly more accurate for heuristic clustering purposes [201],
do not retain any information about their immediate neighborhood, effectively reducing
the desired dictionary to isolated terms. On the other hand, using n-grams with a size
of n ą 2 comes with the inherent risk of skewing the results without generating more
expressive sequences: A slight variation in word order would result in differing n-grams
unsuitable for describing a single event within the process context. Figure 3.3 exem-
plifies the issue: A context-unaware trace would result in n-grams that string together
events which are likely unrelated or that randomly deviate in their place in time. Smart
traces largely circumvent this problem by reordering all events into subtraces that are
connected to their successors by a single transition event.
Since we are especially interested in extracting kernel events that are chronologi-
cally adjacent, using bigrams was the sensible choice. As added benefit, calculating the
log likelihood ratio for n-grams of size n “ 2 does not require consolidation, making it
the most effective approach to tackle LLR-based challenges [84].
4.3.4 Sentiment Analysis
We use an approach akin to sentiment analysis [111] for generating initial knowledge
about relevant OS processes. We use this optional stage to determine the most ex-
pressive process candidates for later investigation. At the same time, this first stage
computes a first benign/malicious score that provides us with a tendency towards gen-
eral harmfulness for the provided dataset. This verdict can also be used as additional
feature in the final classification stage of the overall process, which is detailed in Chap-
ter 7. In the following, we highlight the main properties of the sentiment analysis
component, which has been initially disseminated in [190].
The likelihood ratio (LR) test employed here is a statistical method used to test
model assumptions, namely the quality of fit of a reference (null) and an alternative
model, whereby the simpler model can be understood as a special case of the more
complex one [84]. The test assumes that the model is known, but that its parameters
are not. The goal of a model is to find parameter values that in turn maximize the value
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A !A
B k11=kpABq k12=kp!ABq
!B k21=kpA!Bq k22=kp!A!Bq
Table 4.1: Event occurrence matrix K. The respective counts change in accordance
with the number of times an event token is observed within the bigram.
of the likelihood function, which is equivalent to finding the set of parameters that make
the data most likely [316]. The LR test also relies less on the assumption that a certain
variable (i.e. word) is distributed normally throughout a text than e.g. chi-squared or
z-score tests. When computing the occurrence of rarely observed events – which are
at the core of many a malicious trace – likelihood ratio tests show significantly better
results than the mentioned alternatives [84].
The likelihood function describes the probability that a given experimental outcome
k1, ..., kn is described by a model defined through n parameters p [228, 84]:
Lpp1, ..., pn; k1, ..., knq
Simplified into a single parameter, the likelihood function can be abbreviated as
Hpω; kq, where ω is a point in the parameter space Ω and k is a point in the space of
observations K.
Dunning [84] defines the likelihood ratio for a hypothesis as the ratio of the max-
imum value of the likelihood function over the subspace represented by the hypothesis
to the maximum value of the likelihood function over the entire parameter space, i.e.
LR “ maxωΩ0 Lpω; kq
maxωΩ Lpω; kq
where Ω is the entire parameter space and Ω0 is the hypothesis being tested.
As mentioned above, the basis for sentiment analysis are ‘smart’ kernel event traces
reordered to maintain process and thread context (see Section 4.3.2). After tokeniza-
tion, we extract bigrams (n-grams of length n “ 2) from the collected sequences. The
general goal of this stage is to find useful features in a large amount of system traces,
in particular events that occur in combination. Inspired by Dunning’s work [85], we
compute the LLR score for each individual n-gram to highlight collocations character-
istic for sequences of malicious and benign system events. This enables the analyst
to ultimately rank the words of a corpus by their domain relevance and subsequently
extract processes that are more likely to be involved in adversarial behavior.
The formulas presented in Table 4.1 (matrix K) are responsible for counting token
occurrences in the given distribution. The different values are defined as the number of
times both event tokens occur together (k11), the number of times each event token has
been observed independently from the other (k12 and k21, depending on their position
in the bigram), and the number of times the tokens were not present at all (k22).
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Once these counts have been determined, it becomes possible to compute the log
likelihood ratio (LLR) score. LLR is generally easier to work with than the normal
likelihood ratio, as results with values closer to zero describe a better fit [316]. Applied
to the assembled matrix K, LLR becomes
LLRpKq “ 2SpKq ¨
˜
HpKq ´H
˜
k11 ` k12
k21 ` k22
¸
´H
˜
k11 ` k21
k12 ` k22
¸¸
where SpKq represents the sum of all matrix elements kij in K and H denotes the
function computing the Shannon entropy [285]. I.e. given an mˆ n matrix X “ pxijq,
we have:
HpXq “
mÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
ˆ
xij
SpXq ¨ log
ˆ
xij
SpXq
˙˙
with
SpXq “
mÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
xij
Using this methodology we are able to extract a list of bigrams that represent
likely collocations. For example, the two image load events kernel32.dll and kernel-
base.dll are commonly seen together in our dataset (
?
LLR ą 200), signifying their
semantic relationship. Other pairs describe sequences of certain processes or connect
registry queries. Based on these calculations we can then determine the association of
bigrams to different corpora of known benign and malicious events.
Dictionary Compilation
With a significantly high number of known benign and malicious kernel event traces
at one’s disposal it becomes possible to use the LLR scores for sentiment extraction
and, in the process, for the compilation of a dictionary of suspect and valid events. To
satisfy the requirements of reference and alternative model, we define the malicious data
as special case of the larger, benign data set. This decision is based on observations
that, for both clean and infected systems, the (unique) number of benign events will be
greater than the number of functions used in a malicious context.
The dictionary compilation process itself is similar to the one described above. We
determine the occurrence of known malicious n-grams in a benign sample set. In addi-
tion to LLR-based scoring performed for opposing corpora, we calculate the occurrence
of partial and full malicious bigrams in the benign corpus. This results in a new LLR
score that describes the association of each bigram to both sets of data. Mapped onto
Table 4.1, we get the number of times an event token in the malicious corpus has also
occurred in the benign set (k11), has occurred partially in the form of the left or right
half of the respective n-gram (k12 and k21), and the number of times the malicious
n-gram does not occur in the benign set at all (k22).
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Based on these scores we can assign sentiment to each identified bigram determined
through the occurrence of the sequence and the maximum LLR measured for each
corpus. The result is a normalized sentiment rating s ranging from `1.0 (benign)
to ´1.0 (malicious), whereas experimentation helped set the threshold for distinctively
benign or malicious events to st “ ´0.05 for a reduced false positive rate. This approach
yielded two distinct dictionaries with characteristic event pairs.
While a key aspect of our evaluation scenario, classification is not limited to
good/bad decisions. It is similarly possible to compile dictionaries that describe certain
malware families, semantic classes of attacks or even distinct benign software activities.
The versatile nature of the process promises a number of future applications.
Sentiment Scoring
Scoring is achieved by means of both the benign and malicious scores determined
through a comparison with the sentiment dictionary compiled in the previous stage.
Unlike natural language implementations such as SentiWordNet [94], the malicious bi-
grams were not weighted from n-point to a flat score. Instead, the full range of values
was utilized.
The final score s is determined by whether the root-LLR scores of the unknown
event sequence lean toward the harmless or suspicious end of the spectrum. The calcu-
lation takes the sum of all root-LLR values observed in the dataset and divides it by
the overall maximum root-LLR value in order to derive a percentage. This is done for
both benign and malicious scores; in the end, the b-score is subtracted from the m-score
for a final s.
Since there are no inherently malicious or benign functions in an operating system,
most applications will exhibit behavior found in both domains. Still, LLR-scored se-
quence combinations have proven to be good indicators for both individual programs as
well as entire system sessions. Simultaneously, the resulting scores give us a good idea
which ubiquitous kernel processes are the most likely candidates for closer examination
with one of the more advanced AIDIS components. Concrete results of our prototype
implementation are discussed in Section 4.5.
4.4 Implementation
The utilized kernel monitoring agent (see Section 3.3 and 4.3.1) logs all the event types
to a central listener that in turn writes the events to a Postgres database server. SQL
is used to query the database and to construct the star structures that are the basis for
all further processing. Our approach is able to selectively retrieve entire system sessions
or pick out individual processes.
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The smart traces used by the sentiment component are preprocessed and converted
into matrices using Bash and Python scripts. LLR-based sentiment analysis is imple-
mented in R [251].
4.5 Evaluation
There are two parts to this component’s evaluation. First, we assessed the standalone
anomaly detection capabilities of the approach, testing the dictionary creation and scor-
ing system with both smart traces and conventional raw API call sequences used by
many other solutions. We show that the first method is by far superior in accuracy
and that the LLR component is well-suited for initial good/bad classification of event
corpora.
In the second part (Section 4.5.2), the extraction of relevant processes from a large
set of unique applications is demonstrated. We use the system to create a shortlist
of ubiquitous Windows processes that contribute most to a benign/malicious decision,
arguing that it is both reasonable and viable to base future analysis stages on these
instances alone.
4.5.1 Anomaly Detection
The current prototype of the system was implemented in a test-bed environment consist-
ing of 13 physical Windows 7 and Windows 10 computers used on and off by developers
and office personnel of a medium business. For anomaly detection, this data spanned
several weeks; process extraction conducted near the end of the project extended the
available set 6 months of monitoring data (evaluation in Section 4.5.2). The part-
ner company, a local security solutions developer, performed regular checks to ensure
that the machines in question were not affected by undesired software. Additionally to
the benign baseline (null model) dataset consisting of over 80 real-life system sessions
including over 500 processes each, an isolated machine was manually infected with nu-
merous malware samples of, but not limited to the Agobot, Beast, Blaster, Code Red,
Conficker, Koobface, Loveletter, MyDoom, Sasser, ZeroAccess, and Zeus families and
was studied over the course of 5 days. The variants used in the training stages were
not utilized in the evaluation. Ultimately, the traces generated by that lab computer
provided the alternative model dataset for our initial evaluation.
A total of 65.7 million events were recorded over that extended period of time,
700,000 of which were observed in a malicious context. Smart trace files were assembled
as part of the pre-processing phase. After optimization, this process took about 1 hour
on an Intel Core i5 4690S machine equipped with 8GB of RAM.
All further steps were conducted on an Intel i5-3210M machine utilizing 16GB
of RAM. In that configuration, bigram extraction for the test data set was almost
instantaneous. Aforementioned event files were reduced to 1.94 million benign and
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Figure 4.1: Performance analysis. The LLR process scales linearly in time.
13,000 malicious bigrams. The most resource-heavy stage – the calculation of all LLR
values necessary for the extraction of sentiment – took a reasonable 10 seconds for the
malicious corpus. The dictionary creation itself completed in 54 minutes. Please note
that the more complex dictionary compilation only needs to be performed once per
training set, while LLR processing is mandatory for each tested sample.
To demonstrate the universal applicability of the methodology as well as to compare
performance of our smart approach versus a conventional trace, we additionally collected
a large trace of raw system and API calls by monitoring the execution of benign and
malicious software on a virtual Windows XP SP3 test machine running API Monitor1.
Pre-processing removed all information other than the call name and its arguments
while also replacing volatile memory addresses with dummy values. A total of 5,000
known benign and 800 harmful applications were analyzed in 10-minute intervals and
combined to two non-smart input traces of 31 million and 45 million entries, respectively.
Bigram generation reduced them to around 1 million unique event pairs each. For this
larger dataset, LLR calculation could be completed in a mean 640 seconds, whereas the
one-time compilation of the sentiment dictionary took 42 minutes.
Performance evaluation through regression analysis shows that LLR calculation
scales linearly at t “ 5.872 ˚ 10´4n, where t is the processing time and n is the number
of bigrams extracted from a sample corpus. Considering these advantageous results, we
expect to hit the memory ceiling sooner than any bigram corpus size limit imposed by
computational complexity. See Figure 4.1 for a simple regression analysis.
Results
Smart event traces–During initial testing we extracted and scored likely n-gram
sequences and compiled a sentiment dictionary containing over 1.94 million word pairs.
Against this template we matched 83 new malicious sessions, of which 67 were correctly
classified with a high confidence score of s ą ´0.1. Another 13 samples were awarded
1http://www.rohitab.com/apimonitor
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Sample set Trace type Total True False Undecided TP/TN Accuracy
Malicious events Smart 83 80 0 3 96.4% 98.2%
Malicious API calls Conventional 295 36 103 156 49.8% 73.0%
Benign events Smart 81 81 0 0 100.0% 98.2%
Benign API calls Conventional 282 274 8 0 97.2% 73.0%
Table 4.2: Scoring results for smart event and raw function traces. Evaluating smart
traces is significantly more accurate than using unsorted API calls.
a low confidence score, while only 3 were scored as “undecided”. On the benign side, 57
of the 81 harmless sessions were correctly classified with low confidence, while 24 were
assigned a high-confidence score. None of the bigrams were incorrectly classified.
We performed a binary response ROC analysis extended by a confidence rating
for the entire set of traces and determined an overall 98.2% accuracy even when all
undecided cases are counted as low-confidence false positives. If they are discarded
instead, the accuracy rating is pushed to 100%. This makes the sentiment system no-
ticeably more precise than an earlier approach utilizing Malheur-based classifier training
performed on unigrams [201].
See Table 4.2 for a score breakdown into the respective sensitivity and specificity
values. Figure 4.2 shows the charted empirical ROC curve. Outliers with values far into
the respective benign or malicious range are especially useful for the identification of
behavior patterns, while close-to-neutral bigrams are indicative of activity inherent to
both harmful and harmless applications. See Figure 4.3 for a plot of the specific results
of both malicious and benign smart traces.
Raw function traces–Utilizing our alternative function call data set we compiled
another sentiment dictionary containing approximately 2,2 million bigrams. It quickly
becomes apparent that the approach is significantly less accurate than our new method-
ology: Of the 282 new benign function traces, 272 were correctly classified with a high
confidence score, and 2 with a low confidence score. 8 samples were incorrectly classified
as low-confidence malicious.
295 malicious function traces were matched against the dictionary as well. Of these
samples, 27 were correctly assigned a high-confidence score, while 9 were scored with
a lower confidence of s ą“ ´0.075 & s ă ´0.05. 156 samples were determined as
alignment-neutral and a total of 103 traces were incorrectly classified as benign. Com-
bined into a ROC analysis, the overall accuracy for function calls is 73.0%, considering
that 45 of the undecided cases lean towards an incorrect classification (low confidence)
whereas the remainder is counted as tendentiously correct. Table 4.2 breaks down the
scores for event and call type traces.
Discussion
It is apparent that conventional traces based on non-abstracted API and system calls
are distinctively less accurate for sentiment analysis than our adapted approach. This
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Figure 4.2: Empirical ROC curve for both trace types
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Figure 4.3: Smart trace scores mapped to decision thresholds
is due to the fact that, unlike smart traces and despite removal of memory addresses,
raw system calls contain a lot of parameter information that is unique to each execution
or a particular malware family. Bigram generation therefore results in a high number
of pairs that are not overly representative for malicious software in general. Also, raw
call data is far more vulnerable to mimicry attacks than the abstracted and combined
behavioral data we utilize in our primary approach. This stems from the nature of the
abstracted data: While it is easy to interject system calls into a strictly chronological
sequence, the same is not likely to be successful in the case of smartly reordered events
that describe actions rather than mirror them fully.
Thanks also to the fact that the introduced LLRmethodology does not overcast ma-
licious characteristics with the more numerous benign activities smart event sequences
offer a far more accurate alternative. Above results show that abstracted event traces
recorded over a longer period of time have a distinct advantage in both accuracy and
performance over short-term malware analysis recorded on a function call level.
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4.5.2 Relevant Process Identification
The identification of relevant processes happens in the optional ‘sentiment analysis’
stage of the AIDIS system (see Figure 7.2 in Chapter 7). The goal was to determine
which known Windows OS processes are more likely to be part of a bigram with a
high maliciousness score. If omitted, the selection of processes to be considered during
anomaly detection and classification has to be conducted manually. In the following,
the experiment and its results are discussed.
Results
The data investigated contained close to 2,000 unique processes (svchost.exe being
one of them) that were launched during the lifetime of more than 10,000 benign and
close to 2,000 malicious system sessions. In our benign testbed environment alone,
1,260 unique processes were observed across all workstations. Upon infection with APT
malware, the test machine interacted with a total of 876 distinctive processes. In both
cases, processes with identical names but deviating directory locations were counted
individually, as malware often reuses common application names to evade detection.
The reason for the discrepancy between total events and the lower process counts
lies in the nature of our data: Each process can trigger an arbitrary number of events
during its lifetime, which ranges from minutes to weeks, depending on the frequency
of system reboots. This is markedly pronounced for kernel processes that run for as
long as the OS is active. Ultimately, we used only a fraction of the available data for
anomaly detection to demonstrate AIDIS’ feasibility in a single-process scenario. To
get there, such a process had to be identified:
As a first step, all processes that occurred in only the benign or malicious domains
were discarded, leaving a total of 120 executed binaries that are possibly ubiquitous. The
reason for this is that with AIDIS, we want to reduce the reliance on any prior knowledge
about the name or location of malicious software, focusing our anomaly detection efforts
on omnipresent processes that will exist no matter the current state of compromise.
Additionally, we argue that not all APT attacks will utilize dropped binaries that can
be seen in the operating system; especially when campaigns involve manual intrusion
activity or techniques such as process injection. Full paths were ignored during relevant
process identification in order to make fake system services comparable to their genuine
counterparts.
In step 2, we used LLR sentiment scoring [190] to determine the likelihood of a
process occurring as part of an event bigram exhibiting malicious tendencies. With the
threshold set to st “ ´0.05 and a tolerance bandwidth of 0.1, we extracted all processes
with a mean sentiment rating of s ď 0.05. This resulted in a reduced list of 84 processes.
Next, we eliminated likely false positives that stem from the technical differences of
physical and virtual machines, such as graphics drivers or first-run wizards that were
initialized every time the virtual environment was started. With 72 processes left, it
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Process (.exe) Description ^ x rx _ σx k Events
conhost Console window host process -0.895 0.016 0.008 0.607 0.104 3,691.0
csrss Win32 user-mode subsystem -1.000 0.039 0.044 0.836 0.171 1,000.7
explorer Explorer shell and file manager -1.000 0.003 0.003 1.000 0.008 29,227.0
searchindexer Windows search and indexing -1.000 0.002 0.007 1.000 0.047 4,346.3
smss Session manager subsystem -1.000 -0.236 -0.332 1.000 0.416 6.3
svchost Generic host process -1.000 0.005 0.005 1.000 0.012 126,120.1
taskhost Generic host process for libs -1.000 0.022 0.011 0.983 0.048 1,871.7
Table 4.3: Shortlist of relevant processes identified through sentiment analysis. While
smss.exe produced the most malign numbers, the amount of process data for a mean-
ingful follow-up analysis was simply too small. We opted for the generic host process
as something of a ‘semantic worst case’ with the highest amount of data (number of
events in the database) available.
became apparent that user apps like word processors and programming environments
need to be considered separately. While there is malware in the wild that utilizes such
programs or their associated file types as injection targets or carrier medium, these
attack scenarios were deemed too specific for the initial evaluation. Any baseline created
for these processes would be highly dependent on user interaction which, in this case,
might deviate significantly from benign instance to benign instance. At the same time,
we hypothesize that even a compromised user application will eventually utilize a kernel
process to perform a portion of its adversarial task – something that was corroborated
by our tests.
With 57 processes remaining, we matched the OS-centric shortlist against two
lists1 2 of ubiquitous kernel processes found in modern versions of Windows. This yielded
a match for 7 processes that were determined to be relevant by the sentiment analysis
component. In order to perform meaningful data mining, the process with the most
recorded events (126.1 million) was chosen for all subsequent analyses: svchost.exe,
the Windows generic host (service host) process [271].
See Table 4.3 for details about the 7 primary investigation candidates. Our results
highlight that any event-based anomaly detection system might benefit from focusing
on one or several of these processes.
Discussion
The multi-purpose svchost.exe process is involved in many operating system tasks and
has existed since Windows 2000 [271], making it ideal for in-depth observation. At the
same time, it arguably represents a worst case scenario for anomaly detection systems,
as it is very difficult to create a behavioral baseline for such a versatile application. We
argue that it is unlikely to find a Windows process that will produce more questioning
results in an evaluation scenario, underlying the efficacy of AIDIS in adverse situations.
At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that future iterations of the system will
1https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/4485.windows-7-default-system-
processes.aspx
2https://www.andreafortuna.org/dfir/forensics/standard-windows-processes-a-brief-reference/
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include additional processes for reasons of diversification and accuracy, starting with
the remaining 6 processes determined to be relevant by LLR. Additional applications
such as user programs will be considered in corresponding scenarios. For example,
malware delivery (deception) detection as per the APT kill chain is more likely to focus
on processes like winword.exe and acrord32.exe while many installation, persistence,
and launch tasks can be captured by observing cmd.exe, regedit.exe, or net.exe.
Our initial evaluation focused on the generic host process because of its versatility but
also due to data availability and time constraints. Refer to Section 7.5.3 and 8.1.1 for
a closer look on computational performance.
4.6 Discussion
In the case of smart event traces it has proven difficult to find the optimal snippet size
for scoring individual sample executions. We opted to use session traces in their entirety
in order to facilitate anomaly detection and long-time activity analysis. Applying the
approach to single event chains risks skewing the result of a binary good/bad decision,
as the deviation in execution time between sentiment dictionary and analyzed sample
is simply too great.
Despite the fact that the LLR algorithm regards rare occurrences as more relevant
than tests that rely on a normal distribution of words [84], it is still possible that
significant but rare malicious events are overshadowed by a mass of benign activity. For
event traces, this issue can be countered by defining a time window for each investigation
or by limiting dictionary compilation and scoring to a particular system process or
process tree. In a raw system call context it is recommended to constrain the overall
analysis time and create individual traces per investigated application. Special care has
to be taken when regarding malware traces of unknown samples: If the sample did not
execute correctly, we will likely not see any suspicious behavior other than the OS’s
routines for handling faulty applications.
Further testing with larger, more diverse data sets is essential to fine-tune the
scoring process and to generate a truly representative dictionary for a particular problem
domain. It stands to emphasize that our take on sentiment analysis is not necessarily
confined to two-way decisions: Tiered scoring, classification by type or family, and
other, corpus-based n-gram analysis are all possible using the introduced methodology.
Independently, it will be necessary to select a wider range of malicious programs and
even conduct (targeted) attacks on the template system in order to further test its
robustness.
In terms of process and event type extraction, the introduced system promises
plenty of future applications in need of evaluation. For instance, it becomes possible to
easily collect names and paths of malicious processes responsible for triggering undesired
activity in the OS. This information can be used to supply conventional host-based IDS
with blacklists of malware and to ascertain which processes are most often mimicked by
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attackers. Furthermore, certain types of events may be more represented than others
when it comes to hostile behavior: For example, further evaluation may bring to light
that the presence of image load events is a stronger indicator of an attack than e.g.
registry reads.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a methodology for extracting a dictionary of sentiment-
rich event bigrams previously recorded at OS kernel level. Unlike similar approaches,
we consider each event’s process context while maintaining their chronological order.
Log likelihood ratio testing is used to determine behavioral cohesion and additionally
serves as the foundation for grading bigrams according to their likely maliciousness. The
resulting dictionary can be used as a template for scoring the alignment of unknown
behavioral sequences and offers a data basis for future classification and anomaly de-
tection as implemented by the AIDIS core system. In summary, this component of our
semantics-aware solution contributes by:
• Presenting a smart trace construction method that considers both chronology and
process context of abstracted kernel events;
• Introducing a bigram-based technique that determines likely collocations as well
as the maliciousness of an event sequence through its log likelihood ratio;
• Transparently compiling a WordNet-like sentiment dictionary of benign and ma-
licious kernel event pairs;
• Implementing a fast scoring approach that combines the advantages of signature-
and behavior-based detection.
During our research we compiled two dictionaries – one for our abstracted events
and another for raw system and API functions. Both are readily available for future use.
Initial scoring results are promising: We achieved an accuracy score of 98.2% (100%, if
semantic-neutral traces are discarded) for smart event traces as opposed to 73.0% for
conventional function call sequences. Especially in the malware context, our proposed
data format has proven to be far more accurate than the tested API call alternative.
Thanks to the linear increase of processing complexity, our system can furthermore
be deployed on even low-performance machines, provided that the installed amount of
RAM exceeds 16GB for a set of 1 million or more unique activity pairs.
The LLR system proved to be a suitable approach to identifying processes that are
more likely to be involved in malicious activity. Seven Windows core programs were
shortlisted, with svchost.exe the most promising candidate for continuous monitoring
thanks to its versatile role and the resulting high number of events generated during
an average system session. The graph-based system introduced in this thesis uses the
process selection made in this chapter for all its anomaly detection and classification
tasks.
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LLR-based sentiment extraction of bigrams is a viable way of mining knowledge
not only from natural language texts, but also from OS activity logs such as kernel
event traces and function call sequences. We succeeded in designing a transparent
and obfuscation-resistant behavior-based learning system able to shift the focus from
sample-centric analysis to ubiquitous OS process analysis. In comparison to the API
and function call solutions introduced in the ‘Related Work’ section (see Section 8.2.1
for details), our system offers improved accuracy and a wider range of features. While
no other sentiment-like systems currently exist in the domain of cyber-security to the
best of our knowledge, our LLR-based approach scores more than 12 percentage points
higher than natural language solutions such as the one presented by Gamon [111],
and 4 percentage points higher than the system by Wiebe et al. [341], which seeks to
distinguish subjective and objective language. This supports our hypothesis that human
language processing techniques can be applied to traces of OS behavior and opens up
new research opportunities for similar endeavors.
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5.1 Introduction
Pattern and anomaly detection systems usually suffer from a lack of semantic inter-
pretation. The so-called semantic gap, the hard-to-bridge difference in syntactic event
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information and actual attack semantics, remains an issue. Patterns of binary appear-
ance or execution behavior are often manually assigned to represent analyst knowledge,
while anomaly detection systems do not usually attempt to explain the identified devi-
ations. This makes potential victims vulnerable to unknown attacks and does little to
further the exploration of meaning and intent behind the actions of a malicious actor.
Successfully discovering potentially harmful system behavior boils down to three
major problem domains: i) the automated generation of patterns that contribute to
detecting and understanding complex multi-stage attacks, ii) attack semantics, and iii)
the holistic view on targeted attacks and their many properties. Arguably, a powerful
formal definition of malicious behavior is the foundation for addressing most of these
aspects.
In this chapter, we propose a novel IT system behavior inference and classifica-
tion methodology based on the Sequitur algorithm [234], which we formalize through a
context-free grammar (CFG) extended by semantic attributes. The approach combines
a condensed formal definition with the generation of knowledge linked to the informa-
tion security and malware analysis domains. Instead of manually defining the many
terminals and production rules that the description of a behavior trace would require,
we automate the process through an extension of Sequitur that is fully capable of de-
termining and evaluating significant rules. This, together with our output visualization
and analytics system, eliminates the analysts’ need to define fixed patterns describing
harmful or benign behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 5.2, similar works
in the area of security-related inference are reviewed. In Section 5.3, the specifics of
grammar inference and available algorithms are discussed. We furthermore introduce
our input event data as well as the developed attribute grammar for describing (mali-
cious) system activity, and present our inference algorithm of choice. Applied grammar
inference and data analysis procedures are detailed in Section 5.4. Our implementation,
which includes a visual knowledge extraction prototype (Sections 5.5 and 5.7), as well
as several evaluated applications of the approach (Section 5.6) conclude the chapter.
5.2 Related Work
In light of the large number of operating systems and programming languages currently
available, a universal means of abstraction and classification of malicious behavior into a
more generic representation is paramount. Jacob et al. [140] present a detection system
based on attribute grammars, where syntactic rules describe possible combinations of
operations constituting certain behavior, while semantic rules control the data flow
between events and assign general meaning to a sequence. Jacob et al’s system is
intended as formal foundation for developing robust intrusion and malware detection
automata. On the modeling side, Filiol et al. [99] propose a generalized model for
malware recognition which considers both sequence-based and behavior-based detection.
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An evaluation methodology for behavioral engines of existing products is proposed. The
major difference to SEQUIN is the system’s reliance on manually defined behavioral
rules. Jacob et al.’s approach focuses on specified duplication and propagation behavior
of investigated PE and VBA samples. Close to 20 Windows native API calls are directly
mapped to interaction classes (create, read, write, etc.) and object types such as file,
registry, or network operations. SEQUIN’s grammar inference automates this process,
but relies on an effective naming schema (see 5.4.4) to retain the semantic link.
In general, the discovery of program behavior is key to understanding benign and
malicious software. Zhao et al. [357] present a semi-automatic graph grammar approach
to retrieving the hierarchical structure of an application’s activity. This is achieved by
mining recurring behavioral patterns from execution traces using VEGGIE with Sub-
dueGL [20, 19], a Minimum Description Length (MDL)-based compression algorithm.
The inferred graph grammar and a syntactic parse tree visually represent reused struc-
tures found. Unlike SEQUIN, Zhao et al.’s semi-automated approach uses a more com-
putationally complex context-sensitive grammar to identify common call subgraphs,
which are ultimately used in code verification scenarios.
Joo and Chellappa [147] introduce a method for representing and recognizing spe-
cific event anomalies in a video by using attribute grammars. This limited domain makes
it possible to model most of the events expected to occur and to define anomalies that
do not fit the model. Matches are represented by degree of certainty expressed as a
probability. While Joo and Chellappa’s and our system share the formal foundation,
they differ significantly in inference capabilities and automation.
Thompson and Flynn [309] use a similar algorithm to detect and identify the poly-
morphic instances of a given malware. The approach represents program structure as a
context-free grammar, and compares grammars by checking for homomorphism between
them. The system makes it possible to identify variants of software by abstracting the
control flow of the code. Non-structural elements are removed and the complexity of
code quantified by counting the number of remaining elements within the function. For
comparison, the resulting grammar is serialized (similar to SEQUIN’s zero rule) and
checked against another string. Inference mechanisms or CFG attributes for function
arguments are not employed. Thompson and Flynn’s purely theoretical approach does
not specify concrete algorithms or evaluation scenarios.
On the more traditional anomaly detection side, Creech and Hu [66] introduce a
host-based detection method that uses discontiguous system call patterns. The authors
use a context-free grammar to describe (but not infer) benign and malicious call traces.
Several decision engines were tested and compared in the paper, making it a good
starting point for the selection of learning algorithms applicable to system call sequences.
In a patent submitted by Eiland et al. [90], the authors describe an intrusion mas-
querade detection system that includes a grammar inference engine based on MDL
compression. The compression algorithm is applied to sets of input data to build
user-specific grammars. The use of intrusion masquerade is ultimately based on the
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determined distance between template and observed algorithmic minimum sufficient
statistic.
Visualization is a predominant theme in this field. With GrammarViz, Senin et al.
[282] introduce a grammar mining and visualization tool based on CFG induction. While
GrammarViz does not specifically consider attributes or malicious software scenarios in
general, it describes a practical approach to manually analyzing time series data. In a
more recent paper, Senin et al. [283] expand on the concept of algorithmic incompress-
ibility for anomaly detection and present practical examples using spatial trajectory
data. Senin et al.’s Sequitur-based system heavily relies on the ratio between rules
and terminals for identifying anomalies. Unlike SEQUIN, the employed visualization
tool does not fully support internal pattern extraction and classification while primarily
depicting time series charts.
Specific grammar inference algorithms considered during the design stages of SE-
QUIN are introduced in Section 5.3.1 below.
5.3 Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce the grammar inference background of our solution and
specify type of system event data used as the foundation of semantic pattern analysis.
Sequitur, as our compression algorithm of choice, is used to determine patterns of
interest. Furthermore, a formal definition of the information used is presented in the
form of an attribute grammar.
5.3.1 Grammar Inference
Grammar inference is the process of automatically learning a grammar by examining
the sentences of an unknown language [298]. In the IT sector, grammar inference is pri-
marily used for pattern recognition, computational biology, natural language processing,
language design programming, data mining, and machine learning. The effectiveness of
grammar inference is influenced by the language class and by the information available
about the target language. To raise the effectiveness of grammar inference, a combina-
tion of learning modules and language classes are used. Grammar inference has been
proven to be a feasible approach to anomaly detection, since “algorithmic incompress-
ibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for randomness” [215]. Simply put, this
means that sequences of terminals that are not replaced by rules as part of the induction
process represent anomalous (i.e. non-recurring) words within a corpus of text, which
can be seen as behavioral outlier in the context of an execution trace. We specifically
use grammar inference as key component in the process of compressing event traces to
extract relevant patterns and to shorten corpora by replacing repeating sequences with
representative non-terminals.
92
R. Luh 5.3. PRELIMINARIES
Supervised Semi-supervised Unsupervised
Statistical Co-training [297] Self-training [207] ADIOS [292]
Evolutionary GA-based [273] LAgts [39]
Heuristic ALLiS [74] Inductive CYK [233]
ABL [321]
MDL e-GRIDS [246]
CDC [58]
VEGGIE [20, 19]
Eiland et al. [90]
Greedy search ADIOS
CDC
Incremental parsing [281, 14]
Sequitur [234]
GraphViz [282, 283]
Clustering EMILE [3] CDC
Table 5.1: Grammar inference algorithms and applications by category
The main issues of grammar inference are over-specialization and over-
generalization. Over-specialization (over-fitting) describes the problem when the infer-
ence process produces a grammar whose language is smaller than the unknown target
language. This is typically countered by defining an appropriate validation set from the
available data and by measuring the performance on this data after each training ex-
ample has been processed [86]. Over-generalization occurs when the inference process
produces a grammar whose language is larger than the unknown language. The use
of negligible items results in an unnecessarily large grammar. To limit the impact of
over-generalization, it is recommended to also use a set of negative examples.
There are various computational techniques suitable for grammar inference.
D’Ulizia et al. [86] surveyed various algorithms and categorized them into six groups:
• Statistical methods use probability distribution in a class of models derived
from empirical data generally provided by a large body of text. Applications
include self-training [207] and co-training [297]. ADIOS [292] also uses statistical
information to derive regularities from sentences.
• Evolutionary computing techniques, often used in computational biology,
regularly update (evolve) the initial model or grammar. Each new iteration
is produced by removing less desired solutions. GA-based approaches and e.g.
LAgts [39] both use genetic algorithms to eliminate unnecessary non-terminal
symbols and production rules from the grammar.
• Heuristic methods generate training examples of sentences. In grammar infer-
ence, ALLiS [74] uses heuristics to reduce the number of similar rules as well as
for selecting rules that have the most content. ABL [321] finds, with the help of
heuristics, the longest common sequence shared between sentences.
• Minimum description length (MDL) [264] assumes that the simplest, most
compact representation of data is its best and most probable depiction. The
principle finds its primary application in data reduction, where “any regularity in
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a given set of data can be used to compress the data” [119]. Examples include
CDC [58] and e-GRIDS [246].
• Greedy search algorithms make decisions based on their internal logic which
may lead to the creation, removal or fusion of rules. For example, Sequitur [234]
recursively replaces same-character sequences with new production rules. It pro-
duces a grammar that reflects repetitions and thereby infers the hierarchical struc-
ture of the grammar. ADIOS [292] also applies a greedy learning algorithm to its
graph representation of sentences.
• Clustering techniques require a starting grammar that contains all possible
sentences. They subsequently cluster syntactic units until the grammar has been
constructed. For example, EMILE [3] clusters expressions that occur in the same
context, while CDC [58] creates sets of sequences within a context before selecting
clusters that satisfy the MDL principle (see above).
Grammar inference algorithms are further classified by their learning approach [86].
Refer to Table 5.1 for an overview of the above-mentioned systems, among others. In
Section 5.3.2 below, we further discuss the choice of utilizing a greedy, unsupervised
inference approach for our prototype.
5.3.2 Algorithm Selection
We have identified three prerequisites for the successful identification and extraction of
interesting behavior from a trace:
• Unsupervised learning – The learning module used for generating knowledge
from malicious system behavior must be unassisted. Human intervention in the
decision of whether a grammar is valid or not would contradict the automation
requirements set by most analysts.
• Context-free grammar (CFG) – A compromise between a regular and a
context-sensitive grammar, CFGs offer a good balance between ease of parsing
and computational efficiency. The language created by a CFG can be recognized
in Opn3q time, which will prove helpful in future parsing efforts. This selection
prerequisite was complemented by the decision to use an attribute grammar for
formal representation (see 5.3.3).
• Loss-less operation – It is vital that the algorithm employed does not change
the order or immutability of events, since both is likely to have an impact on the
semantics of a behavioral sequence.
After surveying numerous algorithms such as the ones listed in Section 5.3.1 and
Table 5.1, we decided against using an approach that uses equivalence classes in its
vocabulary (like ADIOS [292]). While this feature might be interesting for studying
mimicry attacks or the use of equivalent API functions at a later point, the first proto-
type needed to be precise and deterministic in its inference process in order to enable a
more expressive evaluation of the general approach. The choice fell on Sequitur.
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Sym String Grammar Remarks
1 a S Ñ a
2 ab S Ñ ab
3 abc S Ñ abc
4 abcd S Ñ abcd
5 abcdb S Ñ abcdb
6 abcdbc S Ñ abcdbc bc appears 2x
S Ñ aAdA bigram uniqueness
A Ñ bc
7 abcdbca S Ñ aAdAa
A Ñ bc
8 abcdbcab S Ñ aAdAab
A Ñ bc
9 abcdbcabc S Ñ aAdAabc bc reappears
A Ñ bc
S Ñ aAdAaA bigram uniqueness
aA appears 2x
A Ñ bc
S Ñ BdAB bigram uniqueness
A Ñ bc
B Ñ aA
10 abcdbcabcd S Ñ BdABd Bd appears 2x
A Ñ bc
B Ñ aA
S Ñ CAC bigram uniqueness
A Ñ bc B used only 1x
B Ñ aA
C Ñ Bd
S Ñ CAC rule utility
A Ñ bc
C Ñ aAd
Table 5.2: Operation of Sequitur [234]. Property application is italicized.
Sequitur
Sequitur is a greedy compression algorithm that creates a hierarchical structure (CFG)
from a sequence of discrete symbols by recursively replacing repeated phrases with a
grammatical rule [234]. The output is a representation of the original sequence, which
effectively results in the creation of a context-free grammar. The algorithm creates this
representation through two essential properties, which are called rule utility and bigram
uniqueness. Rule utility checks if a rule occurs at least twice in the grammar, while
bigram uniqueness observes if a bigram occurs only once. A bigram in this context
describes two adjacent symbols or terms. Assuming we have a string abcdbcabcd, the
first bigram would be ab, followed by a second bigram bc, and so forth. See Table 5.2
for a complete example of the process.
Sequitur is linear in space and time. In terms of data compression, the algorithm
can outperform other designs that achieve data reduction by factoring out repetition.
It is almost as performant as designs that compress data based on probabilistic predic-
tions [234].
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5.3.3 Formal Definition
To enable the conversion of any kind of trace into an applicable ruleset for behavioral
classification, it is necessary to formally define relevant (malicious) actions through
distinct patterns that can be integrated into a grammatical hierarchy. Unlike many
other solutions (see 5.2), we do not manually map system activity to concrete events
but use Sequitur-enabled inference to automatically determine likely rules.
For this purpose, our system uses a context-free grammar extended by at-
tributes [4]. While extendable to a full attribute grammar, we specifically use a CFG
over a parametrized alphabet in our definition, where attributes are assigned to ter-
minals only. This decision followed an in-depth review of several grammars and lan-
guages, including graph grammars [31], state transition graphs based on NLC [269],
trace languages [129], Lindenmayer systems [184], and the aforementioned attribute
grammars [4].
Graph grammars (also known as graph rewriting systems) were identified as the
main competitor to our final specification. Following the notation introduced by Ben-
teler [31], we define a graph grammar as GG “ pN,T Y ∆, P, Sq, where node labels
n P N are non-terminals and t P T are terminals, while the respective edge labels e are
part of alphabet ∆. S P N describes the start axiom whereas a production p P P is
part of the set of production rules P “ pL,R,Cq, which describe the one-node graph
L P p that replaces graph R P p using specific embedding rules C P p. The two main
issues with graph grammars are the inflexibility of the edge labels, which, unlike the
attributes in attribute grammars, are typically limited to one element e P ∆, as well as
the inherent computational complexity of graph rewriting operations/embedding rules:
most algorithms require cubic or greater time to complete. Since our system is intended
to be used as compression tool for simplified graph data (see 5.6.1), the performance
factor was relevant.
In summary, the reason for our choice was grounded in the fact that semantically
interesting connections between system events are often expressed by several parameters;
parameters, that can be aptly modeled by the attributes of a context-free grammar.
Performance and the availability of parsing tools also factored into the decision.
The inferred patterns and, by extension, the full attribute grammar as per our
specification, can be defined as follows:
Let AG “ pG,A,R, V q be an attribute grammar, where:
• G “ pN,T, P, Sq is a context-free grammar
– N ... Set of non-terminal symbols (variables)
– T ... Set of terminal symbols (alphabet)
– P ... Production rules
– S... Start symbol
• A is a finite set of attributes
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• R is a finite set of attribution rules (semantic rules)
• V is a finite set of values assigned to an attribute
Every symbol X P pN Y T q is assigned a finite set of attributes AX . The attribute
a P AX is denoted X.a. Every attribute a P AX also has a set of values V pX.aq.
Typically, an attribute a of symbol X P pN Y T q that is e.g. assigned the value “0” is
denominated as X.a “ 0.
Our methodology uses attributes to store parameters of system events, such as the
names of particular files that are being accessed or IP addresses that are being contacted
in the course of a network operation. Attributes are also used to retain the connection
to the invoking process of an event. In our case, attributes are used to e.g. represent
the name of a file being created and the name of the process triggering that particular
operation (see Sections 5.3.4 and 5.5.1 for more examples).
Two frequently used attributes are a1 “ X.trigger_name and a2 “
X.element_name. The value vi P V pX.a1q identifies the actual name of the observed
process responsible for triggering the individual event X P pNYT q. Value vj P V pX.a2q
denotes the process or file system element the process interacted with.
Raw system events (see 5.3.4) captured by our monitoring agent are processed by
Sequitur, which infers a full grammar in accordance to above definitions. Our system
is able to depict an arbitrary number of input traces with several attributes a P A. The
resulting grammar enables further parsing and semantic analysis. See Section 5.4.2 for
more information about the inference process.
5.3.4 Event Data
Like sentiment extraction, SEQUIN is based on event traces defined as descriptions of
operating system kernel behavior invoked by applications. Refer to Chapter 4.3.1 for
more information about event types, event linking, smart traces, as well as preprocess-
ing.
5.4 Sequitur-based Grammar Inference and Analysis
5.4.1 Preprocessing
Before Sequitur can be used on log files, behavioral traces or other sequential reports
describing the activity of potentially malicious programs, the traces need to be reduced
to their core components. In this normalization stage we have the choice to either
strip away all attributes, or to retain them in an abstracted fashion as part of the
set of terminals. As we want to construct a full, semantics-aware attribute grammar,
most information is typically kept. We only reduce volatile information such as (user)
IDs, memory addresses, and registry paths to a more manageable set of terminals.
Names of known system processes and libraries are not modified in any way while
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unknown binaries and modules (which are possibly randomly named) are represented
by extension-aware placeholders (e.g. 1.txt or 2.exe).
In order to compare the impact of different levels of detail and granularity, we
defined a total of three input formats. A full example input and output scenario is
discussed in Section 5.5.1.
• Verbose – This trace format uses full, attribute-enabled events as individual
words of the corpus. In verbose mode, the input data is transformed into the
following format: triggering-process,operation,element-name, which trans-
lates to vi P V pX.a1q,tx P T ,vj P V pX.a2q. For example, a specific file creation
operation triggered by the known explorer.exe process would be preprocessed
into the following textual input format: explorer.exe,file-create,1.txt.
• Reduced – In this preprocessing mode, we omit attribute a2 to generate a quick
view of the high-level activity exhibited by the processes under scrutiny. Here, vj is
not processed, resulting in a reduced format of triggering-process,operation,
depicted as e.g. explorer.exe,file-create.
• Granular – The goal in granular mode is to investigate operations not as single
word, but as elementary components. Each of the elements processed in verbose
mode is treated by Sequitur as one terminal of the bigram. To maintain a level of
separation between event triples, a forth item denoting the start of a new event
is prepended before each vi. This results in the following input (items delimited
by semicolon): <start>;triggering-process;operation;element-name.
5.4.2 Rule Extraction
Since Sequitur only takes a single input file per default, we added additional function-
ality to the algorithm in order to retain information of origin and to enable multi-file
inference with various evaluation subroutines. This way, SEQUIN’s grammar inference
can be applied to several files at once without having to concatenate the input in ad-
vance. Specifically, we altered Sequitur to be capable of constructing rules across file
boundaries denoted by a unique separator, which is ignored by the inference engine.
This ultimately enables comparative analyses of larger, disconnected data sets that do
not necessarily share repeating behavior within a single trace, which, under normal cir-
cumstances, is required for the inference process to trigger. The main stages of the rule
extraction process are the following:
• Lexical analysis – In this initial step, each unique terminal t P T is assigned
a corresponding symbol, called a token. This numerical representation is used
to streamline the process by reducing the processing complexity of string-only
comparisons. Each new terminal is additionally stored in a translation (symbol)
table for later reference.
• Grammatical inference – After the lexical analysis process, the Sequitur algo-
rithm is applied to generate an execution trace grammar consisting of tokenized
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terminal symbols. The first rule p P P of each grammar is the start rule, or ‘zero
rule’, which depicts the full grammar of the compressed input data. In our imple-
mentation, every line thereafter contains the following extracted information:
– Rule – The rule consists of a left-side rule name (variable), which is se-
quentially numbered, as well as right-side variables and terminals. The non-
terminals are, again, references to finer-grained rules while the terminals
represent the actual system events. In line with the definition of CFGs,
there is only one single variable on the left side of a rule.
– Resolved rule – In order to provide a detailed view on individual rules, we
recursively resolve each sequence of non-terminals n P N to their base ter-
minals t P T .
5.4.3 Rule Evaluation
As part of the evaluation process, the final grammar is parsed to determine how many
times a specific derivation occurs in each of the investigated input files. Semantically
interesting patterns include specific sequences that e.g. occur exactly once in each input
trace, making them potential common denominators for a class of malicious behaviors.
The computed information includes:
• File rule (FR) count – This number shows how many times a rule occurs in the
current input file.
• Grammar rule (GR) count – The overall count across all supplied input files is
specified here. For a single trace, this number is identical to the FR count.
• Prevalence count – This value specifies the number of input files a particular
derivation has been found in. The result is displayed as x{y (x in y), where x is
the number of files the pattern is prevalent and y is the overall count of individual
input files.
• Match flag – The extraction of interesting rules is facilitated by determining rules
that are identical in occurrence and number across all of the processed input files,
indicated by a Boolean flag.
• Rule length – this value defines the overall number of items seen in the entire
derivation (i.e. the resolved rule). Multiples of a specific rule length are likely to
represent recursively compressed rules, as is apparent for rules 81 to 83 shown in
Table 5.4.
• Rule density – this support metric facilitates anomaly detection by calculating
the ratio between inferred rules and single terminals that are present in the input
as well as rule zero.
The various counts always include references to the original input files, which help
retain each pattern’s connection to its semantic source. In Section 5.5.1, we show an
exemplary scenario for a ‘verbose’ (see Section 5.4.1) input set.
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5.4.4 Rule Transformation
In order to transform the newly inferred rules into an attributed grammar as defined
in Section 5.3.3, a set mechanism is required. This mechanism allows the analyst to
easily define a naming schema for inferred rules, resulting in a semantic description of
the terminals and non-terminals contained within. In the initial version of our tool, we
map each operation to an attribute-enhanced terminal while rule identifiers are trans-
formed into descriptive variables: Specifically, each rule is dubbed in accordance to its
semantic nature. For example, a rule describing a process-create operation followed
by a file-delete operation is transformed into the descriptive variable CREATE-
PROC_DELETE-FILE. A rule that describes the loading of two image files is dubbed
LOAD2-IMG.
The full naming schema NS is currently defined as follows:
• NS “ pO,E,MO,ME,Lq, where
– Operation O = {CREA, MOD, START, LOAD, KILL, DEL, CONN}
– Event type E = {PROC, THR, IMG, FILE, REG, NET}
– Operation mapping rules MO = {
CREA Ñ create,
MOD Ñ modify | change | edit,
START Ñ start | spawn,
LOAD Ñ load,
KILL Ñ kill | stop | terminate,
DEL Ñ delete,
CONN Ñ connect
}
– Event mapping rules ME = {PROC Ñ process, THR Ñ thread, IMG Ñ
image, FILE Ñ file, REG Ñ registry, NET Ñ network}
• and labeling rules L, where
– pO1|| “-” ||E1||”_”, ..., On|| “-” ||Enq
– If On ““ On`1 then On|| “2”
The triggering process and element name are then transformed into the attributes
tp (X.a1) and en (a2). Recursive variable descriptors are supported – above naming
schema always considers the fully resolved rule. See Section 5.5.1 for several examples
of automatically determined variables.
Future versions of the method will replace the current mapping with a true se-
mantic descriptor that identifies specific attacker actions or objectives. While a manual
assignment of such variables is already possible [81], it is not feasible in larger analysis
scenarios. The automation of the process is an important research challenge to come.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of SEQUIN. Following AIDIS’ data collection and trace construc-
tion, a context-free grammar is inferred from the input.
5.5 Implementation
Our grammar inference and evaluation tool is based on the Sequitur application devel-
oped by Eibe Frank1. All core and extended functionality has been fully implemented
in Java. The data used as basis for the analysis process is collected using a specifically
created kernel driver agent deployed on 10 actively used and malware-free (fresh instal-
lations performed by security analysts) Windows 7 and Windows 10 machines within
our company partner’s environment. An additional virtual Windows instance is used
for dynamically analyzing malicious software. All machines at least provide common
user applications such as Microsoft Office, Adobe Reader, various browsers, as well as
common OS extensions such as Java SE and the .NET framework. The collected events
are stored and processed on a dedicated PostgreSQL database server that generates
verbose or reduced traces of specific processes or even entire system sessions. These
traces are ultimately used as input for the Sequitur approach: SEQUIN concatenates
the respective files and keeps them apart by inserting a file delimiter that is ignored by
the inference engine. This way we can handle an arbitrary number of traces without
major changes to the underlying algorithm. Following the inference and analysis stage,
our KAMAS prototype visualizes the grammar and helps discover and classify relevant
elements. See Figure 5.1 for a full process overview.
1https://github.com/craignm/sequitur/tree/master/java
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In practical scenarios, it might be prudent to use clustering algorithms to pre-
classify traces that are likely to share common behavior. While these algorithms typi-
cally do not yield insight into event semantics, this intermediate step helps an analyst to
select sequences that e.g. belong to a similar class of malware or describe a comparable
attack stage. In such a scenario, our inference tool can be used to specifically extract
behavioral patterns for a particular use case. In our initial tests, we used Malheur [263]
for this purpose.
5.5.1 Example
With or without preselection, our grammar inference and evaluation tool will generate
variables and production rules for a dynamically growing number of terminals and at-
tributes. Below example demonstrates the use of our tool for two simplified ‘verbose’
input files generated from aforementioned kernel event traces. Thread context informa-
tion and smart reordering has been omitted for better legibility. The character tokens
pa..mq were added manually for better understanding.
Input file 1: Verbose mode (default sequence). Delimiter: newline.
explorer.exe ,file -create ,1.exe (a)
explorer.exe ,process -start ,1.exe (b)
1.exe ,image -load ,kernel32.dll (c)
1.exe ,image -load ,advapi32.dll (d)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,process -create ,cmd.exe (f)
cmd.exe ,process -create ,net.exe (g)
1.exe ,registry -create ,machine/system (h)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
cmd.exe ,process -kill ,net.exe (i)
1.exe ,thread -terminate ,thread (j)
explorer.exe ,file -delete ,1.exe (k)
The second input file has been determined by Malheur to be similar, however the
commonalities are yet unclear. This is where our pattern evaluation extension comes
in.
Input file 2: Verbose mode (default sequence). Delimiter: newline.
explorer.exe ,file -create ,1.exe (a)
explorer.exe ,process -start ,1.exe (b)
1.exe ,thread -create ,thread (l)
1.exe ,image -load ,kernel32.dll (c)
1.exe ,image -load ,advapi32.dll (d)
1.exe ,image -load ,ws2_32.dll (m)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,process -create ,cmd.exe (f)
cmd.exe ,process -create ,net.exe (g)
cmd.exe ,process -kill ,net.exe (i)
1.exe ,thread -terminate ,thread (j)
explorer.exe ,file -delete ,1.exe (k)
Sequitur now infers the following rules and evaluates the frequency and similarity.
Below output has been reformatted to contain the resolved events only for the remaining,
recursively created rules (rule 3), as well as rule zero. Rule density is only calculated
for the latter.
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Rule 1 is found twice across the grammar (GR count) of the two appended in-
put files. The two events explorer.exe,file-create,1.exe (abbreviated: a) and
explorer.exe,process-start,1.exe (b) form the rule 1 Ñ a b. For a more formal
breakdown summary of example input file 1, please consult below grammar depiction
AG1.
Rule: 1
explorer.exe ,file -create ,1.exe (a)
explorer.exe ,process -start ,1.exe (b)
Evaluation:
FR count (file 1, 2): 1, 1
GR count: 2
Prevalence: 2/2
Match: true
Rule length: 2
Rule 2 is inferred by events c and d: 2Ñ c d. It is part of both files and is thereby
prevalent in the input.
Rule: 2
1.exe ,image -load ,kernel32.dll (c)
1.exe ,image -load ,advapi32.dll (d)
Evaluation:
FR count (file 1, 2): 1, 1
GR count: 2
Prevalence: 2/2
Match: true
Rule length: 2
Below rule is part of both input files, but does not perfectly match in terms of
frequency: The second trace contains two identical occurrences instead of just one. It
resolves to 3 Ñ e e.
Rule: 3
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
Evaluation:
FR count (file 1, 2): 2, 1
GR count: 3
Prevalence: 2/2
Match: false
Rule length: 2
Prevalent rule 4 (see below) is the only persisting recursively inferred sequence of
the example: It translates to 4 Ñ 3 f g. However, Sequitur does not immediately build
that rule: Initially, the system infers 4TEMP1Ñ 3 f, followed by 4TEMP2Ñ 4TEMP1
g. Because of the rule utility property, both TEMP rules are ultimately dissolved,
resulting in the final rule 4 Ñ 3 f g.
The final rule (see below) summarizes the triple that concludes both traces: 5 Ñ
i j k. Like rule 4, this process has an intermediate step: Before settling on the final
derivation, Sequitur builds the rule 5TEMP1 Ñ i j, followed by 5TEMP2 Ñ 5TEMP1
k.
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Rule: 4
1.exe ,rule ,rule -3
1.exe ,process -create ,cmd.exe (f)
cmd.exe ,process -create ,net.exe (g)
Evaluation:
FR count (file 1, 2): 1, 1
GR count: 2
Prevalence: 2/2
Match: true
Rule length: 3
Resolved:
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,registry -modify ,hklm/software/microsoft (e)
1.exe ,process -create ,cmd.exe (f)
cmd.exe ,process -create ,net.exe (g)
Rule: 5
cmd.exe ,process -kill ,net.exe (i)
1.exe ,thread -terminate ,thread (j)
explorer.exe ,file -delete ,1.exe (k)
Evaluation:
FR count (file 1, 2): 1, 1
GR count: 2
Prevalence: 2/2
Match: true
Rule length: 3
From these 5 final rules, a compressed zero rule can be inferred. The resolved rule
yields the concatenated original input of both files separated by a file delimiter: 0 Ñ
(file 1) 1 2 4 h 3 5 (file 2) 1 l 2 m 4 5.
Rule: 0
explorer.exe ,rule ,rule -1
1.exe ,rule ,rule -2
1.exe ,rule ,rule -4
1.exe ,registry -create ,machine/system (h)
1.exe ,rule ,rule -3
cmd.exe ,rule ,rule -5
-
explorer.exe ,rule ,rule -1
1.exe ,thread -create ,thread (l)
1.exe ,rule ,rule -2
1.exe ,image -load ,ws2_32.dll (m)
1.exe ,rule ,rule -4
cmd.exe ,rule ,rule -5
Evaluation:
Rule density (input: 3 out of 27): 88.9
Rule density (rule 0: 3 out of 9): 66.6
Resolved:
(see concatenated input)
In our example, the tool has successfully extracted rules that describe behav-
ior observed in both input files. With the uncompressed events 1.exe,registry-
create,machine/system, 1.exe,thread-create,thread, and 1.exe,image-load,ws2_-
32.dll highlighted, we can immediately spot the deviations from the otherwise recurring
behavior.
In conclusion, the output is transformed into an attribute grammar as described in
Section 5.3.3. Since semantics is a major factor of rule construction, we assign variables
based on the nature of the inferred event. Specifically, above example (here: only for
file 1 of rule 0) can be formalized into a grammar as follows:
104
R. Luh 5.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Let AG1 “ pG1, A,R, V q be an inferred CFG extended by attributes, where:
• G1 “ pN,T, P, Sq, and where:
– N = {CREA-FILE_START-PROC; LOAD2-IMG; MOD2-REG_CREA2-
PROC; MOD2-REG; KILL-PROC_KILL-THR_DEL-FILE}
– T = {
file-create.tp, en = explorer.exe, 1.exe;
file-delete.tp, en = explorer.exe, 1.exe;
process-create.tp, en = explorer.exe, 1.exe;
process-create.tp, en = 1.exe, cmd.exe;
process-create.tp, en = 1.exe, net.exe;
process-kill.tp, en = cmd.exe, net.exe;
image-load.tp, en = 1.exe, kernel32.dll;
image-load.tp, en = 1.exe, advapi32.dll;
registry-create.tp, en = 1.exe, machine/system;
registry-modify.tp, en = 1.exe, hklm/software/microsoft;
thread-terminate.tp, en = 1.exe, thread;
}
– P = {
ZERO-RULEÑ CREA-FILE_START-PROC LOAD2-IMG MOD2-REG_-
CREA2-PROC registry-create.tp, en = 1.exe,machine/system MOD2-REG
KILL-PROC_KILL-THR_DEL-FILE;
CREA-FILE_START-PROCÑ file-create.tp, en= explorer.exe,1.exe process-
create.tp, en = explorer.exe,1.exe;
LOAD2-IMG Ñ image-load.tp, en = 1.exe,kernel32.dll image-load.tp, en =
1.exe,advapi32.dll;
MOD2-REG Ñ registry-modify.tp, en = 1.exe,hklm/software/microsoft
registry-modify.tp, en = 1.exe,hklm/software/microsoft;
MOD2-REG_CREA2-PROCÑMOD2-REG process-create.tp, en= 1.exe,cmd.exe
process-create.tp, en = cmd.exe,net.exe;
KILL-PROC_KILL-THR_DEL-FILE Ñ process-kill.tp, en = cmd.exe,
net.exe thread-terminate.tp, en = 1.exe,thread file-delete.tp, en = ex-
plorer.exe, 1.exe
}
– S = {ZERO-RULE}
• A = {tp; en}
• R is described as part of the preprocessing stage and defines which portion of the
data translates into triggering process tp (vi), operation (tx), and element en (vj).
• V = {explorer.exe; 1.exe; kernel32.dll; advapi32.dll; cmd.exe; net.exe; machine/-
software/microsoft; machine/system; thread}
Above attribute grammar for part 1 of the zero rule has been generated automati-
cally and can now be used as the foundation for further (attribute-based) parsing efforts.
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Scenario Evaluation Significance
Compression Section 5.6.1 Reduction of input data size
Reduction of processing complexity (third-party data)
Anomaly detection Section 5.6.2 Detection and extraction of deviating behavior
Baselining Section 5.6.2 Identification of common patterns in traces
Visualization Section 5.7 Visual presentation of inferred rules
Discovery Section 5.7 Interactive filtering and extraction of terminals/rules
Rule labeling, storing
Highlighting of known rules
Table 5.3: Scenarios covered by experiments, in order of appearance by subsection
The inferred variables, if stored, can be used as new behavioral templates for compara-
ble input data sets. Above definition can easily be extended to encompass specific files,
or all of them at once (entire zero rule).
The next section discusses practical applications of this approach and evaluates
them using real-world data.
5.6 Evaluation
The introduced system has a wide variety of applications. Ranging from preliminary
knowledge extraction in malware analysis scenarios to understanding more complex
attacks, the adapted inference methodology is versatile in both terms of input data as
well as practical benefit. Below, we introduce and evaluate some of its applications
and discuss future and ongoing work. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the conducted
experiments.
5.6.1 Preparatory Data Reduction
Concept
In many malware and APT attack stage analysis scenarios, analysts are often forced to
deal with huge amounts of data. Be it kernel events, raw system calls or even assembler-
level CPU instruction information, the abstraction and reduction of input data is es-
sential to decrease the complexity of many an analysis task. Our solution provides the
means through its easily adaptable preprocessing mechanism (see Section 5.4.1) and
the grammar inference system itself. By using the Sequitur approach, it is possible to
reduce the input corpus to only relevant n-grams (n ě 2), instead of working with the
full, unfiltered set of event or code snippet unigrams. The grammar transformation
mechanism (see Section 5.4.4) also enables us to work with an automatically generated
placeholder variable n P N instead of several compound terminals.
A second, closely related application of Sequitur compression is the extraction of
recurring patterns. Dubbed ‘baselining’, this process takes the result of the inference
process and regards sequences of terminals that have been turned into rules. The discov-
ery process is best supported by our KAMAS VA prototype introduced in Section 5.7.
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Figure 5.2: Performance analysis of Sequitur inference. Both processing time and RAM
utilization grow at a linear rate. The alphabet size (not pictured) was determined to
have a greater impact on the time required than on physical memory use.
Evaluation
Current efforts include the pre-abstraction of behavioral data in graph notation (also
see Section 5.3.4) subsequently used for edit distance calculations [191]. Minimizing
the amount of data to be processed drastically reduces computation requirements of
expensive (up to exponential complexity, depending on the application) graph trans-
formation operations. Specifically, we evaluated several days’ worth of benign system
events monitored by our kernel driver (see Section 5.5 for event capture details), col-
lecting 100k, 200k, and 400k sequential events with different size alphabets and rule
density – all associated with instances of the Windows svchost.exe process. Under
normal circumstances, this data would have to be assessed in its uncompressed entirety,
as it is used for creating baseline graph templates utilized in behavior deviation analy-
sis using a combination of Hungarian distance computation [167] and Malheur heuristic
clustering [263]. Thanks to our Sequitur-enabled data reduction, we can focus on event
sequences (rules) that are representative for specific processes – or on the remaining ter-
minals which constitute a potential anomaly. Both significantly speed up all involved,
polynomial complexity star graph matching operations (Figure 5.3) used by the tested
system [191]. At the same time, we increase the accuracy of the template creation
process by drastically reducing the number of empty feature vectors that are normally
produced in the clustering stage.
In our first, medium-sized exemplary dataset of 100k Windows kernel events (al-
phabet of 665 words), we reduced the number events to a list of 1,715 terminals and
6,415 first-level rules (contained in the zero rule), which effectively compressed the data
by 90.7%. This cut the processing time for graph template generation and graph trans-
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Figure 5.3: Performance impact on graph matching operations. The chart compares the
time required for creating a template using uncompressed data versus the non-terminals
inferred by Sequitur. Input filtered to rules with a prevalence count PC ą pn{mq, where
m ă 0.2˚n (here: m “ 1000) and n “ number of unique processes per dataset. Results
show an average speed-up of around 73% for kernel event data.
formation calculations by 77.64%, down to a total of 8.75 + 1.9 minutes, instead of
48.2 minutes sans compression. Performance evaluation showed a maximum memory
utilization of around 1.3 GiB, with a total processing time of 1.9 minutes (9.1 minutes
with full rule resolving) on a dual core virtual machine equipped with 64 GiB of RAM.
The second and third datasets encompassed an alphabet of 1,310 and 1,569 words,
respectively. We achieved a compression rate of 95.95% and 98.26%, which reduced the
graph processing time by 64.91% and 77.26%. RAM usage increased to 2.35 GiB for the
200k dataset, and to 4 GiB for the 400k trace. Figure 5.2 and 5.3 show basic regression
analyses of grammar inference and graph processing times as well as RAM utilization
during compression. See [191] for more information on star graph template generation
and matching.
Discussion
The overall process was determined as scaling at linear time Opnq, putting it in line
with e.g. basic search algorithms and confirming the results disseminated by [234]. RAM
consumption scaled linearly as well – in case of our machine, we expect to hit the memory
ceiling of 64 GiB at around 6 million events, provided the size of the alphabet grows at a
similarly steady rate. SEQUIN without rule resolving performed best overall, saving up
to 90% of its processing time for the largest (400k) dataset. Because of this significant
overhead, rule resolving will in the future be performed independently from compression
– directly in our growing database of known productions. This will offer a convenient
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way to compute and look up patterns without negatively impacting performance during
the actual inference process.
In terms of semantic accuracy, over-zealous recursive compression needs to be con-
sidered when applying the approach to data with large repeating sequences of terminals,
as it may combine too many individual events of significance into one long rule, which
in turn consists of other lengthy rules describing similar behavior. This could not only
skew the result, but also eliminate some of the performance benefits evaluated above.
In our experiments, we have found it prudent to impose a limit on maximum resolved
length for terminal-only rules. Another approach is to set a minimum limit on preva-
lence count (see Section 5.4.3) to remove non-terminals that occur in only a few input
files. The thresholds for these operations largely depend on the nature of the data used
and will have to be determined by experimentation on a case-to-case basis.
SEQUIN has proven to be well suited to the task of preprocessing/reducing input
data needed by other, more expensive algorithms. We achieved an average speed-up
in star-graph data processing of 73% when employing our system to the same dataset.
Data sizes were reduced by up to 98%.
5.6.2 Anomaly Detection
Concept
In our above preprocessing example, we use grammar inference to determine interesting
repeating patterns that are representative of the corpus under investigation. However,
the reverse is also a viable scenario: By focusing attention on patterns that do not
excessively reoccur, our approach can be used to identify anomalies in a sequence or
set of sequences. Parts of the trace that are not replaced by variables during rule
construction (i.e. the remaining terminals in between) represent unique events that,
in such a scenario, are of particular interest as they represent deviating (abnormal)
behavior. Rule density (see 5.4.3) is also important in scenarios where stable behavior
is expected: the higher the share of terminals, the higher the overall entropy, and, by
extension, the likelihood of anomalous behavior. All anomaly detection efforts can be
aided by visualization tools such as GrammarViz [282] as well as our own VA research
introduced in Section 5.7 below.
Evaluation
The Sequitur tool is not limited to system events but can be used with a wide range
of sequential input data formats. In the following, we specifically evaluated an APT
anomaly detection scenario on a set of temperature, speed, and photoelectric sensor
data generated by a Siemens Simatic industrial control system (ICS) within a testbed
environment. We assessed 13 full production runs in total, whereas two of the runs
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File Rule FR # GR # Prevalence Length
Ben-2 3Ñ139 139 2 2 1/12 16
Ben-2 4Ñ140 140 3 3 1/12 4
Ben-2 12Ñ1-0-1-(...)-0-40 1-0-1-(...)-0-40 2 2 1/12 2
Ben-2 23Ñ1-0-1-(...)-1-56 1-0-1-(...)-1-56 2 2 1/12 2
Ben-2 69Ñ1-0-1-(...)-5-59 1-0-1-(...)-5-59 2 2 1/12 2
Ben-2 98Ñ1-0-1-(...)-8-60 1-0-1-(...)-8-60 2 2 1/12 2
Ben-2 102Ñ0-0-1-(...)-8-54 0-0-1-(...)-8-54 2 2 1/12 2
Ben-2 139Ñ4 4 2 2 1/12 8
Ben-2 140Ñ0-0-0-(...)-0-20 0-0-0-(...)-0-20 2 2 1/12 2
Mal-1 57Ñ1-0-1-(...)-4-60 1-0-1-(...)-4-60 2 2 1/12 2
Mal-1 72Ñ1-0-1-(...)-6-52 1-0-1-(...)-6-52 2 2 1/12 2
Mal-1 81Ñ82 82 2 2 1/12 64
Mal-1 82Ñ83 83 3 3 1/12 32
Mal-1 83Ñ157 157 3 3 1/12 16
Mal-1 84Ñ85 85 3 3 1/12 4
Mal-1 85Ñ1-0-1-(...)-7-60 1-0-1-(...)-7-60 3 3 1/12 2
Mal-1 86Ñ1-0-1-(...)-7-59 1-0-1-(...)-7-59 2 2 1/12 2
Mal-1 157Ñ84 84 2 2 1/12 8
Table 5.4: Extracted and evaluated rules for ICS sensor data traces with low rule density
(ď 40%) and prevalence count (“ 1). Each rule describes an anomaly not typically seen
in other input data. FR...file rule, GR...grammar rule.
Sample trace TRR TRR* Length Length* Preval. Preval.* Overall
Ben-1 58.60 0.33 8.87 0.44 2 0.20 0.274
Ben-2 64.00 1.00 9.28 0.95 9 0.90 0.945
Ben-3 59.30 0.41 8.9 0.48 2 0.20 0.313
Ben-4 56.00 0.00 8.51 0.00 1 0.10 0.050
Ben-5 56.80 0.10 8.52 0.01 1 0.10 0.091
Ben-6 58.30 0.29 8.79 0.35 2 0.20 0.250
Ben-7 59.20 0.40 8.69 0.22 0 0.00 0.182
Ben-8 60.00 0.50 8.72 0.26 4 0.40 0.426
Ben-9 63.80 0.98 9.32 1.00 0 0.00 0.490
Ben-10 57.30 0.16 8.6 0.11 3 0.30 0.226
Ben-11 58.50 0.31 8.79 0.35 10 1.00 0.660
Mal-1 62.80 0.85 9.01 0.62 9 0.90 0.852
Mal-2 62.74 0.84 8.99 0.59 9 0.90 0.846
Table 5.5: Scores for TRR, mean rule length (Length), and rules with minimum (“ 1)
prevalence count (Preval). Columns marked with an asterisk (*) mark values normalized
to 0..1 as per Equation (5.1). Normalized scores ě 0.8 are printed in bold.
were maliciously altered by illegally interfering with the rotation. This resulted in some
atypical sensor readings that are nigh impossible to spot manually.
The full evaluated grammar for a total of 34,000 observed events was constructed
within 5 seconds. Sequitur inferred a total of 2,155 rules (sans zero rules), resulting
in a 93.7% data compression rate. In stage one, anomaly detection was conducted by
assessing rules with a low rule density value. By that metric alone, it was already
possible to identify anomalous traces. With a terminal-to-rule ratio (TRR) of over
62.7% (rule density of 37.3%), the malicious samples contained less uniform behavior
patterns than the remainder of 11 traces with a mean ratio of 59.3%. Only two benign
traces came close to that number, exceeding a TRR of 60%. The comparatively small
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margin is due to the fact that, in this scenario, anomalous data did not cause sensor
spikes but rather triggered a slow, continuous change in behavior.
Further analysis of the possibly deviating behavior was (and is typically) required
to solidify the initial verdict. To this end, we used our evaluation system to filter rules
that are present in only a minority of files and that have a prevalence count of 1 out
of 12. Armed with the pre-selection based on rule density, we particularly focused on
traces with a TRR of ą60%. Specifically, we normalized the scores for TRR (xT ), mean
rule length (xL), and the count of low-prevalence rules (xP ) and computed a weighted
total XWT :
XWT “ 0.4 xT ´minpxT q
maxpxT q ´minpxT q ` 0.1
xL ´minpxLq
maxpxLq ´minpxLq`
` 0.5 xP ´minpxP q
maxpxP q ´minpxP q (5.1)
Table 5.5 lists the computed values for each trace. As a result, the Youden index
BCa bootstrap confidence interval [88] was determined as 0.55..1, resulting in an asso-
ciated criterion score threshold of 0.66 for distinguishing true from false matches. For
ICS data, a manual adjustment to a higher threshold (e.g. 0.75) can further increase
result confidence.
Now, we can now analyze the outcome of the inference process in detail: Benign
trace 2 (“Ben-2” in Table 5.4) contained 9 rules that were not seen in the remaining cor-
pus. Likewise, both malicious traces (pictured here: “Mal-1”) contained 9 unique rules.
A direct comparison of the remaining anomalous candidates highlights one particularly
interesting, recursively compressed block per trace, which resolved into 16 (benign) and
64 (malicious) terminals, respectively. It stands to note that patterns with a higher av-
erage length are particularly interesting as they identify larger, uninterrupted sequences
unique for the dataset under scrutiny.
See Table 5.4 for a direct comparison of two of the most deviating behavior traces.
Rule 3 of “Ben-2”, which resolves into 8 terminal pairs as inferred by rule 140 (a rare,
but valid sensor state), contributes most to the trace’s analysis verdict. For “Mal-1”, the
same applies to rule 81 (32 iterations of rule 85), effectively identifying the anomalous
sensor state. The accuracy of this evaluation scenario is detailed in Figure 5.4 and
boasts a high false positive and false negative rate, especially when removing faulty
runs. The extracted, semantically relevant rules can now be formalized and stored for
future parsing efforts.
For a simple baselining experiment, we used our SEQUIN tool on two lengthy
traces depicting the Windows 7 update process performed on two machines with the
same OS patch level. With 10,769 events in update 1 and 11,057 events in the second
update, the combined compression generated 250 rules in total, 218 of which were con-
tained in both input files. The randomly generated 32-bit strings used as names for the
111
CHAPTER 5. GRAMMAR INFERENCE
Figure 5.4: ROC curve of the anomaly detection run. 12 out of 13 sets of sensor data
traces were classified correctly with a sensitivity (true positive rate) of 100% and a
specificity (true negative rate) of 100%. ROC area (AUC) was determined as 0.909.
Since the deviating benign run is actually faulty despite not being a deliberate attack,
its removal would boost the overall accuracy to 100% in our particular test case.
respective download directories within the Windows/SoftwareDistribution/Download
folder structure were replaced during normalization as part of the preprocessing stage
(Section 5.4.1). The remaining unique rules as well as terminals were deviations from
the computed baseline caused by random temporary file names and minor changes in
update chronology. In practice, this variant of the inference process can be used to cre-
ate whitelists, templates for benign process behavior, or, again, for extracting anomalies
from seemingly benign sequences of application behavior.
Discussion
In terms of accuracy, anomaly detection or baselining efforts are less likely to require
fine-tuning than the compression routine (see ‘Discussion’ in Section 5.6.1), as the num-
ber of recursive rule-building iterations does not negatively impact the result. Instead
of limiting the length of resolved rules, the extraction of relevant data is based on choos-
ing the correct rule density and prevalence for the dataset under investigation. Here,
analysts need to keep in mind that choosing the latter is tied to the expected number
of malicious input traces that might share the same characteristics (identical inferred
rules): The more often harmful sequences are assumed to repeat in the corpus, the
higher the prevalence threshold needs to be and the less likely it becomes to spot the
behavior using anomaly detection.
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Initial tests determined an accuracy of well above 92% for the detection of delib-
erate attacks. Relevant anomalies were found in all of the inspected cases. For more
complex scenarios it is recommended to apply visual analytics techniques that enable
interactive data exploration: After the extraction of possible anomalies or baselines, a
domain expert can investigate further to determine the individual events t that truly
describe an illegal action. While this can be done textually using only our inference
system, a visuals-assisted solution such as KAMAS promises (see 5.7 below) even better
results.
5.7 Visualization & Knowledge Discovery
5.7.1 Visual Analytics
One of the major applications of our proposed solution is undoubtedly the extraction of
new domain knowledge. Inferred patterns can be compiled into a permanent grammar
used to detect similar behavior in unknown traces. This process is supported by in-
teractive visualization to drastically improve usability. This area of research, typically
referred to as visual analytics (VA), forms the basis for KAMAS, our novel system used
to visualize SEQUIN’s output for pattern discovery and semantic annotation. In the
following, we briefly explain the concept of VA, KAMAS’ design considerations, and
the prototype implementation itself.
VA is “the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual inter-
faces” [308]. A major tenet of VA is that analytical reasoning is not a routine activity
that can be automated completely [338]. Instead it depends heavily on the analyst’s ini-
tiative and domain experience, which is exercised through interactive visual interfaces.
Such interfaces, especially information visualizations, are high bandwidth gateways for
the depiction of structures, patterns, and connections hidden in the data. Further-
more, visual analytics often involves automated analysis methods that perform various
computations on potentially large volumes of data.
When analysts solve real world problems they typically have vast amounts of com-
plex and heterogeneous data at their disposal, as is evidenced by above application
scenarios (see Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2). Externalization and storing of implicit knowl-
edge will make it available as explicit domain knowledge, which is defined as knowledge
that “represents the results of a computer-simulated cognitive process, such as percep-
tion, learning, association, and reasoning (...)” [48].
Through visualization, explicit knowledge can be used to graphically summarize
and abstract a dataset. Put simply, it enables quicker and more precise analyses of
complex input data such as the set of traces used in our ICS example.
Using VA for security applications is a widely accepted practice. In Wagner et al.
[331], the authors surveyed tools for behavior-based malware analysis in addition to
visual representations best suited to various domain challenges. Through a data–users–
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tasks analysis [212], they ascertained that the parse tree of a grammar such as the one
generated by the Sequitur algorithm, can be abstracted to a directed acyclic graph,
where each node represents part of a sequence.
5.7.2 Visualization Considerations
The nature of the event data and the inference algorithm employed builds the founda-
tion for our knowledge-assisted malware analysis tool, dubbed KAMAS [332], which is
intended to support analysts in their task of identifying relevant behavioral patterns.
In preliminary research [331], problem characterization and abstraction [280] was per-
formed to elaborate the analysts’ needs when using visual analytics for behavior-based
malware analysis. This way, a common terminology describing i) the data to be vi-
sualized; ii) the users of the system; and iii) the tasks to be fulfilled, was established.
Based on the outcome of this problem characterization, the initial design decisions for
the visualization of data generated by the Sequitur algorithm can be established:
• Representation of explicit knowledge. To support the analysts in their task
of behavior-based malware analysis, explicit expert knowledge should be made
available in the system. Additionally, the actual generation of explicit knowledge
needs to be facilitated. For the visualization of that knowledge, a basic hierarchy
of events is required. We utilized the malicious behavior schema by Dornhackl
et al. [81]: Using the provided semantic categorization, it is possible for analysts to
explore currently stored knowledge and to add newly inferred rules to the system.
The visualization of the malicious behavior schema employs a tree structure, where
the nodes are the different types of malicious behavior and the leaves are the rules
for its representation (see Figure 5.5:1).
• Representation of events. For the representation of the events included in an
analysis file, two important aspects have to be covered. On the one hand, the name
of the event (see Section 5.3.4 for more information on input data) is essential for
the analyst who is trying to ascertain its purpose. On the other hand, it is very
important to learn how often a single event is included in the analysis file. We
use a table structure for the visualization of this data, whereby the event name is
represented as string and its occurrence is represented as a bar chart including the
total number as an overlay. Employing this visualization technique, the analyst
gains the ability to quickly find events of interest (e.g., by visually analyzing the
size of the bar charts) (see Figure 5.5:3).
• Representation of rules. Since a rule is a sequential structure containing several
events, it is prudent to use a similar representation as for individual items. In
contrast to the representation of all events included in a rule (resolved rule, see
5.4.2), a more abstract visualization can be applied here. The transformation of
events based on their unique ID into a graphical representation (which is called
‘Graphical Summary’ [332]) helps to more effectively locate unknown patterns in
the data. Additionally, all the other related information can be visualized as bar
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charts in combination with a label representing the total number (e.g., the rule’s
prevalence and length as introduced in Section 5.4.3). The original order of events
within a rule is highlighted (see Figure 5.5:2).
To determine analysts’ requirements for behavior-based malware analysis with re-
gards to usable visualization metaphors [331], a basic set of well-known visualization
techniques was evaluated. Most of the participants indicated a combination of Multiple
View [117], Arc Diagrams [337] and Wordtree [336] as being the most helpful, followed
by OutFlow [345] and Pixel-Oriented Visualization [155]. In contrast, the Parallel Tag
Cloud [60], has been described as the least complementing solution in respect to behav-
ioral trace analysis. In the following, we detail the visualization concepts leading up to
the development of research prototypes for both data processing and visualization.
5.7.3 Implementation
Aforementioned visualization considerations were used as a guideline to define the design
rationale of KAMAS [332]. We decided to use an interface concept akin to well-known
programming IDE interfaces (e.g. Eclipse) as the conceptual foundation for our proto-
type. This helps create a familiar environment based on multiple, vertically separated
views (see Figure 5.5).
In respect to these interface structures, we placed the tree view of the ‘Knowledge
Database’ (KDB) on the left side of the window (see Figure 5.5:1). The KDB element
contains all the explicit knowledge used for automated analysis; newly extracted pat-
terns can be stored in a database for later use, whereas existing ones serve as real-time
filter that automatically highlights known patterns. The key ‘Rule Explorer’ element
is positioned in the center of the screen, where most user actions are performed dur-
ing the analysis of a trace (see Figure 5.5:2). Here, the analyst can see the different
rules generated by Sequitur, including all information pertaining to its file and grammar
count as well as its length. Selecting a specific element expands the fully resolved rule
for further study. Additionally, an arc diagram will be shown to highlight events that
constitute a known sequence. The ‘Call Exploration’ area is positioned on the right
side of the interface (Figure 5.5:3), similar to the functions overview area in commonly
used programming IDEs. Here, the analyst is provided with the ability to explore all
of the events included in the rules that are presented/highlighted in the center element.
The ‘Call Exploration’ view lists all events contained in the loaded file(s). To cope
with the potentially huge amount of data, the analyst has the ability to use different,
regular-expression-enabled filters to locate data of interest. Newly discovered patterns
can be added into the KDB via a simple drag and drop action.
In addition to the IDE-like design decision, we used the Gestalt principles of prox-
imity and similarity [145] to improve interface clarity. Each exploration area (Rule
Explorer and Call Explorer) is expanded with its own filtering elements located directly
below the visualized data. Based on all aforediscussed findings and concepts, we finally
created the KAMAS VA prototype for visualizing and assessing the patterns generated
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by SEQUIN. Figure 5.5 depicts a screenshot of the main interface. Analysts have found
the tool a useful addition to their workflow of exploring potentially harmful traces of
events, be it system calls or OS kernel operations. A full evaluation of KAMAS, includ-
ing a comprehensive usability study, is disseminated in [332]. The prototype has been
released online under Creative Commons Attribution license1.
5.8 Discussion
While SEQUIN is a versatile solution that offers support to IT security experts and
(malware) analysts alike, it is constrained by a number of limitations. As suggested
in the discussion of Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, the system does not currently provide an
automated way of determining the optimal length of rules representative for an anomaly.
The recursive nature of operation of the Sequitur algorithm is likely to produce rules
within rules that, semantically speaking, amount to the same result. Right now, it is
up to the analyst to impose length, TRR, and prevalence thresholds to counter this
limitation.
On the data input side, we are currently required to internally concatenate the
individual files and separate them with a file delimiter, which is skipped by Sequitur’s
rule building engine. This puts greater emphasis on the selection process of input traces,
since SEQUIN will only start to infer rules that occur at least twice in the overall input.
Too diverse an input will result in a lower compression ratio and anomaly detection
accuracy. At the same time, the use of smart traces sacrifices some of the trace’s
chronology by reordering events according to their process and thread context. While
this usually improves the results, long-running processes of lengthy sessions will skew
the timeline more than processes/threads that execute, run, and terminate within a
shorter window. Here, a mechanism of intelligently segmenting traces will have to be
developed to improve accuracy.
One of the other main areas of future improvement is undoubtedly the automated
semantic interpretation of inferred variables, which, in the tool’s current iteration, are
assigned based on the operations (terminals) that constitute the respective rule. In
the future, this representation will be updated to include actual attacker goals and
(malicious) actions that go beyond the purpose-neutral label currently assigned by the
naming schema. Ultimately, we plan to link SEQUIN to a targeted attack ontology
linking TAON [188] and the PenQuest model, which already provides the means for
labeling data by its attack pattern and kill chain state (Chapter 6).
Another area of future research is the improved inclusion of the temporal domain.
Currently, the order of events is maintained only within process and thread context (see
5.3.4). This allows for an investigation of sequences but does not consider the delay
between two behavioral instances. As part of further abstraction efforts it is planned
1https://phaidra.fhstp.ac.at
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to prepend a temporal identifier to each event, which will transport information about
the relative time and duration of execution.
In terms of validation, future work will encompass further proof of soundness for
the attribute grammar specification used in the chapter. Furthermore, we will formally
test our behavioral engine against evaluation systems such as the one introduced by
Filiol et al. [99]. Specific applications like the anomaly detection functionality discussed
in Section 5.6.2 will also be evaluated using an even larger and more diverse set of
behavioral traces to determine the best suited application scenarios.
On the knowledge discovery side, it is planned to continue development of the KA-
MAS visualization tool presented in Section 5.6. Specific functionality enabling further
statistical assessment will be included to facilitate (malware) forensics, automated sam-
ple classification, and various intrusion detection scenarios coupled with a database of
explicit domain knowledge.
In general, the automated cross-integration of visual analytics and knowledge dis-
covery methods will be an integral part of our future research into the practical appli-
cations of the Sequitur approach.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter we presented SEQUIN, a grammar inference system based on the
Sequitur compression algorithm that constructs a context-free grammar (CFG) from
string-based input data. The system is capable of automatically assessing arbitrary
corpora using statistical means. This enables the accurate identification of both rep-
resentative (frequent) or anomalous patterns in sequential traces. On the formal side,
SEQUIN uses a CFG enhanced with attributes to help describe the extracted (malicious)
actions. The inferred rules can be used for flexible unsupervised anomaly detection as
well as for compressing AIDIS’s input, thereby reducing processing times and building
the foundation for future applications beyond the Windows ecosystem. In summary,
this chapter contributes by:
• Defining an attribute grammar capable of depicting sequential behavior while
retaining information about the triggering process and its parameters;
• Presenting a grammar inference framework based on the Sequitur algorithm ca-
pable of performing input data compression and anomaly detection on arbitrary
system traces;
• Expanding this approach to a knowledge discovery system supporting automated
evaluation and extraction of potentially interesting patterns through our novel
KAMAS visualization tool.
We have successfully tested the induction and analysis system with several classes
of input data. When used to streamline traces for computationally expensive processes
such as AIDIS Core, we achieved a significant reduction in complexity by extracting
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representative variables that describe relevant patterns. In our tests, the mean process-
ing time for polynomial graph operations that are the basis of our anomaly detection
and classification system was reduced by more than 70% – a vital contribution to the
overall solution.
The results presented in Section 5.6 demonstrate the feasibility of using our gram-
mar inference approach over systems that rely on the manual definition of rules.
Anomaly detection based on the rule density metric showed promising results by iden-
tifying deviating traces and their behavioral sequences in close to real time. Attack
detection accuracy of an evaluated ICS sensor data scenario was well above 92% with
a specificity of close to 91% (100% each when removing faulty benign runs), while each
and every deviating behavioral pattern (benign and malicious both) was successfully
extracted for further investigation. With KAMAS, we additionally introduced a visual
analytics platform that uses the generated data to assist analysts in locating, extract-
ing, and classifying relevant rules. SEQUIN proved to be a useful supplementation
to AIDIS’s other components, as it offers the only unsupervised approach to learning
malicious behavior, which can be utilized to further dissect anomalies during sentiment
mining and star anomaly detection. Future versions of the overall system may also draw
on the resulting verdict as additional feature for threat classification.
Overall, the introduced grammar inference tool is most effective when employed
to quickly and accurately discover and highlight recurring patterns in sequential sets of
arbitrary host and network event traces, thereby aiding in bridging the semantic gap
between captured data and attacker behavior. The wide range of tested applications
makes SEQUIN a unique tool in the repertoire of malware analysts and researchers
alike. Its key contribution to AIDIS is the white-box anomaly induction functionality
and the event compression routine able to improve performance across all stages.
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6.1 Introduction
Attacks on IT systems are a rising threat against the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of critical information and infrastructures. At the same time, the complex
interplay of attack techniques and possible countermeasures makes it difficult to appro-
priately plan, implement, and evaluate an organization’s defense. More often than not,
the worlds of technical threats and organizational controls remain disjunct.
Detection and mitigation systems usually offer little in terms of contextual interpre-
tation, which would help to better understand attacker motivations and objectives [187].
At the same time, attack pattern lists, vulnerability databases, and mitigation control
catalogs often provide topically constrained information that can rarely be correlated,
thanks to varying levels of granularity or abstraction. Most importantly, few models
provide a means to map concrete system events as seen on affected assets to a seman-
tic interpretation, known system flaw, or definitive countermeasure. Time and system
interdependencies are often not considered. In short, the increasing complexity of cyber-
attacks makes it vital to explore novel approaches to attack/defense modeling, threat
intelligence, knowledge extraction, and malicious activity detection on multiple layers,
while preserving the flexibility needed to encompass new trends and scenarios.
Tailored awareness programs [288, 310] and workable risk assessment proce-
dures [35, 173] have been identified as key components in any successful defense strategy.
One approach to combine attack semantics with possible countermeasures and in-depth
threat intelligence is the development of so-called ‘serious games’ [186], a topic that was
first broached in the late 17th century as a feasible approach to education in general.
Research [78, 122, 261] and security standards/guidelines such as the IT Grundschutz
catalog [41] of the German Federal Office for Information Security emphasize that such
games are well-suited to teach information security and awareness principles to an au-
dience of differing IT background.
PenQuest, the APT roleplaying game (RPG) introduced in this chapter, is a seri-
ous game based on a multi-tiered attacker/defender model that uses gamification, i.e.
“game design metaphors to create (a) more game-like and engaging experience” [200].
Players can utilize the RPG to learn in an entertaining way about digital threats and
how they may affect different infrastructures. PenQuest also provides an abstraction
layer that helps assess the risk of targeted attacks on IT systems by providing an exten-
sible framework for simulating attacker and defender behavior in an adversarial setting.
Shortcomings in current defense implementations are inadvertently highlighted during
a game session. Managers are encouraged to explore new threats and are presented with
possible organizational and system-level countermeasures as suggested by accepted se-
curity standards. Analysts and IT/security experts are provided with the means to
depict concrete hacks through attack patterns and cyber-observables and link them to
the output of intrusion detection systems currently in place at their organization. We
use existing repositories and languages for many of PenQuest’s inherent concepts to
be in line with common industry practices and to enable the future development of
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interfaces between our meta model and existing platforms. Specific mappings include
the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) schema [219]
for describing attacks, various actor and asset elements from the Structured Threat
Information eXpression (STIX) language [223], exploit properties extracted from the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database [221], and security controls
for (federal) information systems & organizations from NIST Special Publication (SP)
800-53 [146].
Altogether, the gamified model introduced in this chapter helps to raise awareness
and supports risk assessment procedures while closing the gap between high-level kill
chains, independently published countermeasures and policies, and concrete attacks
depicted by real-word events. This versatility turns PenQuest into the solid foundation
for an in-depth risk assessment tool as well as framework for simulating attacks based on
real-world threat intelligence – in addition to supporting awareness education in higher
education and corporate environments.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: After exploring related
work in both the intrusion modeling and game (theory) domains (Section 6.2), we
discuss the theoretical aspects of our model and present definitions, a high-level view
on the multi-layered approach employed, as well as core mechanics (Section 6.3). In
Section 6.4, the rule system of the gamified model is presented in detail, ranging from
actor definition to assets, countermeasures and vulnerabilities to the actual game phases,
as well as offensive and defensive actions. Concrete examples are used to describe
the interplay of attack patterns and controls. Italicized segments present a cohesive
example of applied gameplay across all subsections. Section 6.5 specifies our practical
approach to combining STIX vocabularies, CAPEC patterns, CWE and CVE entries,
as well as NIST SP 800-53 controls into one model, thereby uniting existing data sources
across the threat information domain. Our first physical prototype design is evaluated
in Section 6.6. Features and limitations of the model are discussed in Section 6.7.
Section 6.8 concludes the article and provides a research outlook. All acronyms used
can be found in the Appendix.
6.2 Related Work
Since PenQuest incorporates concepts from attack modeling as well as serious gaming,
we take a closer look at similar works in both areas.
6.2.1 Threat Modeling
Several researchers have introduced attacker/defender models that consider numerous
factors and properties. In the following, we discuss the most influential works for the
development of PenQuest. Like our solution, the Diamond Model of Intrusion Anal-
ysis [43] establishes the basic elements of generic intrusion activity, called an event,
which is composed of four core features: adversary, infrastructure, capability, and vic-
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tim. It extends events with a confidence score that can be used to track the reliability
of the data source or a specific event. While some of its premises are similar to our own
work, the Diamond Model does not consider Enablers or Disablers (see Section 6.3.2) or
any automation for determining specific actions on the attacker’s and defender’s side.
While it is a powerful template in its own regard, PenQuest provides these mechanisms
– and more. Its gamified core is synonymous to a ready-to-use framework for simulation
and automated knowledge discovery. In summary, the Diamond Model and PenQuest
share commonalities and could potentially benefit from each other in terms of feature
modeling and terminology.
In the work by Syed et al. [303], the authors present a unified cyber security
ontology (UCO) extending the Intrusion Detection System ontology by Undercoffer
et al. [317]. UCO is a semantic version of STIX with a link to cyber security standards
similar to the ones used in PenQuest. Real-world knowledge is appended using featured
Google searches (Google knowledge graph) and various knowledge bases. Syed et al.
provide little information about data retrieval mechanisms and general automation. The
main use cases emphasized are the identification of similar software and the association
of vulnerabilities with certain (classes of) products. Unlike PenQuest, UCO does not
consider temporal information or measurements of uncertainty.
Most other works in this area do not attempt to model attack–defense dynamics
in a holistic manner while maintaining the link to concrete on-system actions. Existing
models usually focus on specific threats or information security aspects [227, 284], for-
mally depict attack–defense trees [161, 267], or describe ontologies with different topical
focus [97, 333]. Refer to the survey by Mavroeidis and Bromander [206] and Chapter 2
for additional related work on threat models, ontologies, and languages.
6.2.2 Game Theory and Serious Games
On the side of game-theoretic approaches, models are usually separated into several
classes, depending on a multitude of factors. Roy et al. [268] survey a number of
approaches for the network security domain and categorize non-cooperative games into
static and dynamic scenarios of varying levels of information quality and completeness.
As the work provides a good starting point for literature review, we classified PenQuest
in accordance to Roy et al.’s schema (see Section 6.3.3).
Cook et al. [63] present an overview of risk assessment strategies for industrial
control systems (ICS) that includes, among others, the game theoretic approach. The
authors conclude that there exists no unified risk model for hitherto unconsidered ICS
scenarios that incorporates events, threats, vulnerabilities, and general consequences
with a measure of uncertainty. Suggested future work includes the development of an
environment to allow an intelligent adversary to test an ICS’s defenses in a nonde-
structive (e.g. game theoretic) manner. This is specifically addressed by PenQuest.
Similarly, Lewis [178] offers an introduction to risk assessment strategies for critical
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infrastructure protection, including an in-depth look at Bayesian belief networks and
game theory applications.
Addressing a power grid scenario, Holmgren et al. [130] introduce a model for
studying defense strategies against hostile actions leading to a power shutdown. Outages
are split into stages ranging from prevention to recovery. Unlike the more flexible
PenQuest, Holmgren et al.’s model is a perfect and complete information game that
does not allow adding new components to the existing network of assets. In addition,
only qualified attackers of static skill, determination, and existing access to the system
are considered. The overall motivation of implementing the power grid game is still
comparable to our approach: It aims to help with resource planning, risk screening, and
with studying generic mechanisms that enhance the overall understanding of attacks
against a specific system.
Contrary to the above, Nguyen et al. [235] formally describe an abstract zero-
sum, incomplete information game for network security scenarios. Their network model
is based on the concept of linear influence networks [224], which is represented by
two weighted directed graphs that signify the relationship of security assets as well
as denoting vulnerability correlation among the nodes. The resulting influence matrix
describes the contribution of an asset to overall security. If an asset is taken down by
the attacker, its node is removed from the network, lowering the security rating for all
connected entities. For common assets, compromising one node changes the probability
that another linked asset will come under attack. Unlike PenQuest, Nguyen et al. do not
consider specific actors, assets, scenarios, or data sources. Since compromised nodes are
removed entirely from the network, the model does not directly support stepped attacks
or semi-successful attacker actions. As a pure zero-sum game, it also does not offer the
same level of flexible payoff as the system introduced in this chapter.
In the area of serious games, Shostack [290] present Elevation of Privilege, a game
designed to motivate people to engage in threat modeling. It is based on the STRIDE
mnemonic [160] and includes the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Dis-
closure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege attack categories. Defense actions
and further threat specifics supported by our RPG are not part of the game.
Another example is Operation Digital Chameleon [260], a red-team exercise turned
into a board game. Unlike PenQuest, the game asks of the players to build an attack
and defense strategy without the guidance of rules. A game master is responsible for as-
sessing both teams’ solutions and encourages discussion. While this offers flexibility and
is suitable for dedicated workshops comprising large groups of participants, Operation
Digital Chameleon does not provide a model for APT representation and data mapping.
With its formal approach, PenQuest paves the way for future scenario computation and
automated mitigation planning.
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More specialized learning solutions include What.Hack [339], a game revolving
around phishing defense, an approach to generate social engineering awareness [27],
and a game called OWASP Cornucopia1, intended for use in software development.
On the side of light entertainment, several vendors have released strategy or card
games centered around hacking. Examples include d0x3d2, Control-Alt-Hack3, as well
as Hackers and Agents4. Neither of these games attempt to model overly realistic
infrastructures or provide a holistic view on the topic of information security. With
PenQuest, we seek to remedy these shortcomings and provide a gamified model that
offers realistic scenarios while still being classified as edutainment.
6.3 Attacker/Defender Model
Our gamified approach is based on a novel attacker/defender model tailored to depict
interconnected services that maintain – and operate with – various types of information.
Consuming and providing services are represented by parent and child entities that
enable the modeling of arbitrary, interdependent systems and infrastructures. At the
same time, PenQuest incorporates on-system events that define nominal and anomalous
behavior, thereby establishing a link to actual attacker behavior in the form of individual
actions performed.
Below, we take a closer look at the foundational components of PenQuest: The base
model defines information and events in the context of the game and outlines how an
infrastructure of services can be modeled. The game model provides the classification
and definition of an “action” as performed by an actor. Lastly, the rule model introduces
the game-theoretic properties of the RPG.
6.3.1 Base Model
The PenQuest base model consists of three main layers – service, information, and event
– that are influenced by attacker and defender actions. Figure 6.1 provides an overview
of the interplay of the three main layers and sketches the link to the PenQuest game
model. In the following, we present the components that describe the cornerstones of
our approach.
Service Layer
In most modeling scenarios, services are synonymous to assets a defender seeks to
protect. They will most typically be IT systems maintained by an organization but
might also represent a single process running on a computer system.
1https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Cornucopia
2https://www.thegamecrafter.com/games/-d0x3d-
3http://www.controlalthack.com/
4http://www.hackersandagents.com
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layers of the base attacker/defender model while the lower portion depicts the gamified
rule system, which is discussed in detail below.
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In the model, a service has 4 properties: Type, status, exposure, and ownership.
The type of a service can be understood as combination of a unique designation and the
description of its purpose (functionality). In many cases, the type property will simply
contain the name of the service for reference.
Status describes the current level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a
service. It is the measure of a service’s ability to provide its functionality to a consumer,
be that another service or human user. In this context, confidentiality [299] describes
the preservation of secrecy of information associated with the service. If confidentiality
is compromised, the respective knowledge or configuration (see Section 6.3.1 below)
becomes known to the attacker. Integrity, on the other hand, maintains the immutability
of information belonging to the service. If integrity is lost, entities can no longer trust
in the information being correct. Lastly, availability denotes the prevention of system
failure or degradation of service functionality. If availability is compromised, a service
can no longer be used in an unimpeded fashion.
Exposure determines the placement, and by extension, the exposure of a service
to attacks originating outside the infrastructure. Exposed services can be accessed
directly, while internal services can only be attacked once an exposed service in the
path of attack has been compromised. This principle generally represents the vector
used by an adversary to gain access to a specific system.
The owner of a service is synonymous to the defending party in our attack/de-
fense model. Owners can be organizations, physical and legal persons, or even abstract
entities. In the game rules, the owner is often referred to as Player 2, or Bob.
Services can be reliant on other services for maintaining their functionality. Su-
perordinate services are called providers, while consumers are in turn dependent on the
service in question. The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the provider
may in turn lead to the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the consumer.
More information about service dependencies can be found in the game rules in Sec-
tion 6.4.3.
Information Layer
PenQuest distinguishes two types of information: Knowledge and configuration. Knowl-
edge represents potentially sensitive information relevant to the entity owning and/or
using the service. Services are often designed to safeguard knowledge – be that that
their main purpose or only implied functionality. Attacks against the confidentiality
status of a service seek to access restricted knowledge against the owner’s will, while
integrity attacks aim to (covertly) change that information.
Configuration denotes the technical or organizational settings and policies con-
trolling a service’s functionality as well as its level of exposure. It influences how a
service performs its work. Confidentiality attacks against a service’s configuration will
lead to the disclosure of settings and associated service properties (type, status, expo-
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sure). A loss of configuration integrity, on the other hand, might introduce undesired
functionality and can change a service’s exposure level.
In short, a service is controlled by configuration while maintaining knowledge. Ser-
vices and information are protected by controls (technical or organizational measures
aiming to protect the service from adversary activity) that focus on safeguarding con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Event Layer
Events are the link between the base attacker/defender model, the PenQuest RPG
game/rule system, and actual real-world monitoring data. They formalize activity that
leads up to service compromise and describe what an attacking actor is actually doing.
Service operation itself is described by events as well, providing a baseline of nominal
behavior that can be used for anomaly detection.
Events have a number of properties, including arguments, type, value, temporal
information, and an incrementing number in a potential sequence of events. In combina-
tion, events can be used to describe a wide range of happenings, starting from undesired
operating system (OS) process behavior to more high-level activity influencing an entire
(IT) system. For example, a user-land OS process might trigger the event E(sequence,
operation, argument) “ (1, create-file, dropped.exe), followed by the event
(2, start-process, dropped.exe), which results in an IDS anomaly A with a specific
value denoting its deviation from a set baseline: (A(deviation, threshold) “ (22.4,
10)). This occurrence would affect the confidentiality of knowledge that is associated
to the modeled service of e.g. browser.exe, thereby changing the confidentiality sta-
tus of the service to ‘compromised’. On a less granular IT service level, a generic
event E“(1, change-configuration, htaccess) caused by the purposeful alteration
of a web server’s security settings would affect the configuration on an integrity level,
changing the service’s integrity status to ‘compromised’ and altering the information
controlling the service in the process.
Since we do not only want to sketch such simple attack scenarios but also bridge
the gap between actors, assets, vulnerabilities, concrete attack patterns, events, and
countermeasures, we extended the model with formally defined actions which, in turn,
shape the foundation for the PenQuest ruleset.
6.3.2 Game Model
As a model that adopts several concepts from the genres of role playing and strategy
games, PenQuest contains a few base building blocks that need to be understood before
going into detail: The sides of the attacker/defender contest are represented by actors,
or characters, that have a certain class. Classes describe the background and affiliation
of the actor and come with certain properties such as skill, motivation, and monetary
resources, which, in turn, are named attributes. Attributes are the main determining
129
CHAPTER 6. ATTACK/DEFENSE MODELING
factor when it comes to defining an actor’s ‘strength’. They can change under certain
circumstances and are modified through equipment. Equipment comprises physical
appliances, tools, and more general policies – everything that will provide bonuses or
penalties to one side or another. Such modifiers typically directly or indirectly influence
the chance of success of actions performed in the game. Actions are the bread and
butter of PenQuest and describe what each actor is actually doing to attack or defend
the infrastructure of services that is emulated by the scenario. Actions often come with
specific requirements in terms of attributes, which reflects the difficulty of the actor’s
endeavour. The final decision whether an action succeeds usually entails a random
factor which is resolved by ‘rolling the dice’, i.e. computing the outcome according to
the modified probability of success.
In the following, we discuss the definitions that are make up above concepts. De-
picted in the lower half of Figure 6.1, PenQuest differentiates three main elements:
actions, actors, and equipment. The glue between is provided by meta information in
the form of categorization, various action requirements, and the annotation of events as
well as (third party) attack patterns that are used to populate the model.
Actions
Actions are at the core of the model and tie together all the other components. They
also link real-world service and actor behavior to concrete data points such as observable
attack patterns or event sequences. Formally, an actionX is defined as n-tuple of typical
length n “ 11, whereas the model’s flexibility allows for the omission of unneeded
elements. Simply put, an action is performed by an actor and is further enabled or
disabled by various types of equipment. It is assigned a category within the model,
which includes usage requirements, properties pertaining to its success, and a detection
chance. Attack patterns and associated events tie it to real-world data points.
X “ x
xAttackActorxClass,Motivation,Attributes,Resourcesyy,
xDefenseActorxClass,Attributes,Resourcesyy,
xEnablerxType,Effect, Attributes,Nameyy,
xDisablerxType,Effect, Attributes,Nameyy,
xV ictimxType,Name,Exposure, Parent, V ectorParent, Configuration,
Knowledge, Status, Integrityyy
xAttackClassxStage, PatternClass,Modeyy,
xDefenseClassxCategory, ControlClass,ActionClassyy,
xRequirementsx˚ActorxAttributes,Resourcesy, V ictimxExposure, Integrityyy,
xPropertiesxSophistication, SuccessChance,DetectionChanceyy,
xAttackPatternxImpact, IDyy,
xEventxType, T ime, ScoreSequence, Parent,Operation,Argumentyyy
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Actors
Actors are the players of PenQuest. The defending actor (service owner) tries to fend
off an attacker while his or her adversary seeks to compromise the status of a tar-
geted service. Our model differentiates two actor classes: The AttackActor and the
DefenseActor, which correspond to the actor types introduced in the ThreatActorType
vocabulary schema of the STIX threat information language [23]. Each attacker is de-
scribed as a unique class with their own motivation, primary attributes in the form
of Sophistication (measure of an actor’s skill, SO), Determination (measure of actor
motivation and the strength of their cause, DE) and Wealth (financial resources of
an actor, WE), as well as operational resources such as Initiative (INI) and Insight
(INS): Initiative (i.e. time efficiency) is an attribute derived from SO and DE that
determines the number of overall actions each actor can perform within a given period
of time. Generally, each action in the strategy set has a time requirement, making
this attribute the main resource for all attack and defense activities. Insight, on the
other hand, measures the cumulative knowledge gained about the opponent and thereby
increases the overall chance of success when attacking/defending.
The xAttackActory classes currently modeled in the RPG include: Cyber Espi-
onage Operations (TH), Hacker (white (EX), gray (RO), black hat (RA)), Hacktivist
(CR), State Actor/Agency (OP ), Insider (IN), and Disgruntled Customer (PR). See
Section 6.4.1 for more detailed information.
Each attacker class has a range of possible motivations. These goals represent
the overall objective of the attack and provide additional context for determining at-
tacker attributes and skills. They correspond to the STIX Threat Actor Motivation
vocabulary and encompass various ideological goals (id.˚), as well as ego-centered (eg),
financial (fi), military (mi), opportunistic (op), and political (po) motivations. The
actor creation routine of PenQuest supports the automation of the entire process and
provides percentages defining likely actor/goal combinations.
AttackActor “ x
xClasstTH,EX,RO,RA,CR,OP, IN, PRuy,
xMotivationtid.˚, eg, fi,mi, op, pouy,
xAttributesxSOt1..nu, DEt1..nu,WEt1..nuyy,
xResourcesxINIt1..nu, INSt1..nu, xEnableryyyy
Following the same formula, xDefenseActory classes include the three primary
sectors (CP , CM , CS), infrastructure (IF ), military (MI), state actors/agencies (SA),
the education sector (ED), and private individuals (PI).
DefenseActor “ x
xClasstCP,CM,CS, IF,MI, SA,ED,PIuy,
xAttributesxSOt1..nu, DEt1..nu,WEt1..nuy,
xResourcesxINIt1..nu, INSt1..nu, xDisableryyyy
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Equipment
There are two types of equipment in PenQuest. So-called Enablers represent attack
tools and vulnerabilities employed by the aggressor. They have specific effects on the
target service and come with a wide range of properties (e.g. level of impact or maturity
of a vulnerability-type Enabler (see CVE/CVSS mapping in Section 6.5)) and prereq-
uisites (e.g. privileges and level of user interaction required) that need to be considered.
Attacker equipment (ATT.˚) subsumes mostly attack tools (MPT , Pwd), OS, appli-
cation, and (wireless) network scanners (Sca), various types of malware (Mal), as well
as vulnerabilities (V UL) that modify the chance of success against specific assets.
Enabler “ x,
xTypetATT.˚, V UL.˚uy,
xEffectxTypetincSC, decDCu, EffectV aluet1..nu,
EffectTargettH,N, I,M, T uyy,
xAttributesxSophisticationt1..nu, Levelt1, 2uy,
xPropertiesxPrivilegesthigh, lowu,
UserInteractiontnone, requiredu,
xImpactxCtlow,med, highu,
Itlow,med, highu, Atlow,med, highuy,
Maturitytunproven, PoC, functional, highuyyy,
xNamet_ToolName_uy
y
Defenders use Disablers to thwart their adversary. Such defender equipment en-
compasses assets to be protected (AST ), security policies (POL), fixes (FIX) that
counter vulnerabilities, as well as tools that increase security (SEC.˚), e.g. through
prevention (Pre), detection (Det), delay (Del), or by generally hindering the attacker
(Cnt). The respective effects aim to reverse or mitigate the damage caused by at-
tacker equipment and actions. Specific examples can be found in the game rules in
Section 6.4.2.
Disabler “ x,
xTypetAST.˚, SEC.˚, POL.˚, F IX.˚uy,
xEffectxTypetdecSC, decSCu, EffectV aluet1..nu,
EffectTargettH,N, I,M, T uyy,
xAttributesxSophisticationt1..nu, Levelt1, 2uyy,
xPropertiesxMaturitytofficial, temporary,
workarounduyy,
xNamet_SystemName_uyy
Some enablers and disablers only target or apply to specific equipment categories.
The general xEffecty of using a piece of equipment depends on its type and is exem-
plified on a per-item basis in the game rules. Typically, various resources, attributes,
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and detection/success (˚DC/˚SC) probabilities are either increased (inc˚) or decreased
(dec˚) upon use, which further impacts future events and the overall course of the game.
For the xEffectTargety, we generally differentiate host-based (H), network-based (N),
industrial (I), mobile (M), and third-party (T ) equipment. Enablers generally have an
adverse xImpacty on the CIA status of the victim (more below).
The Victim class describes the system that is targeted by the attacker, typically
a specific service (i.e. asset). Victim information differentiates between internal and
exposed systems – which can be accessed directly from within the DMZ – and identifies
service status, integrity, and systemic as well as attack vector parents that represent
consumers, providers, and systems that have to be compromised before the victim can
be attacked directly.
In each gamified scenario, the attacker attempts to achieve his or her goal by
compromising a victim (target) in a specific fashion. This translates to the attempted
compromise of one the defender’s assets by changing its xV ictimxIntegrityyy to ‘com-
promised’ or its xV ictimxStatusyy) to ‘stopped’. There are three kinds of possible
attacks on any asset, in accordance to the CIA triangle of information security [299]:
Confidentiality attacks (theft of information), integrity attacks (altering of information),
and availability attacks (service status changes), which are all part of the xAttackClassy
meta component introduced below.
V ictim “ x
xTypetAsset, SecuritySolutionuy,
xNamet_SystemName_uy,
xExposuretinternal, exposeduy,
xParenttxV ictimy, xDisableryuy,
xV ectorParenttxV ictimyuy,
xConfigurationttech, orguy,
xKnowledgetInformation, xConfigurationyuy,
xStatusxOperationStatustrunning, affected, stoppeduy,
xIntegritytnominal, affected, compromiseduyyy
Meta Information
Each action is assigned an AttackClass by the model. Specifically, this class contains
the categorization into the APT kill chain stage [133, 188] (xStagey), and discriminates
various types of attack pattern. These types correspond to the mapping of granular
actions to CAPEC attack patterns [219], which is discussed in detail in Section 6.4.5.
xModey identifies the optional CIA goal [299] and impact rating of the action, which, if
successful, is reflected in the victim service’s xStatusy information. AttackClass infor-
mation helps to abstract specific attack actions and provides a means to link adversary
behavior to possible defense measures.
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AttackClass “ x
xStagetR.˚,W.˚, D.˚, E.˚, I.˚, C.˚, A.˚uy,
xPatternClasstIG, IN, SE, SA, FA,BF, IA,DM,PR,COuy,
xModexGoaltC, I,Au, Ratingtlow,med, highuyyy
The corresponding DefenseClass contains our abstraction of NIST SP 800-53 con-
trols [146], which we use to link attack patterns to specific technical and organizational
countermeasures. See Section 6.5 for more information.
DefenseClass “ x
xCategorytorganization, information_systemuy
xControlClasstIL,CP,AW,SP, FI,AP,AC,DI, SI, CSuy
xActionClasstACM,ACE, IFE,LEP,REA,AMO,RST,
COM,CCC,COS,COP,COP,AUM, INH,NOM,MES,
PAC, SEP, SCP,BOP,CRP, FLR,MCP, ISMuyy
Requirements identify the minimum actor attributes and resources needed to con-
duct the attack, as well as other prerequisites in the form of system exposure. Re-
quirements are optional and depend on the complexity of the respective attack, which
is defined through its Properties, namely minimum required actor skill (Sophistication
SO) and the chance of success (SC) as well as detection (DC). This information is
largely gleaned from CAPEC and CVE.
Requirements “ x
x˚ActorxAttr.xSOt1..nu, DEt0..nu,WEt0..nuyyy,
x˚ActorxResourcesxINIt1..nu, INSt1..nuyyy,
xV ictimxExposuretinternal, exposeduyy,
xV ictimxIntegritytnominal, affected, compromiseduyyy
Properties “ x
xSophisticationt1..nuy, xSCt0..100%uy, xDCt0..100%uyy
Each action corresponds to an observable AttackPattern, which is identified by its
ID and its impact on the CIA triad. Attack patterns link the modeled action to specific
hostile activity as described in the CAPEC schema.
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AttackPattern “ x
xPurposexExploitationtT, F u, ObfuscationtT, F u,
P enetrationtT, F u, RecontT, F uyy,
xImpactxCtlow,medium, highu, Itlow,medium, highu,
Atlow,medium, highuyy,
xIDtnuyy
Ultimately, attack patterns are mapped to a set of monitored Events with specific
underlying operations and arguments, triggers (parents), timestamps, anomaly scores,
and sequence numbers. The ‘pattern’ type describes event sequences that directly rep-
resent the action, while anomalies describe the behavioral deviation from a baseline.
The modeling of unique events closes the gap to the data layer and allows us to lower
the level of abstraction to the actual systemic representation. Refer to Section 6.5 for
a mapping example.
Event “ x
xTypetPattern,Anomalyuy
xT imexStartt_timestamp_u, Endt_timestamp_uyy,
xScorexDeviationt0..nu, Thresholdt0..nuy,
xSequencetnuy,
xParentt_ParentName_uy,
xOperationt_OperationName_uy,
xArgumentt_OperationArgument_uyy
6.3.3 Rule Model
The definitions discussed above provide the distinct elements that are part of the model
and introduce relationships and concrete class definitions. Before these components can
be assembled into a playable game, we need to outline the game-theoretic principles of
PenQuest as well as its core mechanics.
Game Principles
Instead of relying solely on decision models, adversarial behavior can be expressed in
the form of game situations [178]. Techniques associated with game theory, which is
defined as “the study of models of conflict and cooperation between rational decision-
makers” [266], can be used to model multi-player scenarios that allow participants to
pursue goals and rewards by acting in the most favorable, risk-adverse, or cost-effective
way possible. The outcome of a game presents the actors with a strategy for resource
allocation, risk minimization, or a general approach to meeting a certain objective.
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Even though PenQuest is a model/game hybrid, it can be categorized according to
several principles of game theory, as summarized by Roy et al. [268]:
• Non-cooperative nonzero-sum game: Opposition between players is an inte-
gral part of the design: Player 1 (attacker) always combats Player 2 (defender)
and tries to achieve adverse goals by stealing information, manipulating the in-
tegrity of data or systems, or by shutting them down entirely. Even though actions
are not typically assigned points that are symmetrically gained/lost (making it
nonzero-sum), it can be argued that the mechanism of asset compromise is in
fact a zero-sum game, where the defender loses points describing integrity and
status, while the attacker gains a corresponding advantage. In other situations,
win/loss is represented by an increase or decrease of attributes or action success
and detection chance. These bonuses are one-sided, yet always shift the balance
between the players away from equilibrium.
• Asymmetric strategy: The strategy sets of the two players are not identical –
the attacker draws from a different pool of actions than the defender. This stems
from the difference in goal and purpose: Attackers will attempt to penetrate a
system using malware or by exploiting vulnerabilities, while a defender tries to
counter these actions by implementing technical and organizational controls.
• Dynamic/extensive game with static elements [268]: While the game uses
sequential moves characteristic for dynamic games, the second player typically
remains unaware of the first player’s actions, making the model bear some resem-
blance to a strategic setting where players act simultaneously and in secret. At
its core, PenQuest remains dynamic – emphasized by its multi-stage nature.
• Imperfect, incomplete information: As stated above, Player 1 does not nec-
essarily know the moves previously made by the attacker, and vice versa. It is
in fact vital to players’ success that performed actions remain secret, thereby po-
tentially causing the other party to make imperfect decisions. At the same time,
the general set of strategies is known to both sides. The exact payoff in a certain
situation, however, is not, due to the lack of information about past activity and
their impact on success and detection chances (incomplete information).
• Bayesian formulation of static elements: In PenQuest, players have incom-
plete information on the other players, especially when it comes to actions and
strategies, which are derived from the attacker’s type and ultimate objective.
There is, however, a fixed probability that players, being one of n available classes,
need to conduct/defend against one of three kinds of attacks on a finite set of assets
in order to win the game.
• Finite & discrete: While some action combinations are continuous in nature,
the general action/reaction game follows a discontinuous sequence. The number of
game turns is limited by an exhaustible resource – Initiative (i.e. time efficiency).
Following Roy et al.’s taxonomy [268], our game can be classified as non-
cooperative, dynamic game with imperfect and incomplete information, that draws
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Figure 6.2: WF-net describing the process of picking and attacking a victim. The net
consists of 64 places, 51 transitions, and a total of 133 arcs. Soundness was determined
by analyzing the net in WoPeD [107].
from static elements of Bayesian formulation. According to You and Shiyong [351], our
two-player hybrid zero-sum game G is defined by the triplet:
G “ pA,D,F q, where:
• A is a set of strategies of Player 1 (attacker),
• D is a set of Player 2 (defender) strategies, and
• L is, for select game principles (see below), a real-valued function AˆD. There-
fore, Lpa, dq is a real number for every a P A and d P D.
Core Mechanics
The core mechanics of the game include the model’s sole zero-sum component describ-
ing target compromise and a full attack–response mechanism for achieving hostile or
defensive goals. The central part of the model is synonymous to the process of picking
a xV ictimy service and executing an attack of a certain xAttackClassy corresponding
to the CIA triangle mentioned above, followed by a matching defensive response. We
have modeled this basic building block as a Workflow net (see Figure 6.2) to identify
inconsistencies in the model. A workflow net (WF-net) is a strongly connected Petri
net (PN) with two unique input (source) and output (sink) places as well as a reset
transition r.
Following the notation of Esparza et al. [93], a Petri net can be defined as a 5-tuple
N “ pP, T, F,W,m0q where P is a set of places or states, T is a set of transitions with
P X T “ H, F Ď pP ˆ T q Y pT ˆP q is a flow relation, W : pP ˆ T q Y pT ˆP q Ñ N is a
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Figure 6.3: Information set of the defending player for victim system compromise
through attacker action av1, shown in extensive form [168]. In the above case, Player 2
successfully unveils av1, giving him the chance to specifically counteract the gain Lpavq
of Player 1 by increasing his own score Lpdvq through defense action dv1. Below tree
represents the limited information set for Player 2, when av1 remains undetected.
weight function satisfying W px, yq ą 0 ðñ px, yq P F , and m0 : P Ñ N is a mapping
called the initial marking. In our case, m0 equals the initial state where a victim has
not yet been picked (called “Start”). A reset transition r leads back to the beginning of
the attack process and repeats until the victim has been successfully compromised.
Specifically, an attacker picks a xV ictimy that is either exposed or in-vector (see
Section 6.3.1). Subsequently, a mode of attack (C, I, or A) is chosen. As depicted in
Figure 6.2 the initial impact of such an attack is determined based on the xEnablery
resource and various other properties and attributes. Independently from the level of
success of the action, the defender first attempts to detect the activity. In the Petri net,
this is again modeled as exhaustible resource that corresponds to the xDisablery class,
where detection systems (Det) can be found. If an attack was detected, the defending
entity can attempt to counter the initial impact by utilizing further xDisablersy. Ulti-
mately, initial impact and the degree of success in reducing that impact is resolved in
PenQuest’s only zero-sum game element:
Here, Player 1 chooses action a P A targeted at victim v P V (xV ictimy in our
class structure), which is kept secret unless Player 2 meets the detection requirements
(see Figure 6.3). If action av is conducted successfully, Player 1 gains a number of
points Lpavq representing the level of victim compromise, which are directly or indirectly
deducted from the respective defender’s tally (payoff). Independently from the outcome
of the detection attempt, Player 2 chooses d P D for victim v P V , attempting to counter
the (assumed) action av. Points Lpdvq are computed, fully negating Lpavq in the best
of cases.
This game principle applies to victim system integrity and status (see Figure 6.3
as well as the xV ictimy definition in Section 6.3.2), the success chance of hostile attacks
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and defensive actions (see xPropertiesy and xEnablersy/xDisablersy below), and some
other attribute and resource bonuses and penalties discussed in the next chapter.
We have again modeled this principle as WF-net, describing the process of gener-
ating Lpavq as well as Lpdvq, respectively. This second net, with a total of 33 places and
65 transitions, can be used for simulating arbitrary actions generating L “ 0..3 on both
the attacking and defending side. The unveiling of actions is again part of the parent
WF-net discussed above.
It is important to bear in mind that the RPG’s victory conditions are only indirectly
affected by these shifts in L, and that an increased numeric distance from the equilibrium
of factors other than victim system integrity and status does not always guarantee one
player’s domination over the other. In fact, victory is determined by the exhaustion of
available (temporal) resources or the successful compromise of the chosen victim asset
within an allotted time window.
In the following, we build upon these mechanics and construct a full-fledged strat-
egy game for simulating real-world attacks and their possible countermeasures.
6.4 Game Rules
In order to transform the model into a playable format while exemplifying both educa-
tion and data enrichment purposes, we opted to cast the rules of PenQuest in the mold
of a game manual. This approach is also owed to the fact that our system adheres to
the principle rules of a roleplaying or board strategy game for two players that follows a
set of stages to determine the course of a play-through. Conditional decisions are made
by rolling dice, which is representative for outcomes that come with a certain chance of
success as well as a random element.
In the following, we present the three main aspects of PenQuest, which build the
foundation for our physical prototype. In the preliminary stage, dubbed character or
actor creation, the players specify the two opponents, their basic attributes and skills,
as well as attack/defense goals corresponding to specific objectives and motivations.
Once the actors are defined, the game is ready to start. Specific activities within the
boundaries of this system are represented by conflict actions that, combined into a
full play-through, constitute an attack targeting a service asset. See below for detailed
information on each of these core game rules.
6.4.1 Actor Creation
Characters are the main actors involved into an attack/defense scenario. Since PenQuest
is a very flexible game system, there are many possible combinations of opponents and
scenarios. Instead of offering a fixed set of adversaries, we provide a full-fledged charac-
ter creation system that supports both manual and automated actor design. Generally,
it is important that the player portraying the attacker keeps all their properties secret
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– neither class, goal, attributes, nor the available equipment should be known to the
defender. In contrast, the class of the defender is public knowledge. Defender attributes
and equipment are initially kept secret, but may be uncovered during the reconnaissance
phase (see Section 6.4.4). See Figure 6.4 for a full overview of the character creation
process.
Class and Motivation
The respective player starts by picking in secret a class for the attacking side
(xAttackActory). Classes follow the ThreatActorType vocabulary schema of STIX [23].
Third party eCrime actors such as money laundering services and malware developers
are not modeled, since we want to focus on active factions that are likely to directly
target the assets of a victim. The available classes (STIX name) are:
1. Thief TH (Cyber Espionage Operations): Cyber spies are entities aiming to
steal information such as intellectual property or other private data (knowledge).
2. Explorer EX (Hacker, White hat): This class of hackers does not seek to cause
damage but acts to improve current security measures by e.g. raising awareness.
3. Rogue RO (Hacker, Gray hat): Grey hat hackers sometimes violates regulations
but usually lacks the malicious intent typical for a black hat hacker.
4. Raider RA (Hacker, Black hat): Black hats are malicious cyber-actors that do
not operate within legal or moral boundaries.
5. Crusader CR (Hacktivist): These hackers assume the moral high ground and
typically want to prove a point or leave an ideological statement.
6. Operative OP (State Actor/Agency): State actors can be agencies with various
missions in the areas of (clandestine) intelligence or counter-intelligence.
7. Infiltrator IN (Insider threat): Insider threats are individuals of varying skill
that seek to undermine their own employing organization.
8. Protester PR (Disgruntled customer/user): This class of actors represent a
generally unsatisfied third party.
Each character class has a range of possible motivations. These represent the
overall objective of the attack and provide additional context for determining attacker
attributes and skills. Motivations correspond to the Threat Actor Motivation vocabu-
lary that is part of STIX as well as the Motivation class of our attacker/defender model.
Possible motivations xAttackActorxMotivationyy are:
• Ideological (id): The actor acts out of their ideological belief in a cause, such as
anti-corruption, anti-establishment, environmental, ethnic/nationalist, informa-
tion freedom, religious, security awareness, or human rights.
• Ego (eg): The attacker wants to prove a point to others or herself.
• Financial or Economic (fi): The attack is motivated by financial goals.
140
R. Luh 6.4. GAME RULES
F
ig
ur
e
6.
4:
A
ct
or
cr
ea
ti
on
pr
oc
es
s
ov
er
vi
ew
.
D
at
a
im
po
rt
s
m
ar
ke
d
w
it
h
an
as
te
ri
sk
(*
)
ar
e
us
ed
in
bo
th
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
m
an
ua
la
nd
au
to
m
at
ed
m
od
e
of
ac
to
r
cr
ea
ti
on
.
141
CHAPTER 6. ATTACK/DEFENSE MODELING
• Military (mi): The actors wants to achieve a military victory or gain an strate-
gic/tactical advantage.
• Opportunistic (op): The attacker ceases an unexpected opportunity to strike
against a target.
• Political (po): The adversary acts out of political motivation.
While a player can pick any motivation from the above list when manually creating
a character, not every attacker is equally likely to have a certain motive. Disgruntled
customers will not typically have political agendas, while black hat hackers are unlikely
to be driven by an environmentalist ideology. The likelihood of combinations is modeled
by the RPG rule system as percentage values denoting the likelihood of a character/-
motive mapping. Randomization is achieved by rolling two ten-sided dice (2D10) and
then consulting the probability Table 6.1, whereas the first D10 determines the tens
digit and the second D10 represents the unit position. Currently, these motivations are
largely cosmetic and help to flesh out the actors. However, it is possible to expand the
rule system by incorporating cyber-crime statistics that reflect typical motivations.
Armed with attacker class and motivation, we can specify the defending actor (de-
fender class, xDefenseActory) of the hostile campaign by simply choosing from below
list or by rolling another D8. The list of actors is inspired by STIX’ Victim Targeting
by Sector, which leverages the external CIQ (Customer Information Quality) standard
published by OASIS1. However, there is no exhaustive Industry Type list provided by
STIX. We therefore compiled our own list of target actor types:
1. Company, Primary Sector CP : Private company operating in the primary
sector (e.g. mining, farming, forestry).
2. Company, Manufacturing CM : Company in the business of non-infrastructure
manufacturing and processing.
3. Company, Services CS : Company in the services sector.
4. Infrastructure IF : Organization maintaining (critical) infrastructure.
5. Military MI : (Para-)military organization with strategic or tactical focus.
6. State Actor/Agency SA: State-sponsored organization with possible intelli-
gence background.
7. Education ED : Schools, universities and other organizations in the education
sector.
8. Private individual PI : Person without relevant external affiliation.
In the following and throughout this chapter, we use an example scenario with the
actors of Alice and Bob to explain PenQuest’s rules. Alice personifies the attacker and
Bob represents the defending actor.
1https://stixproject.github.io/documentation/idioms/industry-sector/
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TH EX RO RA CR OP IN PR
Ideological 0-10 0-25 0-16 0-10 0-40 0-10 0-15 0-30
Ego 11-29 24-45 17-32 11-20 41-50 11-15 16-35 31-50
Financial 30-65 46-55 33-49 21-50 51-55 16-40 36-55 51-70
Military 66-70 56-60 50-66 51-65 56-60 41-65 56-60 71-75
Opportunistic 71-90 61-80 67-83 66-80 61-70 66-75 61-90 76-90
Political 91-100 81-100 84-100 81-100 71-100 76-100 91-100 91-100
Table 6.1: Typical motivation of the various attacker classes. The numbers represent
the lower and upper bound of the range. Ideological sub-goals are currently not covered,
but may be easily added for additional granularity.
TH EX RO RA CR OP IN PR CP CM CS IF MI SA ED PI
SO `1 `1 ´1 `1 `1 `1
DE `1 `2 `1 `1 ´1 `1 `1
WE `1 ´1 ´2 `1 ´1 `1 `1 `2 `1 ´1 ´2
INI ´1 `1 `1 ´1 `1 ´1 ´1 `1 `2
INS `1 `1 `2 ´1 ´1 `2
Table 6.2: Default attribute modifier table for all actors. For custom gameplay or sim-
ulation scenarios with a reduced need for balancing, these values can be freely changed
and should be based on the latest available studies.
Alice decides to use automated character creation to put together an APT scenario.
She rolls an eight-sided die (D8) to determine attacker class and scores a ‘5’,
making her offensive actor a Crusader (hacktivist). When it comes to motivation,
she rolls ‘6’ and ‘5’ on a D10. Consulting the probability table, she determines
the attacker motivation to be Opportunistic, meaning that the Crusader simply
chanced upon the occasion. Next, Alice rolls a ‘7’ for the defender class. Her
chance victim (Bob) seems to be in the education sector.
Attributes
PenQuest uses attributes to distinguish different levels of actor skill, motivation, and
resources. These can be set manually for a custom game or determined randomly. At-
tributes have ratings that range from 1 to 5, whereas 1 corresponds to an undeveloped
state and 5 to the highest possible maturation level. Attributes in PenQuest are So-
phistication, Determination, and Wealth:
Sophistication SO – Measures an actor’s capabilities, determines Initiative (number
of actions during conflict, see Section 6.4.1 below), the base success chance of actions
(see Section 6.4.5), and limits the use of more sophisticated equipment. SO is each
actors’ primary attribute, as defined by the STIX threat actor vocabulary Threat-
ActorSophistication. We have opted to use the following levels of Sophistication:
Aspirants (1) show little to no technical capabilities and are usually accidental perpe-
trators (attacker) or common users (defender). Novices (2) have basic computer skills.
Practitioners (3) are versed in using automated tools. Defending practitioners have a
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workable knowledge of the best practices and utilize pre-configured security solutions.
Experts (4) have in-depth knowledge about system internals and operational security.
Innovators (5) are masters of their field and create their own tailored tools and solutions.
Determination DE – Denotes the actor’s overall motivation and drive. It influences
Initiative and, in limited deck mode (see Section 6.4), the number of actions available
to the players. For attackers, Determination specifies how intent they are to reach their
goal, while a defender’s motivation simply quantifies the typical level of effort invested
into protecting a given asset. We define five levels of Determination: Indifferent (1)
actors are not particularly interested in achieving their attack or defense goal – their
willingness to invest time or resources is next to nil. Casual (2) determination repre-
sents a “for fun” attitude and might be representative of an intrinsically and extrinsically
barely motivated individual [203]. Willing (3) actors will invest an average amount of
resources into their mission without sacrificing other duties. Attackers or defenders
classified as Devoted (4) will disregard work hours or will dedicate significant resources
to their task. Finally, Zealous (5) actors will do everything in their power to achieve
their goal, including breaking laws or disregarding personal health.
Wealth WE – Specifies the actor’s available monetary resources that can be spent on
equipment (see below). Wealth is typically dependent on the respective attacker and
defender class. Certain organizations are more likely to have financial constraints for
cyber operations or information security than others, as is apparent in Table 6.2. Like
any other attribute, Wealth comes in 5 levels: Destitute (1) actors do not have any
noteworthy budget, the Provident (2) rating is used for the financial assets of a typi-
cal middle-class individual, Endowed (3) describes the average operational budget of a
small company, Rich (4) actors command funds of a successful medium-sized business,
and Prosperous (5) organizations/individuals can easily spend corporate-size budgets
on a campaign or defense objective. Specific numbers may be attached to these ratings,
if desired. For simplicity’s sake, each point of Wealth translates to 5 fictional credits
that can be spent on xEnablersy and xDisablersy during character creation and setup.
Certain classes may come with modifiers to their attributes, representing an in-
creased or decreased likelihood of having a distinctively high attribute score. These
modifiers are listed in Table 6.2.
Continuing our above example, Alice now needs to specify the attributes for her
Opportunistic Crusader and the victim education organization. She rolls a D6 six
times, re-rolling eventual sixes. She scores ‘3’, ‘2’, and ‘4’ for the attacker. As
the Crusader class has modifiers as listed in the Table 6.2 (`2 Determination, ´2
Wealth), the final attribute levels are Sophistication (3), Determination (4), and
Wealth (2). On the defender side, there are additional modifiers. Bob’s rolls of
‘4’, ‘2’, and ‘4’ are translated into the final values of ‘4’, ‘2’, and ‘3’ (-1 Wealth).
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Resource Pools
Next to the actors’ main attributes, there are two additional actor resources that come
into play when pitting two characters against each other. The first is Initiative (INI ) or
time efficiency. Initiative is a derived attribute that determines the number of overall
actions each character can perform. Each of the actions introduced in Section 6.4.5
has an Initiative requirement and also uses a certain number of Initiative points when
performed, making this attribute the game’s main resource for attack and defense ac-
tivities. There are actions that increase or decrease Initiative. This is representative
for the time required by a hostile action and for how certain (counter)measures might
influence the amount of time an actor has left to successfully thwart the attack. The
game ends in a victory for the defender when the attacking actor has exhausted their
Initiative without compromising the target asset.
The second derived resource is Insight (INS ). Both attack and defense actions
benefit from knowledge about the opponent. The more one party knows about the
other, the more likely his or her chance of successfully conducting an action. The initial
Insight Pool is zero, but might be modified by certain class properties. In the course of
the game, the Insight Pool will gradually increase for both actors – enabling new actions
and giving them the chance to better react to their adversary. The base detection chance
of the defender is linked to the action category of the attack (see 6.4.5).
Alice and Bob determine Initiative for their two sides: With a Sophistication and
Determination rating of 3, Alice’s Crusader has an Initiative score pSO ˚2q`DE
of 9. The education institution targeted is rated at Initiative p4˚2q`2 “ 10, which
is boosted to 11 by the planning policy that Bob implemented during setup. The
unmodified Insight Pool for the attacker is 0 (no class bonuses), while the defender
receives a `2 class bonus.
6.4.2 Equipment
Equipment in the game serves multiple purposes. It represents the target of a hostile
action, the systems used to support or thwart such an attack, and general tools and
policies that can be bought and implemented. Equipment always comes at a mone-
tary cost measured in credits and derived from the Wealth attribute of the actor (see
Section 6.4.1). Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide an overview for the respective equipment
types. While it is still possible to purchase equipment during later stages of the game
(see Section 6.4.4), a baseline of an actor’s technical capabilities has to be established
right off the bat. Both attacker and defender procure equipment individually without
informing the opponent.
Attacker equipment mostly comprises attack tools (xEnablersy) as per our base
model) that modify the chance of success against specific target assets or actors by
increasing their operator’s attributes or base success chance values. Other tools (hack-
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ing suites, vulnerabilities) come with a Sophistication rating of their own, which can
substitute for the attacker’s attribute for operations not directly executed by the actor.
Defender equipment (xDisablersy) encompasses tools that increase security, detect,
or mislead the attacker. The effectiveness of a piece of equipment is measured by its
contribution to detection or evasion as well as its action success chance modification (˘
percentage points).
In general, equipment is divided into the following categories, denoted in the game
model as xxxAttack ActoryEnablersyTypey and xxxDefenseActoryDisablersyTypey.
Disablers
The following presents the types of equipment available to the defending actor, which
includes security solutions, policies, and the systemic assets themselves.
Assets (AST ) are determined by the defender’s class and are awarded automatically at
no cost. It is the goal of the attacker to compromise one of these assets in order to win
the game. See Section 6.4.3 for more information and Table 6.5 for character—asset
allocation.
Security solutions (SEC ) – Security solutions are technical systems and tools intended
to prevent, detect, delay, or generally hinder hostile actions. In the context of the
game, they are physically or logically connected to an asset such as the network or a
user workstation, making it harder to successfully attack the service and its consumers.
Specifically, we differentiate the following systems (also see Table 6.3):
• Prevention solutions (Pre) – increase the difficulty of successfully attacking an as-
set by assigning a penalty to the action’s success chance (decSC ). See Section 6.4.5
for more information on action success.
• Detection measures (Det) – boost the defender’s ability to identify hostile actions
by directly increasing the defender’s detection chance (incDC).
• Delay solutions (Del) – increase the amount of time and effort required by the
attacker to perform the hostile action. In game terms, delay systems increase the
Initiative cost of the respective attack (incINI ).
• Recovery solutions (Rec) – decrease the impact of hostile attacks after the fact.
Specifically, recovery solutions can reduce the level of compromise of C, I, or A
attacks (decIMP.* ).
• Countermeasures (Cnt) – describe generic technical solutions that improve the
defender’s ability to counter hostile attacks. Countermeasures provide a flat boost
to the defending actor’s Sophistication attribute in specific scenarios (incSO.* ).
Security policies (POL) – Security policies are non-technical measures that increase
security on an organization level. Similarly to security solutions, they increase defender
attributes, resources, or grant special abilities. However, the bonus applies to the de-
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xTypey xNamey xEffecty xEV y xET y Cost
Pre Host-based IPS I decSC 5 H (all) 1
Pre Network-based IPS II decSC 10 N (all) 2
Pre Content-based IPS I decSC(D.D) 15 H (all) 0.5
Pre Rate-based IPS II decSC(A.A) 30 N (all) 1
Pre Web application firewall I decSC(R.S,D.I) 15 Web 0.5
Det Host-based IDS II incDC 10 H (all) 2
Det Network behavior analysis system I incINS 1 N 0.5
Det Log analysis system II incDC 10 H 1
Del Sandbox I incINI 1 H 0.5
Rec Failover network II decIMP(A) 2 N 2
Cnt Stateful firewall I incSO 1 all 2
Table 6.3: Exemplary list of security solutions (SEC ). Level II systems always
cost the double amount of credits to implement but also offer twice the bonus
(xEffectV aluepEV qy). Systems with xEffectTargetpET qy = * (all) apply their bene-
fit to all disablers of that type, while others can only be attached to one asset or security
solution.
fending organization as a whole, making them a powerful tool for establishing a secure
baseline. Policies cost time and funds to implement. Below list is taken directly from
the NIST SP 800-53 standard ([146], see Section 6.5 for more information about map-
pings and Section 6.4.5 for more details about NIST-based defense actions) and cover
the following aspects (NIST control ID):
• Access control (AC-1): Combines access control systems, policies, and session
control mechanisms.
• Awareness & training (AT-1): Increases defender Sophistication by implementing
organization-wide awareness and training measures.
• Audit & accountability (AU-1): Relates to audit-based non-repudiation measures.
• Security assessment & authorization (CA-1): Evaluation of controls and their
adherence to e.g. external standards.
• Configuration management (CM-1): Encompasses establishing and maintaining
performance and functionality of systems throughout their life cycle.
• Contingency planning (CP-1): Describes contingency plans such as fail-overs to
alternate storage or processing sites.
• Identification & authentication (IA-1): Manages session control and (crypto-
graphic) identification and authentication measures.
• Incident response (IR-1): Encompasses procedures, handling, monitoring, and
reporting of incidents as well as their follow-up response.
• Maintenance (MA-1): General maintenance of systems, such as update policies
and downtime schedules, are part of this policy.
• Media protection (MP-1): Subsumes access, designation, storage, transportation,
sanitization, use, and downgrading of physical media containing relevant data.
• Physical & environmental protection (PE-1): Physical access control and environ-
mental protection enforcement.
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xTypey xNamey xEffecty xEV y xET y SO Cost
MPT Host exploit kit I incSC 5 H (all) 1 1
MPT Pentesting software II incSO 2 all 2 4
Sca Mobile OS scanner I decDC 5 M (all) - 0.5
Sca ICS analysis tool II decDC 10 I (all) - 1
VSc Cloud vuln. scanner I reduces VUL.cpx low T (all) - 1
NSc Network mapper incINS 1 N (all) - 1
Pwd Password cracker II incSC(D.I) 10 H,N,I,M,T - 1
Mal Rootkit I decDC 5 H,N,I,M,T 1 0.5
Mal Ransomware II incCR 4 H 2 1
Mal Spambot I decINI(D.D) 1 H 1 0.5
Table 6.4: Exemplary list of attack tools. Level II systems always cost the double
amount of credits to implement but also offer twice the bonus (xEffectV aluepEV qy).
Systems with xEffectTargetpET qy = * (all) apply their benefit to all disablers of that
type, while others can only be used to attack one asset or security solution.
• Planning (PL-1): Meta-policy for the design of information security architecture,
secure operation, and central management.
• Personnel security (PS-1): Manages personnel screening, transfer, tracking, and
termination.
• Risk assessment (RA-1): Policy for the risk assessment and vulnerability scanning
process.
• System & services acquisition (SA-1): Revolves around the system development
life cycle, the allocation of resources, as well as the procurement of (third-party)
systems and services.
• System & communications protection (SC-1): Manages defense measures related
to DDoS protection, shared network resources, crypto policies, VoIP, wireless link
protection, I/O device assess and usage restrictions as well as numerous other
factors contributing to secure (inter-)system communication.
• System & information integrity (SI-1): Includes countermeasures to malware, sys-
tem monitoring, alerts, function validations, error handling, and other, primarily
remediation-centered information protection activities.
Enablers
Listed below is the equipment available to the attacker:
Attack tool (ATT ) – Attack tools are malicious programs coded to perform recon-
naissance (scanners) circumvent security (hacking tools) or automate certain offensive
tasks. They either provide a flat bonus or need to be attached to attack actions as
one-time modifiers. See Table 6.4 for an exemplary list. Attack tools are categorized
into:
• Multi purpose tool (MPT ): These hacking tool-sets allow the attacker to auto-
matically probe and exploit known vulnerabilities without purchasing a specific
attack. If the attacking actor operates such a tool, they can decide to use the
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tool’s Sophistication attribute for related actions instead of their own. The spe-
cific capabilities (actions that can be automated) differ from tool to tool and range
from an increase in success chance (incSC) to an increase in Insight (incINS) or
Sophistication (incSO).
• System scanner (Sca): Specific to each class of equipment (see Table 6.4), these
tools increase the knowledge about a system (incINS) or aid via a reduction of
the detection chance (decDC), thereby enabling more complex attacks. There are
scanners for every type of asset that need to be coded or procured individually
for each xEffectTargety category.
• Vulnerability scanner (V Sc): Vulnerability scanners determine the existence of
weaknesses in host-based systems. In game terms, they reduce the complexity
requirements of vulnerability-based attacks performed by the attacker. See Sec-
tion 6.4.2 for more information on vulnerabilities and exploits.
• Network scanners (NSc): Tools in this category (packet sniffers, port scanners)
intercept network traffic and thereby grant insight into the network environment
and its connected systems (incINS). They additionally expose security solutions
installed within the network context.
• Password cracker (Pwd): Primarily used to bypass account security, password
crackers either brute-force passwords or attempt to login using a prepared list of
likely secrets. Using them increases the success chance (incSC.D.I ) of Intrusion
type (D.I ) attacks. See Section 6.4.5 for more information about attack phases.
• Malware (Mal): Malware summarizes all software that mirrors the harmful intent
of an attacker in an automated fashion. In PenQuest, malware is ‘attached’ to
a successful Delivery action (D.* ). We differentiate Rootkits (decrease detection
chance of a subsequent attack, decDC), Backdoors (increase chance of success and
decrease detection risk (incSC, decDC )), Ransomware (generate credits (incCR)),
Trojans (similar to multi purpose tools and some scanners), as well as Botnet
Zombies (reduce Initiative costs for certain kill chain phases (decINI.req). Like
some multi purpose tools, malware has its own Sophistication level for determining
its success. With the exception of backdoors, all malware can only be used once
and expires after it has been triggered.
Exploits and Fixes
Exploits and fixes have a special role in PenQuest. While also equipment by definition,
exploits provide the means to lower the e.g. Sophistication requirements of an attack
by aiding the attacker in her efforts. Fixes available to the defender directly counter
specific exploits. The concept is detailed in the following:
Exploit (VUL) – A (technical) vulnerability is a flaw in a specific asset or security
solution that makes it easier for the attacker to breach the system by exploiting it.
They require a certain level of Sophistication to use and might demand additional
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privileges. Vulnerabilities generally exist in all types of defender equipment, but are
hard to exploit without knowing of their existence. Depending on complexity cpx, they
need a successful run of a vulnerability scanner on the victim resource (see above) before
they can be used. Vulnerabilities are key to compromising the victim asset and therefore
for deciding the outcome of the game.
Vulnerabilities as modeled by the RPG follow the metrics defined by CVSS: At-
tack Complexity cpx (high or low) determines the actor Sophistication requirements,
Privileges Required prv (true or false) additionally decide the need for pre-existing
user privileges, User Interaction usr (none or required) define whether the vulner-
ability can exist stand-alone without an accompanying action, and CIA Impact imp.˚
represents bonuses (high (`2), low (`1), or none (`0) for each triad factor) that deter-
mine the modifier to the accompanying attack’s effect. Each vulnerability is additionally
rated in accordance with its Exploit Code Maturitymat, which determines a one-time
Sophistication SO bonus and monetary cost of the exploit. Vulnerabilities without user
interaction are assigned an SO value of their own, as hinted at by the Temporal Metric
Group of CVSS. This directly affects the success chance of exploiting the respective vul-
nerability. In short, vulnerabilities also come with a Sophistication attribute or modifier
that is derived from their CVSS score, which is linked in turn to the CAPEC attack
pattern via their entry in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) database [222].
See Section 6.5 for more information about model mappings.
In PenQuest, vulnerabilities are generally used together with an attack action for
additional supporting or enabling effects. Corresponding exploits can either be coded
by the attacker (W.C action, as discussed in Section 6.4.5), or purchased (see above).
Either way, a successful Reconnaissance (R.˚) orW.P action is needed to enable the use
of vulnerabilities. In our current iteration of the game, we have implemented a num-
ber of real-world vulnerabilities including some well-known ones such as ShellShock1,
GHOST2, and Heartbleed3.
Fix (FIX ) – Fixes directly counter vulnerabilities or address other weaknesses in ex-
isting assets. They come in several classes as per the Remediation metric of CVSS:
Official Fix, Temporary Fix, and Workaround. Official fixes (high SO, restore integrity
from ‘compromised’ to ‘nominal’ (3 increments, incINT )) and workarounds (low SO,
restore from ‘compromised’ to ‘affected’ or ‘highly affected’ to ‘nominal’ (1 increment))
are effective indefinitely but are not able to counter zero-day exploits. Temporary fixes
(medium SO, restore by 2 increments) are only effective for one game turn and might
come with side effects. Workarounds generally come with a lower chance of success,
conditional on their Sophistication. See Section 6.4.3 for more information about com-
promise levels.
1https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-6271
2https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0235
3https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0160
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In our example, the attacking Crusader’s Wealth rating is 2. Translating to 10
credits’ worth of funds (Wealth ˚ 5), this gives the attacker only a few options to
prepare for her campaign. Alice spends the immediately available 50% of the money
on a host exploit kit (1 credit), a level II vulnerability scanner for database systems
(1 credit), and a ‘functional’ vulnerability for database systems for 2 credits. For
the defender, Bob uses 7 of his 15 credits to implement an access control policy
(2.5 credits), a planning policy (0.5 credit), a level II host-based intrusion detection
system (2 credits), and a level I stateful firewall (2 credits). During the game, the
remaining credit amount can be spent on additional equipment. Therefore, Alice’s
Crusader has an operational budget of 6 credits, while the education organization
can spend 8 credits during play.
6.4.3 Assets and Topology
Before we select the victim of the campaign, we have to take a look at the types of assets
available in the game. Assets are determined by the defender’s class and are awarded
automatically at no cost (see Table 6.5). It is the goal of the attacker to compromise
one or several of these assets in order to win the game. Assets are part of the defender’s
infrastructure and operate within the context of a network (which is an asset itself).
Below, we take a closer look at specific assets and some of the more general equipment
concepts in regards to the modeled topology.
We generally differentiate the following asset types: Host-based (H), network-
based (N), industrial (I), mobile (M), and third-party (T ) assets. Model-wise, we use
a simplified version of the SystemType vocabulary of STIX’ VictimTargetingType TPP
schema to model individual assets (denoted in brackets):
• Application server (App, internal, H) (Enterprise Systems–Application Layer):
Generic server running an organization-relevant application.
• Database server (DB, internal, H) (Enterprise Systems–Database Layer): Generic
data and/or configuration store.
• Network (Net, internal and exposed, N) (Enterprise Systems–Network Systems,
Enterprise Systems–Networking Devices): Underlying network connecting all
other assets. We differentiate an exposed demilitarized zone (DMZ), a local area
network (LAN), and an industrial network (subsumed under the term ‘SCADA’).
A dedicated internal network is optional for the PI defender class.
• Web server (Web, exposed, H) (Enterprise Systems–Web Layer): Server hosting
the public web presence of an organization or individual.
• Communication system (Com, internal and exposed, H) (Enterprise Systems–
VoIP, Enterprise Systems–Web Layer): Communications infrastructure including,
but not limited to, telephony, e-mail, and instant messaging.
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CP CM CS IF MI SA ED PI
Application server (App*) 3 o 3 o o 3 3 h
Database server (DB*) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Network segment (Net) o o o o o o o o
Web server (Web) h 3 o 3 o 3
Communication system (Com) o o o o o o o o
Communication system (Com*) 3 3 3 3 3 3
Industrial control system (ICS*) 3 3 3 h
Industrial safety system (ISS*) h h 3 h
Mobile system (Mob) 3 h 3 3 h o
Third party service (3Pa) 3 h 3 3
Workstation (WS*) o o o o o o o o
Table 6.5: Mapping of defense actor classes to controlled assets. o...no Sophistication
requirement (all actors of this type control at least these assets), 3...Sophistication 2-3,
h...Sophistication 4-5. Asterisk (*): Internal system (LAN or industrial network).
• Industrial control system (ICS, internal, I) (Equipment Under Control, Oper-
ations Management, Supervisory Control): System controlling industrial equip-
ment such as manufacturing plants.
• Industrial safety system (ISS, internal, I) (Industrial Control Systems–Safety,
Protection and Local Control). Safety systems for prevention and mitigation of
disadvantageous scenarios affecting human health.
• Mobile system (Mob, exposed, M) (Mobile Operating Systems, Near Field Com-
munications, Mobile Devices): Mobile devices and (individual) short-range com-
munications tools.
• Third-Party service (3Pa, exposed, T ) (Application Stores, Cloud Services, Se-
curity Vendors, Social Media, Software Update): Services such as cloud storage,
outsourced web services, and supplier systems.
• User workstation (WS, exposed for actor PI, otherwise internal, H) (Applica-
tion And Software, Workstation, Removable Media): Physical or virtual machine
operated by the end-user.
When it comes to targeting assets, there are three key concepts that define how a
system can be attacked: asset compromise, attack vector, and asset dependency.
Asset Compromise
Asset compromise is the key principle that governs how an attack on a system is modeled
in PenQuest. As stated in Sections 6.3.1 and formalized in Section 6.3.3, there are
three kinds of attacks with a xModexRatingyy ranging from ‘low’ (1), ‘medium’ (2), to
‘high’ (3). The available mode and its rating is dependent on the action being used;
not all actions provide the same level of systemic impact (see Section 6.4.5 for more
information). There are three modes of attack of which the attacker can choose one at
the time of the hack:
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Type = AST
Type = AST
Exposure: exposed
Type = AST
Type = AST
Type = AST
Application server
Type = AST
Communication
system (internal)
Type = ASTType = AST
Industrial control
system
Type = AST
Industrial safety
safety system
Type = AST
Exposure: internal
Prevention
solution
Type = SEC
Effect
Attributes
Properties
Policy
Type = SEC
Effect
Attributes
Properties
Detection
solution
Type = SEC
Effect
Attributes
Properties
Delay
solution
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Figure 6.5: Attack vectors and parent–child relationships for both victim exposure levels
in the abstracted topology. Security solutions are parents to assets; attacking them on
the integrity level can set child integrity to ‘affected’. The effect of CIA attacks on
assets and other disablers is further detailed in Section 6.4.5.
• Confidentiality attacks with a rating of ‘high’ (3) increase the attacker’s Insight
pool (incINS ), but have no further effect on system integrity or status. The effect
is cumulative over time: Three successful ‘low’-rated (1) attacks or one ‘medium’
(2) plus one ‘low’-rated attack accumulate to the same effect. A successful ‘high’
(3) level confidentiality attack is necessary to win a game with a data theft (con-
fidentiality) scenario.
• Integrity attacks of ‘low’ (1) and ‘medium’ (2) rating set the targeted service’s
integrity (decINT ) to ‘affected’ or ‘highly affected’, respectively. An attack rated
‘high’ (3) will change integrity to ‘compromised’, which is required to progress
along the attack vector and to win sabotage scenarios. The effect is again cumu-
lative.
• Availability attacks target the victim’s status (xV ictimxStatusyy): One or sev-
eral successful attacks (again dependent on the rating) set the target’s status to
‘stopped’ (xEnablerxEffectyy = decSTA), representing a system that is no longer
operational.
Any successful Integrity compromise (rating 3) of an asset or Disabler within the
‘exposed’ or ‘internal’ exposure domain enables the attacker to target connected ‘in-
ternal’ systems, which would otherwise be inaccessible (see Figure 6.5). See the next
section for more information about the attack vector.
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Attack Vector
We model network topology by differentiating between exposed and internal systems
(see Section 6.3.1). In order to attack an internal system, the attacker has to first
compromise an exposed parent asset or security solution or proceed along a predefined
attack vector : The attack vector describes the path an attacker must take in order to
reach the desired victim, meaning that any attack on a still uncompromised topology has
to target the mobile system (Mob, typeM), third party service (3Pa/T ), external comm
system (Com/H), web server (Web/H), user workstation (WS/H), or the exposed
demilitarized zone network (Net/N) itself. Incidentally, these are also the systems the
defender should do his or her best to wall up. Once a system has been fully compromised
integrity-wise (see Section 6.4.5), the attacker can target any system connected to the
one he or she just hacked. Figure 6.5 depicts the concept as bold black arrow.
Asset Dependency
Assets and security solutions may be parent (provider) to another system. If a parent
is successfully attacked, the effect of the compromise is passed on to all children (con-
sumers) at a reduced rate. Specifically, a ‘high’ (3) level attack on a parent will also
have ‘medium’ (2) impact on the child for level 2 relationships, and ‘low’ (1) impact
for level 1 relationships. An overview of attack vectors and parent–child relationships
is depicted in Figure 6.5.
The assets that Alice might be after are provided automatically. In the case of
our education organization with a Sophistication attribute of 4, Bob the defender
controls an application server, a database server, a web server, a communication
system, third party services, user workstations, an industrial control system for
educational purposes, and various network resources (see Table 6.5).
Victim Selection
Before the game starts in earnest, the attacker picks the actual Target (xV ictimxType “
tAssetuyy) in the attacker/defender model) and Mode (xAttackClassxModeyy), i.e. one
of the defender’s assets to compromise by changing its xV ictimxIntegrityyy to ‘compro-
mised’ or its xV ictimxStatusyy) to ‘stopped’ (also see Figure 6.5). There are three kinds
of possible attacks on any asset: Confidentiality attacks (theft of information), integrity
attacks (altering of information), and availability attacks (system status changes). See
Section 6.4.5 for more information about attack actions.
For custom games, it is perfectly feasible to specify more varied or numerous goals.
An attacker could e.g. attempt to first steal information off an asset before shutting it
down. Other scenarios include penetration tests of all assets within a network segment
or a DoS attack on two systems simultaneously.
154
R. Luh 6.4. GAME RULES
Alice decides that the game will end once she successfully alters the User Database
asset of the defender (integrity attack of the ’System manipulation’ (Action on
Objective–Integrity attack) category, changing some of the grades in the process.
6.4.4 Game Phases
At this point we are ready to play. We differentiate two distinct game modes: In limited
deck mode, attacker and defender randomly select actions (i.e. a card) from the pool.
After an action was used it is discarded from play. At the end of a turn, players draw
a new card for each action spent. Limited deck mode has been designed with gameplay
mechanics and balancing in mind and is intended to be used in casual games.
In simulation mode, players may freely choose from the entire action pool at any
given time. Attack actions are only discarded if the defender successfully spotted and
identified the hostile activity. This mode represents a more realistic approach where
attackers and defenders always have the full strategy set at their disposal.
As depicted in Figure 6.6, the game starts off in Stealth phase. This means that the
defender is unaware of the looming threat and has to rely on his initial equipment to keep
his assets safe. Stealth phase lasts until the defender manages to successfully detect an
attacker action. Actions can be performed for free during Stealth phase, meaning that
they do not deduct from the Initiative total. Purchasing equipment is done normally at
the end of the round. To reflect the reduced activity of the defender during this stage,
he or she generates a certain amount of credits every two rounds, providing the actor
with additional procurement options. Each round, attacker and defender may spend
one Initiative point worth of actions. Typically, the attacker uses this phase to conduct
reconnaissance to increase his or her Insight Pool. Defenders typically spend a part of
their operational budget to improve security systems, conduct spot checks (use defense
actions on systems deemed likely victims) or simply hope for their detection systems
to pick up the attacker’s activity. If the defender manages to detect a hostile action,
the action and its resulting level of compromise of the targeted system is unveiled and
Stealth phase ends with the current turn.
Alice wants to stealthily assess the target system by conducting a reconnaissance
‘Scan’ action (see Section 6.4.5). The rounded down success chance of this action
is 60% (Alice’s base Sophistication rating `3), meaning that she has to score 6 or
less on a ten-sided die. Alice rolls her D10 and scores a ‘5’ – well within range of
the success threshold of 1-6. As a result, her Insight pool is increased by 1, boosting
the base success chance by 5% and enabling a greater range of invasive actions for
her subsequent turns. Bob now rolls another D10 to determine if the action was
caught by his monitoring systems. With his base detection chance (30%) and an
Insight pool of 2 (`10% chance of detecting a hostile action) he needs to score a
‘4’ or less to spot Alice’s scan. Equipment on both sides would additionally modify
this target value.
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With the end of the Stealth phase the game enters Conflict phase. Initiative is
now deducted normally for each action performed, which represents the ticking clock.
There are seven possible action types that correspond to the APT cyber kill chain by
Hutchins et al. [133]. Every APT stage is further split into subcategories [188] that are
ultimately linked to specific attack patterns. See Section 6.4.5 and Section 6.5 for more
information about the interplay and mapping of offensive and defensive actions.
Attacker and defender continue to act alternately. Each attacker action comes
with a success and detection chance (for specifics, see Section 6.4.5) that is modified by
equipment on both sides. Whenever the defending actor succeeds in detecting a hostile
action, the action itself and the current level of compromise of the system are unveiled,
giving the victim the chance to understand the attacker’s goals and react accordingly
with a defensive action, which, similarly, has a certain chance of being successful.
In addition to triggering a normal attack or defense action, the actors can use their
remaining credits to procure equipment from a randomly drawn pool of equipment cards
(limited deck mode), or from the full range of enablers/disablers (simulation mode).
Equipment is available for use at the beginning of the next turn to model necessary
implementation efforts.
Each hostile action further increases the chance of successfully compromising the
target asset, while each reaction of the defender will make it harder for the adversary
to penetrate the system. Misdirection and timing are key, just like in the real world: It
is vital for the attacker to conceal his or her ultimate goal for as long as possible and to
strike when the chance of success is greatest. All the while the defender has to protect
their assets to the best of their abilities until all Initiative has been used up and the
attack has been averted.
6.4.5 Actions
In this section, we discuss PenQuest’s action categories as well as the individual actions
used to compromise or defend an asset. The core mechanics introduced in Section 6.3.3
are hereby specified and linked to accepted vocabularies and standards.
Actions are at the heart of PenQuest. They represent the concrete attack or coun-
termeasure being used at a given point in time. Each action comes with a success
chance and a detection chance modified by actor attributes and equipment currently in
play. The attacker first rolls a die (typically a D10 or D100 to represent percentages)
to determine whether the action is successful. If the result of the roll is equal or lower
than the success chance threshold, the action succeeds. The defender now rolls another
die in an attempt to detect the event after the fact. If that succeeds, the current action
of the attacker is unveiled.
In the following, we introduce concrete attack and defense actions, which are based
on the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) dictionary
and classification taxonomy by MITRE [219] as well as on the mitigation controls listed
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Figure 6.7: APT stage completion dependencies. The arrows represent which stage
(i.e. action associated to the stage) needs to be completed before another stage action
can be executed (‘followed by’). The dashed arrow shows the simplified dependency for
quick (non-persistent) attacks. Black boxes represent possible start points for kill chain
traversal.
in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 [146]. Attack actions are linked to the APT kill
chain by Hutchins et al. [133], which we expanded with several subcategories modeled
in the TAON ontology [188]. Figure 6.8 in Section 6.5 summarize the link between kill
chain, attack mechanisms, and mitigating controls.
Action Categories
Action categories encompass and classify the individual attack operations conducted
by the aggressor. Each subcategory of these kill chain actions has a base detection
and success chance ranging from 0 to 100%. The Sophistication attribute of the actor
or tool, employed vulnerabilities, special attacks, and various countermeasures might
modify that base value. The percentage is currently defined manually by a group of
IT security experts, but may easily be altered to match newly released information in
future iterations. Some kill chain stages require the successful completion of an attack
belonging to another stage prior to execution (see Figure 6.7), depending on desired
game complexity: In APT mode, dependencies include persistence and the establishment
of a C2 channel. Quick mode omits these stages and only requires a successful ‘Launch’
action (I.L).
Each specific attack action (see Section 6.4.5) is assigned one or several action
categories. Specifically, these APT kill chain categories are:
• Reconnaissance (R.* ): Research into the target and scanning of related assets
for information. Subcategories include Research (R.R) using public search en-
gines, Identification (R.I ) of systems through e.g. fingerprinting, and Scan (R.S ),
where a victim system is actively scanned for weaknesses and topological proper-
ties. Successful reconnaissance enables the procurement of vulnerabilities.
• Weaponization (W.* ): Preparing exploits and weaponizing code. Weaponiza-
tion mostly takes place at the attacker’s premises and is therefore nigh impos-
sible to detect. Its subcategories are Preparation (W.P), which includes exploit
searches and targeted research, the Coding (W.C ) of exploits and tools, as well as
Embedding (W.E ) the prepared or purchased malware in websites, mail messages,
or other, ostensibly harmless media.
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xIDy* Name* Methods* xPatternClassy xStagey Kn.* Purp.* C* I* A*
100 Overflow
Buffers
Analysis;
Injection
IG; IN R.I; R.S;
E.I; E.L
1–3 Pen.;
Expl.
3 3 3
103 Clickjacking Spoofing;
Social Eng.
IA; SE D.I; I.P 3 Expl. 3 3 1
104 Cross Zone
Scripting
Analysis;
Injection
IG; IN R.I; R.S;
E.I; E.L
2 Expl. 3 3 3
105 HTTP Request
Splitting
Proto. Man.;
Analysis;
Injection
DM; IG; IN D.I, E.*;
R.I; R.S
2 Expl. 2 2 1
Table 6.6: Excerpt from the current pool of PenQuest attack actions. Columns marked
with asterisk (*) identify information mined from CAPEC attack patterns. ‘Kn.’ speci-
fies the attacker knowledge required to perform the attack, ranging from low (1) to high
(3). The C/I/A columns denote the respective impact of a successful use.
• Delivery (D.* ): Delivery actions describe the process of gaining access to or
smuggling payload into the victim’s perimeter. Specifically, we differentiate De-
ception (D.D) attacks that use logical or physical social engineering to fool the
victim, and straightforward Intrusion (D.I ): Here, the attacker actively tries to
penetrate the target’s system using technical means.
• Exploitation (E.* ): In this stage, a payload or attack code is actively executed
on the system. During Initialization (E.I ), malware or an exploit is prepared
for launch by abusing a system weakness. Launch (E.L) describes worker pro-
cesses, threads, services, or modules that are being started, marking the point in
time where malicious code commences operation. The Evasion (E.E ) subcategory
encompasses techniques that hinder or prevent the analysis of an ongoing attack.
• Installation (I.* ): This stage covers Propagation (I.Pr), which is all about
spreading malware infections and the vertical traversal towards the target. Persis-
tence (I.Pe) attacks, on the other hand, attempt to establish a permanent foothold
in a system.
• Command and Control (C.* ): The C2 channel of an APT is responsible for
communication between the victim and the malicious controller. This stage con-
sists of the Download (C.Do) category, which includes patching and update mech-
anisms that alter or expand the original function of malware or exploits, the Di-
rective (C.Di) category, which subsumes commands sent via the C2 channel that
potentially alter an attack’s original purpose, and the Exfiltration (C.E ) aspect,
which includes smuggling out of e.g. previously stolen information.
• Actions on Objective (A.* ): These actions encompass the actual victim attack
task performed after going through some or all of the above kill chain stages.
They again correspond to the CIA triangle of information security, which is also
referred to as C, I, and A impact. Every attack action with a suitable CIA impact
other than ‘none’ can be used as A.˚ action.
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Attack Actions
Attack actions represent dedicated hostile behavior, which aims to compromise a target
asset or security solution in order to steal information, alter its operational parameters,
or negatively influence its availability. The main bulk of these actions and the afore-
mentioned CIA attacks performed by the hostile actor (see Section 6.4.3) is taken from
the Mechanisms of Attack described in the CAPEC classification. These mechanisms
encompass several levels of hierarchy and a description of possible countermeasures –
subsequently translated to the defender’s arsenal via the NIST Security and Privacy
controls (SP 800-53) standard ([146], see 6.4.5 below). In our game model, this map-
ping links the APT stages with their base detection and success chances to an existing
database of usable attacks as well as numerous possible countermeasures. All actions,
with their classification into confidentiality, integrity, and availability attacks, are linked
directly to the individual mechanisms of attack through the CIA Impact Rating pro-
vided by the CAPEC standard. Similarly, the mapping between TAON’s APT kill chain
subcategories and our primary classes of attack is done partly via CAPEC’s Purpose
information: Attack patterns are separated into reconnaissance, penetration, and ex-
ploitation categories, which directly map to the kill chain’s Reconnaissance, Delivery–
Intrusion, and Exploitation stages. The remainder of links (also see Figure 6.8) is
assigned manually.
The types of attacks (primary attacks) mapped to the [APT kill chain] include
(official CAPEC terminology, where differing):
• Information Gathering IG [Reconnaissance–Identification, Scan] (Analysis):
These attacks include interception, finger- and footprinting and various reverse
engineering and buffer manipulation tasks aiming at generating a better under-
standing of a target system.
• Injection IN [Exploitation–Initialization, Launch]: Injections control or disrupt
the behavior of a target or enable the installation and execution of malicious code.
• Social Engineering SE [Delivery–Deception]: These actions increase the trust
in the malicious entity by spoofing legit content or identities through social engi-
neering.
• State Attack SA [Exploitation–Initialization, Launch] (Time and State): State
attacks try to illegally change the state or timing of an application to gain access
to otherwise protected resources.
• Function Abuse FA [Exploitation–Initialization] (API Abuse): The abuse of
existing API and protocol functionality typically aims at information exposure,
vandalism, degrading or denial of service, or the execution of arbitrary code on
the target.
• Brute Force BF [Delivery–Intrusion, Installation–Propagation, Persistence]:
These techniques explore and overcome security measures of the target by e.g.
brute-forcing passwords.
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• Illegal Access IA [Delivery–Intrusion, Installation–Propagation] (Subvert Ac-
cess Control, Spoofing): In this large class of attacks the adversary attempts to
bypass access control mechanisms to gain control over a system or data store.
• Data Manipulation DM [Delivery–Intrusion, Exploitation–All] (Modification
of Resources, Protocol Manipulation): Attack actions of this category exploit
the characteristics of data structures to gain illegal access or to interfere with
the secure operation of a system. They may also alter the system’s integrity
by manipulating software, files, or otherwise interfere with the operation of an
infrastructure.
The two remaining APT stages, Weaponization and Command and Control, are
maintained as individual categories independent from CAPEC. Their attack patterns
are currently realized through manually defined actions, which will eventually be derived
from other information sources.
• Preparation PR [Weaponization–All]: These attacks describe actions performed
on the premises of the attacker to prepare attack tools, research information about
the chosen target, and other preparatory tasks invisible to the defender. In the
game, weaponization is typically used to generate Insight or reduce the costs of
equipment by spending time on e.g. malware coding.
• Communication CO [Command and Control–All]: C2 traffic is generated when-
ever a piece of resident malware receives new commands from its malicious oper-
ator. PenQuest uses C2 actions to e.g. allow the attacker to change a previously
triggered attack action with a reduced risk of detection. See APT kill chain above
for more details.
Table 6.6 lists some exemplary attack actions and their in-game properties, as well
as their APT kill chain mappings. xIDy, xPatternClassy, xStagey, and CIA impact
(xModey) are retained as part of the model. The remainder is used for linking APT kill
chain elements and CAPEC patterns that constitute our attack actions.
Each action comes with a Sophistication requirement specifying the level of knowl-
edge needed to execute an attack. It is directly derived from the Attacker Knowledge
Required information as identified in CAPEC. The attacker can reduce this prerequisite
by employing exploits (see Section 6.4.2).
Eventually, Alice’s tampering is caught by Bob, triggering the Conflict phase of the
game. Alice managed to boost her Insight pool to an impressive 5 points during
Stealth phase, which now allows her to be rather aggressive in her approach. Alice
still has 9 Initiative points at her disposal (she managed to complete reconnaissance
and weaponization during her stealth play), while Bob is left with 11 points for use
during the open conflict.
Alice wants to take it slowly to maximize her chances. As she can’t directly attack
her internal prime target, she attempts to take over an exposed asset first. With
her initial conflict action, she tries to place her previously weaponized backdoor
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malware on the education organization’s web server for easier subsequent penetra-
tion. To upload her code, she needs to successfully complete a ‘Delivery’ action.
Alice elects to use a D.I kill chain action, which translates to either a DM, IN,
or PH primary attack. Going the data manipulation route (DM), she executes
CAPEC attack pattern 105: “HTTP Request Splitting”. This particular attack is
rated C (medium), I (medium), and A (low). Since Alice is not after information
stored on the web server, she opts for an integrity attack. To be successful, she
needs to roll a test with her unmodified Sophistication attribute (3) plus Insight
modifier (`25%). Thanks to her preparation and her host exploit kit (another
`5%), Alice would have a 60% chance to succeed. Unfortunately, Bob’s access
control policy (´10%) represents a significant obstacle, reducing the final success
chance to 50%. Rolling her die, Alice scores a ‘2’ – easy victory. The integrity of
the web server is temporarily set to ‘highly affected’ (2 increments). If unopposed,
she would now only need one more ‘low’ rated attack (which is made significantly
easier by the ‘Backdoor’ malware card she attached to the attack) to completely
take over the server, thereby opening the path to her actual victim.
However, Bob still has a chance to react – if he manages to detect the attack.
Thanks to his Sophistication (3), his Insight (`10%), his packet filter (`1 SO),
and his IDS (`10%), he has a 60% chance to detect Alice’s hack. He scores a
‘5’ – and succeeds. The attacker has to unveil her past action to him, giving Bob
the opportunity to restore the affected system’s integrity and to anticipate Alice’s
future actions.
Defense Actions
Defender actions directly counter aforementioned attacks and represent the defensive
actor’s response to hostile activity modeled by PenQuest. In general, each implemented
control (i.e. defense action) identified in NIST SP 800-53 translates to one of several
defense actions that counter a number of attack actions in the context of our RPG.
Some actions directly relate to equipment (especially policies, see 6.4.2) and allow the
defender to implement organizational changes that improve security. Others describe
the conduct of security scans, the restriction of access to data, spam protection, or the
setup of a honeyclient.
In game terms, a successful defense action lowers the rating of the previously
executed C, I, or A attack by a certain amount of points. For example, a defense action
might lower the effect of a ‘high’ (3) level availability attack to ‘medium’ (2), therefore
preventing the system shutdown intended by the attacker, while not entirely mitigating
the attack.
To bridge the gap between attack actions that are part of CAPEC’s vocabulary and
the controls of the NIST security standard, we apply a similar, yet more comprehensive
and, to a certain degree, automated approach to the one introduced by [91].
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First, controls are split into two distinct categories that describe the scope of the
security measure:
• Organization level: Controls that target the organization level apply to all
assets and security solutions currently in play. The NIST standard [146] contains
167 organization-level controls, including policies. To losslessly reduce this amount
to a more manageable number, we categorize them into primary controls and
defense actions, both of which can be found below. Organization level controls
are designed to cost an increased amount of Initiative (time) to implement.
• Information system level: If a control specifically relates to an information
system, they can only be applied to one system of the defender’s choice once
an attack on that system has been spotted (successful detection). There are 57
information system controls in NIST SP 800-53. In the game’s context, we support
three modes for information system controls derived from the NIST standard:
1. Abstracted controls: With a focus on accessibility, this mode of PenQuest
implements an information system version of each of the below primary (or-
ganization level) controls. For example, the Account Management (ACM )
primary control can simply be used as organization-wide or information sys-
tem variant.
2. Related controls: For increased modeling accuracy, we can utilize NIST’s
Related Controls associated to below primary categories as system-level
equivalent. See the Account management (ACM ) primary control for an
exemplary list.
3. Control enhancements: Players can also opt to use NIST Control Enhance-
ments for each of the primary controls as information system-level defense
measure, provided the primary control is not already an information system
control (marked by an asterisk). This mode can be adapted to have control
enhancements serve as sole defender action set, omitting organization level
controls (except policies) entirely. PenQuest was implemented and tested
using this mode.
In the next step, we identify key controls that can be used to accurately depict a
class of actual countermeasures. While NIST provides 17 families with a total of 224
controls, these are typically too high level in their categorization to serve as links to the
more technical attack patterns used as attack actions. If we would use families directly,
the game’s rules would have to be adapted to connect each individual control to an
attack action, which does not scale well and negatively impacts the applicability of the
model to other domains. We therefore specify a number of primary controls, which are
the polar opposite of the primary attacks defined in Section 6.4.5:
• Information Leakage Protection IL (counters IG): This primary control pre-
vents information leakage through diligent configuration and data protection. It
is associated with NIST’s Configuration Settings (COS ), Boundary Protection
(BOP), and Cryptographic Protection (CRP) defense actions (see below).
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• Context Protection CP (counters IN ): As control against injection attacks,
this category protects from undesired functionality that lets the attacker break
out of the current system, communications channel, or application. Associations:
Security Engineering Principles (SEP), Malicious Code Protection (MCP), and
Information System Monitoring (ISM ).
• Awareness AW (counters SE ): This group of controls helps the defending or-
ganization to raise awareness for social engineering attacks of any kind, including
spear phishing and physical intrusion attempts. Association: Role-based Security
Training RST.
• State Protection SP (counters SA): Protecting the state of an information sys-
tem is a vital task spanning several groups of actions, ranging from backup systems
to integrity protection measures and status monitoring. It is associated with Con-
figuration Change Control CCC, Configuration Settings COS, Contingency Plan
COP, Incident Handling INH, Nonlocal Maintenance NOM, and Information Sys-
tem Monitoring ISM actions.
• Function Integrity FI (counters FA): Similarly, function integrity controls make
sure that the available functionality (API, commands) of an application are not
in any way abused. NIST associations include: Configuration Change Control
CCC, Security Engineering Principles SEP, Malicious Code Protection MCP, and
Information System Monitoring ISM.
• Authentication Protection AP (counters BF ): This control group is primarily
concerned with managing authenticators such as passwords and tokens. Associ-
ated controls: Remote Access REA, Authenticator Management AUM.
• Access Control AC (counters IA): As a main countermeasure to a wide range
of intrusion attacks, the access control family subsumes account management, en-
forcement strategies, and various access-related policies. Associated controls are:
Account Management ACM, Access Enforcement ACE, Continuous Monitoring
COM, Least Privilege LEP, and Remote Access REA.
• Data Integrity DI (counters DM ): Maintaining the integrity of data is one of
main tasks of information security. In our gamified model, this primary controls
includes: Contingency Plan COP, Incident Handling INH, Cryptographic Protec-
tion CRP, Malicious Code Protection MCP, and Information System Monitoring
ISM.
• Security Intelligence SI (counters PR): Preparation for an attacks works both
ways: Potential victims use intelligence techniques to stay up-to-date with threats
and prepare their systems for any eventuality.
• Communications Security CS (counters CO): The flow of information be-
tween internal and external system is a likely target for attack. In this group, we
combine the following controls: Information Flow Enforcement IFE, Boundary
Protection BOP, Continuous Monitoring COM, Cryptographic Protection CRP,
and Information System Monitoring ISM.
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ID* Name* xCat.y* xControlClassy xActionClassy Related
controls*
Control
enh.*
AC-2 Account
management
Org. AC ACM AC-10, AU-9,
IA-2, IA-8
AC-2
(1)..(13)
AC-3 Access
enforcement
Sys. AC ACE AU-9 AC-3
(1)..(10)
AC-3 (3) Mandatory access
control
Sys. AC ACE AC-25, SC-11 n/a
SI-3 Malicious code
protection
Org. CP,SP,
FI,DI
MCP SC-26 SI-3
(1)..(10)
Table 6.7: Excerpt from the current pool of PenQuest defense actions. Columns marked
with asterisk (*) identify information directly mined from NIST controls. Related con-
trols only list information system level controls that are not in the primary category.
We now map these controls to the following representative defense actions, which
were automatically extracted (see Section 6.5 for details) from NIST’s control cata-
log [146] by assessing their strength of association described through their official Re-
lated Controls property. The official NIST control ID and information system con-
trols are separately identified. Multiple mappings specify that several countermeasure
classes and its related controls are effective in the respective scenario. The defense ac-
tion listed below exemplarily includes related information system controls and control
enhancements, which are finer-grained countermeasures within its context. Please refer
to the Appendix of Luh et al. [195] for a full lost of control-to-action mappings.
• Account Management ACM (AC-2 Ñ AC): Establishes conditions for group
and role membership, specifies authorized users and access authorizations (i.e.,
privileges), creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system
accounts, and monitors their use.
– Related (non-primary) information system controls: Concurrent session con-
trol (AC-10), Protection of audit information (AU-9), Identification and au-
thentication for organizational (IA-2) and non-organizational users (IA-8).
– Control enhancements: Automated system account management, Removal
of temporary/emergency accounts, Disable inactive accounts, Automated au-
dit actions, Inactivity logout, Dynamic privilege management, Role-based
schemes, Dynamic account creation, Restrictions on use of shared/group
accounts, Shared/group account credential termination, Usage conditions,
Account monitoring/atypical use, Disable accounts for high-risk individuals.
The key component to finalizing the game model is the comprehensive mapping of
simplified NIST families and controls (defense actions) to specific CAPEC mechanisms
of attack (attack actions). See Section 6.5 for details about this process. In Table 6.7,
we list some exemplary defense actions and their offensive counterparts.
With Alice’s attack cycle complete, it is now time for Bob to deploy his coun-
termeasures. As he earlier spotted an integrity attack targeting his web server,
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he assumes that Alice is trying to deface his institution’s Internet presence. In
response, Bob can now either implement a system-level ‘data integrity’ (DI) con-
trol for 1 Initiative point to counter the data manipulation (DM) attack, or an
organization-wide control for 2 points. The latter would not complete within the
same round, which poses too great a risk for Bob. He decides to do what he can and
restore system integrity from ‘highly affected’ (2) to ‘affected’ (1). Depending on
the game mode, he could either use an abstracted version of the COP, INH, CRP,
MCP, or ISM controls, or implement related controls or control enhancements.
In this example, we use abstracted control enhancements: Bob checks each of the
defense actions at his disposal and decides to use an enhancement of MCP (SI-3),
namely SI-3(7): “Malicious code protection: Nonsignature-based detection”. The
default success chance of such actions is derived from twice his base Sophistication
(6), Bob’s Insight (`10%), and all equipment boosting either of the two. In our
case, Bob is granted another point of Sophistication because of his packet filter, for
a total defense success chance of 80%. Bob rolls a D10 and succeeds: The level of
compromise of his web server is decreased by one increment to ‘affected’ (low) –
a distinct setback for Alice.
The game will now continue until the attacker achieves her goal or runs out of
Initiative, ultimately deciding the winner.
6.5 Data Mapping
In this section, we specify the mapping of external data to the various classes and
categories that are part of our model. This includes the formal link between actions
and events, the mapping of the APT kill chain to CAPEC attack patterns, the CAPEC
to CVSS mapping, and the association of controls to defense actions. Using below
information, it is possible to easily extend or adapt the game system to new or updated
scenarios in cyber-security and beyond.
6.5.1 Actions to Events
Each action available in the PenQuest rule system can be modeled using the structure
introduced in Section 6.3. The possible link between in-game actions and real-world
events is an integral part of the model. We below exemplify this mapping using the star
graph anomaly detection system that is at the heart of the AIDIS endpoint protection
system. The system is built for detecting and interpreting abnormal Windows OS be-
havior expressed through sequences of kernel events defined as G “ pU, V,Eq, where U
and V are nodes (parametrized event type) and E is the respective edge (type of op-
eration). Specific attacks can be learned by monitoring process activity and comparing
it to a pre-established baseline of known process behavior. In a simplified fashion, a
number of events contributing to an anomaly could look like the ones listed in Table 6.8.
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Start node (U) End node (V ) Edge (E)
process-shell.exe process-drop.exe start (3)
process-drop.exe image-library.dll load (1.5)
process-drop.exe registry-HKLM/Software/.../WindowsFirewall open (0.25)
process-drop.exe registry-DWORD(EnableFirewall=0) add (0.75)
Table 6.8: Example event sequence describing the process of disabling the Windows
Firewall (CAPEC-207: “Removing important client functionality”).
To append the data to the model, we use the PenQuest game model (Chapter 6.3.2)
to transform the list of events to a simple instance of the xEventy class of an action X,
shortened here to two sequential events:
Event “ x
xType “ Anomalyy
xT imexStart “ 16.53.661, End “ 16.53.729yy,
xScorexDeviation “ 112.4, Threshold “ 16.0yy,
xSequence “ 1y,
xParent “ “shell.exe”y,
xOperation “ process_starty,
xArgument “ “drop.exe”y
xSequence “ 2y,
xParent “ “drop.exe”y,
xOperation “ image_loady,
xArgument “ “library.dll”yy
Since AIDIS classifies anomalies by their CAPEC attack pattern, the respective
information can easily be added to the action definition:
AttackPattern “ x
xPurposexExploitation “ T,Obfuscation “ F,
Penetration “ T,Recon “ F yy,
xImpactxC “ high, I “ high,A “ lowyy,
xID “ 207yy
This Purpose information of CAPEC is then used to establish the link to our
abstracted primary attacks, which is discussed below.
This simple interface makes it easy for analysts to add their own data to the game
model. While our game rules use the CAPEC example, PenQuest remains flexible: By
replacing the AttackPattern class definition, the level of abstraction and vocabulary can
be freely specified – ranging from the discussed OS events to high-level behavior such
as ‘Set Fire to House’. See Section 6.6 for a full example in the context of a real IDS
anomaly.
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6.5.2 Kill Chain to Attack Patterns
We use Hutchins et al.’s cyber kill chain [133] as foundation for the high-level view on our
model. For further granularity, we expanded the 7 stages to a total of 19 subcategories
that largely adhere to our APT ontology design introduced with TAON [188]. To link
kill chain elements to CAPEC attack patterns, we introduced the concept of primary
attacks, which were abstracted from CAPEC’s Purpose classes and assigned attacked
patterns to kill chain categories. Figure 6.8 depicts the mapping.
Since the list of attack patterns in CAPEC is partially incomplete or offers too little
information in terms of abstraction required for a model, we only considered patterns of
‘standard’ and ‘meta’ abstraction level – the ‘detailed’ class was omitted in this initial
iteration of the game. In addition, we opted to remove deprecated attacks and focus
only on stable and draft patterns found in version 2.11 of CAPEC1. Incomplete patterns
with no purpose classes were disregarded as well. Overall, this selection retained a total
of 65 representative patterns out of 516. The remainder can easily be added at a later
point.
6.5.3 Attack Patterns to Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are a key component of any intrusion scenario. In order to automatically
map CAPEC attack patterns to CVSS vulnerabilities, we took a closer look at these and
other related MITRE information exchange standards. Ultimately, we use the Related
Weaknesses information provided by CAPEC to map each pattern to specific weaknesses
represented by the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list. CWE “provides a
common language for describing security weaknesses in architecture, design, or code”2.
For example, CAPEC ID 1 (“Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by
ACLs”) is related to CWE ID 276, 285, 434, etc.).
To close the gap between weaknesses and the more concrete vulnerabilities, we use
open source information to map CWE entries to their Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures (CVE) counterpart. For example, CWE-276 (“Incorrect Default Permissions”)
contains the vulnerabilities CVE-2005-1941, CVE-2002-1713, CVE-2001-1550, CVE-
2002-1711, CVE-2002-1844, CVE-2001-0497, and CVE-1999-0426. Armed with this
ID, the specific vulnerability can be looked up in the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD3), where a specific CVSS score is assigned. This multipartite score is the ba-
sis for the requirements and impact calculations used in our model (see xEnablery in
Section 6.3). In our example, the score for CVE-2005-1941 can be easily retrieved4.
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Figure 6.9: Relations between NIST controls rendered in Cytoscape [286]. The inner
circle represents controls with a degree of ě 20. Elements beyond the outer circle have
a degree of 1, while the isolated nodes to the left are not linked to any other controls
(orphan controls).
6.5.4 Primary Controls to Defense Actions
The mapping of controls to defense actions and primary controls was automatically
computed from the NIST SP 800-53r4 standard [146]. To achieve this, we extracted
all links of relationship between the individual controls and modeled them as a graph.
We subsequently separated each control into one of three categories by their level of
degree. Controls with a degree d ą“ 20 were defined as parent defense actions (see
Figure 6.8). Controls with degree d ă 20 and d ą“ 1 form the bulk of related controls
which operate on information system and/or organization level and translate to the
remainder of the defense strategy set for the respective parent action. The model can
be further extended by adding control enhancements that, in turn, are associated with
numerous parent and related controls. Figure 6.9 depicts the relationship between all
224 NIST controls. General measures (NIST suffix *-1) were converted into policies,
which are part of the xDisablersy class (see Section 6.4.2 for a complete list).
For the mapping between defense actions and primary controls, a natural language
approach has been investigated. By combining four IT and information security glos-
saries (Gartner1, Techopedia2, NIST-IR 7298 [157], and the North Carolina statewide
glossary of information technology terms3) into a list of reverse stopwords (i.e. the re-
mainder of words were removed from the corpus), we attempted to automatically link
1https://capec.mitre.org
2https://cwe.mitre.org/about/index.html
3https://nvd.nist.gov
4https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2005-1941
1https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/
2https://www.techopedia.com/dictionary
3https://it.nc.gov/document/statewide-glossary-information-technology-terms
170
R. Luh 6.6. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
CAPEC pattern and NIST control descriptions using Quanteda for R [30]. However,
the difference in terminology and writing style rendered the approach too inaccurate
for practical implementation in this particular case. Instead, we opted to create pri-
mary controls (see Section 6.4.5) and directly assign them to the aforediscussed defense
actions. Figure 6.8 depicts the complete mapping.
6.6 Preliminary Evaluation
In this section, we briefly introduce our first physical prototype of the PenQuest RPG
and present the quantitative and qualitative findings of our initial test games designed
to determine the suitability of the gamified model for (awareness) education and threat
explication. We also take a closer look at data-to-model mapping as well as strategy set
distribution between the attacker and defender to measure the model’s completeness.
The discussion about future scenario simulation and IT-enabled automation can be
found in Section 6.7.
6.6.1 Experimental Setup
Prototype
Our first operational prototype uses a physical approach to present the game and its
components to a predominantly information security audience. Actions and equipment
are designed as cards containing all necessary information ranging from categories, re-
quirements, and game impact. Progress tracking for asset compromise, APT kill chain
traversal, and success modifiers (e.g. Insight, success chance) is realized through phys-
ical tokens placed on a printed game board. Similarly, levels of compromise, actor
attributes, credits, and attack objectives are tracked using a combination of cards and
tokens. Figure 6.10 depicts an early version of the game board. Next to visualizing
attack vectors and asset dependencies, it provides players with a kill chain tracker for
planning their attack and defense.
A total of 100 attack actions and 70 defense actions were prepared for the test
games. Existing CAPEC patterns and NIST control enhancements were complemented
by a small number of placeholder actions for the weaponization and C2 phases of the
APT kill chain, which are not currently covered by CAPEC. In addition, we designed
50 unique attack tools (enablers) and a total of 58 disablers, 18 of which represent
organization-wide policies. This was complemented by a set of 25 representative vul-
nerability exploits and a total of 18 fixes substituting the CVE component of the game.
In future automated simulation games that do not need to meet the same level of ac-
cessibility requirements, vulnerabilities will be retrieved directly from the NVD.
IT support for the current implementation already exists in the form of the WF-net
validator introduced in Section 6.3.3 as well as a PoC prototype for a two-player browser
app that incorporates actor creation and basic game board interaction. This does not
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mean that PenQuest’s physical iteration is limited in terms of overall functionality,
however: the game simply requires a human moderator to enforce some of its more
advanced rules and keep track of point tallies – akin to many commercial strategy
games and moderated red-team exercises [260].
Questionnaire
In order to evaluate the physical game prototype and the model’s suitability for repre-
senting APTs we invited a number of test persons from a corporate and educational IT
security background and presented them with both an introductory and a concluding
questionnaire. Next to age, gender, and specific level of security expertise we asked
participants to answer a number of simple questions about IT security topics to score
their current level of knowledge. Answers to the following questions were ranked from
‘strongly disagree’ (0 points), ‘rather disagree’ (1 point), ‘rather agree’ (2 points), to
‘strongly agree’ (3 points):
1. I know how cyber-attacks typically play out
2. I am familiar with the APT kill chain
3. I am familiar with the NVD and its scoring system (CVSS)
4. I am familiar with the concept of IT system vulnerabilities
5. I am familiar with CAPEC or similar attack pattern schemas
6. I am familiar with standards like ISO 2700x and NIST 800-53
7. I am familiar with information security best practices
8. I am familiar with IT network topology
9. I am familiar with common types of malware
10. I am familiar with the functionality of common hacking tools
11. I know how an organization can defend against cyber-attacks
These questions were repeated after one play-through in order to evaluate lessons
learned. In addition, the subjects graded the game’s suitability for education and threat
modeling in e.g. risk assessment scenarios. Specifically, we asked questions about ac-
cessibility (learning curve, handling of the prototype, abstraction level of attack and
defense actions), realism (applicability to real-world scenarios, scope of actions/equip-
ment), game balance (attacker/defender equilibrium in same-Sophistication games), and
awareness benefit (personal takeaway, educational effect). For threat modeling, subjects
were asked to rank the model’s suitability for awareness building and threat representa-
tion (abstraction level, real-world application, incident representation). All games were
documented to protocol action dynamics and session outcome. Note that testers playing
more than one game were assessed only once and that none of them were involved in
the creation of PenQuest.
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Expert Interviews
All participants of at least ‘professional’ IT security level (see demographics below) were
also given the opportunity to provide individual textual and face-to-face feedback. While
general comments were encouraged, we asked the remaining 7 practitioners to focus on
criticism in the areas of game accessibility, balance, and design. To assess the underlying
model, we also provided them with a copy of PenQuest’s full documentation (base, game,
and rule model) as well as with the game’s ruleset in scientific and instruction guide
format and requested specific feedback on each of the aspects. The results of these
interviews are part of the qualitative evaluation below.
IDS Data
To demonstrate IDS data-to-model mapping, we used classified anomaly events of our
own AIDIS system as input. The system provides automated classification of anomalies
as belonging to a specific CAPEC pattern, through which it becomes possible to di-
rectly link extracted behavioral data to the PenQuest meta model for further semantic
enrichment, interpretation, and mitigation planning.
For evaluative demonstration, we use the CAPEC class with the most events while
boasting a low misclassification rate, as discussed in Chapter 7. We specifically regarded
CAPEC-112 1, ‘Brute Force’, with a total number of 380 process anomaly reports and a
misclassification rate of 0% in the context of AIDIS’s operation. The concrete mapping
is discussed as part of the qualitative evaluation below.
6.6.2 Quantitative Results
In this subsection, we quantitatively evaluate the test games conducted with a number
voluntary participants. While the number of players is arguably limited, the results still
help to get an impression for the practical applicability of PenQuest’s game component
in awareness building scenarios. In addition, we enumerate the rule system itself to
assess its coverage of various attack categories.
Test Games
Of the 8 full test games played (in addition to approx. 12 partial sessions), 5 ended in
victory for the attacker. The average session lasted for 7 Initiative rounds. Initial game
setup and the first-time explanation of the rules to the participants new to PenQuest
took an average of 45 minutes, while the actual playing session concluded in around 115
minutes. Stealth phase lasted an average of 1.88 rounds. On the kill chain, attacking
players rarely exceeded the Exploitation (E.˚) stage that marks the conclusion of a
‘quick mode’ game. In terms of scenario, the play sessions i.a. encompassed ‘Operative
1https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/112.html
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Int1 Int2 Pro1 Pro2 Pro3 Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4
Qn B A + B A ` B A ` B A ` B A ` B A ` B A ` B A ` B A ` Mean
Q1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 2 3 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 0.33
Q2 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 2 3 1 3 3 0 1 2 1 0.89
Q3 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 -1 2 2 0 3 3 0 0.22
Q4 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 2 3 1 3 3 0 0.33
Q4 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 2 2 0 0.67
Q5 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 1 2 1 0.33
Q6 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 2 3 1 3 3 0 2 2 0 0.33
Q7 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 2 3 1 2 2 0 3 3 0 0.44
Q8 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 2 3 1 3 3 0 3 3 0 0.33
Q9 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 2 1 3 3 0 2 3 1 2 2 0 3 3 0 0.44
Q10 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 0.11
Sum 12 11 2 2 4 0 5 2 2 4.44
Table 6.9: Total knowledge gain per participating player. The score is derived from a
self-assessment conducted once before playing PenQuest (B) and a second time there-
after (A). There are 4 answer categories per question, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’
(0) to ‘strongly agree’ (`3). Each point of improvement (‘`’ column) represents the
knowledge gain of the individual player, ranging from 0 to 3. The sum in the lowermost
row designates the overall knowledge gain per participant.
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Game has an appropriate learning curve
Handling of game components (cards, sheets) is good
Scope and type of actions and equipment is appropriate
Game is balanced (in same-Sophistication scenarios)
Game increases general security awareness
Game teaches specific responses to security incidents
Game is fun to play
Game/model is a suitable tool for security education
Abstraction level of the model is appropriate
Model is applicable to real-world scenarios
Model accurately represents real-world security incidents
Strongly disagree Rather disagree Rather agree Strongly agree
Game evaluation
Model evaluation
Figure 6.11: Player feedback by question, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly
agree’. While most players would use the game as part of an awareness program, almost
half of them find the learning curve to be rather steep.
vs. Military’, ‘Protester vs. Education’, ‘Infiltrator vs. Infrastructure’, ‘Thief vs.
Manufacturing’, and ‘Raider vs. Services Sector’ scenarios.
Demographically, most players (7) of the total 9 were male, aged 26 to 35 years.
Dominant occupations were university lecturer/researcher, company employee (5 and 3
participants respectively), and 1 student, while the level of knowledge was evenly spread
between ‘Operator/Specialist’ and ‘Executive/Management’ (4 and 4). One ‘Assistan-
t/Intern’ participated in the testing. Occupation-wise, the I(C)T/informatics sector
was represented the most (7 participants), followed by marketing/media (1) and gen-
eral education (1). All of the players claimed to have at least intermediate experience
in the area of IT security. Of the 9 participants, 4 ranked themselves as experts (iden-
tified as Exp˚ in Table 6.9), 3 as professionals (Pro˚), and 2 as intermediate (Int˚).
Most players (5) did not have prior experience with learning games. Only one person
designated herself as moderately experienced in serious gaming.
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According to the returned questionnaires, the greatest learning effect was achieved
in the areas of the APT kill chain, CAPEC attack patterns, network topology, and
the functionality of hacking tools. Interestingly, the area of CAPEC was also the one
where many participants (4 out of 9) showed no knowledge gain after playing the game.
This is likely owed to the fact that most games were not contentually moderated –
most of the time, the game master focused on explaining mechanisms and rules instead
of information security aspects. Either way, understanding attack patterns has been
identified as an area in high need of impartation beyond the single line of explanatory
text currently printed on the card.
Non-experts benefited the most from playing the game, reporting the highest gain
in domain knowledge. Experts still claimed a minor increase in topical insight in 3 out
of 4 cases. See Table 6.9 for an overview.
When asked to grade their personal experience, all the players stated that it was
overall positive. All participants agreed that the game showed significant promise for
educational use in a higher education or company environment. The question as to
whether the “Game/model is a suitable tool for security education” was answered pos-
itively most often, with an average score of 2.78 out of 3, followed by the statements
“Game is fun to play” (2.56), “Game increases general security awareness” (2.44), and
“Model accurately represents real-world security incidents” (2.44). In terms of learning
curve, answers were the most controversial (1.56 out of 3), indicating a need to further
improve accessibility for players unfamiliar with serious games. Figure 6.11 depicts the
results of the final questionnaire.
Strategy Set Distribution
The distribution of actions between the attack and defense domains is both an indicator
for control effectiveness (where few controls counter a large number of attacks) and
model completeness. In Figure 6.12, we show the distribution of attack/defense actions
per primary attack/control. In the current prototype, state attacks (SA) were identified
as underrepresented due to a lack of CAPEC patterns meeting the requirements specified
in Section 6.5.2. This can be partially remedied by adding ‘detailed’-level controls to
the model.
In terms of APT kill chain coverage of the game, the CIA triangle is represented
with a nearly identical number (60 to 66 each) of available attacks corresponding to
the three information security factors. With the exception of availability attacks where
‘low’-rated attacks are predominant, most of CAPEC’s utilized patterns describe ‘high’
impact attacks, followed by ‘medium’ attacks. Stage-wise, most actions (120) belong to
the Exploitation phase, with around 45 patterns linked to Delivery and Reconnaissance.
The remainder of the kill chain is represented by everything between 16 and 39 CAPEC
and placeholder pattern attacks. See Figure 6.13 for a full breakdown.
Figure 6.14 quantifies the number of attack patterns per defense action category.
Unlike the strategy set distribution, these numbers encompass all currently available
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*IG* 21 21 *IL* 12 12
*IN* 36 36 *CP* 13 13
*SE* 11 11 *AW* 2 2
*SA* 2 2 *SP* 15 15
*FA* 28 28 *FI* 17 17
*BF* 13 13 *AP* 10 10
*IA* 10 10 *AC* 24 24
*DM* 23 23 *DI* 28 28
*PR* 19 19 *SI* 0 0
*CO* 14 14 *CS* 26 26
Distribution of attack/defense actions per primary attack/control
Attack patterns per defense action category
ACM 10 13
ACE 10 8
IFE 23 21
LEP 10 9
REA 23 6
RST 11 5
COM 10 2
CCC 30 7
COS 23 2
COP 25 9
AUM 23 15
INH 25 11
NOM 2 7
MES 23 1
SEP 64 1
BOP 21 21
CRP 44 2
FLR 28 6
MCP 87 9
ISM 89 23
APT kill chain distribution
*R.R* 3 Recon 45
*R.I* 22 Weaponization 16
*R.S* 20 Delivery 51
*W.P* 3 Exploitation 120
*W.C* 5 Installation 39
*W.E* 8 Communication 16
*D.D* 11 A.C 66
*D.I* 40 A.I 61
*E.I* 52 A.A 62
*E.L* 47
*E.E* 21
*I.Pr* 22
*I.Pe* 17
*C.Do* 4
*C.Di* 4
*C.E* 8
*A.C* 66
*A.I* 61
*A.A* 62
*A.C* (high) 45
*A.C* (med) 15
*A.C* (low) 6
*A.I* (high) 43
*A.I* (med) 10
*A.I* (low) 8
*A.A* (high) 23
*A.A* (med) 7
*A.A* (low) 32
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Figure 6.12: Distribution of attack/defense actions per primary attack (black) and
primary control (gray). Some attack actions (such as on-premises weaponization (PR))
do not have counterparts.
*IG* 21 21 *IL* 12 12
*IN* 36 36 *CP* 13 13
*SE* 11 11 *AW* 2 2
*SA* 2 2 *SP* 15 15
*FA* 28 28 *FI* 17 17
*BF* 13 13 *AP* 10 10
*IA* 10 10 *AC* 24 24
*DM* 23 23 *DI* 28 28
*PR* 19 19 *SI* 0 0
*CO* 14 14 *CS* 26 26
Distribution of attack/defense actions per primary attack/control
Attack patterns per defense action category
ACM 10 13
ACE 10 8
IFE 23 21
LEP 10 9
REA 23 6
RST 11 5
COM 10 2
CCC 30 7
COS 23 2
COP 25 9
AUM 23 15
INH 25 11
NOM 2 7
MES 23 1
SEP 64 1
BOP 21 21
CRP 44 2
FLR 28 6
MCP 87 9
ISM 89 23
APT kill chain distribution
*R.R* 3 Recon 45
*R.I* 22 Weaponization 16
*R.S* 20 Delivery 51
*W.P* 3 Exploitation 120
*W.C* 5 Installation 39
*W.E* 8 Communication 16
*D.D* 11 A.C 66
*D.I* 40 A.I 61
*E.I* 52 A.A 62
*E.L* 47
*E.E* 21
*I.Pr* 22
*I.Pe* 17
*C.Do* 4
*C.Di* 4
*C.E* 8
*A.C* 66
*A.I* 61
*A.A* 62
*A.C* (high) 45
*A.C* (med) 15
*A.C* (low) 6
*A.I* (high) 43
*A.I* (med) 10
*A.I* (low) 8
*A.A* (high) 23
*A.A* (med) 7
*A.A* (low) 32
21 36 11 2 28 13 10 23 19 14
12 13 2 15 17 10 24 28 0 26
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
I G / I L I N / C P S E / A W S A / S P F A / F I BF / A P I A / A C D M / D I P R / S I C O / C S
ST
R
A
TE
G
Y 
SE
T 
D
IS
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
PRIMARY ATTACKS/CONTROLS
10 10 23 10 23 11 10 30 23 25 23 25 2 23 64 21 44 28 87 89
13 8 21 9 6 5 2 7 2 9 15 11 7 1 1 21 2 6 9 23
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
ACM ACE IFE LEP REA RST COM CCC COS COP AUM INH NOM MES SEP BOP CRP FLR MCP ISM
A
TT
A
C
K
 P
A
TT
ER
N
S
DEFENSE ACTION CATEGORY
Figure 6.13: APT kill chain coverage through available attack actions. The ‘Action on
Objective’ stage is integrated into the other categories by means of the game model.
categories as per the data mapping specified in Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.4. Here, the
number of attack patterns countered by each defense action is largely well distributed.
Media Storage (MES), Security Engineering Principles (SEP ), and Cryptographic
Protection (CRP ) controls are not enhanced by more granular NIST countermeasures,
making them particularly effective if employed at organization level. At the same time,
there are only few attack patterns that can be countered by Nonlocal Maintenance
(NOM), which is less concerned with deliberate attacks and more with system upkeep.
The distribution of the categories clearly shows where current standards offer fewer,
if broader – and potentially more effective – guidelines in terms of mitigation. For many
technical attacks NIST suggests only a few countermeasures without going into detail
with extended controls. Next to above examples, this includes anti-malware solutions,
configuration management, and (software) flaw remediation. Similarly, attack patterns
are not equally easy to come by and tend to describe some types of attacks over others.
Especially system state manipulation, spoofing, and the subversion of access control
mechanisms are harder to specify in significant quantity than e.g. injection attacks.
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*IG* 22 *IL* 23
*IN* 36 *CP* 31
*SE* 5 *AW* 4
*SA* 2 *SP* 55
*FA* 21 *FI* 42
*BF* 13 *AP* 21
*IA* 10 *AC* 53
*DM* 22 *DI* 71
*PR* 4 *SI* 4
*CO* 12 *CS* 66
Distribution of attack/defense actions per primary attack/control
Attack patterns per defense action category
ACM 10 13
ACE 10 8
IFE 22 21
LEP 10 9
REA 23 6
RST 5 4
COM 10 2
CCC 23 6
COS 24 2
COP 24 8
AUM 23 15
INH 24 10
NOM 2 7
MES 22 1
SEP 57 1
BOP 22 20
CRP 44 1
FLR 21 5
MCP 79 8
ISM 81 22
APT kill chain distribution
*R.R* 4 R 40
*R.I* 18 W 12
*R.S* 18 D 44
*W.P* 4 E 123
*W.C* 4 I 24
*W.E* 4 C 12
*D.D* 5 A.C 58
*D.I* 39 A.I 58
*E.I* 53 A.A 57
*E.L* 48
*E.E* 22
*I.Pr* 12
*I.Pe* 12
*C.Do* 4
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*A.A* 57
*A.C* (high) 44
*A.C* (med) 10
*A.C* (low) 4
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Figure 6.14: Attack patterns (black) per defense action category (gray). This chart
encompasses all actions and categories currently available for game development.
6.6.3 Qualitative Results
When asked to provide additional textual and oral feedback, security practitioners con-
tributed valuable insight and suggested a number of improvements to both model and
game. A summary can be found below. Lastly, we sketch how the mapping of IDS data
to the model works in practice.
Game
In stage 1, we collected feedback aimed directly at the game and its prototype imple-
mentation. This information is particularly important for the ongoing development of
PenQuest’s digital iteration and primarily addresses three topics of interest: accessibil-
ity, balance, and design.
Accessibility – One of the major points raised in the expert discussion was that the
current prototype aims at a target audience with at least a Bachelor-level degree in
computer science or IT security. While terms and explanations used in the game cor-
respond to the current business practice, the entry level for students or employees of
other areas is too high. Several participants suggested that future versions of PenQuest
– provided they also seek to target non-IT players – should paraphrase security con-
cepts in simpler language and provide the original information as footnote pointing to
an external reference.
It was also noted by a tester that people unfamiliar with complex strategy games
might be overwhelmed by the amount of rules. In contrast, participants who plays
board games regularly described PenQuest’s rule set as “about average in difficulty”
and added that it is common for such games to require 2 or more playthroughs to get a
full grasp of the more advanced mechanics. Most of the interviewed stated that having
a digital system for calculating system compromise and success probabilities would be
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beneficial in terms of accessibility.
Balance – Tester feedback was mostly in line with the results of our quantitative
evaluation of PenQuest’s strategy set distribution. While some actions were perceived
as more effective than others, there were no trump cards that enabled an easy victory.
Without exception, the participants agreed that the slight bias towards the attacking
actor is both realistic and entertaining – and helps transport the message of awareness.
The majority of experts showed themselves surprised that even though the model
uses real-world data sources for its loss and gain scores, the resulting game is naturally
balanced. It was added, however, that this equilibrium would likely be lost without the
limiting factors of Initiative and Wealth, which temporally and financially constrain the
modeled adversarial campaign.
Design – Since the visual design of the game is not the focus of this article, we only
briefly summarize tester feedback: While most game elements were deemed as practical
and comprehensible, players suggested various improvements to iconography and game
board design. In particular the CIA impact of attack actions and the representation of
the APT kill chain were criticized as not immediately self-explanatory.
Model
The second stage of the qualitative feedback process revolved around the model on
which the game is built. After playing at least one test game and having been given a
detailed introduction to the base, game, and rule models as well as the game’s resulting
ruleset, participants were asked to provide criticism from their perspective as experi-
enced security practitioners.
Base model – Testers agreed that PenQuest’s base model serves well to introduce the
core concepts of the gamified system and defines all terms needed to understand layer
and component interplay. It was suggested, however, that future iterations of the model
could benefit from additional detail, especially for the ‘knowledge’ and ‘configuration’
aspects found within the model’s information layer. One expert recommended that
the concept of vulnerabilities could be incorporated directly into the base model, yet
admitted that detaching them from the ‘equipment’ definition would add an undesired
layer of complexity.
Game model – Generally, PenQuest’s use of attack and defense classes to abstract
attack patterns and controls was lauded by the testers. Most experts emphasized that
the approach helps to better understand the model’s mapping procedures and enables
security practitioners to plan an appropriate defense against threats even without un-
derstanding all the specifics of each individual attack or control.
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Scrutinizing feedback included the aforementioned vulnerabilities and fixes, which
are currently part of the xEnablery and xDisablery classes of action X. It was suggested
by an expert to consider creating a class of its own for both, something that will be
investigated for future versions of the model.
When discussing the game model’s xEventy class, several of the participants in-
dependently confirmed that it provides the means to interface PenQuest to not only
IDS data, but to established threat intelligence languages as well. This link and the
construction of an ontology based on our meta model will be thoroughly explored in
future research.
Rule model – All participants agreed that the game’s core principles aptly capture
the essence of the problem. The zero-sum component for tallying system compromise
was deemed a suitable abstraction for the process of attacking an asset with a certain
goal in mind.
Game rules – The discussion of the rules resulting from the above model components
took up most of the allotted interview time. Testers predominantly agreed that the
rules are a good compromise between a realistic simulation and an awareness-building
game that is also entertaining its players. Feedback mostly related to future work
and additions to the game, which included awarding situational modifiers depending
on which xAttackActorxMotivationyy the attacking player has chosen. It was stated
that PenQuest would also benefit from replacing generic equipment with real-world
appliances and tools, while another expert noted that such a move would be akin to
advertising and should be considered carefully.
Several testers were enthused by the fact that the current, abstracted topology
could be easily expanded to mirror more complex networks. At the same time, they
suggested that threat simulation based on PenQuest would benefit from a formalized
‘topology creation mechanism’ that helps prevent design errors in terms of attack vec-
tor and asset dependency. Two participants suggested the use of a more streamlined
version of the APT kill chain for modeling the typical sequence of attack actions. While
its current level of detail was appreciated and deemed useful for information security
audiences, the testers argued that a simpler representation without sub-stages would
be beneficial for the average player.
Data Mapping
Concluding the qualitative evaluation, we take a look a specific use case where data
captured by an IDS is mapped to the PenQuest model for semantic enrichment and mit-
igation planning. For this purpose, we first use PenQuest’s xEventxType “ Anomalyyy
notation of X. The exemplary event sequence extracted by AIDIS has a time range
of xTimexStart “ 0, End “ 10yy. As seen below, each xOperationy+xArgumenty pair
with xParent “ svchost.exey is appended in sequence.
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Event “ x
xType “ Anomalyy
xT imexStart “ 0, End “ 10yy,
xScorexDeviation “ 62.7, Threshold “ 45.8yy,
xSequence “ 1y,
xParent “ svchost.exey,
xOperation “ image_loady,
xArgument “ advapi32.dlly
xSequence “ 2y,
xParent “ svchost.exey,
xOperation “ image_loady,
xArgument “ cfgmgr32.dlly
...
xSequence “ 30y,
xParent “ svchost.exey,
xOperation “ registry_modifyy,
xArgument “ {machine{system{controlset001{services{wbiosrvc{...yy
The result is a simple description of X that can be easily converted to other threat
definition languages or shared directly with others. In our particular case, X represents
an anomalous deviation tagged as ‘CAPEC-112’ by AIDIS. The link to CAPEC provides
us with additional semantic information, namely that the corresponding ‘Brute Force’
label refers to activity where the “attacker attempts to gain access to this asset by
using trial-and-error to exhaustively explore all the possible secret values in the hope
of finding the secret (or a value that is functionally equivalent) that will unlock the
asset.” [219]
According to the meta model summarized in Figure 6.7, CAPEC-112 can be
an APT kill chain ‘Delivery–Intrusion’ as well as an ‘Installation–Propagation’ or
‘Installation–Persistence’ support action which is typically used in combination with
other attack activity. Categorized as the identically named BF (Brute Force) attack ac-
tion, PenQuest also defines appropriate primary controls countering the threat, namely
‘Authentication protection’ (AP ): This controls group is primarily concerned with man-
aging authenticators such as passwords, tokens, and biometric information. Associated
defense actions include the categories ‘Remote Access’ (REA) and ‘Authenticator Man-
agement’ (AUM), with a range of controls directly out of NIST SP 800-53 [146]. Specific
countermeasures therefore include remote access control and encryption, access point
management, password/PKI/hardware/biometric authentication, as well as controls re-
lated to cache expiration settings.
The information gleaned from the model can now be used to plan appropriate
defensive measures to prevent this particular attack. PenQuest’s gamified nature also
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allows us to play through the attack and test various controls and systems that may re-
duce threat impact and probability. While the efficacy of the suggested countermeasures
need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis using real world infrastructure or larger-
scale expert interviews, the interviewed security practitioners agree that PenQuest is
‘applicable to real world scenarios’ and that the example mapping makes sense in terms
of threat–mitigation pairing.
6.7 Discussion
In this section, we reiterate key features and briefly discuss the implications arising from
the evaluation. Future enhancements that go beyond the current implementation are
highlighted. In conclusion, we discuss the drawbacks of the current variant of the game
and talk about future research.
6.7.1 Features
One of the key aspects of the model is its support for new, hitherto neglected use cases
that go beyond the hacking scenario described in this chapter. The general structure
of classes presented in Section 6.3.2 is fully compatible with user-side changes to their
content. New actors, motivations, enablers and disablers, effects, and attack/defense
classes can simply be replaced or amended with low to medium effort, and without
any alterations to the core rules. Information derived from external sources (primarily
attack patterns and controls) can be changed by applying the introduced data mapping
mechanisms – be it semi-automated assignment using intermediate abstraction levels or
a natural language approach such as the one sketched in Section 6.5.4.
The network topology introduced in this article – while based on STIX’ Victim-
TargetingType TPP schema – remains flexible as well. As long as a attack vectors and
dependencies are maintained, game masters/designers can add or remove assets as they
see fit. In simulation scenarios it is actually encouraged to model the topology after the
real-world system chosen for assessment instead of using PenQuest’s default structure.
While the process of creating a custom topology is not currently formalized in the rule
system, it will be added in the near future to minimize human error.
Assembling new scenarios from the list of actors and assets is a matter of computing
all possible actor–goal combinations. The same is significantly harder to do for the
game itself due to the combinatorial challenge of pitting each actor, action, enabler,
and disabler against one another. It is currently more feasible to use PenQuest to
explore an exemplary infrastructure and test various likely attack/defense scenarios in
the course of one or several playthroughs. Still, automatically simulating a large number
of attack cases is a valid approach to deriving ideal strategies. Such a simulator is one of
the major contributions planned for future research and will investigate the utilization
of both model checking [59] and reinforcement learning [151].
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6.7.2 Limitations
There are a number of limitations that need to be considered before employing the
prototype version of PenQuest for attack analysis, risk assessment, or simply as an
awareness game. Most of these factors also offer opportunities for future research.
Firstly, one needs to keep in mind that PenQuest currently exists as model with
a physical prototype implementation only. While the zero-sum component of system
compromise has been realized programmatically (see Section 6.3.3), it is not yet in-
tegrated into a fully featured app. This impacts scalability and makes it difficult to
effectively reenact large APT campaigns in a sensible amount of time. Ongoing efforts
to remedy this limitation include an educational two-player web application expected
to be released in 2020. Despite the lack of automation, all modeling and mapping tasks
are fully fleshed out and ready for use through cross-referenced tables and the physi-
cal game prototype itself. The limited automation and the length of an average game
session make the current version of PenQuest best suited for moderated workshops and
special lectures.
Another limiting factor pertains the use of external data sources and threat intel-
ligence: Attack patterns may outdate due to a lack of database maintenance and novel
threats might not be considered immediately after disclosure. For CAPEC specifically,
there are patterns that lack CIA impact or purpose information, e.g. CAPEC-2: “In-
ducing account lockout”. This might make it necessary for the player to expand the
repository of attack strategies/actions with their own information.
The assignment of primary controls to defense actions (see Figure 6.8) is currently
done semi-manually by a group of IT security experts. Automated mechanisms have
proven to be too inaccurate during initial experiments, which utilized a natural language
approach using several IT security glossaries. Because of this limitation, the attack–
defense mapping of data sources that are significantly larger than the NIST standard
might not be feasible. Another minor drawback of the NIST control approach is the
small number (19) of orphan controls, which are not related to any other countermea-
sures. Currently, these controls are not considered in the game, since they would have
to be manually added and assigned a specific category, levering out most mechanisms
of automation currently in place.
On the CAPEC side, we do not restrict attacks to a specific target type like we do
for equipment, since CAPEC does not offer a clean way to assign systems (hosts, net-
work, industrial components, etc.) to a particular pattern. That means that e.g. theBF
primary attack such as CAPEC-49: “Password Brute Forcing” can, in the game, be used
on an arbitrary victim without further distinction into target categories. This limita-
tion might in some cases simplify a hostile action at the expense of realism. Countering
this drawback is possible, but currently requires manual intervention: Depending on
the description of the respective attack pattern, the information provided in CAPEC’s
database (namely the Summary and Example Instances columns) can be parsed and
assigned one of the equipment type categories used for assets (xEffectTargety).
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Modeling-wise, not all of the 517 CAPEC classes and only a portion of the defensive
controls are currently part of PenQuest. Around 12% of the available patterns have
been used to populate the model to date, whereas ‘detailed’ technical patterns referring
to specific software attacks (as opposed to ‘meta’ and ‘standard’) are not currently
included. Control-wise, we prototypically implemented 70 out of 224 controls specified
by NIST. With the model itself ready for use, the remainder of the data can be added
at will. However, it needs to be stated that the CAPEC repository itself is missing
some of the required information needed for automated mapping, which increases the
effort required to add the remaining patterns. For future iterations, we will therefore
consider alternative vocabularies such as MITRE ATT&CK1.
Lastly, the limits of the preliminary evaluation itself need to be mentioned: With
the relatively small pool of test persons, representative quantitative assessment of the
game and model has proven to be difficult. Our current prototype confines experiments
to on-site play-testing, and the number of security experts available for evaluating Pen-
Quest’s base, game, and rule models who were not involved in the creation of PenQuest
is similarly limited – mostly due to geographic constraints and the time required to
explain, understand, and assess such a complex model. For this reason, large-scale eval-
uation has been postponed until the full digital iteration of the game is available, which
will eliminate the need for test players to be physically present.
6.8 Summary
In this article, we introduced PenQuest, a meta model designed to present a complete
view on information system attacks and their mitigation while providing a tool for both
semantic data enrichment and security education. PenQuest simulates time-enabled
attacker/defender behavior as part of a dynamic, imperfect information multi-player
game that derives significant parts of its ruleset from established information security
sources such as STIX, CAPEC, CVE/CWE and NIST SP 800-53. Attack patterns,
vulnerabilities, and mitigating controls are mapped to counterpart strategies and con-
crete actions through practical, data-centric mechanisms. The gamified model considers
and defines a wide range of actors, assets, and actions, thereby enabling the assessment
of cyber risks while giving technical experts the opportunity to explore specific attack
scenarios in the context of an abstracted IT infrastructure.
In summary, PenQuest contributes by:
• Presenting an easily expandable, time-enabled attacker/defender meta model for
depicting and assessing advanced persistent threats;
• Developing a set of dynamic, non-cooperative roleplaying game (RPG) rules rep-
resenting APT campaigns with all their assets, actors, and actions;
1https://attack.mitre.org/
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• Providing a link between various standards and formats, such as STIX-defined
data observables, CAPEC attack patterns, as well as operational risk assessment
and mitigation planning within a gamified setting;
• Introducing a mapping mechanism for correlating attacker behavior to opposing
security and privacy controls listed in the NIST SP 800-53 standard;
• Presenting and evaluating a physical game prototype ready for deployment in
higher education and awareness training;
• Paving the way towards automated attacker and defender strategy inference as
well as threat simulation.
We implemented PenQuest as a physical serious game prototype and successfully
tested it in a higher education environment. Additional expert interviews helped eval-
uate the model’s applicability to information security scenarios. Key questions asking
practitioners if the “abstraction level of attack/defense actions is appropriate”, whether
the model is “applicable to real-world scenarios”, or if the model “appropriately links
specific responses to security incidents” were met with a widely favorable response,
underlying PenQuest’s usefulness for IT threat modeling.
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7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce the final Advanced Intrusion Detection and Interpretation
System (AIDIS) designed to detect and classify a variety of targeted attack scenarios.
Most existing intrusion detection systems do not present the offending behavioral data
to the analyst and contribute little to an attack’s interpretation. We argue that closing
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the resulting semantic gap is a vital next step in holistic IT system threat mitigation.
Consequently, our approach contributes by presenting a semantics-aware, fully transpar-
ent graph-based anomaly detection system coupled with the automated interpretation of
abstracted kernel events collected from Windows workstation computers. AIDIS helps
widen the focus of analysis from suspicious binaries to ubiquitous kernel processes that
might be affected by adversarial action, thereby enabling uniform anomaly detection
for known portions of the operating system. Our approach reduces the computational
requirements attached to analyzing each and every application launched on a system
and presents anomalies in a human-readable way. Identified outliers are ultimately
mapped to our gamified APT meta model, which encompasses widely used threat in-
telligence languages, attack patterns, as well as mitigating controls. The model can be
queried for information and possible responses to past and ongoing attacks while always
maintaining the link to the data layer beneath.
In its entirety, AIDIS enables detecting attacks and sharing interpreted threat intel-
ligence for entire OS ecosystems. The accessible combination of attack modeling, white
box anomaly detection, and real-world system event data provides a novel approach to
combating high-impact threats on IT infrastructures.
In the following, we discuss related approaches and how our system can contribute
to current attack detection efforts. Section 7.2 presents related work in the areas of
attack modeling and anomaly detection/classification. In Section 7.3, the design con-
siderations of our interpretation system are discussed in detail. AIDIS’ technical imple-
mentation and all its components are elucidated in Section 7.4, while a full evaluation
can be found in Section 7.5. In conclusion, we discuss the current prototype’s properties
and drawbacks and outline future work.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Attack Modeling
Threat formalisms such as attack/defense models are commonly used by security an-
alysts to share insight, enhance scenario coverage, and help planning and prioritizing
threat mitigation by quantifying related system vulnerabilities. Both static and dy-
namic (behavioral) models are used [248]. AIDIS makes use of ‘PenQuest’, an advanced
dynamic approach realized as a full-fledged strategy game. In the following, we discuss
existing work similar to our modeling approach.
AIDIS uses an extended variant of the APT kill chain by Hutchins et al. [133],
which represents a simple yet useful solution for modeling targeted attacks by depicting
attacker activity as stages in the manner of a tiered military campaign. Several such
models have been developed in the past – the decision of which variant to use largely
depends on personal preference and data exchange requirements: While the cyber kill
chain model [133] considers command and control activity and weaponization as sep-
arate stages, the model by Giura and Wang [113] is more detailed when it comes to
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the collection of data. Reconnaissance, exploitation, operation, and exfiltration stages
are mostly identical, albeit named differently at times. Both models can be used in
conjunction with MITRE’s APT-enabled Structured Threat Information eXpression
(STIX) data exchange format [223], which was developed to represent threat informa-
tion in a comprehensive manner. In our work, we built upon the general kill chain
approach and added sub-stages as well as interdependencies for a more finer-grained
view on targeted attacks. See Section 7.3.2 for more information.
Similar to our model in much of its terminology, the Diamond Model of Intrusion
Analysis [43] establishes the basic elements of generic intrusion activity, called an event,
which is composed of four core features: adversary, infrastructure, capability, and vic-
tim. It extends events with a confidence score that can be used to track the reliability
of the data source or a specific event. While some of its premises are comparable to
our own work, the Diamond Model does not consider technical or organizational tools
and controls. Mechanisms for determining specific actions conducted on the attacker’s
or defender’s side are not offered. While the Diamond Model is a powerful template
in its own regard, our approach aims to provide these mechanisms – and more: Pen-
Quest/AIDIS combine threat modeling with a ready-to-use framework for simulation
and automated knowledge discovery. In summary, the Diamond Model and our gamified
approach share commonalities and could potentially benefit from each other in terms
of feature modeling and terminology.
Syed et al. [303] present a unified cyber security ontology (UCO) extending the
Intrusion Detection System ontology by Undercoffer et al. [317]. UCO is a semantic
version of STIX [23] with a link to security standards similar to the ones that are used
in our work. Real-world knowledge is appended using featured Google searches (Google
Knowledge Graph) and various knowledge bases. Syed et al. provide little information
about data retrieval mechanisms and general automation. The main use cases empha-
sized are the identification of similar software and the association of vulnerabilities with
certain (classes of) products. Unlike our research, UCO does not consider temporal
information or measurements of uncertainty.
Following Schneier’s introduction of attack trees [276], the idea of a tree-like rep-
resentation of an attack scenario, where the root of an attack tree corresponds to an
attacker’s goal, has been picked up by several other research groups. For instance, Ko-
rdy et al. [162] developed a formalism called attack-defense trees (ADTrees), which are
node-labeled rooted trees describing not only the measures an attacker might take to
attack a system but also the defenses that a victim can employ to protect it. The au-
thors provide semantics and axiomatic definitions that are relevant for further research.
However, ADTrees are primarily designed for visualization and require manual map-
ping of countermeasures – something our model is seeking to remedy. Further works
in the area, and at the same time the foundation for Kordy et al.’s work, include at-
tack and protection trees for physical security [87] and attack trees with a temporal
component [149].
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Many other approaches can be subsumed as taxonomies designed to help analysts
or researchers counter specific threats. For example, Mirkovic and Reiher [216] present
two taxonomies for classifying attacks and defenses against DDoS attacks. Their ap-
proach is to highlight commonalities and important features of attack strategies, a task
that is done manually in the light of the problem’s complexity. While a common clas-
sification scheme is important, our model goes beyond this vital first step and aims to
deliver automation support for mapping general attack tasks as described by pattern
repositories like CAPEC [219] to standardized defensive controls. This ultimately serves
as a foundation for anomaly interpretation and mitigation planning.
7.2.2 Anomaly Detection and Interpretation
Anomaly-based malware or intrusion detection systems are found in many a proposed
solution. However, it is rare to see it combined with a semantic component that is
dedicated to the automated interpretation of the generated traces, logs, or alerts.
General
The shift of focus towards semantic awareness is visible in several, more general works.
For example, Anagnostopoulos et al. [11] present a system for the application of seman-
tics to general intrusion scenarios. The authors seek to classify and predict attacker
intentions using a Bayesian classifier paired with a probabilistic inference algorithm.
Their semantic model includes both legitimate and illegitimate actors, activities in the
form of sequential events, concrete commands issued, and an overall state of attack.
Putting a novel spin on anomaly detection in general, Gautam et al. [112] present a
multi-kernel learning approach for One-Class Classification (OCC), an approach where
data of only one out of n classes in the dataset is used for training. The authors
present an alternative to existing One-Class SVM methods [277] and the Multi Kernel
Anomaly Detection (MKAD) algorithm [70] by locally assigning weight to each kernel.
While AIDIS relies on binary and multi-class SVM to perform its distinction, the OCC
approach will have to be investigated for scenarios that cannot rely on knowledge about
classes other than the one defining e.g. benign baseline behavior.
For unsupervised anomaly detection, Zhang et al. [354] introduce a density-based
system using the Gaussian kernel function. The objective is to improve outlier detection
in non-linear data by assessing the similarity of data points through measuring the local
density between a point and a set of its neighbors. In AIDIS, we use three alternative
approaches to unsupervised learning for our mostly sequential data, which typically
revolve around strings instead of numerals: Grammar inference, heuristic clustering of
traces for the generation of template behavior, and text similarity hashing (see Sec-
tion 7.4.5). Despite the differences in input, Zhang et al.’s take on anomaly detection
warrants further investigation as e.g. component in unsupervised trace clustering.
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Noble and Cook [236] explore graph-based anomaly detection through the iden-
tification of repetitive substructures within graphs as well as by determining which
subgraph of interest consists of the highest number of unique substructures and there-
fore stands out the most. The introduced system is also able to measure the regularity
of a graph using conditional entropy. Being mostly formal in nature, the approach does
not consider attack semantics. Most other graph-based systems for intrusion detection
scenarios discuss attack graphs, which put the focus on (network) vulnerability analysis
and the sequence of events leading to a state of compromise [247, 289].
Host Activity
Kruegel et al. [166] describe a classical approach to detecting anomalies in call sequences.
Their system is designed to detect attacks against privileged applications. To this end,
it analyzes the relation between system call arguments and calling contexts. Among the
anomalies considered are string length, character distribution, as well as the occurrence
of certain characters. In contrast, AIDIS mainly considers file system activity linked to
a central graph node representing the calling process.
Dolgikh et al. [79] conduct dynamic behavioral analysis of applications. Their
system is capable of automatically creating application profiles for both malicious and
benign samples. It considers recorded API calls that are subsequently transformed into
a labeled graph representing a stream of system calls. Graphs are compressed using a
genetic data processing algorithm in order to extract behavioral profiles. There is no
classification interpretation or interpretation of the resulting data.
Anderson et al. [12] present a detection algorithm based on the analysis of graphs
constructed from dynamically collected instruction traces. Working with simplified
assembly sequences represented as Markov chain and subsequently transformed into
a weighted directed graph, the general level of abstraction is lower than in AIDIS,
which primarily uses generalized API calls. For classification, Anderson et al. [12] use
SVM on previously created similarity matrices. The system’s specific results are further
discussed in Section 7.5.4, where they are compared to AIDIS’ binary classifier.
Touching the network domain, Jacob et al. [141] present Jackstraws, a system
designed to identify command and control (C2) communication. Unlike other network-
centric approaches, Jackstraws uses host events captured through dynamic analysis.
Association of network activity to local processes is achieved through behavior graph
modeling of data flows between individual system calls. Graph templates for C2 pat-
tern similarity matching are mined from a known set based on a technique introduced
by Yan and Han [350], followed by a clustering stage. While Jackstraws is potentially
vulnerable to certain obfuscation and mimicry attacks [329], its unique approach to
detecting C2 traffic makes it interesting for both APT detection and knowledge genera-
tion. Jacob et al. [141]’s work is further discussed as part of the comparative evaluation
in Section 7.5.4.
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Network Domain
On the network traffic side, Münz and Carle [232] present TOPAS, a traffic flow and
packet analysis system compatible with NetFlow and IPFIX. The system’s algorithm
uses threshold-based detection via pre-defined values as well as outlier detection through
the comparison of a sample to previously learned, nominal behavior. While this offers
a good foundation for traffic anomaly detection, the link to local processes and appli-
cations is not investigated.
The system presented by Ambwani [10] focuses on full network traffic dumps asso-
ciated to DoS, privilege escalation, and other remote threats. It is similar to AIDIS in
its use of SVM multi-class classification for the identification of various attacks, under-
lining the feasibility of such ML approaches for classification tasks. Anomaly detection
or threat modeling is not part of the system. We compare the system’s accuracy to
AIDIS in the evaluation in Section 7.5.4.
The work by Vance [322] is one of the few approaches that focus directly on APTs:
He describes a flow-based monitoring system that uses statistical analysis of captured
network traffic data to detect anomalies – instead of event-based deviations. Vance’s
system uses change detection to identify flows that hint at command & control traffic,
data mining, or exfiltration activities.
As above works exemplify, none of the solutions quite manage to bridge the gap
between system events (be they function calls or traffic flows) and a truly meaningful
representation of an attack in its entirety. Closing this semantic gap is one of the main
goals of the system presented in this work. For more related work in the domain of
semantics-aware APT detection, refer to Chapter 2.
7.3 System Design and Model
Our proposed system revolves around the hypothesis that the observation of ubiquitous
OS kernel processes is a feasible alternative to sample-focused analysis, where extracted
binaries are checked for malicious properties and behavior. Unlike suspicious samples,
system processes are present at all times and do not need to be identified prior to
analysis. However, it is not entirely clear which processes deserve our scrutiny the most
– something that AIDIS is built to address through its highlighting of expressive system
applications.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that classifying identified anomalies is preferable to
classifying entire traces of unknown behavior. Instead of processing all captured events
associated to a process or a full user session, the system identifies and extracts anomalous
events prior to classification. This reduces the amount of data necessary for interpre-
tation and provides the analyst with not only a pattern of potentially harmful activity,
but also a more accurate verdict as to which class/stage of attack it may belong to.
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Since the computational complexity of any graph-based solution is likely to be
high, any such anomaly detection and explication system will have to consider means
to reduce processing times. With AIDIS, we opted to utilize compression through
grammar inference, which transparently creates rules from sequences of events that are
synonymous to nominal behavior – in contradistinction to uncompressed terminals rep-
resenting outliers. By replacing commonplace activity with rules, we can save both time
and computing resources, while at the same time offering advanced threat formalization
capabilities.
Lastly, we hypothesize that the interpretation of previously disseminated anomaly
data (i.e. events that constitute a deviation) by mapping it to a dedicated attacker/de-
fender model can, in conjunction with automated anomaly classification, be used to
explain threats in a comprehensible manner. For this reason, we map all results to
PenQuest, the model component of AIDIS, which provides a link to our enhanced APT
kill chain as well as various threat vocabularies.
In summary, the proposed system provides the following functionality:
1. Identification of relevant OS kernel processes for continuous, sample-independent
monitoring;
2. Compression of event data through grammar inference;
3. Automated detection and classification of anomalies;
4. Mapping of classified anomalies to a model for threat explication and reasoning.
Before a technical implementation can be approached (see Section 7.4), we have
to consider several formal, semantic, and strategic factors. In the following, we dis-
cuss these initial premises by following a design checklist (see Table 7.1) developed for
the assembly of semantics-aware systems countering advanced threats to information
systems.
7.3.1 Design Checklist
The design of the system, which has been independently discussed in [189], is based on
the roadmap for a conceptual APT defense system introduced in a survey by Luh et al.
[187]. In order to fulfill the requirements for the comprehensive detection and analysis
of targeted attacks we followed the presented checklist and extended the design with
the ability to explain detected anomalies in behavioral data through a combination of
classification and threat modeling.
Referencing the design objectives for semantics-aware detection and analysis sys-
tems (Chapter 2), AIDIS fulfills the suggestions for the scope of implementation–and
more. Table 7.1 provides an overview. Specifically, our approach considers both OS and
network events, fuses threat detection as well as attack analysis into a behavior-based
anomaly detection system able to classify, extract, and interpret hostile activity, and
combines threat intelligence and response into a common model. The system’s detec-
tion methods and analysis techniques encompass anomaly detection on behavioral data,
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Figure 7.1: Simplified representation of the PenQuest meta model. The lower left side
depicts the AIDIS data provider (agent) monitoring for anomalies or pattern occurrence,
while the right sight shows PenQuest’s class structure for a generalized Action X.
threat context, classification, and reusable (attack) patterns extracted from the origi-
nal corpus. These unique combination of features helps to make AIDIS an expedient
response to the increasing complexity of targeted attacks.
In the following subsections, we talk about the general threat definition as well as
the underlying attack/defense model, leading up to the technical implementation.
7.3.2 Threat Definition
For a definition of high-level threat stages we decided to extend the cyber kill chain
model by Hutchins et al. [133]: Every APT stage is further split into subcategories
(see Figure 6.7) that are ultimately linked to concrete attack actions provided by the
underlying attacker/defender model. For APTs, attack stages typically have successor
stages that may be executed once its predecessor has been successfully completed. For
example, Exploitation attacks require the prior completion of a Delivery action, lest the
utilized malicious code cannot be executed on the target. The APT kill chain categories
used to define the general threat are discussed in detail in Section 6.4.5.
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The adapted APT kill chain is only one part of the model underlying AIDIS. Refer
to Chapter 6 for general information on the gamified component of PenQuest and how
it can be used to explain, simulate, and help mitigate a threat.
7.3.3 Attack Modeling
For attack modeling and the subsequent interpretation of classified system behavior, we
utilize PenQuest, our versatile attacker–defender meta model that takes the definition
of threat stages and provides concrete actions based on accepted security languages and
standards. See Figure 7.1 for an overview of the model. Refer to Chapter 6 for detailed
information about the model, its gamified rule set, and specific action definitions.
7.4 Core Components
AIDIS is composed of several components enabling the underlying anomaly detection
and knowledge explication process. The initial tasks encompass the acquisition of data
on a number of monitored machines and/or network devices as well as the transmission
and translation of kernel events to a clean database format. In stage 2, we extract OS
processes suitable for observation through sentiment analysis. Following optional data
compression using grammar inference, we link events by their contextual parent and
construct traces in the form of star structures [353], simple graphs that describe the
operations conducted by each process within a specific time range. From a baseline of
benign system behavior we then extract one or several process-unique templates that are
subsequently used to check new activity for anomalies by measuring the edit distance
between the simplified graphs.
Our approach not only calculates deviations but also returns a human-readable list
of actions that constitute the identified anomaly. This list is ultimately classified using
both a Random Forest and SVM-based approach. The resulting behavioral patterns are
mapped to the aforementioned PenQuest model, thereby linking each anomalous action
to an APT attack stage and semantic description. Figure 7.2 and Table 7.2 provide
a full overview of the system components. The following subsections detail each stage
and provide technical specifics.
7.4.1 Data Collection
AIDIS works with events collected directly on the host (endpoint). Event traces (i.e.
ordered lists) are typically defined as descriptions of operating system kernel behavior
invoked by applications and, by extension, a legitimate or illegitimate user. Individual
events are abstractions of raw system or API calls that yield information about the
general behavior of a sample [330]. API calls may include wrapper functions (e.g.
CreateProcess) that offer a simple interface to the application programmer, or native
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Figure 7.2: AIDIS system overview. Optional sentiment analysis is used for extracting
kernel processes that deserve special attention, while the grammar inference component
offers data reduction and unsupervised anomaly detection. The core knowledge extrac-
tion and anomaly detection component utilizes star structures for template generation
and matching. Event interpretation is realized through RF and SVM classification ap-
plied to the resulting anomaly reports. The link to our meta model (see Figure 7.1)
semantically enriches the information and helps plan an appropriate response.
functions (e.g. NtCreateProcess) that represent the underlying OS or kernel support
tools. In its abstracted form, a contextual event trace might look like this:
ProcessEvent • Start: ‘shell.exe’ (PID 220)
ImageLoadEvent • Load: ‘library.dll’
RegistryEvent • Open: ‘HKLM/Software/.../Run’
RegistryEvent • Add: REG_SZ (‘evil.exe’)
FileEvent • Create: ‘evil.exe’
ProcessEvent • Start: ‘evil.exe’ (PID 224)
ProcessEvent • Terminate: ‘shell.exe’ (PID 220)
Table 7.3: Example trace of events as chronological list.
AIDIS collects process and network event data directly from the Windows kernel.
We employ a driver-based monitoring agent designed to collect and forward a wide
198
R. Luh 7.4. CORE COMPONENTS
range of events to a database server. This gives us unimpeded and fast access to events
depicting various OS operations [201]:
• Process events – Whenever a process is started or stopped, the monitoring
system registers a new event. Next to PID and paths, we record parent and
contextual information such as ownership data. Process events are at the heart
of our system: Every other type of event is ultimately associated to a process
through its PID and timestamp (see below for more information).
• Thread events – Some events are triggered by individual threads instead of
processes. The information logged by the agent is largely similar to process events;
the main identifier for threads is the thread ID (TID).
• Image load events – Most processes load additional resources (functions) stored
in various program libraries (DLLs). The nature of a DLL can give a good indi-
cation as to which behavior the binary executable will exhibit during its lifetime.
• File events – File events are logged when a file is read, created, accessed, modi-
fied, or deleted. Logging file interaction is important since processes can interact
with virtually every file stored on the disk. Attack-related file events can e.g. help
identify dropped executables or data theft.
• Registry events – Applications use the registry to save user and program set-
tings while other hives contain startup programs or file type settings. Since it
is a common target for espionage and system manipulation attacks, monitoring
registry events is critical for any Windows-based detection solution.
• Network events – Network events encompass the handling of inbound and out-
bound connections as well as the access to general OS networking resources. De-
pending on the nature of the process, network events can be used as indicator for
malicious behavior, since many malware variants contact remote systems for e.g.
command & control purposes.
The relative ease of monitoring as well as the semantic expressiveness of kernel
events and network operations make such traces ideal for dynamic software and, by ex-
tension, malware analysis as well as application classification. The system introduced in
this thesis uses this rich repository of behavioral data to compile sentiment dictionaries
as well as graph-like star structures of event sequences that can describe not only a
single application, but a system session in its entirety. This approach is detailed in the
following subsections.
7.4.2 Preprocessing
All previously collected events are linked through their parent process in order to es-
tablish a semantic connection between action and cause. This is realized through two
attributes that are present in all the data collected by the host monitoring agent: Cre-
ation time, and the PID that forms a unique identifier for each process. Threads work
in a similar fashion. Like PIDs, thread IDs (TIDs) are appended to other event types
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(e.g. registry events). Ultimately, each process or thread created by the respective event
can incorporate an arbitrary number of child events, depending on its nature and run
time.
Both process and thread events can be used to construct an event tree depicting
the flow of file system activity that helps to determine specific dependencies between
processes and general events. Concatenated into a full system graph, the sequence of
events constituting a monitored session are assembled without orphan entries (depicted
in Figure 3.3) interrupting the process flow by grouping them by their associated process
and thread. These pseudo-chronological smart traces (see Chapter 4 and [201]) are the
basis for all follow-up computation.
Further preprocessing includes the normalization of non-uniform IDs such as user
names, security identifiers, and temporary folder names. This is done to make data
more comparable across systems and to prepare the traces for future anonymization.
7.4.3 Sentiment Analysis
AIDIS uses an approach akin to sentiment analysis [111] for generating initial knowledge
about relevant OS processes. In this optional stage, we determine the most expressive
process candidates for later investigation. At the same time, this kick-off stage com-
putes a first benign/malicious score that provides us with a tendency towards general
harmfulness for the provided dataset. The resulting verdict can be used as additional
feature in the final classification stage of the AIDIS process. Figure 7.2 and Table 7.2
show how this component fits into the big picture of AIDIS.
The details of the sentiment analysis component have been previously discussed
as stand-alone anomaly detection solution based on inferred dictionaries containing
‘malicious’ vocabulary. While the evaluation found in this chapter instead focuses on
the selection of relevant processes for continuous monitoring (see Section 7.5.3), the
technical foundations of the core component remain the same. Please refer to Chapter 4
for more information.
7.4.4 Grammar Inference
Grammar inference through Sequitur compression is the second optional stage in the
AIDIS process. It is used to losslessly reduce the amount of input data for the more com-
putationally expensive final stages, while providing a semi-supervised approach to iden-
tifying potentially interesting portions in arbitrary event sequences and smart traces.
For the purpose of compression we utilize SEQUIN (Chapter 5), a grammar infer-
ence system based on the Sequitur algorithm, which constructs a context-free grammar
(CFG) from string-based input data. Specifically, Sequitur is a greedy compression
algorithm that creates a hierarchical structure from a sequence of discrete symbols by
recursively replacing repeated phrases with a grammatical rule [234]. The algorithm
creates this representation through two essential properties, which are called rule utility
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and bigram uniqueness. Rule utility checks if a rule occurs at least twice in the gram-
mar, while bigram uniqueness observes if a bigram occurs only once. A bigram in this
context describes two adjacent symbols or terms.
The full rule extraction and evaluation process is detailed in Chapter 5. There
we describe the application of our adapted Sequitur system on smart traces of kernel
events associated with arbitrary processes and other security-relevant data, proving a
full example grammar. In short, SEQUIN has a wide variety of applications that go
beyond AIDIS: Table 5.3 provides an overview.
The reduction of input data in particular can be helpful to decrease the complexity
of lengthier analysis tasks, such as the graph-based approach discussed in this chapter
(see Section 7.4.5): By using SEQUIN, it is possible to slim down the input corpus
to only relevant n-grams (n ě 2), instead of working with the full, unfiltered set of
event or code snippet unigrams. SEQUIN’s rule transformation mechanism (5.4.4) also
enables us to work with an automatically generated placeholder variable instead of
several compound terminals.
See Section 7.5 for an evaluation of the compression component in the context of
AIDIS. Refer to Chapter 5 for more information on SEQUIN.
7.4.5 Star Graph Analysis
Whether or not relevant processes have been identified using sentiment analysis and
input data has been compressed, the key analysis component of AIDIS can be executed
at this point: We utilize star structures to create a by-process representation of event
sequences that encompass single process launch behavior, its full run time, or even entire
multi-process system sessions. Star structures are a means to reduce the complexity of
a known NP problem to polynomial complexity [131, 353]. Instead of searching entire
system session graphs for matching patterns, the star structure approach breaks down
the computation into a triplet of nodes (vertices) connected by a labeled edge, denoted
as G “ pU, V,Eq, where U and V are nodes and E is the respective edge. The attached
label is used as basis for minimal cost calculation of same-size star structures. Specif-
ically, we utilize bipartite graph matching based on the Hungarian (Kuhn-Munkres)
algorithm [167], where every star is processed as a matrix. Graph edit distance calcu-
lation determines the minimal costs of relabeling the nodes and edges of a graph G to
match a target graph H. The edit path PG,H can be understood as a sequence of trans-
formation operations σ. The final graph edit distance is determined by the cheapest of
all edit paths between G and H.
Compared to full graph matching, this approach is typically considered to be a
faster, but less precise approximation, as it only matches the immediate neighborhood
of one node at a time. In our system, we use an adaptation of the Hu et al. [131]
approach that combines n bipartite graphs into one star representing a single process.
This makes the effect on result accuracy far less pronounced: With a focus on individual
processes, our input data can already be reduced to star structures without significantly
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Figure 7.3: Example event representation for process svchost.exe (central node). Tar-
get graph H (right) differs from the baseline graph G (left) by several additional or
missing events, depicted as red nodes. Mere changes to the edge label (different oper-
ation type applied to the same object) are considered as well. Graph transformation σ
is derived using the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm [167].
compromising trace semantics, because we anchor every event to a trigger (parent)
process (see Section 7.4.2) that actively invokes respective actions, making this process
the natural center vertex of a star-shaped graph. In our system, elemental operations
for determining the minimal cost graph edit distance between individual elements are
not limited to relabeling nodes, but consider the connecting edges as well. There are
two operations that contribute to the edit score:
Vertex edit operations encompass single vertex relabeling σRV as well as both an
insert vertex σIV and a delete vertex operation σDV . Semantically, each vertex is akin to
an unspecified system event (event type plus parameter, sans event type) as introduced
in Section 7.4.1. Depending on the type of operation, the respective event in H is either
new (insert), missing (delete), or has been altered (relabel) from the baseline G.
Edge edit operations, on the other hand, primarily consider the edge relabeling
cost σRE . We opted to dynamically assign individual relabel costs based on the type
of event considered, making the approach fully capable of assessing event similarities.
For example, σ˚V will drastically increase in cost when e.g. converting a semantically
inexpensive file ‘read’ event to a relatively high-impact ‘delete’ event. The type of
operation (numerical representations of e.g. create, modify, delete, start, and stop oper-
ations) considered by σRE determines the final cost of edge relabeling. See Table 7.5 for
a list of event types and their experimental labels. Combined with a vertex operation,
all possible changes to a process can be quantified.
Figure 7.3 shows a simplified example. In the depicted case, the base graph consists
of various vertices representing events such as the creation of a file, the start of a process
and an open/read operation conducted in the HKLM/Security hive of the Windows
registry. When comparing the baseline graph G to a targetH, the introduced Hungarian
graph edit distance approach will use σ to determine the minimal cost of transforming
G to H. In case of the exemplary file event interacting with data.txt, this edit distance
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Method Perfect match Majority Prototype Sim. hashing
Algorithm(s) String comp. String comp. Malheur [263, 314] MinHash [40]
Jaccard sim. [138]
Deterministic 3 3 3 7
Template count 1 1 n n
Reduction 7 7 7 3
Complexity
(extraction)
Opnq Opnq Opk ˚ nq Opn2q
Complexity
(matching)
Opnq Opnq Opk ˚ nq Opk ˚ nq
Table 7.4: Overview of star graph template creation methods. Single template ap-
proaches are well suited for simple processes with little semantic variance. Multiple
templates are needed for complex, multifaceted processes. Similarity hashing is the
only method that supports the reduction of Malheur-derived templates but is less accu-
rate when used for extraction due to its non-deterministic nature. It is computationally
advantageous to reduce Malheur templates using similarity hashing.
is a mere 0.25, since a single σRE operation is sufficient to transform the bipartite graph
Gpsvchost.exe, 1.5, file.txtq to Hpsvchost.exe, 1.75, file.txtq.
This method for determining the minimal edit distance between two star-shaped
graphs is used as the foundation for context-aware anomaly detection utilizing super-
vised learning on a per-process basis.
Star Anomaly Detection
The required transformation operations and, by extension, the minimal graph edit dis-
tance between two star structures can be used to determine the event-level deviation
between instances of the same process. In order to automatically determine thresholds
for each observed process, we first need to create a template from a benign environment.
Only then can we match base to target graphs and disseminate their differences.
We have implemented the generation of baseline templates in 4 different ways (also
see Table 7.4), two of which generate a single template, while the other two produce any
number of templates ranging from 2 to n, depending on the complexity and versatility
of the process/session in question. In each case we take a set of benign process graphs
and extract an optimal representative using one of the below methods:
Perfect match – Here, we extract identical events found in each iteration of a process
(i.a. the ‘smallest common denominator’) and assemble an entirely new graph. This
creates a sleek template that enables the analyst to primarily focus on hitherto unob-
served events. However, there is an performance-for-accuracy trade-off that results in
higher mean edit distance values. The approach proved to be best suited for background
processes with a single purpose and little user interaction.
Use-case examples: Quick Access for Intel Grapics (igfxtray.exe), Office Telemetry
Agent (msoia.exe), Windows Power Management (powercfg.exe).
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Majority – This method picks the most common base graph from the input set and
converts it to a template without altering its contents. While slightly more accurate
than ’perfect match’, this approach struggles with processes that show greater variety
in their benign instances due to their multifaceted nature.
Majority extraction is generally similar to the perfect match approach. It is best
utilized for processes where major deviations from the baseline are not tolerated. Exam-
ples would include applications that exhibit behavior following a set schedule or isolated
processes with little system interaction. Despite its limitations, majority matching is
still the best choice for complex processes where a multi-template approach is not de-
sired for e.g. performance reasons. Certain concessions regarding accuracy have to made,
however, as is discussed in the Evaluation chapter below.
Use case examples (in addition to the above): Chrome Updater (GoogleUpdater.exe),
Windows Activation Client (slui.exe), Java Launcher (java.exe).
Prototype extraction – Especially useful for diverse processes, this approach uses the
Malheur algorithm [263, 314] to extract not one, but several prototypes representative
of the various aspects of a single process. This promises significantly improved accu-
racy when assessing more complex OS applications. However, the resulting number of
templates sometimes negatively impacts performance, which is why we added a second
component that intelligently merges templates using similarity hashing.
Prototype extraction is best used for complex processes which control a wide range
of OS functions and that are not necessarily similar in their behavior. In a best-case
scenario, each functionality is automatically assigned a template. If newly logged be-
havior does not correspond to at least one of them, the observed activity is treated as
an anomaly.
Use case examples: Windows Generic Host Process (svchost.exe), Generic Host Pro-
cess for Libraries (taskhost.exe), Registry Editor (regedit.exe).
Similarity hashing – Usable as both standalone alternative for the Malheur approach
as well as a reduction mechanism for the same, this take on multi-template creation is
based on the MinHash algorithm [40], which builds upon the mathematical concepts of
resemblance and containment to measure document similarity. Specifically, we measure
the differences between original traces or previously Malheur-extracted templates by
their Jaccard distance [138]:
JpA,Bq “ |AXB||AYB| “
|AXB|
|A| ` |B| ´ |AXB| , wherepA,Bq Ă U
In short, the MinHash algorithm converts a set of tokens from U into n randomly
selected and hashed tokens, which are then broken down into bands and compared [252].
Documents are considered similar if the resulting Jaccard distance threshold is exceeded.
In AIDIS, the individual document similarity values are mapped to a graph, where rep-
resentative prototypes are determined by their betweenness centrality (see Figure 7.4).
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Figure 7.4: Example template extraction through similarity hashing. Similar templates
are determined by their Jaccard distance and graph betweenness centrality. The yellow
nodes were determined to have the greatest betweenness centrality score. All matches
with a Pareto score of ě 90% are ultimately chosen as templates.
If betweenness centrality is equal, node in-degree is used instead. The most significant
traces, determined by a Pareto score of ě 90%, are ultimately kept as templates.
Similarity hashing has proven to be a feasible second stage to the prototype ex-
traction approach. For complex processes, it reduces the number of Malheur prototypes
to a more workable number without negatively impacting accuracy. Additionally, simi-
larity hashing is well suited to processes that are versatile in nature but similar in their
behavior.
Use case examples: File Ownership Tool (takeown.exe), Task Scheduler (schtasks.exe),
Session Manager (smss.exe).
Before any anomaly detection can be implemented, we need to set threat thresh-
olds. In our case, they are determined by comparing the generated template(s) to the
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remainder of the benign input graphs using the Hungarian distance. This yields a
minimum, mean, median, and maximum lower-bound edit distance for each process.
Depending on the level of scrutiny, each of these distances can be used as anomaly
threshold. In our case, the default (mean) threshold was dynamically derived from a
high number of test runs.
Armed with one or several templates for each process, we can now check unknown
graphs against the predetermined thresholds and extract events responsible for the
deviation.
Star Anomaly Classification
As our system focuses on the classification of anomalies instead of unknown system
traces in their entirety, the amount of data processed in this explication stage is dras-
tically reduced. Specifically, we seek to explain why the anomaly detection routine has
identified a star structure as significantly deviating from the template, thereby dissemi-
nating the in-depth knowledge gained in the process. Only afterwards can we commence
with anomaly classification.
Knowledge dissemination – One of the advantages of our anomaly detection system
lies in the fact that the star depiction of a graph allows for the comprehensive dissemi-
nation of semantic information that depicts each and every anomaly in a simple fashion.
The analyst is presented a report detailing the events that constitute the respective de-
viation. Below snippet shows an example svchost.exe process being checked against
one of its extracted prototype templates:
==> svchost . exe [ Deviat ion ( th r e sho ld ) : 300 .5 ( 123 . 3 ) ´´ > ANOMALY]
svchost . exe spawns 13 add i t i ona l threads
svchost . exe te rminates 18 add i t i o na l threads
svchost . exe loads 54 add i t i o na l images
=> a t l . d l l
=> bcrypt . d l l
( . . . )
svchost . exe s e t s 6 add i t i ona l r e g i s t r y e n t r i e s
=> /HKLM/Software /Microso f t / . . .
( . . . )
svchost . exe mod i f i e s / d e l e t e s 6 add i t i o na l f i l e s
=> /Windows/ system32/ a c c t r e s . d l l
( . . . )
svchost . exe opens 7 add i t i ona l network so cke t s
=> 192 . 168 . 100 . 100
( . . . )
As mentioned in Section 7.4.2, AIDIS allows for varying levels of granularity.
Registry paths can either be normalized to hive names or be processed in their en-
tirety. Abstraction of IDs, memory addresses, user IDs is implemented as well – as is
pseudonymization of file names, IP addresses, and other personally identifiable infor-
mation.
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Knowledge interpretation – Knowledge dissemination offers interesting information
to the analyst but does not yet automate its interpretation. One of the key compo-
nents of our system is the classification of certain combinations of anomalous events by
mapping them to both APT attack stages contained in the model (discussed in Sec-
tion 7.3.2), as well as CAPEC attack patterns describing even more concrete adversary
behavior (Section 7.3.3).
The initial version of our system explores event combinations using Random Forest
and linear kernel Support Vector Machines (SVM). In the first step, we use the dissem-
inated knowledge to answer over 200 competency questions that are expected to aid in
the decision of whether a factor contributes to a malicious objective of a certain kind.
These questions include simple Boolean queries into the presence of events over another
event (e.g. if the number of thread terminations exceed the number of thread spawns)
as well as decisions based on the presence of certain activity tags describing the base
functionality of a loaded image (e.g. networking, authentication, user interface, kernel,
etc.). The latter is enabled by intelligent tagging (categorization) of more than 1,700
known Windows function libraries, which has been done in advance by parsing both the
Windows API section of the MSDN library1 as well as community sources2. Pattern
checks determining the use of certain system directories for file events or the assess-
ment of IP addresses are technically possible, but were not implemented at this point:
The goal of the prototype system was to avoid fixed patterns as much as possible, as
they require constant tuning effort and might be circumvented by a malware’s analysis
evasion routines.
In order to support the development of expressive competency queries we apply
the Random Forest algorithm to determine the mean decrease in accuracy/Gini for each
feature, thereby selecting the most significant questions for the respective scenario. For
the discrimination of anomaly traces, both binary ‘benign’ vs. ‘malicious’ and multi-
class classification is used: Based on the response to the competency questions, we
get a probability describing the graph’s affinity towards a certain kill chain stage or
attack pattern. The process was double-checked using a linear kernel SVM with and
without hyperplane optimization. See Section 7.5 for the list of assigned classes as well
as detailed evaluation results.
Ultimately, AIDIS maps the resulting verdict (e.g. ‘anomaly belongs to class
CAPEC-112’) and the anomaly report itself to our PenQuest model (Chapter 6), thereby
building our knowledge base of labeled attacks that can then be associated a goal, stage,
likely actor, possible countermeasure, and more. From then on, the data would be seen
as part of the model and can be viewed in context, presenting analysts with classifica-
tion and interpretation of hitherto unknown events. See 7.5.3 for an example mapping
based on real-world data and Section 6.5 for a closer look on the modeling aspect.
1https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
2https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/
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7.5 Evaluation
In this section we discuss the experimental setup as well as the individual steps of
the AIDIS system, beginning with the identification of relevant processes through LLR
sentiment analysis. Figure 7.2 and Table 7.2 provide an overview of how the individ-
ual components play together. In summary, AIDIS provides the following: 1) Data
collection, 2) tree and trace construction with data cleanup, 3) LLR-based sentiment
analysis for relevant process identification, 4) optional compression through grammar
inference, 5) star graph anomaly detection, 6) anomaly classification (core component),
as well as 7) a mapping mechanism of anomaly data to the PenQuest meta model
for additional threat semantics. Stages 3 and 4 provide anomaly scores that result in
a binary malicious/benign classification, which can be used as additional feature in
star graph anomaly classification (stage 6). Multi-class classification in preparation for
model mapping is also performed in stage 6.
In this evaluation, anomaly classification is based on star structure anomaly re-
ports. While it is also possible to use the computed anomaly traces of LLR and SE-
QUIN as training set, the respective components have proven to be better suited to
process extraction and compression in the context of AIDIS. Nevertheless, LLR senti-
ment dictionary matching and SEQUIN’s unsupervised anomaly detection capabilities
have been evaluated as individual systems. Detailed results can be found in Chapter 5.
In the following, we focus on the compound stages of the process and compare AIDIS
to 3 similar solutions.
7.5.1 Experimental Setup
The prototype of the system was implemented in a test-bed environment consisting of
13 physical Windows 7 and Windows 10 computers used on and off by developers and
IT personnel of a medium business over the course of half a year. The company, a
local security solutions provider, performed regular checks to ensure that the machines
in question were not affected by undesired software. One additional virtual Windows
7 instance was utilized for dynamically monitoring malicious software and automated
targeted attacks on demand. All machines at least provided common user applications
such as Microsoft Office, Adobe Reader, various browsers, as well as widely used OS
extensions such as Java SE and the .NET framework. The required host and network
event data was collected by a specifically developed kernel driver agent outlined in
Section 7.4.1. Figure 7.5 provides an overview of AIDIS’ testbed topology.
While the system is capable of collecting all the discussed event types, we omitted
several of them (e.g. file reads) for practical reasons. Available event classes are listed in
Table 7.5, represented as columns. The respective arguments considered were process,
image, file, and registry path/key names, as well as accessed IP addresses denoted as
hash values. The type of operation (table rows) was internally processed as numeric
value ranging from 0.1 (registry read) to 3.5 (process termination).
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Figure 7.5: Topology of the testbed network. Event data is pushed to the database
server in 3-second intervals, where it is converted to smart traces and made available
for AIDIS processing.
E Process Thread Image File Registry Network
Start 3.0 3
Stop 3.5 3
Spawn 0.9 3
Terminate 1.1 3
Load 1.5 3
Read 0.2 7
Create 0.75 3
Modify/Delete 1.25 3
Read 0.1 7
Set Key 0.5 3
Edit Value 0.25 3
Open Socket 2.0 3
Table 7.5: Types of events collected by the agent and evaluated by AIDIS. The values
for edge E were assigned manually for mapping purposes and in accordance to their
approximated impact on the system. Operations marked with an 7 are supported by
the agent but were not considered in the evaluation.
The kernel monitoring agent logs all the event types to a central listener that in
turn writes the events to a Postgres database server. SQL is used to query the database
and to construct the star structures that are the basis for all further processing, which is
handled by AIDIS’ individual program components (see Section 7.5.2 for code specifics).
Our approach is able to selectively retrieve entire system sessions or pick out individual
processes, whereby any temporal range can be specified. For example, we can process
only the first n seconds after an application’s launch or extract data from a specific
point within its lifetime – which is exactly what was done for our initial PoC evaluation
(n “ 10).
The repository of data included a total of 125 GiB of traces with more than 1.3
billion individual events across all monitored processes, with an event type distribu-
tion as depicted in Figure 7.6. Another 4.3 million (4.5 GiB) events were recorded
on the aforementioned analysis VM. For these malicious traces, we executed a total
of 1,995 APT malware samples and attack software, ranging from DarkComet [169]
and other, unnamed Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to various crypto-miners and tools
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Figure 7.6: Types of events found in the full benign dataset. While ‘process’ events
generally describe applications launched in the OS, the remainder represent actions
triggered by said processes.
1608 benign
1298 capec-112
205 capec-131
600 capec-136
448 capec-159
488 capec-169
13 capec-185
232 capec-203
3488 capec-207
4 capec-242
32 capec-251
9 capec-389
249 capec-442
4 capec-510
21 capec-549
488 capec-557
6 capec-564
1 capec-568
13 capec-578
562 capec-629
75 capec-68
3571 capec-75
211 capec-94
329 crash
6 idle
16
08
12
98
20
5
60
0
44
8
48
8
13
23
2
34
88
4
32
9
24
9
4
21
48
8
6
1
13
56
2
75
35
71
21
1 3
29
6
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
128
256
512
1024
2048
4096
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
ce
ss
 tr
ac
es
 (l
og
 2
)
Label
Figure 7.7: Number of process traces associated to a specific (CAPEC) class. The
majority of data was labeled in accordance to its observed behavior, not malware family
affiliation.
such as ShoulderSurfer1, which is used for stealing information from Microsoft Exchange
databases. Since AIDIS is not primarily used for malware classification but considers
behavior independently, most monitored attack activity is not attributed to specific
sample families. We instead use a CAPEC-based classification [219] to describe pat-
terns for e.g. reconfiguring the system or disabling security mechanisms. This ensures
that shared behavior is prioritized over family designation, which is typically not avail-
able for hitherto unknown samples. See Figure 7.7 for a distribution of classes used in
the evaluation.
We performed only minimal cleanup of the input data by normalizing certain file
paths and IDs (see Section 7.4.1). Largely idle or possibly faulty malware was retained,
1https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_524353.html
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since such samples are likely to be found in real-world datasets. The data was labeled
from the get-go, assigning 22 CAPEC classes in addition to 3 meta categories:
1. BENIGN: Non-malicious execution of the process
2. CAPEC-112: Brute Force
3. CAPEC-131: Resource Leak Exposure
4. CAPEC-136: LDAP Injection
5. CAPEC-159: Redirect Access to Libraries
6. CAPEC-169: Footprinting
7. CAPEC-185: Malicious Software Download
8. CAPEC-203: Manipulate Registry Information
9. CAPEC-207: Removing Important Client Functionality
10. CAPEC-242: Code Injection
11. CAPEC-251: Local Code Inclusion
12. CAPEC-389: Content Spoofing Via Application API Manipulation
13. CAPEC-442: Malicious Logic Inserted Into Product Software
14. CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery
15. CAPEC-549: Local Execution of Code
16. CAPEC-557: Schedule Software To Run
17. CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
18. CAPEC-568: Capture Credentials via Keylogger
19. CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
20. CAPEC-629: Unauthorized Use of Device Resources
21. CAPEC-68: Subvert Code-signing Facilities
22. CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
23. CAPEC-94: Man in the Middle Attack
24. CRASH: Process crashed within 10 seconds
25. IDLE: Process shows insufficient activity for labeling
The numbering of the list corresponds to the class IDs seen in the confusion matrix
below (see Table 7.8). Refer to the CAPEC repository [219] for more information about
these particular attack patterns.
7.5.2 Code Implementation
The CSV-formatted graphs as well as the smart traces used by the sentiment com-
ponent are preprocessed and converted into matrices using Bash and Python scripts.
LLR-based sentiment analysis is implemented in R [251]. The optional grammar in-
ference component of AIDIS is based on our own SEQUIN tool, which utilizes parts
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of a Java Sequitur implementation by Eibe Frank1. The Hungarian distance (Kuhn-
Munkres), which is the basis for all graph distance computations, is determined using
the solve_LSAP function2 available in R. Knowledge dissemination and the answering
of competency questions is currently done via Linux on-board tools (see output in Sec-
tion 7.4.5). For prototype-based template generation, we utilize a local Malheur [263]
installation configured to accept non-MIST [314] input data. Similarity hashing is based
on a Python tool coded by Chris McCormack3. Decision trees are computed in R us-
ing the randomForest function4, while our SVM implementation utilizes svm_Linear
and svm_Linear_Grid. The mapping of resulting anomaly reports and scores to the
PenQuest model is currently done manually.
7.5.3 Results
Relevant Process Identification
Since this stage uses the sentiment analysis component detailed in Chapter 4, please
refer to Section 4.5 for the evaluation of both relevant process extraction as well as the
standalone LLR sentiment analysis system. In summary, we have identified the generic
host process svchost.exe as the most viable candidate for ubiquitous kernel process
monitoring.
SEQUIN Compression
Data compression is part of the ‘grammar inference’ component of AIDIS (see Fig-
ure 7.2). Like process identification, this stage is optional.
The standalone version of the SEQUIN component is evaluated in detail in Chap-
ter 5. In summary, event trace compression resulted in a 97.2% reduction of data for the
51.3 million events that comprise the investigated (benign) svchost.exe traces. How-
ever, with 47.6% processing time reduction, the average speed-up of the star anomaly
detection process was less than we have seen for smaller corpora, where the average
speed increase for AIDIS-type data was around 73%.
Discussion – There are two factors that limit the use of SEQUIN as recommended
stage in the AIDIS process: Firstly, memory consumption is significant for corpora
above a certain size. Initial experimentation had us reach a 64 GiB ceiling at around 6
million events. While the more extensive experiment in the context of AIDIS consumed
only 120 GiB RAM as opposed to the expected ą 500 GiB determined by earlier linear
regression (see Section 5.6.1), the memory demands on the analysis system remains a
limiting factor.
1https://github.com/craignm/sequitur/tree/master/java
2https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/clue/versions/0.3-55/topics/solve_LSAP
3https://github.com/chrisjmccormick/MinHash
4https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/randomForest/versions/4.6-14/topics/randomForest
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Secondly, the effective reduction of data may prevent the creation of star anomaly
templates, as the amount of events remaining to compute meaningful prototypes is
simply too small. In our specific case, both Malheur and MinHash failed to produce
templates because of insufficient data.
This points to the conclusion that SEQUIN, while very effective in compressing star
graph data, is better suited as visualization-assisted knowledge extraction system tasked
with analyzing event data that cannot be accurately classified by AIDIS. By highlight-
ing deviating events, SEQUIN helps to spot anomalies without relying on supervised
learning. Because of the specific approach used by Sequitur [234], SEQUIN has proven
to be best suited for processes that are less eclectic than e.g. svchost.exe in their de-
fault behavior, such as driver software, error handlers, and on-demand applications for
specific user or system tasks.
In future research, we will also investigate SEQUIN’s suitability as an additional
feature in the anomaly classification process itself. Furthermore, the component’s ability
to extract common sequences warrants investigation into its suitability as alternative to
the ‘perfect match’ approach to template generation. In the meantime, SEQUIN will
be used to aid in analyzing outliers and non-ubiquitous processes.
Star Anomaly Detection
The anomaly detection process based on extracted star structures fulfills two major
purposes: Firstly, it scores unknown process traces against one or several templates for
a numeric anomaly score, and secondly, it provides a human readable report explain-
ing the deviation from a baseline graph. These reports are then used in the anomaly
classification component discussed in the next Section (7.5.3). In the following, we eval-
uate anomaly detection accuracy for the process svchost.exe using a single template
produced by the ‘majority’ mode approach as well as a multi-template experiment uti-
lizing ‘prototype’ mode followed by further reduction through similarity hashing (see
Table 7.4 for an overview of graph template creation methods). Instead of analyzing
traces in their entirety, we focus on the initial startup behavior, namely the first 10
seconds of execution of each process instance. In all cases, half of the available data
was used for validation.
Results show that, while a single template is well suited for processes that exhibit
stable behavior, it is difficult to accurately classify a versatile process like svchost.exe
as benign or malicious with just one baseline to compare to. We ultimately achieved
an accuracy of 89.34% using the mean benign score m as threshold separating the two
classes. The optimum threshold was determined to be mo “ m3 . Using this value
increased accuracy to 94.38%. Template generation took a negligible amount of time
for each of the 13,961 malicious and 2,202 benign process instances, while matching
required an average of 51 seconds per trace. See Table 7.6 for detailed results.
In a second experiment we automatically created a number of templates using
the Malheur prototype approach, which resulted in 186 baseline traces computed in
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Mode Templates Threshold TP TN FP FN Accuracy
Single 1 m 93.86% 37.04% 62.96% 6.14% 89.34%
Single 1 mo 99.99% 29.56% 70.44% 0.01% 94.38%
Multi n m 93.86% 75.68% 24.32% 6.14% 92.42%
Multi n mo 99.99% 52.76% 47.24% 0.01% 96.23%
Table 7.6: Accuracy of the star anomaly detection component in standalone mode, for
both single and multiple (n “ 17) templates. We use ‘majority’ mode and ‘prototype’
plus ‘similarity hashing’ mode (reduction), respectively. While optimizing the threshold
increases overall accuracy for the dataset, a more balanced approach to reducing the
false positive rate is recommended (multi m). Note that this AIDIS component is not
typically used without subsequent classification, which boosts accuracy significantly.
around 30 hours. To reduce this number to more practical dimensions we used similarity
hashing in ‘reduction’ mode, bringing this number down to 17 within a few seconds.
Using similarity hashing without prior heuristic clustering did not prove feasible: With
a processing time of 47 hours and a resulting 589 templates, it was less computationally
effective and yielded too high a number of templates for practical use.
To evaluate the multi-template approach, we considered the same dataset as before.
If any of the 17 benign templates deemed a trace as within tolerance, the process run
was classified as non-malicious. This increased the overall accuracy to 92.42% when
using the arithmetic mean of benign scores m as threshold, while mo accuracy was
boosted to 96.23%. The false positive rate was significantly reduced from 63% (70.4%)
to 24.3% or 47.2%, respectively. For detailed results, see Table 7.6.
Discussion – Above results show the ‘worst-case’ accuracy of the star anomaly detec-
tion process when used as an individual system. Despite the better overall numbers, we
recommend the mean or median benign score from the training set as threshold between
the benign and malicious classes, as it more drastically reduces the false positive rate.
The key outcome of this evaluation stage isn’t stand-alone component accuracy, but
the degree of process coverage: 88.48% of all malicious activity created events attributed
to svchost.exe. Considering single-template matching using m, this resulted in a
83.05% accuracy in attack detection when observing only the generic host process for a
total of 10 seconds. Combined with subsequent anomaly classification (see Section 7.5.3
below), this number was pushed to 88.31%. This finding is especially promising as it
might help eliminate the need to incipiently identify malware binaries and to observe
more that a few key OS processes such as the ones identified in Table 4.3) for system-
wide attack detection.
In conclusion, it stands to mention that threshold-based anomaly detection it not
AIDIS’ core purpose. While the results are workable, the overall false positive rate is
still too high to trust this purely number-based decision. As initially argued, considering
event semantics is key to improving detection rates and eventual interpretation, which
is why the actual classification of anomalies identified in this stage is considered the
system’s main component, discussed hereafter.
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Classifier Classes OOB error Accuracy Kappa C-value Time (s)
RF 2 0.26% 99.77% - - 142.1
RF n 4.96% 91.37% - - 224.8
SVM 2 - 99.82% 99.24% 1 70.4
SVM grid 2 - 99.83% 99.28% 0.25 1899.8
SVM n - 95.53% 94.67% 1 412.0
SVM grid n - 95.73% 94.87% 1.75 8180.4
Table 7.7: Classification accuracy (n “ 25) of the RF and SVM approach. Support
vector machines generally proved to be more accurate in our scenario. For Random
Forest, we tried 1000 trees with 100 variables on each split. For SVM, we used 10-fold
cross validation with 3 repeats to reduce overfitting.
Classes OOB error Accuracy Kappa C-value Time (s)
RF 2 0.26% 99.77% - - 142.1
SVM 2 - 99.82% 99.24% 1 70.4
SVM grid 2 - 99.83% 99.28% 0.25 1899.8
RF n 4.96% 91.37% - - 224.8
SVM n - 95.53% 94.67% 1 412.0
SVM grid n - 95.73% 94.87% 1.75 8180.4
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Figure 7.8: Classification accuracy and processing times overview for binary and multi-
class RF/SVM. The use of hyperplane optimization through the alteration of the C-
value slightly improved the results, but significantly increased processing times, making
common linear kernel SVMs the most sensible choice for our dataset.
Star Anomaly Classification
With the previous star anomaly detection stage providing a purely threshold-based
score, anomaly classification takes the resulting reports (as shown in Section 7.4.5) and
asks a number of competency questions, the answers of which are used as classification
features. We tested two technical approaches to classification: Random forest, and linear
support vector machines with and without variable C-score (hyperplane optimization).
In the first experiment, we used previously generated single-template anomaly re-
ports from the anomaly detection stage and classified the data into a benign and ma-
licious category: Both methods returned near-perfect results, with a ROC accuracy of
99.77% for RF and 99.82% accuracy for SVM (see Table 7.7 and Figure 7.8a for details).
Finally, we repeated the process with the labeled data of the aforementioned 13,961
malicious and 2,202 benign process instances in order to test classification into 22+3
CAPEC-determined behavior categories. Linear kernel SVM with a C-value of 1.75
achieved the best result with an accuracy of 95.73%, closely followed by a constant-C
(C “ 1) SVM with 95.53% and Random Forest with 91.37% multi-ROC accuracy and
an out-of-bag (OOB) error rate of 4.96%. See Table 7.7 and Figure 7.8b for a detailed
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overview of classification accuracy as well as processing times. Table 7.8 shows the class
confusion matrix of the most accurate approach.
Discussion – Above results show the advantage of semantics-enabled classification over
purely threshold-based approaches. Even with 25 classes, the accuracy was much higher
than with the default (st “ m) benign/malicious distinction used in the previous stage.
There is still room for improvement, however. The main source of misclassification
were CAPEC patterns 75 1 (‘Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files’) and 207 2
(‘Removing Important Client Functionality’). Here, between 4 and 8% of the associated
traces were misclassified as the respective other. The reason can be found in the am-
biguous nature of the pattern as well as the difficulty of clearly labeling data as one or
the other: The removal of client functionality (e.g. firewall or user authentication mea-
sures) is often done by manipulating configuration files, leading to similar star graph
elements and by extension, anomalous events.
Key features as per mean decrease in accuracy/Gini turned out to be the count of
error function libraries imported, the use of Windows user management and universal
app functions, high (system) registry interaction, operations related to log files, network
activity in general, as well as the import of data access and diagnostics functions. See
Figure 7.9 for a list and explanation of the most impactful features.
Summed up, many of the most relevant features are related to image load and
registry operations. The reason for this can be found to a degree in the selection of data
used in the experiment: With a focus on the initial 10 seconds of activity, it is expected
to see numerous events pertaining to the dynamic linking of libraries [105], which is
generally more widely used than static or runtime linking in both malware and benign
software. The concept of dynamic linking requires applications to search and load library
(DLL) resources at launch, resulting in a spike of corresponding ‘image load’ events.
Registry events typically represent initialization tasks or changes to certain settings,
something that is often seen in the early stages of operation as well. Interestingly, file
events were found to be generally underrepresented during the start-up of compromised
process instances in particular: Only 108 events in the selection described malicious
file operations, as opposed to 40,538 events in the benign svchost.exe corpus. As a
result, the lack of specific file operations might be a strong indicator of manipulation
– something that has to be considered in future feature selection. Currently, only the
general existence of such events is assessed.
While the importance of image and registry operations constitutes an interesting
finding in itself, upcoming experiments will increasingly focus on file and network events
typically triggered during a process’s entire lifetime. This includes defining new features
corresponding to questions about the nature of any created or modified files, as well as
to the fact that compromised system processes fail to display a level of file interaction
commonly seen in their benign cousins.
1https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/75.html
2https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/207.html
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Figure 7.9: Overview of features linked to the answer of a corresponding competency
question. Features prefixed by ‘imagecat’ correspond to observed image load (‘loadim-
age’) activity (or the count thereof) in one of the 87 Windows library (DLL) categories
parsed from various Microsoft and developer sources as part of the initial project stages.
‘createregistry’ and ‘highregistry’ determine the existence of anomalous operations that
insert data into the Windows registry and the presence of a large number (ą 35) of cre-
ate/change/delete operations in general. ‘systemregistry’ is one of the few fixed pattern
questions that are set to ‘true’ when keys within the HKLM\System registry hive are in-
teracted with. ‘logfilechange’ does the same when *.log or *.evt(x) files are modified.
If the parsed anomaly report contains network interaction, the ‘accessnetwork’ feature
value is set to ‘true’.
Image categories in the top 10 features: COM (10), Data Access (13), DHCP/DNS
(17), Diagnostics (18), Error Handling (20), File System (24), Remote Desktop (56),
Security (59), Windows User Management (82), Windows Universal App (83). A full
list of categories and libraries within is available on request.
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Model Mapping
Armed with the automated classification of anomalies as belonging to a specific CAPEC
pattern, it now becomes possible to link our data with the PenQuest meta model for
further semantic enrichment, interpretation, and mitigation planning.
For our evaluation, we use the class with the most events while boasting a low
misclassification rate. Disqualifying classes 9 and 22 (see Table 7.8), we take a look
at class 2 (CAPEC-112 1, ‘Brute Force’), with a total number of 380 process anomaly
reports and a misclassification rate of 0%.
For data mapping, we use PenQuest’s xEventxType “ Anomalyyy notation of X,
as specified in Sections 7.3.3 and 6.5. With a time range of xTimexStart “ 0, End “
10yy, each xOperationy+xArgumenty pair with xParent “ svchost.exey will be ap-
pended in sequence, resulting in a simple description of X that can be easily converted
to other threat definition languages or shared directly with others.
The link to CAPEC provides us with additional semantic information, namely that
‘Brute Force’ refers to activity where the “attacker attempts to gain access to this asset
by using trial-and-error to exhaustively explore all the possible secret values in the
hope of finding the secret (or a value that is functionally equivalent) that will unlock
the asset.” [219]
According to the meta model and Figure 6.7, CAPEC-112 can be an APT kill chain
‘Delivery–Intrusion’ as well as an ‘Installation–Propagation’ or ‘Installation–Persistence’
support action which is typically used in combination with other attack activity. Cate-
gorized as the identically named ‘BF’ (Brute Force) attack action, PenQuest also defines
appropriate primary controls countering the threat, namely ‘Authentication protection’
(AP): This controls group is primarily concerned with managing authenticators such
as passwords, tokens, and biometric information. Associated defense actions include
the categories ‘Remote Access’ (REA) and ‘Authenticator Management’ (AUM), with
a range of controls directly out of NIST SP 800-53 [146]. Specific countermeasures
therefore include remote access control and encryption, access point management, pass-
word/PKI/hardware/biometric authentication, as well as controls related to cache ex-
piration settings.
The information gleaned from the model can now be used to plan appropriate
defensive measures to prevent this particular attack. PenQuest’s gamified nature also
allows us to play through the attack and test various controls and systems that may re-
duce threat impact and probability. While the efficacy of the suggested countermeasures
need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis using real world infrastructure, 9 inter-
viewed security practitioners of intermediate, professional, and expert level strongly (3
points) or rather agree (2 points) that the model is ‘applicable to real world scenar-
ios’, resulting in 21 out of 27 possible points. Almost all testers strongly agree that
1https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/112.html
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using PenQuest increases general security awareness when used (22/27 points). Refer
to Chapter 6 for more information on the model’s in-depth evaluation.
Discussion – It stands to reason that this final mapping stage of AIDIS is difficult to
quantitatively evaluate. Future work will investigate crafted attack scenarios that are
then mitigated by specific defense measures suggested by the respective NIST categories
in order to determine the effectiveness of the controls. Furthermore, we will design a full
simulation component of the gamified model using reinforcement learning to automate
the process of ‘playing through’ a large number of attacks for strategy optimization
purposes.
On the modeling side, not all of the 517 CAPEC classes and only a portion of
the defensive controls are currently part of PenQuest. Around 12% of the available
patterns have been used to populate the model to date, whereas ‘detailed’ technical
patterns referring to specific software attacks (as opposed to ‘meta’ and ‘standard’)
are not currently included. Control-wise, we prototypically implemented 70 out of 224
controls specified by NIST. With the model itself ready for use, the remainder of the data
can be added at will. However, it needs to be stated that the CAPEC repository itself
is missing some of the required information needed for successful automated mapping,
which increases the effort required to add the remaining patterns. For future iterations,
we will therefore consider alternative vocabularies such as MITRE ATT&CK1.
7.5.4 Comparison
In this final evaluation section we take a look at 3 systems that share technical aspects
with AIDIS’ core components. Please note that it is generally difficult to compare
our approach to any alternative solutions, since the data basis used for training and
validation is not the same for reasons of both availability and compatibility. Further-
more, none of the identified works provide semantic enrichment through a model such
as PenQuest.
In the following, we pit AIDIS against a general intrusion detection system based
on similar SVM multi-class classification [10], as well as against two graph-based threat
detection systems [12, 141] using binary classification. Refer to the ‘Related Work’
section for additional information about the discussed works. Figure 7.10 provides an
overview of the respective accuracy scores. Additional in-depth comparisons of the
overall system can be found in Section 8.2.1.
SVM Multi-Class Classification for Network Traffic
With its SVM-based multi-class classification based on the KDD99 dataset [318], Amb-
wani [10] presents a network-based intrusion detection system attempting to distinguish
4 different attack categories: denial of service (DoS), probing, remote to local (R2L),
1https://attack.mitre.org/
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Figure 7.10: Classification accuracy of AIDIS components (both core and stand-alone)
compared to three similar systems [10, 12, 141].
and user-to-root (U2R). With a total of 23 inherent attacks considered, the classifica-
tion problem is comparable to AIDIS in scope. Its focus on full traffic dumps makes
Ambwani [10]’s solution a direct network equivalent to our host-based approach, which
uses both SVM and RF in its classification of predetermined anomalies.
The authors observed an optimized 91.67% detection accuracy when discriminating
23 classes. AIDIS achieves 95.73%, which marks a significant improvement over a
purely network-traffic based system. While this does not make Ambwani [10]’s approach
obsolete in any way, it gives a strong indication that assessing endpoint events is at least
as feasible as using traffic dumps when it comes to ML-powered intrusion detection.
Coupled with AIDIS’ anomaly detection stages, our system additionally provides means
to spot unknown behavior not covered by labeled datasets.
Graph-based Attack Detection
Since AIDIS utilizes a graph-based approach, we compare it to two such systems in
our evaluation. Previously outlined in Section 7.2, the work by Anderson et al. [12]
encompasses a detection algorithm based on the analysis of graphs constructed from
dynamically collected instruction traces. The utilized SVM classifier is tested in a
binary scenario distinguishing benign from malicious software. With a combined kernel
(best-case) accuracy of 96.41% compared to AIDIS’ 99.82%, the solution fares notably
worse. In terms of performance, however, our system is at a disadvantage, as it requires
an additional „50 seconds per trace instance to compute the anomaly graphs needed
for classification.
Jackstraws [141] offers host-side C2 traffic identification through dynamic analysis
of individual malware samples. Not unlike AIDIS, it models data flows between API calls
as graph. The resulting patterns are used as templates for subsequent detection. This
is also the key difference to our solution: Under the hood, Jackstraws extracts graph
templates not as baseline for anomaly detection, but uses them as de-facto signatures.
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This results in a high number (75%) of unclassified network connections. The remainder
was categorized with workable accuracy, but still scores over 9 percentage points lower
than AIDIS core in a binary classification setting.
7.6 Discussion
In this section, we want to highlight current limitations of the AIDIS system and discuss
three main areas of improvement: Automation, performance, and accuracy.
Regarding automation, our approach currently relies on the manual definition of
competency questions that provide the features for RF/SVM classification. Especially
thresholds (e.g. what constitutes a ‘high number’ of file or registry events) stem from
software analysis experience rather than statistical evaluation. Here, future work will
improve and automate both the creation of the competency questions as well as the
process of parsing anomaly reports, which is currently realized through conventional
text processing scripts. Another area that would benefit from additional automation
is the conversion and mapping of classified anomalies to the PenQuest notation. This
will help to ultimately map monitoring data to an ontology describing the meta model,
which is currently a work in progress based on earlier efforts such as TAON [188].
Future research will also include the automated simulation of attack scenarios aimed at
discovering optimal defense strategies through reinforcement learning.
A second aspect in need of improvement is performance. Currently, the creation
of graph templates and their matching to target star structures is implemented as an
early prototype that does not significantly optimize these computationally complex
operations. Future iterations of AIDIS will therefore focus particularly on runtime
reduction to open the door for close to real-time applications. This will also include
optional stages such as sentiment analysis and Sequitur compression, where the resolving
of rules is responsible for much of its processing overhead (see Chapter 5).
Lastly, there is the matter of accuracy. While the general results are promising, star
structure anomaly detection by itself is in need of further fine-tuning to bring down false
positive rates for multifaceted processes such as the investigated Windows host process.
However, acknowledging that threshold-based systems are unlikely to achieve the same
level of accuracy as semantic approaches, most effort will be invested into improving star
structure classification for multiple categories. Firstly, we will investigate potentially
less ambiguous and more complete vocabularies than CAPEC to reduce the risk of
misclassification. Secondly, we will develop new competency questions utilizing the
insight gained from evaluating AIDIS – especially the determined decrease of accuracy
for various question types (Figure 7.9) and the observed peculiarities of (malicious) file
events. This will help replace some of the less relevant questions with more expressive
ones. Future versions of AIDIS will also see the inclusion of other detection system
scores/results as additional classification features, which is expected to further improve
accuracy.
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For a more in-depth look at limitations, refer to Section 8.2.2 in the concluding
chapter.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the core components of AIDIS, a star structure-based
“Advanced Intrusion Detection and Interpretation System’ able to detect and explain
anomalous deviations in operating system process behavior. The returned output of
detailed state changes as well as a tendency towards a specific APT stage and attack
pattern is expressed through the mapping of semantic key factors to PenQuest, our
dedicated attacker–defender model (Chapter 6). At the same time, the model suggests
specific measures intended to counter any observed attack. Specifically, this chapter
contributed by:
• Presenting a holistic approach to collecting and analyzing host and network events
able to describe and assess all victim-side APT attack stages;
• Introducing a transparent anomaly detection system based on star structures;
• Providing optional processing components incorporating features such as event
sequence compression through grammar inference and sentiment analysis for iden-
tifying expressive operating system processes;
• Classifying anomalies into semantic threat categories based on the CAPEC dictio-
nary [219] using both a Random Forest (RF) and Support Vector Machine (SVM)
approach;
• Enabling the interpretation of classified data through a comprehensive targeted
attack meta model encompassing actors, assets, as well as hostile and mitigating
actions.
The process was prototypically implemented and successfully tested using real-
world process data captured on more than a dozen company workstations over half
a year. Ultimately, 99.8% of all star structure anomalies were correctly identified as
benign or malicious, with a solid 95.7% accuracy in multi-class scenarios that seek to
associate each anomaly with a distinct CAPEC attack pattern. Furthermore, we have
shown that 88.3% of close to 2,000 attacks could be accurately identified by observing
and classifying just one generic Windows process (svchost.exe) for a mere 10 seconds,
thereby eliminating the necessity to monitor each and every (unknown) process existing
on a system.
In comparison to similar solutions, our system promises improved accuracy for
both binary and multi-class classification, as evidenced in Section 7.5.4. When pitted
against research identified in the literature survey, AIDIS sets itself apart through high
accuracy and its core features in general – namely its classification, modeling, and white-
box anomaly detection capabilities not reliant on fixed patterns. See Section 8.2.1 for
more details.
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AIDIS represents the core contribution of this thesis by providing transparent
anomaly detection and classification for ubiquitous kernel processes. For future research
(see Section 8.2.3), we aim to focus on strategy inference utilizing PenQuest’s model in
combination with anomalous events tagged by AIDIS’s other components to compute
optimal responses to a wide range of attacks. This will enable analysts to employ our
solution as expert system supporting both risk management and organizational threat
mitigation while being provided detailed technical assessments about individual stages
of an intrusion.
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This chapter summarizes the evaluation of all technical AIDIS components and
discusses individual and combined accuracy. Our system is additionally compared to 13
key works identified during literate review, highlighting differences, commonalities, and
research opportunities. A closer look is taken at processing times and their implications
for productive deployment. Research questions, hypotheses, and overall contributions
are revisited and we outline future work aiming to improve data procedures, event
processing, computational performance, and overall accuracy. Last but not least, we
discuss optimal strategy inference through model checking and reinforcement learning
as a promising direction of further research.
8.1 Overall Evaluation
The Advanced Intrusion Detection and Interpretation System is very flexible in terms
of implementation: The individual components can be deployed alone or in concert –
promising a wide range of possible applications within an organization. This section
summarizes the evaluation outcomes previously discussed in the respective evaluation
chapters and highlights where and how each AIDIS component is best utilized. Finally,
we centrally answer the research questions and test the hypotheses stated in Section 1.3.
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8.1.1 Results Summary
Accuracy
Next to the compound system dubbed ‘AIDIS Core’ (Chapter 7), all individual compo-
nents can be employed in standalone mode and have been tested with standard event
traces as described in Section 3.3. With its focus on compression and more exotic
anomaly extraction scenarios, the SEQUIN prototype is the only exception to this rule:
Here, ICS sensor data was analyzed in addition to individual OS traces.
Each system’s performance was assessed using the traditional accuracy score as
main performance indicator. According to ISO 5725-1 [101], the term “accuracy” is
used to describe the closeness of a measurement to the true value. It is defined as:
Accuracy “ TP ` TN
TP ` FP ` FN ` TN
where TP “ true positive rate,
TN “ true negative rate,
FP “ false positive rate,
FN “ false negative rate.
The reason for this choice over alternatives such as the f-measure [249] is its widespread
use in comparable solutions and the fact that many machine learning applications utilize
traditional accuracy by default.
Figure 8.1 shows the accuracy values determined for each component of AIDIS.
We specifically evaluate the LLR sentiment analysis system, 4 different template and
threshold optimization variants available in the star structure anomaly detection sys-
tem, SEQUIN’s grammar inference component, the PenQuest model, and the combined
system (AIDIS Core) as a whole.
For both binary and CAPEC multi-class classification, AIDIS Core utilizing SVM
with hyperplane optimization offers the highest accuracy with 99.82% and 95.73%, re-
spectively. Considering processing times, the more viable choice in both cases is conven-
tional linear kernel SVM, however: Here, scores are only slightly lower but computation
time decreases by at least the factor of 20. Figure 7.8 provides further details.
As a standalone system, the LLR component performed well in comparison to simi-
lar n-gram-based implementations such as AccessMiner [176], which achieved an average
accuracy rate of 89.5% using file operation trigrams of benign applications as baseline.
For registry activity, the results of AccessMiner are far inferior (48.6%). This supports
our decision of observing several event types in synergy and of basing our decision on
a statistical test rather than the number of n-grams deviating from a baseline. In our
experiments, LLR even yielded better results than each of the four star structure algo-
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Figure 8.1: Classification accuracy comparison of the AIDIS core system and its individ-
ual components. Only the star anomaly classification system supports the assignment
of multiple classes.
rithms. The reason for this can be found in the different approaches to data processing:
LLR assesses bigrams of events that maintain their strict chronological order. While
this makes each pair more expressive than the individual events processed by the star
structure system, it also makes the algorithm more susceptible to mimicry attacks that
inject events into a process or thread, thereby interrupting sequences that would nor-
mally constitute a malicious bigram. For star structures, the order of events does not
strictly matter in the context of a specific process – which might risk misclassification
of ambiguous activity but increases resilience to obfuscation. Ultimately, the choice
of system depends on the data analyzed: The more volatile a process, the more our
preference shifts towards the use of star structures, where we can opt to use multiple
templates instead of a single dictionary.
Star anomaly detection by itself resulted in a workable accuracy of at least 89.3%
and up to 96.2%, depending on the number of templates and the kind of threshold opti-
mization used. Utilizing multiple templates for complex processes such as svchost.exe
is highly recommended: In our experiments, doing so increased accuracy by at least
2 percentage points across the board. Still, optimizing the threshold instead of using
the mean star graph distance deviation should be used sparingly to avoid overfitting.
The key contribution of the (standalone) star anomaly system is undoubtedly the new
insights into process coverage: Our results show that 88.48% of all malicious activity
is reflected in the first 10 seconds of activity of the svchost.exe generic host process.
This finding has the potential to significantly contribute to IDS efficiency for both new
and existing solutions. Lastly, the star structure component provides the anomaly in-
formation needed for the classification happening in AIDIS Core – its promising results
would not be replicable without this semantic data.
The final technical component, SEQUIN, fulfills a special role. Next to data com-
pression, the Sequitur-based system is the only one that offers unsupervised learning for
anomaly detection. Frequent and anomalous patterns can be extracted and explored in
detail. When tested at scale, SEQUIN achieved a detection accuracy of 92.9% on ICS
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Process Edge Event
cmd.exe 106 rule-329
httpd.exe 105 rule-67
cmd.exe 3 process-conhost.exe
SYSTEM 2 network-private-ip
httpd.exe 105 rule-67
cmd.exe 106 rule-510
httpd.exe 116 rule-277
httpd.exe 3 process-cmd.exe
cmd.exe 3 process-conhost.exe
httpd.exe 106 rule-21
httpd.exe 0.75 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\tmp\php6c6.tmp
httpd.exe 1.25 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\tmp\php6c6.tmp
httpd.exe 0.75 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\htdocs\phpfilemanager-0.9.8\jurex\juril.php
httpd.exe 1.25 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\htdocs\phpfilemanager-0.9.8\jurex\juril.php
httpd.exe 1.33 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\tmp\php6c6.tmp
httpd.exe 107 rule-66
cmd.exe 3 process-conhost.exe
httpd.exe 105 rule-67
cmd.exe 3 process-conhost.exe
httpd.exe 112 rule-76
httpd.exe 0.75 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\tmp\sess_0ipkv6fuv51pa6eqj9slfo0cr5
httpd.exe 0.75 file-\dev\harddiskvolume2\xampp\tmp\sess_r8u0graeflq017fbo5mlad56s1
Table 8.1: Example SEQUIN output highlighting anomalous entries in a sequence of
Windows events. The data follows the format of G “ pU, V,Eq, as explained in Sec-
tion 7.4.5. Dark grey lines represent rules (recurring events) identified by SEQUIN.
Light grey marks temporary files, black represents anonymized network activity and
orange highlights uninterrupted blocks of 4 or more anomalous terminals.
sensor data, with a 100% detection rate for undesired behavior in general. Additional
experiments with Windows event data successfully identified a reverse shell web server
attack through SEQUIN’s statistical data evaluation coupled with visual analytics. Ta-
ble 8.1 depicts an extract of the result.
The PenQuest model was evaluated in three ways: First, the game prototype
was play-tested with 9 security practitioners of intermediate to expert knowledge level
in order to assess its suitability for threat modeling, risk assessment, education, and
awareness training. All participants agreed that the experience of using PenQuest was
overly positive. Its applicability to awareness training was met with uniform agreement.
Similarly, most testers strongly or rather agreed that the model is ‘applicable to real
world scenarios’ and that PenQuest increases security insight when consulted. Detailed
information about test and questionnaire can be found in Section 6.6.2.
The second part of the evaluation determined if the model manages to provide a
strategy set for all APT stages as well as all three aspects of the CIA triad, while pro-
viding a balanced and realistic range of attack patterns and possible countermeasures.
Results show that the gamified model is mostly complete in its coverage: Only ‘state
attacks’ such as race conditions and certain kinds of session forging remain underrepre-
sented because of labeling deficiencies in the CAPEC repository – something that can
be easily remedied by manually adding new actions. At the same time, our populated
model generated or confirmed insights into the current state of organizational defense
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ID Processing step Processing time (s)
C 1 Preprocessing 51,753
L
L
R 1 LLR calculation 235,281
2 LLR dictionary computation 22,684
3 LLR key process extraction 1,932
S 1 SEQUIN inference (standalone) 51,212
St
ar
te
m
pl
at
e
1 Stars extraction (all processes) 71,971
2 Stars template generation (match) 123,070
3 Stars template generation (majority) 123,509
4 Stars template generation (prototype) 109,465
5 Stars template generation (similarity) 40,143
6 Stars template generation (prototype+similarity) 6
7 Stars template generation (Sequitur+match) 7,328
8 Stars template generation (Sequitur+majority) 7,332
9 Stars template generation (Sequitur+prototype) n/a
10 Stars template generation (Sequitur+similarity) 452
St
ar
an
om
al
y
1 Stars anomaly detection 833,389
2 Stars anomaly classification (question parsing) 20,214
3 Stars anomaly classification (RF binary) 142
4 Stars anomaly classification (RF multi-class) 224
5 Stars anomaly classification (SVM binary) 70
6 Stars anomaly classification (SVM binary w/ hyperplane opt.) 1,900
7 Stars anomaly classification (SVM multi-class) 412
8 Stars anomaly classification (SVM multi-class w/ hyperplane opt.) 8,180
Table 8.2: Overview of processing times including all alternative template generation
and classification methods for process svchost.exe. For compound steps (denoted as
A ` B), only phase B duration is listed. Sequitur compression followed by ‘prototype’
template generation could not be measured since there was insufficient data for Malheur
prototype extraction.
even without mapping data to a concrete scenario: For example, awareness initiatives
consistently counter a high number of attacks across multiple categories. Similarly, me-
dia storage guidelines, security engineering principles, and cryptographic controls tend
to have greater reach and promise organization-wide benefits. For more information
about strategy set distribution and insights, see Section 6.6.2.
Lastly, we investigated the mapping of individual attacks identified and classified
by AIDIS Core. This final random sample test complemented the evaluation of the
game component and semantically assessed if the countermeasures suggested by Pen-
Quest ‘make sense’. An example of such a test can be found in Section 7.5.3. Overall,
decision support functioned as intended and yielded sensible suggestions even though
the model is only partially populated with data. Additional large-scale testing with se-
curity operators needs to be conducted in the future to determine whether data sources
other than CAPEC and NIST SP800-53 synergize well with PenQuest. The gamified
ruleset itself is fully capable of incorporating alternative vocabularies with negligible
effort.
In the following we take a closer look at the second major appraisal factor: Com-
putational performance.
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Figure 8.2: Processing times of the main evaluation for linear kernel SVM (grid) multi-
classification of process svchost.exe. Note that steps 1 through 6 do not need to be
repeated regularly and that expensive step 7 is rarely conducted for more than a few new
process instances at once. The chart here depicts computation times for all available
data (16,361 svchost.exe traces) collected over 6 months.
Performance
While the AIDIS prototype is far from optimized, the overall processing times are still
indicative for its future use in productive environments. Table 8.2 lists all mandatory
and optional steps for the overall performance evaluation. LLR stages (1) through (3)
determine the most relevant processes for observation and therefore need to consider all
available traces. With the exception of the stars extraction step (1), the remainder of
processing times are limited to svchost.exe.
We can see that the most expensive stages with a computation time of above 100k
seconds are the LLR calculation, the stars template generation, and the stars anomaly
detection process. Thanks to SEQUIN, which offers efficient compression of most input
data, it is possible to reduce corpus sizes by up to 97.2%. This cuts down star structure
processing times by 47.6% to 73%. LLR calculation times can be further reduced by
approximately 90% if future runs are limited to identified processes of relevance in the
first place. Moreover, stars template generation is a step that only needs to be repeated
on demand upon an expected change to an application’s baseline behavior (e.g. because
of new software rollouts). Additional re-training may be necessary at regular intervals
of weeks to months to counter concept drift [315].
Since many processing steps listed in Table 8.2 are optional or represent alternatives
for generating templates, Figure 8.2 depicts the computation times specific to our main
evaluation scenario. Star anomaly detection is undoubtedly the most impactful factor:
With a mean computation time of 50.9 seconds per svchost.exe process trace, anomaly
detection is not quite realtime-capable in AIDIS’ current iteration. Other processes com-
pute significantly faster but are not as expressive because of their limited function scope
within the OS. For example, the process for changing file attributes (attrib.exe), the
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Figure 8.3: Regression analysis of different-length event traces. With the star graph’s
polynomial scaling in time, traces with more than 700 events will take approx. 10
minutes to complete. The current svchost.exe average for a time span of 10 seconds
is 368 events, processed in 51 seconds.
configuration tool net.exe, and the session manager smss.exe all completed anomaly
detection in less than 2.5 seconds per trace. Observing svchost.exe, an organization
deploying AIDIS would have to invest approximately 1.69 hours of mid-range CPU time
(2.4 GHz, single-core processing) each day to calculate anomaly scores for a network
of 10 computers, provided the machines are used by a single user adhering to average
FTE work hours.
While future code optimization is expected to reduce these numbers significantly,
it is important to keep in mind that increasing the observed time span to more than
the currently analyzed 10 seconds of process activity will further increase processing
times at a polynomial rate (see Figure 8.3). It is therefore unlikely that a process
as complex as the Windows generic host can be timely assessed for more than a few
minutes of runtime without using a sliding or session window approach. Please refer to
Section 8.2.2 below for a discussion about how this alternative take on data processing
might look like.
AIDIS’ accuracy even before optimization makes it a promising alternative to ex-
isting systems, which rarely offer the same level of functionality. In the following, we
take a look at the system’s key contributions and compare it to solutions identified as
useful additions to an organization’s APT detection efforts.
8.1.2 Contributions
In the following, we revisit the problems identified in Section 1.2 and summarize how
our proposed solutions contribute to the state-of-the-art in threat detection.
There are five aspects we have identified as key contributions of AIDIS: The non-
reliance on fixed patterns or signatures, independence from pre-extracted (known) sam-
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ples, a white-box approach to anomaly detection, support for anomaly classification, as
well as the existence of an underlying threat model that enables wide-ranging interpre-
tation capabilities. Specifically:
Pattern-free anomaly detection. All components of AIDIS have been designed
with pattern avoidance in mind. There are no signature-based mechanisms in place.
For anomaly detection or classification, none of the components utilize heuristics or
other behavioral patterns as part of their detection routines:
• LLR sentiment analysis makes its decisions through supervised learning based on
dictionaries of sequential behavior derived from large corpora of event data. The
dictionaries and their n-gram anomaly thresholds are computed automatically and
do not require the manual definition of patterns.
• SEQUIN uses unsupervised learning to extract repeating or deviating patterns
from a sequence of events. This is done via grammar inference, which is not reliant
on predefined patterns of any kind. It stands to mention that rule transformation
going beyond the initial version introduced in Section 5.4.4 would benefit from
continuous labeling. However, the respective labels need not be specified before-
hand but could be assigned a designation as part of the analyst’s assessment of an
inferred sequence. The terminals making up the rule could even be transformed
into a signature for other detection systems, making SEQUIN a feasible support
and knowledge extraction system in its own right.
• Star structure anomaly detection uses templates of nominal behavior automati-
cally selected using one of 4 implemented algorithms. This supervised approach
is not reliant on patterns and computes all decision thresholds automatically.
Anomaly classification uses a number of generic questions as features, which
mostly avoid any kind of specifics that could be interpreted as heuristic pattern.
The exception to the rule is the list of Windows function library categories: This
list is likely to somewhat change with every major OS release, making it the only
source of data in need of occasional updates.
Ubiquitous kernel process analysis. With the automated identification of kernel
processes most expedient for observation, AIDIS is fully sample-independent in its oper-
ation. No advance knowledge of malware binaries or suspicious applications is required.
The results presented in Chapter 7 show that analyzing and classifying process instances
of omnipresent Windows components is very promising indeed, as almost 88.5% of all
investigated attacks are reflected by events created in the first 10 seconds of a single
kernel process (svchost.exe). This underlines the feasibility of the approach and dras-
tically reduces the number of binaries that need to be analyzed to reach a verdict on a
system’s state of infection.
Transparent (white-box) anomaly detection. Each of the aforementioned anomaly
detection components operate transparently. This means that the algorithms imple-
mented for AIDIS always generate a list of events that can be seen as responsible for
the anomaly alert, thereby explaining how the respective decision was reached. For
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sentiment analysis, explication takes the form of event n-grams associated with an LLR
score representing the maliciousness of the sequence. In SEQUIN’s case, our tool yields
a list of events akin to Table 8.1 as well as several pattern occurrence statistics (see Sec-
tion 5.4.3). All rules computed in the inference process can be looked up in a database
for maximum insight. Star structure anomaly detection creates a structured list of
baseline-deviating events that can be rendered as graph.
Classification and dissemination of identified anomalies. As discussed in Sec-
tion 7.4.5, the RF and SVM multi-class classification of detected (star structure) anoma-
lies is one of the major features of AIDIS. Each threat is assigned a CAPEC attack pat-
tern, which describes the specific adversary action independent from malware family or
other sample-based categorization. The labeled anomaly, which consists of a sequence
of events, can now be transformed to a format supported by the PenQuest model or
turned into a behavioral signature similar to SEQUIN’s output. Our results show (see
Section 8.1.1) a high classification accuracy for our experiment, both in binary good/bad
and multi-class scenarios.
Interpretation through comprehensive attacker–defender modeling. Few
anomaly detection systems provide a full attacker–defender model for interpretative
tasks (see Section 8.2.1 for a comparison of features). With AIDIS, we map the de-
tected and classified anomalies directly to PenQuest, which offers a large repository
of attack patterns and mitigating controls via established information security sources.
Attack vectors, adversary goals, and system inter-dependencies are all considered. This
allows analysts to explore likely actor motivations and helps locate vulnerable systems,
as well as plan appropriate defensive measures to counter the threat on a technical and
organizational level. Through our model, we narrow the semantic gap between data and
the purpose and nature of an observed cyber-attack. AIDIS as a whole therefore pro-
vides the means to detect, classify, interpret, and disseminate all information pertaining
to the possible APT, paving the way for automated threat response.
8.1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions
In this section we revisit the research questions posed at the beginning of the project
and discuss if and how they were answered. Afterwards, hypotheses are tested by
referencing/summarizing relevant portions of research. Refer to Section 1.3 for more
details about question design.
All three research questions could be answered in the course of the project. We
discuss the respective answers in the following:
How can advanced targeted attacks be comprehensively modeled in prepa-
ration for semantic enrichment? In Chapter 6, we investigated gamified attack-
er/defender modeling as means to depict targeted attacks on arbitrary infrastructures.
This follows an initial assessment of KAOS [259], GRL [319], and the i* Strategic De-
233
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
pendency (SD) model [92] as part of the literature survey, as well as the development
of TAON [188], our first targeted attack ontology modeling actors, goals, and threat
actions. Ultimately, TAON became PenQuest. In response to the research question,
we argue that a gamified attacker/defender approach is not only capable of modeling
hostile and mitigating actions on various assets, but also offers a way to automate
the inference of optimal strategies leading to system compromise or successful attack
prevention. This possible future research direction is discussed in Section 8.2.3 below.
How can suspicious system behavior be accurately identified without relying
on predefined patterns? The drawbacks of pattern-based systems has been discussed
at length in Section 1.2. The use of anomaly detection and machine learning in general
offers a solution to the problem. However, the efficiency of such systems has often been
disputed. With AIDIS, we show that all stages of data processing can be completed
successfully without resorting to more than a bare minimum of fixed patterns: Only
some of the competency questions used as features by the RF and SVM classifiers could
be understood as patterns, as they refer to e.g. the existence of certain types of files
within an observed anomaly. Our solution offers high accuracy and computes its results
within a workable amount of time; even in comparison to other anomaly-based works
(see Section 8.2.1 below).
How can identified system anomalies be mapped to specific attacks? To
answer this question, we focused our research on a classification system that can be tied
to a comprehensive threat model. In the top-down research stage (see Section 3.1), we
designed PenQuest to support external threat information languages and attack pattern
repositories such as CAPEC. An internal mapping mechanism, introduced in Section 6.5,
matches these patterns to an APT kill chain phase as well as sub-categories describing
their specific purpose. Target assets and potential actors are in turn connected through
PenQuest’s rule system. On the technical side, AIDIS Core classifies each anomaly
detected by our star graph anomaly component by its preassigned CAPEC label, which
serves as link to the model. Alternatively, the APT (sub-)stage itself could serve as
class for supervised learning. With some adaptations, the model could also be used as
malware family classifier.
In summary, targeted attacks can be accurately identified and interpreted using a
combination of a granular threat modeling that supports semantically annotated attack
patterns, and a classification system based on supervised machine learning, where the
data assessed corresponds to an anomaly that can be mapped to said pattern.
Hypotheses
Most of the initially stated hypotheses have proven to be correct and could be con-
firmed through experimental research. As propounded in Chapter 2, APT detection
and analysis is currently lacking, as it focuses on singular areas and rarely considers the
full picture. AIDIS proves that a semantics-aware approach is better suited to learn
about advanced threats and plan for their mitigation. Specifically:
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The detection of APTs can be improved by using semantics-aware techniques
and tools. This initial hypothesis was also addressed as part of the literature survey:
The rising prominence of targeted attacks makes it necessary for new monitoring and
analysis solutions to consider such scenarios from the get-go. We have shown that
including both the host and network domain is vital and that the semantic classification
of explained anomalies is feasible for kernel event sequences captured on an endpoint.
Both SEQUIN and the PenQuest model added a formal component to the system that
helps to confirm this hypothesis.
System anomalies describing attacker behavior are more feasible to use in a
holistic system/network environment than fixed misuse scenarios. The overall
results of our anomaly-based system confirm that classification accuracy is identical or
superior to signature-based systems, such as the ones reviewed in Chapter 2. This elim-
inates one of the major drawbacks inherent to many behavioral systems [180]. AIDIS’
successful classification of threats indirectly confirms its resistance to conventional (sub-
stitution) mimicry attacks. More advanced semantic obfuscation, adversarial learning,
and feature poisoning will have to be further investigated in the context of our system.
Knowledge extraction followed by model-based attack explication is a viable
approach to understanding targeted threats. AIDIS achieves knowledge extrac-
tion through its transparent explanation of anomalies. Each of the components – LLR,
SEQUIN, and the star anomaly system – provides or infers events that constitute devi-
ating behavior. This information, be it labeled as CAPEC attack pattern or semantic
rule of SEQUIN, can be mapped to the PenQuest model. Experiments exhibited in
Chapter 7 confirm that our take on attack explication is a promising means of clos-
ing the semantic gap, as PenQuest offers insight into adversary strategies and suggests
sensible threat mitigation options.
Observing ubiquitous OS kernel processes is a feasible alternative to sample-
focused analysis. Our results confirm that monitoring a single omnipresent system
process is sufficient to spot nearly 88.5% of all attacks conducted on a Windows system.
No prior knowledge of sample names, suspicious processes, or attack time frame is
required. This arguably makes the AIDIS approach a viable substitute or extension for
sample-centric analysis systems, which generally focus on individual malware binaries.
It stands to mention that the SEQUIN subsystem is well suited to the task of analyzing
hitherto unseen samples, regardless of our focus on ubiquitous processes.
Considering traces of abstracted behavior is more effective than observing
raw API calls. Experiments conducted in Chapter 4 demonstrate that smartly re-
ordered traces of abstracted system behavior captured by Sonar is indeed more accurate
than assessing raw API calls in strict sequence of occurrence. Specifically, the difference
in accuracy for the same dataset is more than 25 percentage points: Raw traces scored
only 73%. See Section 4.5.1 for details.
Classifying anomalies is preferable to classifying entire traces of unknown be-
havior. Traces describing anomalies are significantly smaller in size than full process
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logs. Considering the polynomial increase in processing time (see Figure 8.3), assessing
more than a minute of process data at once was found to be unfeasible. Furthermore,
using full system traces achieved a lower accuracy for both binary and multi-class classi-
fication, with the difference most pronounced when using RF: Here, multi-class accuracy
was slightly below 68% as opposed to over 91% for anomaly data.
8.2 Discussion and Future Work
This final discussion section it split into three parts: A side-by-side comparison of AIDIS
to the highest scored APT solutions identified during literature review, a discussion
of key improvements and suggestions how to implement them in the context of an
organization’s infrastructure, as well as a short discourse of directions proposed for
future research.
8.2.1 Comparison to Key Research
In this section we take an evaluative look at key APT research identified in the literature
survey (Chapter 2). Listed and scored in Table 2.2, these works contribute most to
APT detection in the context of their respective domain. We discuss commonalities,
differences and synergies below. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 provide an overview of system
properties in regards to the research questions/hypotheses and based on the system
design checklist discussed in Chapter 2. This way we directly compare our system
to the reviewed solutions and reach a verdict regarding AIDIS’ singular role in future
threat mitigation.
Host Solutions
As discussed in Chapter 2, Jackstraws [141] offers host-side C2 traffic identification
through dynamic analysis of individual malware samples. Not unlike AIDIS, it models
data flows between API calls as graph. The resulting patterns are used as templates
for subsequent detection. This is also the key difference to our solution: Under the
hood, Jackstraws extracts graph templates not as baseline for anomaly detection, but
uses them as de-facto signatures. This results in a high number (75%) of unclassified
network connections. The remainder was categorized with workable accuracy, but still
scores more than 9 percentage points lower than AIDIS Core. Jackstraws and the graph
matching approach underneath [350] remains a viable alternative for C2 traffic detection
and will have to be further investigated for use in our prototype, as it potentially offers
improved processing performance.
Malheur [314, 263] offers heuristic clustering of dynamically generated application
traces of malware. The distance to a representative prototype is determined, stored,
and subsequently used for the comparison of new samples to the respective cluster.
Although Malheur provides its own format (MIST) for sequential traces, almost any
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event sequence generated by another analysis system can be supplied. With its focus on
rapid function n-gram processing comes a lack of transparency: Prototypes or prototype
distances are only expressed as numeric values. Rieck et al. assess the accuracy of the
system through its F1 score (f-measure) [249], which is defined as follows:
F1 “
2 ˚ TPTP`FN ˚ TPTP`FP
TP
TP`FN ` TPTP`FP
Using MIST and third-party monitoring data, Malheur achieves a clustering f-measure
of 0.936 to 0.95 [263]. Classification achieves a best-case F1 score of 0.981 for known
malware samples. Note that a direct comparison to AIDIS’ scores is not soundly possi-
ble because of missing sensitivity/specificity values. Still, the overall level of accuracy
is estimated as within the same bracket of 99.75 to 100%. Using formats other than
MIST reduces F1 all across the board, which was confirmed by our own experiments.
The authors evaluated their system with a real-world dataset of malware labeled by
an anti-virus product. However, since Malheur categorizes traces by behavior instead
of malware family, the separation was not cleanly reflected by the resulting clusters.
Additionally, 10.7% of traces could not be assigned a prototype at all. Ultimately, we
consider Malheur a valuable support system and alternative to e.g. SVM classification
or similarity hashing. We decided to use Rieck et al.’s system as part of the ‘proto-
type extraction’ process of AIDIS (see Section 7.4.5), were it achieved a non-MIST F1
score of slightly below 80%. Malheur will be evaluated as RF and SVM alternative for
AIDIS’ CAPEC classification in the future – should the conversion of our current graph
representation into the MIST format prove to be feasible.
Dolgikh et al. [79] automatically create application profiles through graph-based
function/parameter tracing of malware or benign system processes. API calls are trans-
formed into a labeled graph representing a stream of events. Graphs are then com-
pressed using the Graphitour algorithm [245], resulting in rules that, in case of benign
applications, represent nominal behavior. This information can then be used as part of
an anomaly detection system. While the approach is generally similar to the SEQUIN
grammar inference component of AIDIS, a direct comparison is difficult because of the
system’s lack of comprehensive evaluation.
With VirusBattle, Miles et al. [213] focus on the similarity of malware instances
to discover links between actors, machines, and malware: Code, semantically similar
procedures of code, and API call execution/event log traces are compared to identify
similarities. This includes visited websites, e-mail messages, and static PE file headers.
VirusBattle can best be compared to AIDIS’ Sonar monitoring agent with the key
difference being its reliance on static analysis through concolic execution. Miles et al.’s
approach connects various levels of information to infer new semantic links. In contrast,
AIDIS always maintains process context and does not need to reconnect the dots in the
first place – a distinct advantage of dynamic analysis. User information and machine IDs
are readily available in the database as well. Furthermore, we can link observed events
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to likely actor classes and even attack descriptions. The VirusBattle paper does not
provide the numbers necessary for a side-by-side accuracy evaluation of the approach.
Ou et al. [238] present a formal model depicting the (human) reasoning process
used to determine whether a system is compromised. Unlike AIDIS, they primarily use
captured network traffic scanned by an existing IDS configured with pre-existing intru-
sion alert patterns. The reasoning engine converts signature descriptions to rules, where
individual events contribute to the overall certainty level of compromise. In short, Ou
et al.’s system interprets its findings in accordance to existing threat descriptions with
all the shortcomings of a signature-reliant approach, while AIDIS bases its classifica-
tion on the outcome of a supervised learning process using anomalies. Formally, Ou
et al. [238] use a Datalog-like language [46], whereas PenQuest provides detailed class
definitions and a comprehensive ‘game manual’ for the representation of its ruleset.
Network Solutions
The reviewed research by Razzaq et al. [257] presents a detection and classification
system for web application attacks through an ontological model. The model includes
semantic rules for validating protocol formats and inferring malicious activity. At its
core, however, the system still relies on fixed rules (regular expressions) describing
various attacks, even if it promises higher accuracy than purely sequential network-
based IDS. On average, it detected 18 classes of evaluated network attacks with a mean
accuracy of 85.9%, whereby SQL injections were detected most reliably (95.4%) and
information leakage attacks posed the greatest challenge (78.1% accuracy). Similar
to AIDIS, the system by Razzaq et al. attaches a short description of consequence
to its rules (e.g. ‘accessing sensitive information’). Our own model assigns a patterns
class (‘IL–illegal access’) describing attacker behavior. Each class is then associated
with specific (CAPEC) attack patterns and their properties. While AIDIS/PenQuest
arguably offer more detailed semantic information and even mitigation strategies, it
does not yet boast the same level of automation as Razzaq et al.’s system.
With its focus on HTTP traffic generated by malware, Zarras et al.’s BotH-
ound [352] primarily offers template-based detection of C2 traffic. The system uses
an optimized threshold similar to the star graph anomaly detection component (sans
classification) of AIDIS. Similar in scope to our 23+2 CAPEC classes, BotHound was
trained with traffic of a total of 24 malware families. However, all classification done
by Zarras et al. only assigned a benign or malicious label; no separation into malware
families was performed. In the binary scenario, the system’s accuracy was comparable
to AIDIS’ SVM-based classification (see Figure 8.6).
In [15] the authors create an attack ontology based on threat intelligence infor-
mation gleaned from CAPEC, CWE, and CVE. In addition to similar data sources,
their work can be compared to PenQuest’s foundation ontology, TAON [188]. While
Ansarinia et al.’ system aims to construct an ontology for describing DDoS-related pat-
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terns, it does not attempt to map real-world data to the model. With no concrete input
data, accuracy comparisons cannot be performed.
SpuNge [22] focuses on behavioral clustering of URL strings in order to correlate
attacks targeting a specific industry or location. This is achieved mostly through string
similarity measurement, after which similar request/response information is grouped
together. For example, binary files transmitted over the network that use a similar file
name will likely be put in the same cluster. Like SEQUIN, SpuNge is primarily used for
data reduction and pattern inference, as it helps identify event commonalities such as
shared C2 servers. It was not evaluated as automated detection system by its authors.
Vance [322]’s work introduces a flow-based traffic monitoring system capable of
statistical anomaly detection. The system uses change detection through sketch-based
measurement [165] to identify flows that hint at command & control traffic, data mining,
or exfiltration activities. It can be understood as a support solution that primarily
reduces the amount of flow data in need of processing by highlighting the changes. This,
in a way, makes it similar to AIDIS’ classification system, where we consider anomalies
instead of entire event traces. Vance claims to have achieved an increase in APT alerts
with his approach, but fails to provide specific numbers for a direct comparison.
Other Solutions
The remaining three works listed in Table 2.2 are discussed below. As they represent
general research and modeling efforts, a quantitative comparison (table) was omitted.
With Gestalt, Atighetchi et al. [21] introduce a multi-source data management sys-
tem for centralized forensic data query and analysis. All information is abstracted using
a custom language. Gestalt is best compared to the database server hosting our agent’s
collected monitoring data. They key difference to AIDIS’ storage and querying system
is that Gestalt leaves the (log, traffic, alert) data where it was generated. Semantic
queries are translated to low-level requests to e.g. a database server. With Sonar, we
use raw SQL queries to extract the data needed for anomaly detection from a central
system. Since the design of the agent and its database server is not within the scope of
this thesis, a direct comparison was omitted. However, any future AIDIS implementa-
tion will undoubtedly benefit from changes emulating Gestalt’s take on data collection
and processing. For more discussion on this topic, see Section 8.2.2.
Gorodetski et al. [116] sketch a threat modeling and traffic simulation system for
multi-source data similar to Gestalt’s. Semantic information such as attacker intentions
are considered, which makes Gorodetski et al.’s model something of an early cousin to
AIDIS/PenQuest and SIEM systems in general.
With ADeLe, Totel et al. [312] present a language specifically tailored to describe
exploits and attacks from the target’s perspective. In the context of AIDIS, the compo-
nent most similar to Totel et al.’s research is the mapping mechanism linking identified
anomalies to the PenQuest model (see Section 7.4.5), which is currently realized through
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Figure 8.4: Distribution of solution categories found in all of the compared systems.
time-enhanced event sequences exemplified in 7.5.3. ADeLe additionally supports re-
curring events, which are not currently distinguished by AIDIS. Refer to 8.2.2 below for
planned future improvements to the event-to-model mapping process.
Summary
With 5 host, 5 network and 3 general solutions, this side-by-side comparison took a
closer look at the differences and commonalities of existing research and our AIDIS
approach. The key findings are summarized here. Please note that the final 3 works
could not be quantified and are therefore omitted from most of the below statistics.
Of the 10 remaining works all but one use or necessitate dynamic data gathering
for collecting their input. Almost all of them offer threat detection, closely followed
by threat intelligence. Correlation, analysis, and prediction are rarely seen. Response
and prevention is not covered by the third-party systems at all. By comparison, AIDIS
offers all of the above with the exception of automated response and prediction. Such
functionality is discussed in Section 8.2.3, where we take a detailed look at future
research directions.
As shown in Figure 8.4, behavior extraction and web traffic analysis are the most
represented categories. If classified accordingly, AIDIS would best fit into the host-based
IDS cluster, followed by behavior extraction and malware classification. Behavioral and
contextual analysis techniques are each used in 4 of the systems. One solution uses
attribute-based analysis. AIDIS itself primarily uses behavioral analysis.
Out of the 10 quantified solutions, 5 focus on malware detection – 4 of which
require a pre-identified sample to operate. One system is close to a host-based IDS
similar to what AIDIS would be classified as, while the remainder (4) is designed to
deal with network intrusions. Our approach remains the only one able to cover all APT
attack stages, save off-site weaponization. With 9 systems in total, kill chain stage 6
(C2 communication) is considered the most.
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Figure 8.5: Overview of AIDIS features present in other solutions. Contribution 5
(interpretation through comprehensive attacker–defender modeling) has been split up
into ‘threat model’ and ‘interpretation’ for this comparison.
As di cussed in Section 8.1.2, there are five aspects we have identified as key con-
tributions of AIDIS, most of which have been initially defined as part of the research
questions and hypotheses. Since AIDIS is a specialized multipurpose solution it was
unlikely to find other tools with exactly the same capabilities. Indeed, only 5 works
manage to provide three of the five aforementioned aspects. The remainder share even
less of AIDIS’ distinguishing features. Sample-independence is represented the most (6),
closely followed by clustering/classification capabilities. Threat models and interpreta-
tive features are rarely seen; such are typically found in formal solutions that do not
offer a link to real-world data. Anomaly detection, if supported at all, fails to provide
transparent decision-making in all but one cases. A complete feature overview can be
found in Figure 8.5.
Lastly, we take a closer look at classification accuracy of systems providing this
information. Only the solution by Zarras et al. [352] promises scores similar to AIDIS.
Their ‘BotHound’ prototype achieved 99.9% accuracy in binary scenarios. Multiple
classes are not supported. The system also relies on samples, patterns, and does not
utilize a threat model or interpretation components. The works by Jacob et al. [141] and
Razzaq et al. [257] range between 85 and 91% benign/malicious classification accuracy.
The only system on the shortlist supporting multi-class assignment is Malheur [263]:
F1 scores achieved by that system are discussed separately above.
Despite the limited number of systems AIDIS can be compared to, it is apparent
that most research identified during the early stages of the project does not match
its capabilities in terms of functionality and accuracy. The system proposed in this
thesis should offer information security specialists novel means of combating attacks on
their infrastructure. To better prepare our prototype for productive implementation we
discuss specific areas of improvement below.
8.2.2 Limitations and Improvements
In this section we discuss the various areas of improvement as well as future work iden-
tified in previous chapters and sketch how a productive implementation of AIDIS would
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look like in a real-world setting. Focusing on the functionality and modus operandi of
a hypothetical system beyond its current prototype stadium, we create a list of future
research tasks and discuss desired system features. Four areas are considered in partic-
ular: The data basis and possible changes thereof, information processing and analysis
automation, overall performance improvements, as well as steps to boost detection and
classification accuracy.
Data
In the following, we investigate possible changes to the data selection and research
instruments as well as useful new features in regards to a wider OS compatibility.
Expanded data selection. There are several areas where data captured by an updated
Sonar agent or even an additional external data provider (see Section 7.4.1) may lead to
better results and richer threat semantics. In isolated experiments [182], we assessed the
feasibility of adding NetFlow data to complement kernel-level network events. NetFlow
is a network traffic monitoring solution originally developed by Cisco [57]. In addition
to exiting source/destination addresses and port information, it offers TCP flags, IP
header and routing information, as well as packet and byte counts. With its possible
deployment directly on routers and switches, NetFlow offers supplementary observation
points outside the local OS. This data would enable AIDIS to build baseline templates
based on information such as the average number of bytes transferred by each process
or the presence of specific flags within a dataframe. Since NetFlow does not provide
PID/TID information, correlation has to be achieved by matching timestamps and
destination IP addresses to the respective arguments contained in the corresponding
kernel calls.
Locally, it makes sense to investigate additional types of events that could be
captured by the existing kernel monitoring agent. That includes e.g. certificate events,
which produce a data point whenever the local certificate store is altered, as well as the
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use of encryption functions possibly relevant for ransomware detection. Furthermore,
logging user context outside of filesystem or registry paths would be a valuable addition
for detecting impersonation or privilege escalation attacks.
Operating system compatibility. Currently, the Sonar monitoring agent only sup-
ports API call hooking inside the Microsoft Windows ecosystem. Database, preprocess-
ing and all analysis stages have been coded with Windows 7` events in mind. In order
to provide Unix/Linux compatibility, several changes to the system are necessary: First
and foremost, a new agent needs to be developed from scratch. Alternatively, tools
like strace1, ptrace2, or the audit subsystem3 could be utilized to collect the required
behavioral information. Next, the database structure has to be updated to reflect the
changes in event handling and to support additional event types. Abstraction routines
and preprocessing scripts require changes as well – mainly due to differences in the Unix
filesystem and its directory structure. Because of their largely OS-neutral implemen-
tation, the actual AIDIS components can be amended for Unix environments with no
to little effort: LLR and SEQUIN are fully compatible out of the box. Star structures
and the RF/SVM classification system will have to be updated to include new event
types and competency questions; the lack of dynamic link libraries and registry events
has also to be considered when leaving the Windows platform.
New evaluation instruments. On a non-technical side, the currently employed data
instruments for the evaluation of PenQuest – namely the feedback questionnaire – will
benefit from some structural changes. In its first iteration, the model has been tested
as gamified risk assessment and awareness tool for use in higher education. For AIDIS
Core, random sample testing determined if the suggested countermeasures following the
classification and mapping stages are sensible (see Chapter 7.5.3). However, a full expert
evaluation of PenQuest’s output is still outstanding. For this purpose, new testing
scenarios and a new questionnaire need to be prepared. We plan to present a group
of security professionals with a list of several anomaly reports and their corresponding
threat/mitigation annotations as provided by PenQuest. The participants will be asked
to grade in detail the system’s suggestions in order to ascertain practical applicability.
Future work will also include customized network maps for threat assessments tailored
to specific organizations. Like before, this process will be subject to human review. See
‘Automated data to model mapping’ below for additional improvements to the gamified
model.
Processing and Automation
Processing and automation is undoubtedly a vital aspect of AIDIS. The complexity
of our approach invites the discussion of alternative means of data processing, data
mapping automation, and additional knowledge discovery routines in future implemen-
tations.
1https://strace.io/
2https://linux.die.net/man/2/ptrace
3https://linux.die.net/man/8/auditd
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New windows are either determined by time or by the occurrence of an event. For
standard session windowing, the presence of at least m anomalous events within a time
period t “ yw extends the window W by another yw seconds. Here: m “ 1, yw “ 2.
Stream window processing. In AIDIS’ current prototype, all data processing is ei-
ther conducted on full system traces depicting the entire runtime of a process (e.g. as
part of the LLR component), or using a fixed window describing n seconds of activity
containing possible star structure anomalies. In both cases, the respective dictionary
or template of an unknown trace is compared against the same temporal frame: For
example, an unclassified 10-second trace is always compared against a template de-
scribing the same 10-second period of its baseline process. While this works well in our
experiments, there are alternative means of processing that need to be considered for
a production version of AIDIS. The reasons are manifold: With processes less generic
than svchost.exe, attackers may delay their hostile activity until after the window
of analysis, thereby evading detection. Additionally, the complexity of computation
will not always allow full trace processing but may require the use of streaming, where
a window of inspection is moved over the data in a specific manner. Streaming also
implies that the data is not statically retrieved from the database but continuously
processed as it arrives. As shown in Figure 8.7, there are several approaches to stream
windowing that need to be considered for future versions of our system. We follow the
Azure Stream Analytics nomenclature [208] for discussing the various alternatives.
There are two general approaches to stream-based processing: time- or count-based
windowing, and event-triggered windowing. For temporal windows, the time passed
decides when to stop analysis or when to move the window to its next position. Alter-
natively, AIDIS allows the use of event counts instead of a fixed time range: Here, the
window is shifted only after e.g. 300 events have been recorded instead of after 10 sec-
onds of process runtime. This is useful for apps that include longer wait times or where
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a temporal window may contain too many events for efficient computation. Figure 8.3
provides sensible thresholds.
Event-triggered windowing such as the ‘sliding window’ and ‘session window’ ap-
proach (see Figure 8.7) are designed to move the inspection range whenever a certain
event is registered. The latter method is even capable of grouping and dynamically ex-
tending the window depending on whether they occur within a certain timeout period.
Since AIDIS’ star graph component is not using pattern matching on strictly tem-
poral data, we also need to consider template selection. A certain window of inspection
does not necessarily have to imply the use of a same-length, same-time template. Even
a ‘hopping window’ with a small shift of e.g. 1 second will struggle with ‘template drift’,
the fact that any additional event registered in an anomalous trace might push benign
events semantically belonging to the same window out of the inspection range. Addi-
tionally, purely temporal or count-based windowing will cause a lot of computational
overhead with data that does not contain a large number of deviating events. For this
reason, we suggest a custom ‘session window’ approach for future implementations:
First, a full star template T for the entire process runtime needs to be created
using one of AIDIS’ single- or multi-template methods. This has to be repeated at
intervals short enough to prevent concept drift (i.e. weeks to months) or whenever
major changes are made to the setup of the observed machines. This template serves
as decision maker for creating a new session window: Whenever the stream delivers
an event etrigger not contained in the full template, a session window W is created.
It is dynamically extended by a count of events etrigger ` xw or a number of seconds
ttrigger ` yw whenever another anomalous event is registered. This keeps the session
window growing until no further triggers are observed, or until a maximum window
size Wmax “ a ˚ xw or Wmax “ b ˚ yw has been reached, whereas a and b are limited
by available computational power. Once a session ‘ends’, the actual anomaly detection
process will start, computing the graph edit distance to a reduced template Tpart for a
suggested interval of te ´ xw, . . . , e ` 2xwu or tt ´ yw, . . . , t ` 2ywu, respectively. This
ensures that any activity happening close to the trigger event will be considered even if
we are facing noticeable template drift.
Summed up, the conversion to stream-based processing is recommended for IDS
scenarios that require continuous monitoring instead of application launch or full process
behavioral analysis as currently conducted by AIDIS. Further experiments are required
to prove the effectiveness of the suggested session window approach and its aforemen-
tioned alternatives.
Automated data to model mapping. As of the time of writing, the PenQuest model
exists as set of axioms, class definitions, and rules prototypically implemented as phys-
ical strategy game. The mapping of detected and classified anomalies happens mostly
manually. To automate this process, future work is planned to include the conversion
of anomaly data from the basic xEventy format to established threat intelligence lan-
guages such as STIX: Individual events could be translated to STIX Cyber Observable
247
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
Objects1, corresponding to various file system activity. For example, the initial process
launch that is part of the sequence shown in Section 7.4.5 (Table 6.8) might be denoted
as follows:
{
"0" : {
" type " : " f i l e " ,
" hashes " : {
"SHA´256": "9 f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad01 ( . . . ) "
} ,
} ,
"1" : {
" type " : " p roce s s " ,
"name" : " parent . exe " ,
" c rea ted " : "2019´01´01T16 : 0 0 : 0 00Z" ,
} ,
"2" : {
" type " : " p roce s s " ,
"name" : " s h e l l . exe " ,
" c rea ted " : "2019´01´01T16 : 5 3 : 6 61Z" ,
" binary_ref " : "0"
" parent_ref " : "1"
}
}
As de-facto standard for describing threat intelligence [274], STIX includes a wide
range of observables that are generally similar to the events supported by our system.
The “parent_ref” property even allows for the representation of (partial) process trees as
constructed by our monitoring agent during preprocessing (exemplified above). There is
still work to be done, however: New properties will have to be introduced to encompass
the full range of details provided by AIDIS and Sonar. PenQuest’s semantic annotations
will require additional adaptation of existing STIX objects, likely the ones used to
describe attack patterns, campaigns, and action relationships2. Integrating our system
into the data models of languages such as STIX or MISP3 will generally help to improve
threat information sharing between organizations.
An alternative approach to the structured description of events linked to the model
would be to use a formal language akin to ADeLe [312]. For instance, the xEventy
sequence referenced above could be denoted as follows:
<ENCHAIN>
Sequence ( process´s h e l l . exe_START_process´drop . exe ,
process´drop . exe_LOAD_image´ l i b r a r y . d l l ,
process´drop . exe_OPEN_registry H´KLM/Software / . . . / Run ,
process´drop . exe_ADD_registry R´EG_SZ( e v i l . exe ) )
</ENCHAIN>
ADeLe supports user context and the specification of minimum and maximum
temporal delay between individual events, which would provide a sensible addition to
PenQuest’s xEventy class. While specific third-party research needs to be surveyed
in more detail to prepare our model for automation, reasoning and storage, it is also
1http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/cs01/part4-cyber-observable-objects/stix-v2.0-cs01-
part4-cyber-observable-objects.html
2http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/cs01/part2-stix-objects/stix-v2.0-cs01-part2-stix-
objects.html
3https://www.misp-project.org/
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reasonable to revisit our own TAON ontology [188], which has been designed as both
predecessor and possible extension to the PenQuest system. We will investigate building
an updated Protégé ontology to support the new classes and to provide a uniform
OWL XML interface for linking events to TAON’s hierarchical storage. To exemplify
the process, below snippet depicts an Individual of the xV ictimy class as defined in
Section 6.3.2, written here in Manchester OWL syntax:
I nd i v i dua l : Victim_1_DatabaseServer
Types :
Asset
Facts :
hasParent Victim_2_WebServer ,
hasParent Disabler_1_IDS ,
hasVectorParent Victim_2_WebServer ,
hasVectorParent Victim_7_MobileDevice ,
hasConf igurat ion Tech_NIST_SI´3_Malic iousCodeProtection ,
hasConf igurat ion Org_NIST_AC´2_AccountManagement ,
( . . . )
containsKnowledge Information_9_CustomerData ,
containsKnowledge Configuration_4_HashedPasswords ,
( . . . )
Exposure " exposed " ,
Status " running " ,
I n t e g r i t y " a f f e c t e d " ,
Name "Generic SQL Database Server "
With the remodeling of PenQuest’s classes and axioms into an ontology format it
becomes possible to provide others with shareable repositories of threats, (mitigating)
configurations, and sequences of events registered on the system itself – be that in
an ADeLe-like language, STIX, or the internal OWL XML format. Summed up, the
next stages of research will revolve around ontology construction and the conversion of
classified anomaly reports into a compatible format that can be automatically parsed
and stored.
Additional knowledge discovery and prediction. As a semantics-aware solution
designed to infer or provide (anomalous) event information at each step, AIDIS offers
invaluable insight into attacker behavior. Future work will encompass a more in-depth
analysis of preferred tools and actions, in addition to automated knowledge discovery
using KAMAS and other (visual) analysis systems. For example, the output of both
LLR and the SEQUIN component can be used to collect information about malicious
domains potentially involved in C2 communication. By extracting addresses from net-
work events it becomes trivial to build new blacklists for conventional IDS solutions.
LLR additionally provides the means to infer event types or directory names that are
more likely to lead to a compromise.
Armed with the respective anomaly scores we can build predictive models that
assess the chance of future misbehavior – a huge step towards a more proactive defense.
As a first step, we plan to update the competency questions currently used for RF and
SVM classification and apply them to the event trace dataset in its entirety. The goal
is to compare binary classification to our current anomalies-only approach and to test
the system’s suitability for regression analysis. Similar efforts are planned for SEQUIN,
which is designed to express nominal behavior through its induction of grammar rules.
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Future research into visual analytics will be conducted to help experts spot and label
deviations. See Section 5.7.2 and [332] for more information.
Performance
As discussed in Section 8.1.1, performance remains an issue with some components of
the system. Below, we consider future optimization in terms of code improvements and
data generalization.
Code optimization. The re-implementation of some of the prototypes developed as
part of the project promises significant performance boosts across the board. While
the main LLR and Kuhn-Munkres computations have been realized mainly in R, the
assembly of the matrices used for these components is in particular need of improvement:
Currently, most of the necessary parsing/restructuring work is done using Linux on-
board tools, which do not support parallel processing and execute an excess number of
I/O operations when reading trace files. A full R implementation or new code based
on Python’s SciPy1 suite are under investigation. In-database computation will also be
considered as part of our efforts to move to a stream-based format that supports session
windowing.
Data generalization. In our experiment design (see Section 3.2) we opted to perform
as little data generalization as possible to prevent the loss of information potentially
required for later interpretation. Nevertheless, AIDIS offers mechanisms to abstract
directory paths and registry hive names to semantic descriptors; for example, a full reg-
istry path pointing at the configuration settings of a system app could be generalized
to \LocalMachine\Software. Likewise, an arbitrary temporary directory within the
user’s AppData folder might just be labeled as such. While this undoubtedly leads to
a loss of positional information, future experiments will have to determine the feasibil-
ity of such an approach – namely how much information can be omitted before data
generalization reduces classification accuracy.
Detection and Classification Accuracy
Lastly, we take a closer look at improvements that could potentially increase the overall
accuracy of the system. Here, we focus on changes to the LLR component, general
feature optimization of AIDIS Core, as well as on the topic of data labeling in general.
Trigram processing. In their study, Lanzi et al. [176] determined that n-grams of
length 3 provided the best results for their AccessMiner system. Using bigrams and
4-grams resulted in significantly lower accuracy scores. Our own experiments with a
random set of kernel events could not corroborate these findings, but where too small
in scope to be truly representative. A full side-by-side evaluation of variable-length n-
grams is still pending. It stands to mention that the bigram classification accuracy of our
LLR standalone system was markedly higher than Lanzi et al. [176]’s implementation,
1https://www.scipy.org/
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however. Future work will detail the proposed experiment, while at the same time
increase the amount of data used to evaluate the LLR system.
Feature optimization. The selection of features is key for any detection system’s
classification accuracy. As discussed in Section 7.5.3 and depicted in Figure 7.9, not all
of the features assessed in our evaluation are of identical import. Further optimizing
and automating the creation of competency questions will undoubtedly improve overall
results. Additionally, adding the score and verdict of the other AIDIS components to the
feature set needs to be investigated: Only the analysis result of the star anomaly system
is currently among the features used in the prototype. The reason why including LLR
and SEQUIN was not a priority to date can be found in the relatively minor contribution
of the respective star structure feature: In terms of mean decrease in accuracy, it cannot
be found in the top 30.
Data labeling challenge. One of the biggest issues with any kind of classification
system is the quality of labeled data. In our experiments we used real-world monitoring
information captured from machines used by software developers and office personnel.
While this provides a behavioral snapshot close to the reality of deployment, it still
comes with a semantic bias towards the IT sector and might not result in data rep-
resentative for other businesses. Similarly, the label quality of any malicious software
observed by the Sonar agent depends on the insight and know-how of the analyst who
originally dissected the sample. Any errors during labeling will skew the results gener-
ated by AIDIS’ RF and SVM classifier. In order to address this formidable challenge,
further efforts need to be made to create shared sets of endpoint event monitoring data
similar to the testing repositories available for network traffic analysis [2, 65].
Last but not least, future work will exploit the support of select machine learning
algorithms for assigning multiple labels. It is not guaranteed that even the 10-second
‘fixed window’ evaluated as part of AIDIS’ classification contains activity associated
with only a single (CAPEC) attack pattern. On the contrary, it is highly likely that
a malicious actor will perform a range of actions that need to be mapped to differ-
ent xAttackClassy items. Multiple labels are expected to synergize well with session
windowing, where the determined window can serve as a semantic boundary to the
pattern in question. Algorithms supporting multi-label classification include, but are
not limited to: ML-k-nearest neighbor (kNN) [355], MH-AdaBoost [123], decision tree
variants [324], and stream-based approaches such as ADWIN Bagging [258].
8.2.3 Future Research Directions
Next to above improvements to the AIDIS system, we see the continued development of
the PenQuest gamified model as key to improving APT mitigation and defense planning.
While the model can already be used for that purpose on a case-by-case basis there is a
distinct lack of automation in regards to the computation of optimal defense strategies
that apply to a given scenario. For this purpose, future research may focus on formal
analysis through model checking or on e.g. a reinforcement learning (RL) approach for
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inferring a defender’s ideal response. Generally speaking, we suggest to evaluate our
game-based approach by utilizing deep learning methods that aim to maximize the
‘reward’ (speed, stealth, effectiveness) in the context of our gamified model.
An inference system based on PenQuest would likely focus on answering the fol-
lowing general questions:
• Which attack strategies can be considered most dangerous in terms of systemic
effect?
• Which access vectors to an arbitrary IT infrastructure are most vulnerable to
hostile action?
• Which combinations of attack patterns facilitate the fastest, stealthiest, or most
impactful compromise of a system?
• In turn, which defensive measures and controls are able to best reduce the success
rate and impact of specific attacks in terms of delay, detection, or alleviation?
In the following, we outline two possible approaches to achieving the goal of auto-
mated strategy inference.
Model Checking
Model checking [59] is an established technique which complements the traditional (pen-
etration) testing approach for validating ICT systems. While testing only explores one
specific execution of a given system, the idea of model checking is to systematically
explore all possible runs in search for system states that may violate a required prop-
erty. If a state violating the specified property (e.g. system or data confidentiality,
integrity, or availability) is found, an execution of the system leading to the error state
is generated. In practice, model checking suffers from what is known as the state space
explosion problem [183]: The reachable state space grows exponentially with the size
of the system. For this reason, explicitly exploring the state space is not feasible. An
alternative is to combine the strength of model checking with the practicality of a tra-
ditional testing approach: Model-based testing techniques [77] automatically generate
test cases based on exploring a (simplified) system model. These techniques are espe-
cially useful for achieving test coverage and for generating test cases which will stress
potentially weak parts of the system.
As part of future research such an approach could be used to enable the analysis
of a given IT infrastructure with regard to its vulnerability – respectively resilience – to
APTs. The goal would be to come up with modeling techniques and algorithms which
allow the analyst to automatically answer queries like the following:
• How can I violate confidentiality, integrity, or availability [299] of a specific level
of impact?
• Given an attack vector X, how can I best defend?
• What are likely attack vectors?
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• What are the minimal requirements an attack actor needs to meet in order to have
a certain chance of successfully violating confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of the given infrastructure?
• Generally speaking, which kind of likely attack actors are the most threatening
to our infrastructure?
While model checking may not be the answer to all the general questions posed
above, it promises the ability to automate significant portions of a future inference
process.
Reinforcement Learning
Next to supervised and unsupervised learning, reinforcement learning [151] constitutes
the third group of machine learning methods. The basic idea behind reinforcement
learning is that agents interacting with their environment receive rewards or penalties
by repeatedly performing actions that aim to achieve certain goals. This procedure is
carried out until a final system state is reached. The agent has to learn the optimal
strategy – the policy – by itself. The goal of the agent is to explore the state-action space
in order to find the best strategy by maximizing the possible reward. To achieve this
goal, algorithms like Temporal Difference (TD) learning [302], Q-Learning [335], or Deep
Q-Learning [226] are used to calculate individual states and actions in advance. This
explorational ability of the learning algorithm empowers agents to find more successful
strategies than human operators might [225, 239, 325].
Any such reinforcement learning system could be able to compute optimal strate-
gies that promise the highest probability of success when it comes to attacking or de-
fending an infrastructure. Tying in to the sketched model checking approach, another
goal would be to help maximizing/minimizing confidentiality, integrity, or availability
impact on the assessed infrastructure. Other inference runs would focus on detection
chance, the time required for successfully conducting/mitigating an attack before major
harm can be done, or the optimization of monetary cost.
8.3 Résumé
This thesis presented AIDIS, a full-fledged threat detection and interpretation system
capable of detecting and classifying anomalous behavior in abstracted OS software ac-
tivity. We specifically focused on omnipresent system processes that are part of the
Windows kernel and are therefore ideal candidates for continuous, sample-independent
monitoring. AIDIS’s premise is to keep anomaly detection transparent to the user,
thereby allowing analysts to check how an individual score was computed. Events re-
sponsible for an alert are always disclosed. Based on this information, we successfully
mapped the resulting reports to PenQuest, our own attacker–defender model capable of
illustrating adversarial activity as actions in a strategy game. Through the model, all
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captured and classified data can be assigned a tendency towards a specific APT stage
and technical attack pattern as defined by external vocabularies. At the same time, Pen-
Quest provides asset and actor details and suggests specific controls intended to counter
an observed attack. This versatility makes AIDIS one of the first truly semantics-aware
threat detection systems to combine applied analysis of real-world data with model-
aided interpretation of anomalies.
The system’s many features are expected to help industry professionals in their
task of discovering, assessing, and mitigating threats on their infrastructures. Thanks
to our flexible model and the white-box approach to anomaly classification, possible
deployment scenarios are not limited to the domain of conventional IT and might in
the future cover industrial scenarios, physical security, and even human behavior.
As a next step, AIDIS will likely be implemented as part of CyberTrap, an upcom-
ing security solution by an Austrian company of the same name, which seeks to spot
and analyze attacker behavior on a high-interaction honeypot cloned from a production
system. The SEQUIN component is continuously developed as unsupervised pattern
inference system for industrial settings. PenQuest, in its game iteration, is expected to
be released as educational app in 2020.
With its semantic take on endpoint intrusion detection and classification, AIDIS
offers a holistic solution to an ever-growing threat. The white-box approach helps
analysts understand adversary behavior at the lowest levels, while the PenQuest model
incorporates threat intelligence and risk management. We hope that, over time, our
work will help to prove true the famous words of Sun Tzu:
“If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
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Acronyms
General glossary of acronyms, alphabetically sorted:
API Application Programming Interface
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
ATA Advanced Targeted Attack (see also APT)
AV Anti-Virus
C2 Command and Control
CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CVSS Common Vulnerabilities Scoring System
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DLL Dynamic Link Library
DNS Domain Name System
DMZ De-Militarized Zone
DoS Denial of Service
ICS Industrial Control System
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
LAN Local Area Network
LLR Log Likelihood Ratio
LR Likelihood Ratio
NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVD National Vulnerability Database
OS Operating System
PID Process Identifier (Windows)
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
RF Random Forest
RL Reinforcement Learning
RPG Role-Playing Game
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
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SIEM Security Information and Event Management
SQL Structured Query Language
SSDT System Service Descriptor Table (Windows)
STIX Structured Threat Information Expression
SVM Support Vector Machine
TA Targeted Attack (see also ATA)
TAON Targeted Attack Ontology [188]
TID Thread Identifier (Windows)
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
VoIP Voice over IP
Acronyms in the context of the PenQuest game model introduced in Chapter 7, sorted
by type and occurrence:
SO Sophistication (Actor skill level attribute)
DE Determination (Actor motivation attribute)
WE Wealth (Actor resources attribute)
INI Initiative (Actor time efficiency derived attribute)
INS Insight (Opponent knowledge derived attribute)
TH Thief (STIX Cyber Espionage Operations actor)
EX Explorer (STIX Hacker, White Hat actor)
RO Rogue (STIX Hacker, Grey Hat actor)
RA Raider (STIX Hacker, Black Hat actor)
CR Crusader (STIX Hacktivist actor)
OP Operative (STIX State Actor/Agency actor)
IN Infiltrator (STIX Insider Threat actor)
PR Protester (STIX Disgruntled Customer actor)
CP Production Company (Primary sector actor)
CM Manufacturing Company (Secondary sector actor)
CS Services Company (Tertiary sector actor)
IF Infrastructure provider (Actor)
MI Military (Actor)
SA State Actor/Agency (Actor)
ED Education sector (Actor)
PI Private Individual (Actor)
ATT Attacker equipment (Enabler)
MPT Multi-Purpose Tool (ATT)
Sca System scanner (ATT)
VSc Vulnerability Scanner (ATT)
NSc Network Scanner (ATT)
Wir Wireless tool (ATT)
Pwd Password cracker (ATT)
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Mal Malware (ATT)
VUL Vulnerability (Enabler)
PoC Proof of Concept (Enabler Maturity)
AST Asset (Disabler)
SEC Security solution (Disabler)
Pre Prevention solution (SEC)
Det Detection solution (SEC)
Del Delay solution (SEC)
Rec Recovery solution (SEC)
Cnt Countermeasures (SEC)
POL Policy (Disabler)
FIX Fix for VUL (Disabler)
*DC, D Detection Chance (Effect)
*SC, S Success Chance (Effect)
*CR Credits (Effect)
*STA Status (Effect)
H Host (Effect target)
M Mobile system (Effect target)
I Industrial system (Effect target)
N Network asset (Effect target)
T Third party service (Effect target)
R.* Reconnaissance (APT kill chain phase)
W.* Weaponization (APT kill chain phase)
D.* Delivery (APT kill chain phase)
E.* Exploitation (APT kill chain phase)
I.* Installation (APT kill chain phase)
C.* Command and Control (APT kill chain phase)
A.* Action on Objective (APT kill chain phase)
IG Information Gathering (CAPEC primary attack class)
IN Injection (CAPEC primary attack class)
SE Social Engineering (CAPEC primary attack class)
SA State Attack (CAPEC primary attack class)
FA Function Abuse (CAPEC primary attack class)
BF Brute Force (CAPEC primary attack class)
IA Illegal Access (CAPEC primary attack class)
DM Data Manipulation (CAPEC primary attack class)
PR Preparation (Non-CAPEC primary attack class)
CO Communication (Non-CAPEC primary attack class)
IL Information Leakage protection (Primary control class)
CP Context Protection (Primary control class)
AW Awareness (Primary control class)
SP State Protection (Primary control class)
FI Function Integrity (Primary control class)
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AP Authentication Protection (Primary control class)
AC Access Control (Primary control class)
DI Data Integrity (Primary control class)
SI Security Intelligence (Primary control class)
CS Communications Security (Primary control class)
ACM Account Management (NIST-based defense action)
ACE Access Enforcement (NIST-based defense action)
IFE Information Flow Enforcement (NIST-based defense action)
LEP Least Privilege (NIST-based defense action)
REA Remote Access (NIST-based defense action)
RST Role-based Security Training (NIST-based defense action)
COM Continuous Monitoring (NIST-based defense action)
CCC Configuration Change Control (NIST-based defense action)
COS Configuration Settings (NIST-based defense action)
COP Contingency Plan (NIST-based defense action)
AUM Authenticator Management (NIST-based defense action)
INH Incident Handling (NIST-based defense action)
NOM Nonlocal Maintenance (NIST-based defense action)
MES Media Storage (NIST-based defense action)
SEP Security Engineering Principles (NIST-based defense action)
BOP Boundary Protection (NIST-based defense action)
CRP Cryptographic Protection (NIST-based defense action)
FLR Flaw Remediation (NIST-based defense action)
MCP Malicious Code Protection (NIST-based defense action)
ISM Information System Monitoring (NIST-based defense action)
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